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«At the end of every seven years, you must cancel debts....Be careful not
to harbor this wicked thought: ‘The seventh year, the year for canceling
debts, is near,’ so that you do not show ill will toward your needy brother
and give him nothing»
Deuteronomy 15:1,9
«There is no practice more dangerous than that of borrowing money»
George Washington, 1791
«The biggest single mispection about the foreign aid program is that we send money
abroad. We don’t. Foreign aid consists of American equipment, raw materials,
expert services, and food. 93 percent of aid funds are spent directly in the US to pay
for these things»
William S. Gaud, Department of State Bulletin, 1968
«The problems of many heavily indebted developing countries are a cause
of economic and political concern and can be a threat to world stability»
Declaration of G7, 1988
«If I were the president of a Third World nation… I would be far more frightened by
a well-dressed gentleman bringing loans from the IMF or Citibank than by a
bearded guerrilla muttering threats of revolution»
Lewis Lapham, Imperial Masquerade, 1990
 «The debate is not about whether some countries need some debt reduction, but how
deep this reduction should be. Is there a level which is sustainable?… How long will
it take to get this reduction of debt in place, and what safeguards should there be?»
Andrew Rogerson, Jubilee 2000 campaign, 1999
«Drop the debt!»
Bono and Jovanotti, G-8 Genoa Summit, 2001
1Introduction
1. The Limitations of Scientific Paradigms
Thomas Kuhn applied the term «paradigm» to define that «constellation of values, beliefs and
perceptions of empirical reality, which, together with a body of theory based upon the foregoing, is
used by a group of scientists, and by applying a distinctive methodology, to interpret the nature of
some aspect of the universe we inhabit».1
Thus, the scientists use a schematic view of the universe, which is object of their study, an
intellectual framework, a gestalt providing the modus operandi to approach their work. Governed
by a particular vision of the nature of the problems, they can interpret and explain facts as well as
solve problems.
The inability of a vision to solve the problems means a paradigm failure. It can be due to some
limitations of the paradigm itself, pressed by the challenge of external factors – technological and
socio-economic changes, for example –. Then, a paradigm failure can directly influence the
emergence of new paradigms; but there is no linear evolution of paradigms. In the social sciences,
as well as in the physical sciences, it is inevitable that some paradigms prove politically more
acceptable than others, and it does matter. As Northrop and Kurt Gödel demonstrated2, physics and
mathematics can not be considered very «objective» disciplines, even less – Barrington Moore jr.
wrote – the social sciences3. And as Schumpeter said: “Economic laws are much less stable than
are the laws of any physical science… they work out differently in different institutional conditions,
and… the neglect of this fact has been responsible for many aberrations”4.
The «objective» potential of a paradigm to interpret the facts is not what determines the success of
this paradigm. We should distinguish between the ontological nature (referred to the object of the
scientific knowledge, without considering its relationship with the observer: the real and final nature
of «matter») and the epistemological nature (referred to the interrelation of the scientist’s mind and
«matter» in the processes of perception and knowledge) of a paradigm. We could say that Albert
Einstein, with his general and restricted theory of relativity, changed the ontological theory of
physics, through a radical shift to a new vision of a symmetrical link between space-time and
matter5. On the contrary, quantum mechanics, and particularly the uncertainty principle of Werner
Heisenberg6, changed also the epistemological theory of scientific knowledge 7. Nevertheless, just
following Gödel and Heisenberg, it is important to stress that the content of social theorising always
reflects the values and purposes of scientists, even when it seems to be a very objective description
of the reality of facts.
                                                
1 See Kuhn, T. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
2 See Gödel, K. (1962), On Formally Undecidable Propositions, Basic Books, New York. The original German version
was published in 1931.
3 See Barrington Moore jr. (1966), Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of
the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston.
4 This idea has been adopted in modern comparative studies of economic performance. For instance, see Bruno and
Sachs argue that general economic theories wrongly consider one and the same basic model as applicable to all theories.
See J. A. Schumpeter (1954), History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 34.
5 Einstein conceived, or took from Newton, the hypothesis that light travels in curved, not straight lines; deduced from it
the conclusion that a star appearing to be in a certain position in the heavens is really a little to one side of that position.
Matter curves space-time, and this curve determines the movement of matter. No geometry is inherent to the space. See
Schlipp, P. A. [ed.] (1949), Albert Einstein, Philosopher Scientist, The Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston.
6 The irreversibility, stochasticity and non-locality implications of quantum theory, as well as the recognized failure of
predictability in Newtonian dynamics, derive from the important quantum discontinuity. It can be linked to the
instabilities, bifurcations and fluctuations in chemical systems as well as to the entropic interpretation of the universe.
See Heisenberg, W. (1972), Physics and Beyond. Encounters and Conversations, Harper Torchbooks, New York.
7 See Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. (1988), Entre le Temps et l’Éternité, Librairie Arthème Fayard, Paris.
22. New Paradigms of international governance and the changing World-System
Thomas Kuhn, with his brilliant work published in 1962, provided an excellent description for those
who want to think about how old paradigms are replaced by new ones in the long run. Referred to
the natural science, he said that scientific discovery «commences with the awareness of anomaly. It
then continues with an exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm
theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected»8.
Nowadays, the paradigms we use to understand the changing World-System trends are strongly
stressed by events that discredit theories and predictions.
After the end of the Cold War and US hegemony era (1945-1990), can the current North-South
history be exhaustively explained?
Political science, economics, sociology, law are the pivotal disciplines we use to produce
«scientific» theories which very easily fail to understand and predict trends.
Yet, these paradigms remain our main reading of real world. Nowadays they become more and
more important as we are daily bombarded by information and we risk of making no sense of it.
Inevitably, whether we know it or not, we continue to use theories to understand, explain and link
facts as well as to decide what to do. It is particularly relevant nowadays, as we are passing through
a post-bipolarism crisis, and periods of change like this create opportunities and risks to be
decoded9.
Referring to the Third World position, Wallerstein says it risks to become far more difficult, passing
from a time of hopes and struggles to a time of troubles and desperation10. Using the human
development concept introduced by the United Nations Development Program11, the opportunities
of (political, economic, cultural and social) choice become more and more limited, and uncertainty
and social exclusion risk to be the prevailing phenomena in developing countries. The problem of
exploitation must be modified or extended, in the era of globalisation, considering marginalisation
process a new main dimension of between and within-country inequality.
In particular talking about developing countries, States, societies and citizens are subject to a global
economic regime and to push to economic policies, not necessarily respondent to local needs,
aspirations and market characteristics12.
How well does current international strategy to face external debt problems of poor countries create
the opportunities for promoting sustainable development processes and equitable market
arrangements to serve local needs? And do new paradigms of international systems offer adequate
reading of it? The need for more adequate theoretical framework to understand changes over the
world economy is evident.
Social interest is a concept that must be used extensively in the discussion of external debt
problems, as debt involves – directly and indirectly – a wide range of social actors, debtors as well
as lenders with their own legitimate interests. A concept to be reconsidered is «class», because the
important changes of the organisation and division of labour and the very specificity of developing
countries’ context should imply a reconsideration of the concept of class as it was categorised by
Marx.
The defeat of the USSR, the political fall of the Communism and the collapse of Marxism-Leninism
as an ideological force, although the dominant USSR version of Marxism, through its
Nomenclature, was never the only one, can produce, as a consequence, the questioning of one of the
                                                
8 Kuhn, T. (1962), ibid.
9 Crises amplify the need to change and push to new ideas, but it also risks to discourage and create confusion. Neither
more nor less what the ancient Greek demonstrates through its literature: the Antigon, by Soflokes is a good example.
10 Wallerstein, I. (1995), After liberalism, The New Press, New York.
11 UNDP (1990), Human Development Report 1990, Oxford University Press, New York.
12 Amoroso, B. (1998), «Pattern of industrialization in the Mediterranean Region. The Small Medium Size Enterprises»,
in FEMISE, Les enjeux du Partenariat Euro-Méditerranée, FEMISE, Marseille and Amoroso, B. (1999), Economie
Mediterranee. Sistemi produttivi locali tradizionali e di nuova formazione. Cooperazione Sud-Sud e Nord-Sud. V
Rapporto sul Mediterrraneo, CNEL-Università di Roskilde, Roma.
3most important concepts of the Marxian theory: the concept of class struggle, which was largely
used by a lot of studies on Africa13. A flourishing of aggregations on ethnic (or religious) ground
looms on the horizon, lacking of evident social features and taking up a defensive position of their
inter-classist, particularistic, localistic identities.  In such a way, the concept of class could be
reconsidered in a ethnic-nationalist context, in spite of the ambiguous and reactionary features that
result from a conflict caused by ethnic components: all the liberating potentialities of nationalism
finish to be absorbed by the perversity of xenophobia and intolerance, losing sight of the real
mechanisms of injustice, discrimination and crisis14.
The inadequacy of Marxist analysis of nationalist, racial or ethnic struggle has been widely noted,
and particularly the thesis that it is always possible to argue that other forms of struggle are masked
forms of the class struggle15.
The Marxian analysis lacks of flexibility and considers ethnicity as a super-structure; in short, the
class conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are primordial, and all other conflicts are
epiphenomenal and neglected16.
This led Marxist analysis deliberately to understate the theoretical importance of any social
cleavage other than that of class. Whereas, today social polarisation and marginalisation has got
worse and we must search for a more useful definition of social interests: class struggles tend to be
conducted under the banner of race and ethnicity (and religion), and the true bourgeoisie and
proletariat definitions are too narrow, reflecting the society of the XIX century17. In Africa, since
the 1960s, ethnism and class struggle overlapped to promote the self-determination process of
former colonies18.
When we deeply investigate the problem of external debt of poor countries, other forms of conflicts
than the proletariat and the bourgeoisie struggle seem to prevail. However, as Karl Polanyi argued,
capitalism remains itself, that is an anomaly since it embodies a system wherein social relations are
defined by economic relations; whereas in previous economic systems economic interactions
followed from social relations 19. An anomaly with, at the other hand, very few counter-systems.
This general rule must be taken in account, as external debt problems seem to be a main
characteristic of contemporary global capitalism.
In any case, an even larger proportion of the world’s population falls into the «lower stratum»: post-
colonialism and North-South relationship have masked and changed the nature of dominating and
dominated classes.
A map of numerous and fragmented constituencies (local, national and international ones; from
official, private and civil society’s sectors) try to impose their conflicting interests having different
political voices and economic powers. From this perspective, therefore, it is evident the fallacy of
any axiom on the likelihood of automatic positive-sum games for the global problems, where all the
players are the winners20.
                                                
13 See Arrighi,G. (1974), Sviluppo economico e sovrastruttura in Africa, Einaudi, Torino; Arrighi, G. (1983), "Labour
supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia", in Essays,
Arrighi & Saul ed., New York; Balibar, E. and I. Wallerstein (1991), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso,
London; Daka,V. and G. N. Mudenda (1980), "Class Formation and Class Struggle", in Southern Africa Universities
Social Science Conference, Morija Printing Works, Lesotho.
14 Silvestri, G. (1991), «Editorial», in Indipendenza, Monthly bulletin, year VI, May, Rome.
15 Wallerstein, I (1991a) «Class Conflict in the Capitalist World-Economy», in Balibar, E. and I. Wallerstein (1991),
Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London; Wallerstein, I (1991b) «Social Conflict in Post-
Independence Black Africa: The concepts of race and Status-group reconsidered», in Balibar, E. and I. Wallerstein
(1991), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London.
16 Balibar, E. (1991), «From Class Struggle to Classless Struggle?», in Balibar, E. and I. Wallerstein (1991), Race,
Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London.
17 Wallerstein, I. (1995), ibid.
18 Balibar, E. and I. Wallerstein (1991), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London.
19 Polanyi, K. (1944), The Great Transformation, Rinehart & Co., New York.
20 The variable-sum game refers to a situation in which two or more players have an option that permits them to
cooperate for a greater mutual payoff  than either would gain alone in making a choice that did not permit or involve
4From this point of view and perspective, we can analyse debt crisis in Africa. Nowadays, Sub-
Saharan Africa is facing a debt crisis of major international significance. We argue that debt relief
can be considered a sort of «game», representing the complexity of effective governance of
globalisation.
Jubilee 2000 campaign has been one of the most successful international initiatives of the last
decades. Because of the support of very important religious figures – such as the Pope and Dalai
Lama – and a direct involvement of famous pop stars - as Bob Geldof and Bono in UK, or Jovanotti
in Italy – everyone knows what is about. The international political community itself has been
hugely pressed by this non-governmental campaign spread all over the countries. In fact, this
campaign, originated within civil society organisations, has induced a more serious political
concern on the problem of external debt of poor countries. Consequently, several governments of
industrialised countries and international financial institutions have committed themselves to pursue
an immediate debt relief strategy. In some cases, as happened in Italy, this movement has
determined new national Laws, focused on the bilateral implementation of debt relief initiative.
At multilateral level, the «Heavily Indebted Poor Countries» (HIPC) initiative was launched in the
1996 by the World Bank and the IMF and it has been enhanced in the 1999. This initiative intends
to reduce the external debt of the world's poorest, most heavily indebted countries to sustainable
levels, through debt cancellation.
From this perspective, debt relief seems to demonstrate the emergence of international political
consensus and capacity to implement a win-win strategy, which will satisfy debtor countries as well
as most of the constituencies based in developed countries.
But apart from the rhetoric widely spread all over the world on debt cancellation, we should remind
that when we talk about developing countries, States, societies and citizens are subject to a global
economic regime and to economic policies, not necessarily respondent to local needs, aspirations
and market characteristics. Political motivations have been by far the more important for aid and
loans, especially for the major industrialised countries. Creditors and donors give resources because
it is in their political, strategic, or economic self-interest to do so. Some assistance may be
motivated by humanitarian desires, but there is no historical evidence to suggest that over longer
periods of time, rich nations assist others without expecting some corresponding benefits (not
necessarily financial) in return.
Political motivations are the real determinants of decisions. When the US decided to write-off
certain debt owed by Egypt, it followed a more fundamental switch in Egypt’s regional policy, as
Egypt recognised Israel and became a US partner in a long-term regional settlement and in the Gulf
war against Saddam Hussein. Or, more recently, as the US-led Operation “Enduring Freedom”
against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime got under way, the United States needed crucial intelligence
and logistics support from Pakistan. In return Pakistan’ President General Pervez Musharraf
expected economic assistance and a revival of close ties with Washington. And in fact the US
Congress waived sanctions against Pakistan for an initial period of two years and Britain and the
United States have come forward with economic packages, which fall far short of wiping out
Pakistan’s $36 billion outstanding debt. In contemporary world, there are no permanent friends and
enemies in international relations, and therefore countries base their ties on shared interests, and
debt cancellation can simply derive from temporary political agreements.
Nevertheless, rhetoric prevails, when politicians say that a final solution to external debt problem of
poor countries is currently implemented, and it strikes people as being expensive for lender
countries to assist poor countries, as far as guided by their moral responsibility, and given the
existence of technical problems to provide more debt relief. And the economic rationale has been
given lip service as the overriding motivation. At this regard, our purpose is to investigate the
                                                                                                                                                                 
cooperation. This contrast with the zero-sum game (i.e. chess) in which cooperation in not rational since each choice
with a positive payoff for one player has exactly the same negative payoff for the other player: the focus is upon the
distribution of the existing «pie», rather than upon the creation of new pie. See von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern
(1947), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2nd edition.
5economic aspects and rationale of external debt crisis in order to unmask the abuse of technical
excuses, which often cover the lack of political will21, and to demonstrate the complexity of
problems and interests in the age of globalisation.
We have a map of multiple interests and preferences (political, strategic, economic,
environmental,…), each of one having different time horizons (long-term or short-term horizons).
The Multiple Players of  "Debt Relief" Game
Lenders (good and bad) Borrowers (good and bad)
Multilateral II.OO. (=I.F.I.)
the World Bank, IMF and RDBs
Regional official lenders
EU
Bilateral official lenders
G7
Other members of the Paris Club
Other countries
Private lenders
Commercial Banks (London Club)
Private Enterprises
Export Credit Agencies
Civil society (indirect stakeholders)
Savers, consumers, NGOs, poor...
HIPC
(small debtors, official exposure)
The Least developed countries
Low income countries
Middle income countries
(big debtors, private exposure)
Civil society (indirect stakeholders)
Savers, consumers, NGOs, poor...
The relationship between all the involved interests is thus of crucial importance. However, its
significance is not often fully understood nor its developmental potential explored. In this case the
basic question remains “is a positive-sum solution possible and likely in the debt relief game?”
In sum, there are limits to the liberal belief that the pursuit of self-interest in a free, competitive
economy achieves the greatest good for the greatest number in international no less than in the
national society. And, if liberals think too little about powers, realists focus excessively on its
relevance for most powerful states. Any outcome, like what is said by those who subscribe to
complexity theory, must be judged in terms of specific results for high or low-empowered
constituencies, representing different, legitimate social interests. International politics offers no
quick panacea for these myriad social interests, even though the liberal school perspective has
tended to elide power consideration and its adherents have not thought very hard about how
everyday market imperfections and failures, born of conflicts between different preferences, block
the achievement of the liberal dream22. Particularly in international economics and debt crises
management, the role of conflict and co-operation have been treated as largely unproblematic.
Considering all these elements, we share Barrington Moore jr.’s ideas23: impartial and truthful
analyses seem pieces of criticism, denunciations rather than «objective» statements; to embrace the
cause of the victims of historical processes and to be sceptical regarding the winners’ pretension is
the basic safeguard against myths.
                                                
21 Any argument that the money is not available is not acceptable: in just one week, during December 1997, donors
managed to pledge US$57 billion to bail out South Korea (Japan pledged US$10 billion, the US pledged US$5 billion).
22 Durfeu, M. And J. M. Rosenau (1996), «Playing catch-up: international relations theory and poverty», in Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2.
23 Barrington Moore jr. (1968), Critica della Tolleranza Pura, Einaudi, Torino.
6Debt crisis in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has been one of the main factors inducing a radical shift
in development strategies of all developing countries and a severe reduction in their concrete
opportunities to search for alternatives to orthodox measures. Old and new forms of debt
management can be considered satisfactory or not, depending on what social interests we are
referring to. Debt crisis is clearly one of incipient signs that globalisation and the institutional
architecture for its governance24 are not providing positive results to developing countries and poor.
Analysts are increasingly citing Karl Polanyi’s 1944 classic, The Great Transformation, as a basis
for thinking on the possibility to have again in the twenty-first century the experience of «double
movement» described by Polanyi as a (first) movement of the twentieth century induced by fervour
for wide-open capitalism without government control which led to economic crises, followed by a
(second) movement founded on authoritarian governments that disciplined all society, culminated in
the fascism and produced the onset of world war. What prevented, during those tragic moments, the
economic and political constituencies and powers from taking the step necessary to prevent a global
crisis? Is the debt crisis management demonstrating that current international governance of
globalisation is more aware of the profound negative consequences debt is causing on poor people
or simply the illusion of a real control over the dramatic problems of this period?
This research considers international finance and debt relief as a part of coherent strategy to reduce
poverty and promoting growth factors, particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
3. Objective of this work
This study has three aims.
The first is to provide a systematic analysis of the economic rationale of external debt for
development of poor countries. This analysis combines the heritage of economic theory literature
and the more recent debate on finance for development. Surprisingly, such a combination does not
already exist in one book, and this work aims, albeit partially, to fill this gap by covering a lot of
major issues related to debt of poor countries.
The second aim is to analyse debt crisis in SSA. The problem of debt can be judged in principle at
several levels. This work tries to assess the complex issue from different perspectives: political,
economic, social and historical dimensions are presented, at aggregated level as well as at national
level, using both data description, inferential statistics and econometric methods.
A final aim of this study is to review the extent, the effectiveness and the future prospects for
current debt relief initiatives and also to explore the vision, expressed as a set of recommendations,
of international civil society, which has been seriously involved in the search for solutions of debt
crisis. This work presents an original synthesis of a lot of documentation and discussions of
different Non governmental organisations (NGOs) and networks, all of them working on finance for
development issue. Civil society feels a growing need to take part in the construction of
international policies through co-operation; the social movements concerned with peace, human
rights, solidarity, the environment and development have established the organisational foundations
of which a broad, heterogeneous and variegated “grassroots globalisation” movement has started
building. Our summary unquestionably proves the complexity of the discussion, the importance of
the contents (rather than slogans) and the maturity of the proposals within the multifaceted non-
governmental world. This part is an expression of the capacity of the numerous organisations of
civil society, apart from a lot of different and legitimate positions and expectations, to engage in
proposals on the content, which is a reflection of the skill and know-how accumulated with regard
to the external debt issue, within a coherent comprehensive approach to financing for development.
In fact, we have to remind that, when we talk of Sub-Saharan African countries, the concept of
external debt is not very separate from development aid.
                                                
24 The globalized political structures: United Nations system, Bretton Woods institutions, OECD, G8. Liberal theory
allows for the resort of macroeconomic coordination at the international level, as the G8, as a means of enhancing the
smooth operation of market, but it is precise at the international institutional level that effective solutions to debtors
crises are not guaranteed.
7Moreover, for a number of years “aid was calculated  as the sum of official and private capital
flows, although now these two items are listed separately”25, and aid is “a term which had been
ambiguously used and sometimes actually applied to the entire flow, including private investment
and export credits”26. And, “Although the private international capital market revived in the late
1950’s, for LDCs capital flows remained almost entirely official. This remained the rule in the
1960’s, with the notable exceptions of a few dramatically successful countries”27. In the case of
African countries, it is still true.
That’s why, to analyse the relationship between debt and development in Africa as well as current
debt relief initiatives is a way to analyse development co-operation, within the main context of
finance for development. This is the final result of our work.
4. Approach and methodology of this work
In theoretical terms, our reflections try to link some pair issues, which have been traditionally
considered as opposite terms in a dualistic approach. The vision lying beneath this traditional
approach assumed a broader opposition between aid and debt (and trade), between domestic and
international determinants of development, between economic growth and social development. It is,
in our view, partly fallacious to see these pairs as internally contradictory and more so the longer
the run we consider. Our purpose is to demonstrate how these pairs, in the long run, can mutually
interact and strengthen each other, given the characteristics of the debt relief game.
The Set of Pairs to Be Combined in an Olistic Approach to Solve the Debt Relief Game
Issues (A) Issues (B)
Analysis of the macro-economic performance and
prospects: GDP growth, saving and investment
growth, the impact of stabilisation and structural
adjustment programs, economic policies - budget,
taxation -
Analysis of the impact on social development:
poverty assessment, health and education situation
Analysis of the sources of an endogenous growth:
the strategic nature of investment, development of
infrastructure, expenditure on education, positive
externalities of investment, industrial development
policy and agriculture, State-market equilibrium
Analysis of the exogenous factors: regionalisation
and globalisation, international trade and financial
markets, export diversification and import
substitution
Analysis of objectives of national development
strategies
Analysis of international development co-operation
policies
Analysis of the interests of creditors Analysis of the interests of debtors
In linking these issues and the complex map of multiple interests involved in debt relief and poverty
reduction strategies, we hope this could be of interest to national policy makers and to the
international community, to establish the priorities for action an to offer a means for broadening
theoretical lenses to encompass debt relief.
In approaching the debt relief issue, our aim is to provide an integrated debt relief-development
strategy, taking in account all the major constraints that, both at theoretical and operational level,
can affect any strategy of debt relief, and are used to justify the limitations of debt relief for Sub-
Saharan Africa.
                                                
25 M. P. Todaro (1989), Economic Development in the Third World, Longman, New York, p.481.
26 W. T. Newlyn (1977), The Financing of Economic Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 98.
27 A. O. Krueger (1987), “Debt, Capital Flows, and LDC Growth”, American Economic Review, Vol.77 N. 2, May, p.
159.
8Problems to be Considered in Solving the Debt Relief Game
Theoretical problems Operational Constraints
- Moral Hazard
- Information Asymmetry
- Free riders
- Fungibility of aid
- International Reputation
- Political (will)
- Financial (resources)
- Technical (equilibrium and steady-state path)
- Tension: Conditionalities vs. Ownership
- Future Lending
From a methodological point of view, the study of debt relief is an end in itself (debt reduction) and
a means to another end (sustainable human development). It is based upon the purpose of producing
a systematic and cogent case for analysing external debt problems of poor countries. This research
results from wide consultation with international NGOs, the exchange of questionnaires,
information and documentation. This study cites and derives from many background studies
prepared on thematic issues as well as analyses of experiences in countries, international technical
reports and position papers by international organisations, who generously shared their materials.
This study tries to provide an original synthesis of the main economic analyses and policy
recommendations on external debt problems of poor countries provided by academic literature and
experts, too. The Paris Office of the World Bank, in the person of the external counsellor Susana
Esteban Barrocal, kindly provided data and information on a number of debt issues and invited me
to participate to seminars on global finance. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its
Statistics Office, General Directorate for Development Co-operation, provided data on bilateral
issues. As co-ordinator of the Genoa Non Governmental Initiative, promoted by the Italian
Presidency of the G8, and as co-ordinator of the research activities to monitor the implementation of
debt relief initiatives, co-financed by the European Commission, DG VIII, during the year 2001, I
had the opportunity to contact and discuss the main issues of debt relief with researchers and
experts. In 2000 CeSPI informal group on debt relief was a great opportunity to discuss debt issues
with some researchers coming from different Italian institutions and represented a great opportunity
of discussion.
Thus, this work is mainly based on reviewing academic research papers, official documentation
from international organisations - UN agencies and international financial institutions -, internal
memoranda and interviews with experts. This study is based on direct communication with officials
from international organisations and bilateral agencies. This study has benefited from numerous
discussions and criticism. Prof. Bruno Amoroso was my supervisor and I have greatly benefited
from many discussions with him. I was, furthermore, very stimulated by the questions that were
asked and the remarks that were made in the discussions following my lectures and seminars at
Roskilde University Centre and La Sapienza University.
It is important to record that this study has been completed from lenders’ capitals (Brussels,
Copenhagen, London, Paris, Rome, Washington D.C.). No visits were made for the purposes of this
work to SSA countries. This will inevitably create some bias to the evidence presented, since the
reality of debt crisis is basically its impact on real live in poor countries.
5. Structure of this work
Based on this preliminary care, this work is divided, in terms of structure, into three parts.
The complexity of external debt problem in SSA is the basic mainstreaming, spread all over the
three parts. They have to be considered a progressive way of approaching the issue of debt relief.
The analysis departs, in Part I, from a review of theoretical foundations of international debate on
debt relief: the unconscious long history of economic thoughts – chapter 1 -, the ambiguous
linkages between development and debt – chapter 2 -, and the difficulties to define, in general
terms, burden and sustainability of debt – chapter 3 -. Then, it passes, in Part II, through the history
9of debt crisis in SSA countries – chapter 4 -, and it investigates the empirical evidence of the
problems – chapters 5 and 6 -. The final Part III analyses peculiarities, solutions and problems of
current debt relief initiative – chapters 7 and 8 – and provides an unquestionable proof of civil
society’s capacity for proposals on debt relief for the future – chapter 9 -.
These three parts, and all the chapters within them, are directly linked together; every chapter must
be considered a partial verification of the general idea.
Beyond prevailing rhetoric of international initiatives, which affirm to make external debt
sustainable (as the current multilateral initiative says), differences among countries are important,
the nature and composition of debt are important, specific history and context do matter, the
interests and motivation and bargaining power of different lenders and debtors are crucial. There is
no “scientific” reason to define a general threshold of debt sustainability or to identify 41 countries
eligible to debt relief initiatives (as the current HIPC initiative does), rather than concrete,
legitimate political will. And it is important to link debt relief initiatives to aid policies, trade
regimes, financial systems and national economic and social policies.
In detail, in part I, chapter 1 tries to provide an original review of the development economic
theories that emerged at different historical phases, in different contexts, with different purposes.
The originality of this review is its focus on the relationship between foreign finance and theory of
development process. Even though development economics emerged after the II World War to
confront the causes of poverty in developing countries and to define strategies for economic
progress, nevertheless the economists brought with them the legacy of mainstream economics –
appropriate or not – within the new sub-discipline.
Chapter 2 explores and analyses alternative models used in theoretical and empirical studies to
capture the links between debt and development, in order to provide an original synthesis of
different points of view. In particular, it emphasises the importance of fiscal components of external
debt problem, the so called three-gaps model, which is considered a peculiarity of SSA case. But it
also stresses the complexity of factors that interact, as demonstrated by the fungibility argument and
the Dutch disease. The complexity and the presence of counteracting effects seem to be the real
nature of development and debt linkages, when we analyse in detail economic literature. Schematic
and simple relations must be abandoned in favour of case-by-case analysis.
Chapter 3 provides a review and critique of the literature on the sustainability of foreign debt,
conducting the discussion in economic and financial as well as political terms, and how this relates
to the question of debt relief.
Part II is an analysis of SSA debt crisis. Chapter 4 presents the crisis exploded in the 1980s, which
invested the least developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, describing the measures implemented
to solve it. The chapter tries to emphasise the characteristics of African problems, which stress the
importance of contextual aspects (SSA is different from Latin America), within the same thematic
issue of debt crisis. This chapter tries to define the profile of current debt problem, within the
context of total external capital inflows.
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to an econometric analysis of debt problems. In economics and other
fields, statistical models that allow for more complex relationships than can be inferred using only
cross-sectional data, are taken in account as a complementary empirical test. Chapter 5 is a review
of the econometric analysis applied to foreign debt problems of developing countries. It provides a
synthesis of the main approaches, which have been used in econometrics to analyse the relationship
between external finance (debt and aid) and development: a complex map of different approaches
and set of variables, which provide competing results.
Chapter 6 uses ideographic technique, multi-variate analysis and pooled time series analysis,
correcting an initial specification of the relationship to be estimated, basically related to a linear
regression form, through different pooled models, in order to provide the most adequate model
needed for investigating the links between external debt and development in SSA. Through the help
of ideograph technique, the chapter provides some information on the dynamic structure of the
relationship between the variables linked to foreign debt problem in SSA. The empirical analysis
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examines whether or not debt relief, in fact, interacts with development process in SSA. It examines
whether debt crisis reduced the resources available to developing countries, particularly those
directed towards sustainable human development, inducing a change in the expenditure patterns of
recipient governments.
Part III presents the current political debate on the need of linking debt relief, development and
poverty reduction strategies, animated by NGO’s networks (Third Sector organisations, interest
groups, trade unions, academics, research centres and local administrations). Chapter 7 addresses
the «Heavily Indebted Poor Countries» initiative launched during the 1990s by the World Bank and
the IMF. This chapter analyses, from inside the World Bank and the IMF, the HIPC rational,
describing how this initiative intends to reduce the external debt of the world's poorest, most
heavily indebted countries to sustainable levels and what conditionalities it implies in terms of
critical social and economic reforms; it analyses how much the HIPC initiative has accomplished
over the little more than four years it has been in place, drawing a comprehensive review of the
HIPC Initiative, including updated cost estimates.
Chapter 8 provides a critical and comprehensive review from outside the World Bank and the IMF
of the key problems of the HIPC Initiative: it begins with some brief comments on the rational for
debt relief and analyses then some key issues related to the HIPC Initiative’s goal to achieve debt
sustainability and the weakness of its long-term implications. The aim of this chapter is to
demonstrate how the external critical comments have contributed to correct the nature and
implementation of the HIPC Initiative, thus confirming the importance of dialogue between
governmental and non-governmental constituencies to improve the quality and performance of
policies. Nevertheless, the distance between positions remains clear, as it is clear that civil society
organisations constitute an innovation on the scene of international relations, new global actors in
the globalised world.
Chapter 9 does represent an original synthesis of a lot of separate political requests that can be
reduced at coherent and comprehensive approach. This is an important political counter-part to the
economic analyses presented in the previous parts. It is not necessarily based on the theoretical
assumptions proposed in the economic literature28, but it represents an effective lobbying campaign
to be taken in account, which should be seriously assessed, through empirical analyses on their
arguments. This chapter cites and derives from many background studies, which have been recently
prepared on thematic issues as well as analyses of experiences in countries, international technical
reports and position papers by NGOs and international organisations. The international civil society
has become an increasingly powerful influence on international relations; its political contribution
to international finance and development co-operation has to be considered.
A concluding chapter brings the strands of the argument together, in order to comment the
outcomes in terms of the multiple interests and preferences involved in a «debt relief game» and to
suggest some measures needed to fully implement and strengthen the implementation of initiatives
of debt relief, treating them as a component of a coherent package that must constitute an holistic
approach to international development co-operation.
                                                
28 In the political debate, many of the theoretical arguments are considered just that, theoretical argument.
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1. Economic Literature on Foreign Finance for Development. An Analysis
of Alternative Paradigms
1. The pre-Classical Heritage: the mercantilism
Referring to the pre-classical literature on economic growth that could be considered
remarkable in terms of the foreign finance issue, we should first mention the age of
mercantilism. During the XV century, when international trade increased together with
development of shipping companies, merchants, bankers and cities, Spain achieved the
international supremacy through the Invincible armada and huge inflows of gold and silver
from its Latin American colonies. At the same time, the letter of exchange and bank notes
were introduced.
These last five centuries have been important in terms of long historical processes of
transformation (Polanyi’s framework), world-systems and world-economies (Braudel’s and
Wallerstein’s approaches), hegemonies (in the Gramscian sense)1.
The age of mercantilism was the historical context of the fundamental political conflict and
the doctrine which it gave birth was the early process of State formation, in favour of a
market-oriented economy. Mercantilism can be considered the political economy of State-
building2 and the birth of a theory of capitalism based on international trade and foreign
finance as the engine of development.
For mercantilists – John Hales and Thomas Mun in the United Kingdom, Antoine de
Montchrestien and Barthélemy Laffemas in France, Ortiz in Spain, Giovanni Botero and
Antonio Serra in Italy -, wealth is essentially profit, that is produced by merchants and
manufacturers and that produces, through accumulation, new profits. Any surplus of workers
supply and the abundance of capital can facilitate credit and finance for trade and
manufacturing. This virtuous circle corresponds to the interests of the State: the abundance of
capital and workers is the end of the State (and means for merchants), increase of trade is
means of the State (and it is end for merchants).
Trade is crucial and it is based on the existence of a big amount of money, assuming that
circulating money is good money. Even though the presence of bad money (coins adulterated
in their metal content)3 and the huge inflows of gold and silver provoked an inflationary
pressure in Europe during the XVII century, nevertheless mercantilism continued to support
the idea of abundant money, as it implies less expensive credit opportunities. As indicated by
Thomas Culpeper4 in 1621, if the interest rate for credit lines is 10 percent, then all the
                                                
1 The theory of hegemonic stability asserts that an open world economy requires a dominant global power for its
smooth functioning. See Kindleberger, C. (1973), The World in Depression, University of California Press,
Berkeley.
2 See Hettne, B. (1995), International Political Economy. Understanding Global Disorder, Zed Books, London.
3 Linked to this phenomenon was the so called Thomas Gresham’s law: when two coins are equal in debt-paying
value but unequal in intrinsic value, the one having the lesser intrinsic value tends to remain in circulation and
the other to be hoarded or exported as bullion.
4 The mercantilists were «Pamphleteers» rather than a school of thought. They had no systematic,
comprehensive, consistent treatise, no leader, common method, or theory. Each «mercantilist» sought advantage
for a specific, trade, merchant, joint-stock company or social group. Thomas Culpeper (1578-1662) was one of
the major representatives of «bullionists», who emphasised gold and silver as «wealth» and considered crucial
the acquisition of gold and silver through «favourable balance of trade», colonies or conquest (colonies to
supply resources or gold). See R. Larry Reynolds (1998), Mercantilism: An Outline, Boise State University,
mimeo.
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investment options having an expected rate of return lower than 10 percent are abandoned.
When money and financing are abundant, then trade and private profits increase as well as
State enhances its power. Money (gold and silver) is important, thus to increase reserves is
important; if you can’t produce it, you have to import it from abroad through trade.
Contrary to Machiavelli who said that a well-organised government should require a rich
State and poor citizens 5, history demonstrated that bourgeois merchants and European States
developed together and the new idea of a close link between trade interests of nations,
political success of sovereign powers and military results prevailed. This implied a shift from
the State as the end of human life to the wealth as a value itself. Society must develop, and
development is economic growth and wealth; thus, both the means and the ends are economic
ones. Man is understood as «economic man». If Machiavelli’s Prince appears to be addressed
to the powerful, to the palazzo; then a specific economic theory – the Mercantilism –
developed to support the new riches and the domination of societies by the market principle.
We can consider this as the theoretical and historical pre-condition of what Paolo Sylos
Labini calls the first stage of modern capitalism (being referred to the XVII and XVIII
century) 6.
As the market system penetrated all spheres of human activities, social structures were eroded
and redistribution had to be guaranteed in order to let people satisfy their social needs.
Polanyi described these changes as «double movement», the first part being the expansion
and deepening of market exchange and the second part being the social reaction originating
mechanisms of economic integration as the modern welfare system7.
Antoine de Montchrestien, who published the first treatise on political economy in 16168,
recapitulated the basic ideas of mercantilism. Private profits are based on international trade
which is enhanced by the abundance of silver and gold, that is money; the abundance of gold
and silver keeps interest rate low and, when domestic endowment of gold is not adequate,
then international flows are needed. Thus, if development is economic growth, trade is an
engine of growth requiring the existence and circulation of a big amount of money; then
foreign finance is directly involved in the process of development.
In this connection, it is also relevant to note that mercantilists have sought to recommend a
balance of trade surplus, which implied an interventionist State for regulating trade, to
compensate the huge amount of gold and silver inflow.
2. The counter-mercantilism
If the foundations of international capitalistic trade were laid during the XV and XVI
centuries, in 1588 the Spanish Invincible armada was destroyed and Spain lost its supremacy.
One century later, at the beginning of the XVIII century, the success of capitalism was rapid,
supremacy passed to England, which promoted financial speculation9.
                                                
5 See Machiavelli, N. (1518), Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, 1954 edition, Ricciardi, Milano.
6 See Sylos Labini, P. (2000), Sottosviluppo. Una strategia di riforme, Editori Laterza, Bari.
7 See Polanyi, K. (1944), The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon,
Boston.
8 See de Montchrestien A. (1616), Traité de l’’économie politique, Paris.
9 Financial speculation means the purchase or sale of financial assets for the sole purpose of making a capital
gain. An important component of this phenomenon was the existence of the South Seas Company, created in
1771, which managed public debt.
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In 1767, James Stuart, in contrast to the mercantilists, observed that if international trade
becomes permanent, the consequence is a financial inflow, which can not be considered
automatically as a positive phenomenon. It provokes an increase of domestic demand of
consumption, which induces: (a) increase of imports, (b) higher cost of manpower, (c)
demand of luxury goods, which are produced abroad, creating dependence on foreign
production and altering domestic equilibrium10.
In the meantime, David Hume, one of the founders of liberal theory, criticised another aspect
of the mercantilism: the abundance of money is not the cause of reduction in interest rate,
which depends on the amount of profits from trade and manufacturing. Purchasing power of
money is inversely proportional to quantity: the abundance of gold and silver is unimportant
to a State, as its only effect in the long run is the increase of prices, which determines a
reduction in exports. Thus trade accounts are in balance again, stopping the inflow of gold11.
Prior to the founding of the classical school, another economic school, in the XVIII century,
analysed the process of economic growth in France, contrasting the mercantilist vision of
development. The physiocrats criticised economic policy in France, which discriminated
against agriculture, but above all studied the role of capital in economy. Economic activity as
a whole is based on the existence of capital and of expenditure, that is advances through
capital. Capitalism is based on a permanent circulation of capital: incomes generated through
production are translated into expenditure, thus capital is regenerated through sale, permitting
an expansion of output also. Thus, development of capital investment is the basic condition of
growth12. Concerning the role of finance for development, the importance of capital was
reaffirmed.
All these theories paved the way for the emergence of a new theory concerning the causes of
growth, including also a new elaboration of the opportunities and constraints to foreign
finance.
3. The Classical Heritage. The age of Smith and Marx
Adam Smith, the father of the classical school of liberalism, published the Wealth of Nations
in 1776 and observed that growth in output and productivity rely upon investment in capital,
which can occur if and only if there is a prior increase in savings. Smith did not consider
foreign finance, and said that only merchants and manufacturers, who have sufficient income
and motivation to save, can achieve increased savings.
Smith recommended eliminating all the barriers to free-trade and competition: any
intervention to direct capital is an artificial diversion from its natural usage, which
spontaneously follows the more productive opportunities. The promotion of infant industries
through the use of tariffs to cut imports alters – in Smith’s opinion - the mechanism of
market: the correct way is to buy less expensive goods abroad and concentrating domestic
production into products linked to the national endowment of factors, used to buy those
goods abroad. An automatism-oriented perspective seems to prevail in Smith’s approach: we
should avoid to reduce national income, that is the path of capital accumulation, through
interventionist actions of State and remember that available capital can be always devoted to
domestic productive usage. When the stage of national development has become particularly
                                                
10 See Steuart, J. (1767), An Inquiry into the principles of Political Economy, London.
11 See Hume, D. (1752), Writings on Economics, 1955 new edition, Madison, US.
12 See Quesnay, F. (1758), Oeuvres, 1888 Ed. Oncken, Paris.
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advanced, then a surplus of capital may naturally occur, and it leads to foreign flows of
capital to promote industrial growth abroad, making the usage of capital more productive.
In the third chapter of his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith describes the natural evolution of
capital. At the beginning, it is generated by agriculture and it is invested there. Then, as
capital profitability in agriculture decreases, it is devoted to manufacture. In the end when
industry itself is saturated with capital international markets become the convenient place to
allocate capital in surplus13.
During a period of great optimism on the future of domestic and international economy,
which prevailed in England and France14, a minority of scholars expressed serious doubts on
the benefits of liberalism and mercantilism. Most of them lived in Germany, at that time a
backward country compared to England and France.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who lived in Berlin in the earlier XIX century, introduced the concept
of  the «closed trading State». International trade increases poverty in backward countries, as
people migrate abroad, lands remain uncultivated or are sold to foreign enterprises who are
interested in speculation, State receives money from selling manpower abroad as well as from
a sort of subsidy given by industrialised States. The only alternative for backward countries
to promote development is to interrupt all the international relations 15, because foreign trade
and finance become a way to impoverish poor countries. In 1800, Fichte published a book,
which used a lot of arguments developed also by Hamilton in the United States and List in
Germany, to advocate protection as a means of promoting the economic development in the
backward countries and to be cautious on foreign finance. But these arguments have received
a very scarce attention by the mainstream of economic theory16.
Concerning the importance of foreign finance, Thomas Robert Malthus, who was not so
relevant in terms of theory of value and income distribution, identified the crucial role of
effective demand in the determination of development. It is not sufficient to have domestic or
foreign capital in order to promote development, the prerequisite is the effective demand, that
is the existence of purchasing power to buy what is produced through the usage of capital. It
is not true that supply creates its demand, capitalism needs a preventive enlargement of
demand. It is not true that foreign finance automatically generates development, it is
important the enabling environment of the system17. This idea, which did not represent the
core of international financial relations in the past, has become one of the milestones of
current international financing institutions. Surveillance and lending are closely interlinked,
the availability of conditional financing can strengthen the leverage of financing institutions
and provide the incentive for borrower countries to follow sound policies to create an
enabling environment.
Coming back to the XIX century, based on the English classical economy, particularly on
David Ricardo, Karl Marx tried to demonstrate that current economy is an historical mode of
production, inherently based on the exploitation of manpower by capital. In his dualistic
vision, capitalist class control production, whereas the working-class is condemned to be
                                                
13 See Smith A. (1776), Wealth of Nations, Pelican Books, London (1974 ed.).
14 At the end of the XVIII century, England could base its development on the industrial revolution and its
innovations: in 1765, Hargreaves introduced spinning jenny; in 1771, Arkwright used the Water-Frame, a
primitive power spinning machine driven by waterpower.
15 An ante litteram idea of «déconnexion», re-written in the 1970s by the neo-Marxian Samir Amin. Amin, S.
(1985), La Déconnexion – Pour Sortir du système mondial, Éditions La Découverte, Paris.
16 See Léon X. (1958), Fichte et son temps, vol. II, Paris.
17 See Malthus, T. (1798), An Essay on the Principle of Population, Ward Lock, London (1890 ed.).
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proletarised. In capitalism there are two classes, with opposing interests. The core of
capitalism is the relationship between capital and labour, and there is no room for a peaceful
shift in the distribution of power. However, some internal contradictions of the system occur,
as profits require cheap labour and, simultaneously, rising output requires an expanding
demand to be absorbed. Capitalism has an inherent tendency to periodic crises of
overproduction and under-consumption.
The objective of the capitalist class is to accumulate wealth in the form of exchange value,
not to produce use values. The capitalistic exchange relationship is the opposite to the pre-
capitalist modes of production (based on the following sequence: production of commodities,
exchanged for money, which is transformed into other commodities: C  M  C).
The capitalistic production process begins with a stock of financial capital, that is exchange
value, with which can buy factors in order to produce commodities, which are sold to realise
an augmented exchange value (M  C  M’). Production generates the surplus value (i. e.
the difference between M and M’), the extraction of which is based on the rate of exploitation
of labour18.
Marx was marginally interested on the colonial States, but he encouraged international flows
of foreign finance in order to destroy stagnant pre-capitalist modes of production, establish a
capitalist mode, develop the productive forces and prepare the way for a transition to a
socialist workers’ State and, then, to a communist society. When capital in surplus goes
abroad, it creates the conditions in which the rate of profit tends to rise again, contrasting a
natural decline in the rate of profit due to capital intensification.
As in Smith’s case, Marx’s thesis was that foreign markets represent an emergency market to
prevent system from crises of overproduction and declining rate of profit, thus accepting the
basic idea that the amount of saving and investment solely depend on the average rate of
profit, an idea earlier formulated by David Ricardo and based on the «loi des débouchés» of
Jean-Baptiste Say19. Following Malthus, Marx severely criticised Say and Ricardo, because
they did not consider the risk of overproduction and did not understand the usage of foreign
finance to balance the system.
In 1917, Vladimir Il’ic Ul’janov Lenin published a work to update the Marxian theory.
Capital has accumulated faster than the outlets for profitable investment, thus banks and
private companies used imperialism to keep the rate of profit high, the colonies became
outlets for surplus finance capital, as well as source of raw materials and new markets20.
In Lenin’s analysis, imperialist capitalism differs from the endogenous capitalism described
by Marx. The imperialist capital has suppressed the emergence of local one. Foreign
investment of equity and loan capital in infrastructure, plantations and mines have produced
profit and interest, preventing from the emergence of local capitalism, as well as crowding
out local manufacturers. Lenin, much more than Marx, paved the way for the neo-Marxist
theory of development.
                                                
18 See Marx, K. (1887), Capital, Vol. I, Lawrence and Wishart, London (1970 ed.).
19 Supply creates its demand, the production as a whole is always sold, and thus saving is automatically
translated into investment, without being associated with enlargement of markets. The automatic mechanism of
market is perfect: through a decrease in the rate of profit, the risk of capital in excess is always avoided.
20 See Lenin, V. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress Publishers, Moscow (1975 ed.).
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4. The neo-classical Heritage
From the end of the XVIII century, most economists devoted their studies to the problem of
the efficient allocation of resources. It was a net shift of the mainstream economics from the
long-run perspective to firms and consumers behaviours and the role of free markets.
William Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall, and John Hicks in England, Kenneth Joseph Arrow
and Gérard Debreu in the USA, Carl Menger and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk in Austria, Léon
Walras in France, Vilfredo Pareto in Italy have been very significant theorists in the
neoclassical perspective.
The neo-classical theory is based on a short-run, efficiency-maximisation of partial and
general equilibrium approach, which is linked to the theory of comparative advantages.
The neo-classical consequences concerning development and foreign finance are that if there
is a positive propensity to save and to invest in excess of the capital replacement, then
sustained growth is possible. The rate of investment will be determined by the social rate of
time preference (which, given the rate of interest, determines the supply of savings) and the
marginal productivity of capital (which, given the rate of interest, determines the producers’
propensity to invest). In terms of foreign finance, as price distortion leads to a distorted
allocation of resources – reducing efficiency -, any form of subsidy (like soft loans) are
market distortions and they must be removed. Technical progress is the real source of long-
run income growth, as the increase in saving itself can have a positive effect on the growth
rate only temporarily (it lowers the price of capital).
In 1933, a Swedish economist, Bertil Ohlin, introduced the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem, a neo-classical interpretation of Ricardo’s law of comparative costs. It is true that
there is an advantage enjoyed by a country in the cost ratio of one commodity to another in
comparison with the ratio of costs of these same commodities elsewhere. However it should
not be explained in terms of «real» costs (linked to the labour content, in Ricardo’s opinion),
but in terms of relative prices of factors, as in neo-classical approach. If a country has a huge
amount of capital, compared to other factors endowment, then the rate of interest of capital is
domestically lowered, and the country can opt for investing abroad its capital or for importing
other factors, assuming a world of perfect mobility of factors. Neo-classical theory adopted,
with the Ricardian law of comparative cost, also the classical theory of automatic equilibrium
of the balance of payments.
There are some basic assumptions that are implicit in the neo-classical theory of capital
accumulation:
(1) the growth of production is due to investment, which is financed by savings in advance;
(2) those who save become the owners of new capital goods, and their ownership is
represented by the interests, which they receive for the savings in advance;
(3) the entrepreneur and the banker receive a payment for their job, as free competition
eliminate any profit.
These assumptions are linked to the idea of perfectly competitive markets, profit
maximisation by firms, utility maximisation by consumers, an infinite range of production
technologies. These assumptions generate the proposition that free market equilibrium prices
are the correct prices for the purpose of guiding resource allocation. Thus, relative factor
prices determine factor income shares, whereas any government intervention to determine
income distribution is a distortion. Hence the key policy recommendation is to remove all
market distortions, in order to improve efficiency and welfare, let international capital be free
to move all over the world, without distortions or rigidities.
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All these assumption are removed by Joseph Schumpeter.
5. The Schumpeterian and Keynesian Heritage
In 1911, Joseph Schumpeter introduced a clear distinction between economic growth and
development. As briefly described the classical economists based growth on saving and
investment, considering growth as additional expansion of production and market. This is
exactly growth, added Schumpeter, whereas development is a revolutionary process, which
transforms the conditions of production, markets and institutions. Development implies
innovation, and it must be studied in terms of the dynamics of long-run economic change.
The accumulation of capital in an incremental way that can not produce economic
development, if it is not embodied in the mobilisation of existing factors. Capital does matter,
if it interacts with new combination of factors of production and new institutions. The
capitalist, that is the banker, who creates finance capital, requires the existence of innovative
entrepreneurs, who create a new combination of factors. The basic condition to promote
development is not the mobilisation of savings to finance the accumulation of productive
capital, but the innovative action of entrepreneurs in mobilising credit towards innovative
combinations of factors21.
The classical and neo-classical economists said that savings are crucial to finance
development; Schumpeter rather stressed the importance of credit creation. The neo-classical
theory said that the rate of interest is the price of savings; Schumpeter rather said that the rate
of interest is paid to the bank, not to the saver. The mechanism of capital accumulation is
completely changed: innovation (linked to entrepreneurs and remunerated by profit) and
finance (linked to banks and remunerated by rate of interest, which rests on part of profit) are
the bulk, whereas the savers are excluded. In the context of international development, we
could derive the basic assumption that foreign finance can not be de-linked by the crucial role
of investment capacity and entrepreneurial culture. A manifest truth which has been widely
forgotten during the last thirty years as we will try to demonstrate in part III.
During the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes, as well as Michal Kalecki, emphasised the
importance of effective demand and the fact that, during recession phases, deficit spending22
can be very useful. Keynes based his theory on the comparative static, and he analysed the
macro-economic equilibrium aspects of the market mechanism, taking into account the
problem of unemployment. Even though his studies were not focused on development of
developing countries and on foreign finance, the Keynesian heritage has been influential into
the core mainstream of economics and, directly or not, also into development studies. His
only major work in what would now be called «development economics» was Indian
Currency Reform, based on a plan worked out at the Indian Office23.
Neo-classical development economists have neglected the importance of Keynes. But all of
us should recognise that the importance of macro-economic policy (rather than the priority to
micro-economic efficiency), the crucial role of investment and aggregate demand as the
engine of growth, the positive role of State, the need of international institutional reforms
(both trade and finance), clearly linked to the Keynesian heritage, remain on the agenda of
international relations.
                                                
21 See Schumpeter, J. (1911), The Theory of Economic Development, Oxford, (1961 ed.).
22 The creation of a government budget deficit for the purpose of influencing economic activity, producing new
demand.
23 H. G. Johnson (1977), «Keynes and the Developing World», in R. Skidelsky (ed.), The End of the Keynesian
Era, MacMillan, London.
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6. The Harrod-Domar model
The birth of modern growth theory, in the work of Roy Forbes Harrod and Evsey David
Domar, has been one of the by-products of Keynes’s General Theory that have been more
directly linked to development economics. A common purpose of their independent analyses
was to give a dynamic dimension to Keynesian approach, transforming a short-term
dimension (where the implications of the level of investment and saving for the stock of
capital are ignored: the stock of capital is an exogenous variable and investment is considered
as influencing the effective demand) into a long-period approach. In this perspective,
investment expenditure influences the stock of capital.
If Schumpeter criticised the idea that an economy can sustain a steady rate of growth for an
indefinite period (the idea of a steady growth state), Harrod and Domar considered the
conditions to realise continuous growth with full employment 24.
Roy Forbes Harrod25, assumed the Keynesian savings function, where savings (=S) is a
function of output (=Y). Savings is the sum of spending power which people plan to withhold
from consumption and can be made available to finance new capital formation. At any time t,
S is a constant proportional function of output:
S(t) = s Y(t); 0<s<1 (1.1)
where s is the average (and marginal) propensity to save.
In order to ensure a perfect balance between demand and supply at aggregate level, ex-ante
identity between investment (=I) and savings (=S) is required at any time t :
I(t) = S(t) (1.2)
Being the Keynesian condition for equilibrium in the goods market.
Supposing that the investment function is governed by the acceleration principle26, we have:
I(t) = vY(t+1) – Y(t) (1.3)
Where Y(t) is the output, Y(t+1) - Y(t) 27 is the instantaneous rate of change of output that is
expected with respect to time, and v is the desired incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR),
representing the value of the capital needed to produce a given output divided by the value of
that output, that is the acceleration coefficient, also assumed to be constant.
If the expectations have to be realised, then the expected Y(t+1) must be equal to the real
Y(t+1). Remembering that:
Y(t+1) – Y(t) = DY (1.4)
In this case, we are treating time as a discrete variable, and DY represents the change in Y
between two successive periods. Otherwise, we could treat time as a continuous variable,
thinking in terms of point of time, and use the derivative with respect to time (=dY).
 We get:
                                                
24 See G. Hacche (1979), The Theory of Economic Growth, London, MacMillan.
25 See R. F. Harrod (1939), «An Essay in Dynamic Theory», Economic Journal, vol. 49 and R. F. Harrod
(1948), Towards a Dynamic Economics, London, MacMillan.
26 An increase or decrease in income induces a corresponding change in investment; thus the acceleration
coefficient is the ratio of increase or decrease in investment to an increase or decrease in income.
27 Y/Y and K/K are the rate of change in the proportion to the level, that is the proportional rate of growth of Y
and K.
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s Y(t) = v DY (1.5)
 which implies
s/v = DY/Y(t) = G(t) (1.6)
This is the crucial equation of Harrod’s dynamic theory, combining the acceleration principle
and the multiplier theory28.
Given (1.2) the proportional rate of growth (=G) of output (=Y2) is:
G(t) = [I(t)/Y(t)]/[I(t)/Y(t)] = [S(t)/Y(t)]/[K(t)/Y(t)] (1.7)
where K is the volume of capital (both fixed capital and stock).
The identity:
G(t) = [S(t)/Y(t)]/[K(t)/Y(t)] (1.8)
is the Harrodian identity: the growth rate of output can be expressed as the ratio of the
proportion of income saved to the ICOR.
G(t) is an equilibrium growth rate, and the identity assumes that the proportion of income
saved (s Y(t)), matches the average propensity to save of the community, and the ICOR
satisfies investment demand.
Starting from an equilibrium, and given constant and positive s and v, there is a unique
growth path of output (and investment and saving), along which all the core variables of the
system (that is Y, I, S) grow at the constant rate s/v.
Assuming that the labour force (=L) is growing at a constant exogenous rate (l) and that
labour productivity, that is output per head (y), is increasing at a constant exogenous rate (t),
then the necessary and sufficient conditions to maintain full employment is full employment
at the starting point and output growth at a rate equal to l + t. Thus, labour market
equilibrium requires that growth rate which allows full employment (so-called natural growth
rate, n, that is the maximum rate of growth allowed by population growth and labour-saving
technical innovation) to be attained and maintained.
The unique equilibrium growth path is when growth is both warranted (actual investment and
saving = desired investment and saving = Gw) and natural (full employment):
G(t) = Gw = s/v =  n = l + t (1.9)
Obviously, in the real world, there is no automatic mechanism whereby warranted growth
and natural growth would tend to coincide, as well as the constancy of s and v are simplifying
assumptions.
A growth path along which the capital-output ratio (K/Y) is constant is sometimes referred to
as a balanced growth path. A particular balanced growth path is a path along which each
economic aggregate grows at a proportional rate which is constant over time (=G), except the
growth rate of the labour force. This growth path is the steady-state growth path.
The basic contribution of Harrod dynamic theory of development remains the fact that,
starting from the multiplier and accelerator principles, the warranted growth rate is the way
which guarantees that supply adequately responds to demand expansion. In such a way, the
engine of development is the dynamism of the demand side, rather than the supply side.This
is a typical Keynesian vision of development.
                                                
28 The multiplier is the ratio of the income held to result from an addition to investment to the amount of such
addition.
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Evsey David Domar29 adopted the same proportional saving function as Harrod (1.1) and the
equilibrium condition (1.2). He added a proportional relationship between the rate of increase
of productive capacity (full employment output = Y) and investment:
Y  = s I (1.10)
s I is the aggregate net investment multiplied by the output-capital ratio. For saving-
investment equilibrium and full employment, income and investment must grow at a constant
rate which is the product of the parameters s and s.
Y /Y = I / I = ss (1.11)
The equilibrium growth rate, ss, is similar to the Harrod’s warranted growth rate s/v. In fact,
s embodies the influences of labour-force growth and technical progress in productive
potential, and the idea of optimal ICOR. s refers to an increase in capacity which
accompanies investment; its magnitude depends on technological progress. Since s is simply
the inverse of the capital-output ratio, Domar’s equation is the same as Harrod’s.
Domar emphasised potential growth dependence on capital accumulation, whereas Harrod
emphasised the interaction of the multiplier and the accelerator principles to show the lack of
any automatic tendency for warranted growth to conform with full employment. Adopting the
Keynesian multiplier, without introducing any theory of what determines investment,
Domar’s model shows what the path of investment is required to be. As in the Harrod model,
Domar model implication is that the automatic maintenance of equilibrium steady-state
growth, with full employment, is unlikely to be the outcome of a free-market capitalist
economy, extending Keynes’s analysis to a dynamic economy. If actual growth rate, equal to
the warranted rate of growth, is below full employment, then steady growth may occur, but
any divergence of actual growth rate from the warranted one will lead the economy away
from the steady state growth path. Cyclical swings are inevitable unless government policy
intervenes. Nevertheless, the savings rate, together with the capital-output ratio, is considered
as one of the determinants of growth.
The Harrod-Domar growth formula has been widely adopted and used  for calculating target
rates of investment in economic planning and for estimating foreign aid requirements. The
savings constraint is considered dominant as well as in Western development paradigm of
Modernisation. And foreign capital inflows make it possible a poor economy to escape from
a stagnation vicious circle30.
7. Western development paradigm of Modernisation31
During the 1940s and the 1950s, the paradigm of the expanding capitalist nucleus was the
dominant approach, contrasting with the alternative structuralism approach, spread in Latin
America. Both of them rejected the neo-classical paradigm (in particular, perfectly
competitive markets, perfect divisibility of factors and products and the absence of significant
technological or pecuniary externalities) and the static theory of comparative advantages as a
basis for analysing the development process. This growing interest among the economists in
                                                
29 E. D. Domar (1946), «Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment», Econometrica, vol. 14 and E.
D. Domar (1947), «Expansion and Employment», American Economic Review, vol. 37.
30 W. T. Newlyn (1977), The Financing of Economic Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
31 A general review that traces the theoretical history, since the 1940s, of those who analysed economic
development is Hunt, D. (1989), Economic Theories of Development: An Analysis of Competing Programs,
Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York. A review of development co-operation theories and policies, referred to the
same period, is Zupi, M. (ed.) (1997), Teorie dello sviluppo e nuove forme di cooperazione, Molisv Ed., Roma.
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the Western countries depended on the purpose of containing the expansion of communism
and preserving the international stability.
In 1943, Paul Narcis Rosenstein-Rodan, a Polish economist who lived in UK and served as a
World Bank and United Nations’ consultant, proposed a strategy for the post-war economic
development of Western Europe32. Following Adam Smith, he emphasised the importance of
expanding markets as a stimulus to growth, and he stressed the need to base the industrial
development strategy on specialisation and integration into world economy, which permits
the mobilisation of international capital to fund part of the development effort with loans.
These loans need to be repaid from export revenues. State planning and organisation of a
large-scale investment programme would be needed to help mobilise the finance for a
programme of industrialisation, and State intervention is requested to guarantee abroad loans
and to promote exports in order to permit loans repayment. Rosenstein-Rodan emphasised
market failure (the small size of the domestic market and the inability of individual firms to
internalise the value of the external economies that they generate are important constraints)
and the need for State interventionism. In the late 1940s and 1950s the successful
implementation of the Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction in Europe generated
confidence in the role of foreign finance and economic aid, and had a significant influence on
the approach to development. The dominant constraint to development were seen as internal
rather than external: the low rate of saving out of national income, and the need to rise GNP
so that the benefits of growth would trickle down to the population. The importance of the
role of savings and capital accumulation derived directly from the classical growth theory and
from Harrod’s and Domar’s model. This model was not interpreted as the search for the
equilibrium growth rate given existing savings propensities, but as a way to raising the
savings rate in order to warrant higher growth.
Nurkse33 supported the Rosenstein-Rodan’s idea to encourage the mobilisation of both
domestic and foreign finance to support the investment programme. What was considered
important was that the government should ensure effective use of foreign aid, through
curtailing the growth of domestic consumption. Foreign aid is not able to raise automatically
investment, because of the fungibility of foreign resources.
Harvey Leibenstein34 stressed the importance of foreign aid to escape from the low level
equilibrium trap, where people have a high marginal propensity to consume stimulated by the
demonstration Duesenberry effect – emphasised by Nurkse -. Finance is a way to break out
the trap into cumulative growth if it really promotes productive investment.
Greater emphasis to autonomous capital accumulation in the private sector was given by
complementary contributions of Lewis and Rostow.
William Arthur Lewis 35 assumed that monetary expansion can promote growth in a country
with surplus labour, when: (1) credit is provided to private capitalists or to finance
government capital formation, and (2) the country can contain the pressure on the foreign
balance, while ensuring a significant increase in investment. Thus, the opening up of the
Lewis model is clearly compatible with the encouragement of capital import.
                                                
32 P. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), «Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe», Economic
Journal, June-September.
33 R. Nurkse (1952), «Some international aspects of the problem of economic development», American
Economic Review, May.
34 H. Leibenstein (1957), Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, Wiley, London.
35 W. A. Lewis (1954), «Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour», Manchester School, May.
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The historical evidence of the inevitability of capitalism was summarised by the influential
work of Walt Withman Rostow36. Like Lewis, for Rostow the crucial factor needed to take-
off an economy into sustained growth path is a significant increase in the share of savings and
investment in national income. In both Lewis and Rostow’s works a prevalent emphasis was
given to the role of capital accumulation in economic development, interpreted as a
cumulative process. The central assumption was that the capitalist class has the highest
propensity to save in underdeveloped countries; in order to raise the overall savings rate it is
needed to increase the capitalists’ share of national income. Moreover, if capital is scarce,
then the important thing is to maximise its productivity.
Based on the emphasis of the Lewis model on the savings constraint and on the
complementary work of Rostow, from the mid-1950s simple savings gap models for foreign
aid requirements have emerged. External capital requirements were the difference between
total capital requirements and domestic savings. These ideas were discussed as the country’s
absorptive capacity issue, that is the capacity to absorb effectively an increase in investment
made possible by financial aid and foreign loans. Rostow himself said that foreign capital
should be made available only when it can be effectively used. Millikan and Rostow37
attempted to estimate foreign aid requirements by considering both absorptive capacity and
the savings-investment gap. Rosenstein-Rodan38 mentioned three indices to measure the
absorptive capacity, in order to project the foreign aid requirements: (i) the rate by which a
country has succeeded in increasing the volume of investment in the past five years; (ii) an
estimate of the extent to which a country has succeeded in raising the deviation between the
marginal and average propensity to save over the past five years; (iii) a judgement on the
country’s overall administrative organisation39.
8. The Structuralist paradigm of development
After the Great Depression in the 1929, in Argentina exchange controls were introduces, as
well as import controls to protect the balance of payments and debt repayment. These
measures were needed to face the changes in trading conditions: as world prices of primary
products declined relative to manufactured goods, Argentina’s import capacity fell. In
Argentina, Brazil and Chile there was a rapid growth of national industry in response of the
shortage of imports.
In that period, it was widely accepted that industrialisation was the key to economic
development and that it could not be promoted by concentrating economy on primary exports
in exchange for manufactured imports, but by a dynamic cumulative process. The Latin
American experience demonstrated the possibility to promote industrialisation through
management of imports: the introduction of political measures to change the composition of
imports from consumer to capital goods. In 1948, the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) was created, and its director became the Argentinean economist Raoul
Prebish. ECLA economists rejected traditional trade theory as a basis for national economic
policies and developed a new body of theory. It was based on the need of imposing improved
conditions of international trade for primary products and supporting initial periods of
                                                
36 W. Rostow (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
37 R. Mikesell (1968), The Economics of Foreign Aid, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.
38 P. Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), «International aid for underdeveloped countries», Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, May.
39 The so-called gap-models are  discussed in chapter 2.
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import-substituting industrialisation national policies inducing structural transformation,
focused on the development of a diversified domestic industrial sector40. “Imports are
specified as a linear function of output, implying that fixed amount of imports are required in
production (that is, there is a constant marginal propensity to import). This assumption,
together with that of exogenous export growth, make this a structuralist model”41.
With respect to international finance, Karl Gunnar Myrdal42 emphasised the inter-connection
between internal and international causes of under-development. A small group of countries,
dominating science, technology, finance and industrial production, a experiencing a path of
cumulative development, whereas the majority of countries, with low levels of output and
savings, low levels of health and education, are condemned to stagnation or declining per
capita incomes, enlarging international inequality. There is a tendency of finance capital to
flow into areas where cost structures and market prospects seem attractive, and there is the
presence of developing countries’ governments to protect their own interests and export
enclaves to prevent international relations from disseminating among people all the potential
benefits derived from foreign finance. Thus, national poverty is associated with rising intra as
well international inequality. Foreign aid is not sufficient to change the structural inadequacy
of system and it risks exacerbating, through the repayment mechanism, the under-
development.
Another economist who stressed the structural component of development was Hla Myint43.
He said that a combination of market forces having different power, social institutions and
prejudice act to prevent poor people from improving their status; developing countries are
borrowers of capital who face monopolistic markets of creditors. The main effort should be
concentrated on the search for developing counter-powers to counteract the existing unequal
distribution of market power.
Also Albert Otto Hirschman developed a theoretical work which was fully consistent with
structuralist thinking, even though he did not regard himself as a structuralist, and the ECLA
economist did not considered him as a member of the structuralist school. Hirschman44
attacked the balanced growth theories – developed by the theory of modernisation –which
identified the causes of underdevelopment in terms of the lack of key factors, be it finance or
skilled labour. He proposed a strategy of unbalanced growth, guided by major resources
bottlenecks as revealed in the market, he advocated the use of large-scale capital-intensive
techniques of production (which do not require high organisational and managerial resources)
and favoured foreign capital for its ability to identify successful priority sectors and regions.
The inducements to invest in the industrial sector can be maximised if economies follow an
investment path in which each stage of investment generates, through backward and forward
linkages to other branches of the economy, cumulative inducements to invest in these
branches also.
Concerned with the criticism to the Western development paradigm of modernisation, the
structuralism comment stressed that such a perspective which over-optimistically invoked
                                                
40 See R. Prebish (1962), «The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems»,
Economic Bulletin of Latin America, Vol. VII, No. 1, February and C. Furtado (1961), Desenvolvimento y
Subdesenvolvimento, Editora Fundo de Cultura, Rio de Janeiro.
41 H. White, “The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid”, in The Journal of Development Studies,
vol.28 n°2, January 1992, p.170.
42 G. Myrdal (1957), Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Countries, Duckworth.
43 H. Myint (1954), «An interpretation of economic backwardness», Oxford Economic Papers, June.
44 A. Hirschman (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale, Yale University Press.
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international finance support to development, over-emphasised the supply-side constraint to
growth (the rate of capital accumulation, determined by the supply of savings) and ignored
the possibility of a domestic demand constraint to capitalist accumulation. It also ignored the
possibility of a foreign exchange constraint. Because of the growing technological gap
between industrialised and underdeveloped countries, combined with the low income
elasticity of demand for primary products in industrialised countries and high income and low
price elasticities of demand for imports in underdeveloped countries, it should be stressed the
importance of the serious balance of payments difficulties of developing countries, facing a
secular deterioration of their terms of trade. A further structuralism criticism emphasised the
importance of market imperfections and inequity context which could lead international loans
to a growing stock of under-unutilised new capital stock, provisions to rent-seekers, without
any real match to the needs of the population and the economy.
The structuralism school of thought rejected neo-classical and monetarist45 solutions to the
problem of balance of payments disequilibria (domestic deflation and devaluation of the
currency, in order to reduce the demand for foreign exchange and increase foreign currency
earnings) and recommended policy measures for both developing and developed countries:
Developing countries should: (i) cut non-essential imports; (ii) expand primary and
manufactured exports, (iii) orient investment on import-substituting sectors, (iv)
introduce import control as a counter-cyclical policy, (v) create regional integration.
Developed countries should: (i) reduce protectionism against developing countries, (ii)
orient foreign direct investment to developing countries, (iii) introduce compensatory
finance schemes to assist primary goods exporters to meet their foreign payments
obligations, (iv) increase lending to developing countries, (v) introduce systems of
preferences for manufactured exports from developing countries.
In order to project the foreign aid requirements of underdeveloped countries, being the
primary role of foreign aid to help relieve balance of payments pressures, Chenery and
Strout46 employed the first index proposed by Rosenstein-Rodan to measure the absorptive
capacity (the rate by which a country has succeeded in increasing the volume of investment
in the past five years). They assumed that during the first part of the take-off stage, foreign
aid serves to plug a savings gap, provided that marginal propensity to save is not high enough
and the incremental capital/output ratio is not low enough to sustain the desired rate of
growth domestically, without recourse to foreign finance. In their model Chenery and Strout
used the absorptive capacity, investment-savings gap approach and, in the structuralism
tradition, foreign exchange gap approach47. In this context of two-gap model, foreign aid can
                                                
45 The monetarism is a school of thought in economics that places money at the centre of macroeconomic
policy. Based on the quantity theory of money, it relates the price level to the quantity of money in the economy.
It claims that monetary factors are a major influence on the economy and that, in particular, government
expansion of the money supply will tend to generate inflation rather than employment. This view is associated
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theory of rational expectations, proposed by Robert Lucas jr., Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace. The
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Economists. The Chicago School in Chile, Cambridge University Press, New York.
46 H. Chenery and A. Strout (1966), «Foreign assistance and economic development», American Economic
Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4, Part 1, September.
47 See chapter 3.
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help to finance essential imports. For eliminating the foreign exchange gap the two crucial
parameters are the rate of growth of export and the marginal propensity to import: if the
former rises and the latter falls, then the gap is eliminated48.
Economic development consists not only of raising per capita income through international
finance, but also in structural transformation, so that economies acquire the endogenous
capacity to sustain development. The central issue is therefore whether international finance
can in turn generate an internal demand to induce a process of sustained investment to expand
domestic market.
9. The neo-Marxist and dependency approaches
In the 1960s, against the structuralism and the optimistic modernisation perspectives, which
put emphasis on capital accumulation and focused on domestic problems of capital scarcity
and inadequate institutions (which impede savings and investment), radical left criticised the
mainstream orthodoxy. They explored Marxist principles and Lenin’s innovations on the
class modes of appropriation and use of the actual economic surplus.
The neo-Marxist critique of classical structuralism theory has elements in common with the
dependency-oriented auto-critique of some of the structuralists themselves. But there is a
clear distinction in the analytical concepts and in the logic of argument: the neo-Marxists
moved towards the analytical framework of the global development of the capitalist system49.
Paul Baran50 considered underdevelopment as the process of continuing extraction of surplus
from the underdeveloped countries and its transference to the centres of world capitalism,
through monopsonistic trade and the perpetuation of mass pauperisation. Dominant classes in
underdeveloped countries failed to use surplus for productive accumulation within the
domestic economy.
Andre Gunder Frank 51 adopted Baran’s vision and emphasised surplus appropriation
mechanism through trade and the alliance of the domestic comprador bourgeoisie and foreign
capitalists. Rather than considering existing economic structures as the causes of
underdevelopment – as in the structuralism approach -, the neo-Marxists stressed the
importance of class control over the surplus as the main factor inducing underdevelopment.
International finance is not useful, if the masses don’t replace the existing ruling class
alliances in the periphery as well in the centre of the world and take control of the economic
surplus. If underdeveloped economies remain dependent on the world metropolitan
economies for access to finance, as a result the latter continues to determine the
underdevelopment in the periphery.
Samir Amin52 concluded that the only way to full autonomous development is via socialist
revolution or de-linking the underdeveloped countries from the western economies.
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have contributed to this exaggeration. See V. Joshi (1970), «Saving and foreign exchange constraints», in P.
Streeten (ed.), Unfashionable Economics, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.
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50 P. Baran (1957), The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press, New York.
51 A. G. Frank (1978), Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, MacMillan, London.
52 S. Amin (1973), Le Développement inégal, Les Editions Minuit, Paris.
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In the 1970s, dependency analyses were carried out in Latin America, focused on a range of
unequal and dependent relationship between the countries of the periphery and the
industrialised countries. If the structuralists, who favoured macro-economic balance,
emphasising the limits of the monetarist approach and the output and welfare costs associated
with orthodox stabilisation, otherwise dependency theorists favoured state interventions to
correct market failures, and considered the monetarist approach to stabilisation unnecessary
and the risks connected to deficit financing exaggerated.
10. A neo-classical revival towards the Washington Consensus
In the 1950s most of the economists supported the idea that, in the short-run, governments of
developing countries had to try to mobilise large quantities of national and international
capital for public development expenditure. Only a few economists followed the neo-classical
approach, as Peter Bauer and Basil Yamey53 who said that government should always
concentrate upon removing the impediments to private saving and investment, through the
maintenance of law and order, political stability, adequate monetary conditions, without
interfering with the operation of market forces, but supporting them to operate more
efficiently.
The focus of neo-classical approach was efficiency in resource allocation and its critique to
the programmes of import-substituting industrialisation strategies and to any form of
subsidised international financial flow, which altered the true indication of the relative
opportunity cost of resources (given by a correct structure of prices reflecting the relative
scarcity of capital). Foreign finance is an extraordinary fuel of growth engine, but private
flows must be the bulk, without any distortion induced by over-regulations. If during the
1950s and 1960s a lot of neo-classicals had accepted a crucial role of governments of
developing countries in the first stages of their national development, from the 1970s the neo-
classical critique to the public sector involvement in economy improved dramatically. From a
chronological point of view, there have been three important elements which concurred to
strengthened this idea: (i) in the 1970s, the perception that transition from pre-capitalist States
to capitalism had been achieved in developing countries and private sector could become an
autonomous and mature actor to be linked to international private sector, reducing the role of
public sector; (ii) in the 1980s, debt crisis reduced de facto the State bureaucracy capacity of
resistance to a radical transition to a new State, much more market-oriented; (iii) in the
1990s, the end of communism in the Eastern block eliminated the need of strong
(authoritarian) governments in developing countries, used by the Western countries to
prevent the world from the risk of widened opposition to capitalism, and this post-bipolarised
context created the opportunities for a «light» public sector.
In the 1970s, at micro-economic level, neo-classical critique was complemented by the
literature on cost-benefit analysis, designed to facilitate greater efficiency in investment
decisions.
In the 1980s, as it will be illustrated in chapter 4, foreign debt crisis of developing countries
represented a main factor, which facilitated a radical shift in the theory and practice of
development policies. “Until the 1980s the predominant concerns of development economists
were sectoral (...). During the 80s the predominant concern shifted to macroeconomic issues.
This shift was not because the sectoral problems had been solved, but because they were
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suddenly swamped by even more serious macroeconomic shocks”54. And “The series of
external shocks at the beginning of the 1980s (...) forced macroeconomic issues back into the
heart of the development debate”55.
A paradox occurred: if during the previous decades different paradigms stressed the
inadequacy of neo-classical approach to face the challenge of development and encouraged
the usage of foreign finance and debt, then the debt itself paved the way for a renewed vigour
of the neo-classical revival. This revival was reinforced by the application from developing
countries to the IMF and WB assistance with stabilisation plans and structural adjustment
programmes. These programmes emphasised control of the money supply and removal of
price distortions and the freeing of markets from public sector interventionism. In 1981, the
World Bank published an influential report on Africa56, which emphasised the importance of
domestic correct pricing policies and reduced government intervention in African economies,
rather than searching for the New international economic order (NIEO), proposed by the
Group of 77 countries, the most important aggregation of developing countries.
Foreign finance is an issue on which the neo-classicals expressed a wide range of opinions.
The strongest opposition to aid, linked to a rigorous philosophy of laissez faire, was
expressed by Bauer57 in the late 1960s. Aid, based on subsidised fund (grants and highly
concessional soft loans), prevents necessary policy reforms in developing countries and
encourages the view that developed countries must carry the moral responsibility for the
underdeveloped countries. Lal58 sustained the importance of technical assistance, whereas the
financial aid is likely to be counter-productive.
But most of the neo-classicals argue that financial aid has a positive role to play, and in order
to ensure this potential it is needed to adhere to cost-benefit analysis methodology and, rather
than supporting specific projects and programmes, aid and loans should support stabilisation
and structural adjustment programmes. It means to provide funds not to all developing
countries, but only those who accept these conditionalities aimed at creating a performing
macro-economic structure. Later, in 1998, the World Bank published a report entitled
“Assessing Aid”, as the result of an extensive investigation into the effectiveness of
development co-operation59. The empirical analysis of the report shows that development co-
operation helps to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty, but only in recipient
countries with good economic management (or good governance), that is good economic
policies and strong institutions. The main conclusion of the report is therefore that
development co-operation should be allocated by “selecting” recipient countries according to
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Balasubramanyam and S. Lall (editors), Current Issues in development economics, MacMillan, London, p. 91.
55 H. White (1992), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid”, The Journal of Development Studies,
vol. 28 N. 2, January, pp.168.
56 World Bank (1981), Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, World Bank,
Washington D.C.
57 P. T. Bauer (1971), Dissent on Development, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.
58 D. Lal (1983), The Poverty of Development Economics, Institute of Economic Affairs, Washington D.C.,
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59 World Bank (1998), Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, And Why, The World Bank, Washington
D.C.
29
their policy environment. This report has led to heated debates, both among academics and
policy makers, about the future of development co-operation policies60.
The monetarist macro-economic approach which underpins the IMF views of the causes of
the balance of payments instability and domestic inflation has its foundations in the neo-
classical model of economic systems, based on flexible prices, high competition, absence of
rigidities. When the growth rate of the money supply exceeds the growth rate of output and
incomes, then the demand for goods and services will grow faster, leading to pressure on
domestic prices (inflation) and on the balance of payments. The solution is to control the
growth of the money supply in order to reduce the growth of the domestic demand. A
strategic measure to control money supply is to reduce the public sector deficit, as the
government’s need to finance expenditure programmes that exceed tax revenue is the main
source of the pressure. To reduce imports and increase exports, using the devaluation of the
domestic currency, is important in order to restore the balance of payments equilibrium. An
increase in the domestic interest rates can reduce capital outflows and increase savings. Price
and exchange rate rigidities, monopolies, taxes, subsidies and trade restrictions are all
distortions to be removed, as they reduce short-run efficiency61.
When the stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes faced failures, during the
1980s, neo-classicals ascribed them to attempts to introduce large changes too fast, creating
political tensions and uncertainty. The failure of the programmes was due to the lack of
implementation of the complete package of reforms. Thus, by introducing some safety-net
components, to reduce the negative effects on the poor, Neo-classicals have continued to
support their theoretical model, debating on the optimal timing of liberalisation programmes,
which only implicitly recognised the importance of structural rigidities and the need for
medium and long-term reforms.
Today, the influential role of the WB and the IMF makes it harder for governments
dependent on these institutions (and their loans) to embark on economic strategies that depart
from neo-classical orthodoxy. Partly as a consequence of the conditionality imposed by the
WB and the IMF, but also because of widespread domestic dissatisfaction with the
structuralism set of import-substitution policies, outward-oriented policies have become the
norm among developing countries62. A remarkable convergence of views among
policymakers and academics has developed on the virtues of the market-oriented model, the
neo-liberal approach, which has been called the Washington Consensus 63. A main limitation
of this consensus, as Joseph Stiglitz noted64, is that it seeks to make economies adjust to the
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61 M. Kahn and M. Knight (1981), «Stabilisation programs in developing countries: a formal framework», IMF
Staff Papers, Washington D.C.
62 D. Rodrik (1999), The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work, ODC
Policy Essay No. 24, Washington D.C.
63 The origin of this concept lies back in 1989, when John Williamson was expressing his support for the Brady
Plan in front of a US Congressional Committee. In his original presentation, Williamson identified ten specific
policy prescriptions: (1) Fiscal discipline, (2)Public expenditure redirection, (3) Tax reform, (4) Financial
liberalisation, (5) Trade liberalisation, (6) Exchange rates unification, (7) Privatisation, (8) Deregulation, (9)
Promotion of FDI, (10) Defence of property rights. Williamson refuses to consider the Washington consensus as
a neo-liberal, conservative manifesto. See J. Williamson (1996), “Lowest Common Denominator or Neoliberal
Manifesto? The Polemics of the Washington Consensus”, R. M. Auty and J. Toye (eds.), Challenging the
Orthodoxies, MacMillan Press Ltd., London.
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distorted world market rather than to challenge the global wealth and power imbalances, and
it paves the way for severe criticism against this approach.
11. The alternative perspective of sustainable human development approach
Based on the structuralism and dependency theorists’ perspectives, and moving towards an
alternative holistic vision of development, wide criticism mounted since the 1980s against the
Washington Consensus approach, which adopted measures that hit the poor hardest, attack
the symptoms but not the causes of instability, do not guarantee significant improvement in
the balance of payments.
Global inequality has risen during the last years, not only because of an increase in between-
country inequality, but also because of greater within-country inequality.  Distribution does
matter for poverty reduction65. Successful poverty reduction strategies depend not only on
favourable changes in average GDP growth, but also on favourable changes in income
inequality. New poverty means social exclusion. The World Development Report 1990
projected that the total number of poor would have fallen from 1,125 million (1985) to 825
million if developing countries had performed good macro-economic policies (projected
figure, 2000). The World Bank assumed a neutral effect of the implementation of the
structural adjustment programmes. But, in practice, the Washington Consensus’ measures
mean: inflation control by means of large rises in interest rates and budget cut; demand
management through a reduction in money supply, wage repression, cuts in public
expenditures and revenue raising measures; trade liberalisation inducing increased wage
inequality; deregulation of the labour market, through greater wage flexibility, reduced
regulation, erosion of minimum wages, lower unionisation; financial liberalisation; erosion of
the redistributive role of the State. The reality of past 20 years has been a huge increase in
inequality, as demonstrated by recent trends in income distribution, poverty data set and
econometric studies. The World Development Report 2000/2001 clearly indicates that the
World Bank target has been missed by a large margin: poor have increased to 1,250 million
(2000). Through the Washington Consensus’ assumptions, the structural adjustment
programs have negatively affected developing countries in a distributionally manner, and
inequality trends are likely to depress growth and reduce the poverty alleviation effect of
national and international policies, whereas debt burden increased.
Since the late 1960s some economists questioned the assumption that an increase in
inequality was inevitable in the early stages of economic growth, to be followed later by a
tendency towards greater equality. Their unwillingness to accept the inevitability of a trade-
off between growth and equity66 meant to put the problem of continuing widespread poverty
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66 In the 1950s, Simon Kuznets suggested that "as economic development occurs, income inequality first
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Term Changes in the National Income of the United States of America since 1870», in Income and Wealth of
the United States: Trends and Structure, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Income
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at the core of the agenda. Academic institutions, branches of the UN and NGOs shared this
vision of development.
Dudley Seers67 noted that development should be reinterpreted to take account not only of
growth but poverty, income distribution and employment.
The 1972 ILO Kenya report68 identified the informal sector as an important source of output
growth, employment and productivity gains for the poor.
In 1974, a team from the World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at
Sussex, guided by Hollis Burnley Chenery69 synthesised and provided more robust analytical
foundations to the redistribution with growth approach, endorsing a new enlarged definition
of development, assuming different savings rates for rich and poor and, consequently,
accepting the idea of a trade-off between the rate of growth of GDP and greater equality, in
the short-term.
In 1976, the ILO 70 proposed that all countries should give priority to the meeting of the basic
needs of all members of their population by the year 2000, as the policies of redistribution
with growth might not be sufficient to guarantee an increase in welfare for the 800 million
people living in absolute poverty. Basic needs were defined to include the minimal
consumption requirements needed for a healthy population, minimal standards of access to
public social services, access to employment opportunities to achieve a target minimum
income, and the right to participate in decisions affecting livelihood of the people.
From the «Basic needs first» strategy of Paul Streeten71 in the 1970s, to the capabilities and
entitlement approach of Amartya Sen in the 1980s72, and to the Human development
approach of the UNDP in the 1990s, all these perspective shared the vision of investing on
the human resources and public service provision, emphasising the need also to raise directly
the incomes and the «power» of the poor. In this context, foreign exchange savings can
fruitfully increase the supply of savings to finance essential imports and can contribute to
empower people if, and only if, it serves their interests.
These approaches stress the importance of non-economic factors in the development process.
It does mean that development is a multi-dimensional process, where political interests are
the basic elements to be considered in a long-term perspective, which implies a sustainable
nature of the process.
International finance and aid can be useful components of development if they are oriented to
funding public services, institutional development (research and development, small-scale
credit provision) and compensation for land reform. This approach of foreign finance implies
a significant attention to be devoted to the time horizon of loans: if long-term strategies need
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to be supported, then loans must be long-term oriented in their repayment schedule. This
point is particularly important relatively to the question of debt sustainability73.
International finance must be strictly linked to national poverty reduction strategies and to
trade policies and development co-operation, in a coherent framework. It does imply an
holistic approach to development. This approach animated the international political debate
on the presence of debt relief as a main component of the G8 agenda at the 2001 Genoa
Summit and can represent one of the most interesting and original ways to define a new
approach to development co-operation and debt relief74.
                                                
73 Time does matter, in every case. For those theoreticians being part of the mainstream economics, attention
turned to the objective of the maximisation of short-run efficiency in resource allocation and in management;
whereas for those economists who were interested in macro-economic dynamics, the analysis of long-term
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2. Foreign debt and development
1. Introduction
How much does foreign debt matter for development process? From a very general point of
view it is important that external debt does not fall in a spiral. Since the surplus or deficit on
the current account represents the change in a country’s net foreign assets, one approach to
judging whether a current account deficit will become a problem is to assess the country’s
external debt situation. This approach, which evaluates intertemporal solvency, investigates
the country’s ability to repay its external debt. For a country to be intertemporally solvent, the
present discounted value of future trade surpluses must equal the present value of its foreign
debt. That is, intertemporal solvency requires that, in the long-run, the country’s external
debts will be paid. In this case, a country can remain technically solvent even while running
large account deficits.
Another approach is to consider the implications of a path of external imbalance for the size
of external indebtedness relative to GDP. The “sustainable” path of an economy’s external
debt depends on two factors: (i) trade imbalances; and (ii) a debt dynamics term equal to the
difference between the world interest rate and the domestic growth rate of the debtor country.
If the world interest rate exceeds the domestic growth rate, then the only sustainable path
along which the current account (excluding net factor payments) is constant is when the trade
balance is in surplus. In order to keep the stock of external debt from rising without limit, the
debtor country must generate a surplus on the net trade account in order to be able to service
its debt commitments. The more rapid GDP growth, the larger is the sustainable level of
external debt.
But the real picture is much more complex. The nature of external borrowing is another
important factor, given the critical relationship between the current account and the capital
account. Inflows that are not permanent can potentially destabilise the domestic economy
when they arrive and when they depart. Short-term capital inflows are likely to be more
volatile than long-term inflows; and variable interest rates (compared with a fixed coupon)
are all likely to increase the risk of an external crisis. The composition of a country’s external
liabilities can affect its ability to manage its external position. Swings in international
exchange rates and interest rates can be potentially devastating, especially if a large
proportion of foreign debt is classed as short-term. The currency composition and maturity
profile of a country’s external debt can contribute as much to vulnerability to external shocks
as does the total volume of debt. A country’s ability to sustain a current account deficit is
influenced not only by the size and nature of existing liabilities and the stock of foreign
assets, but also by the extent of the debt-servicing burden.
Degree of openness does matter, too. A country’s propensity to import and export will clearly
influence the sustainability of its external position. The production of tradable goods provides
an invaluable source of foreign exchange as these inflows can be used to service and reduce
the size of the country’s external indebtedness. As any sustained structural deterioration of
the trade balance would make a current account deficit even less sustainable, then a real
exchange rate appreciation may be adverse or not. And strongly related to movements in the
real exchange rate are a country’s terms of trade: a strengthening of the real exchange rate, or
negative shocks in foreign demand, for example, would put downward pressure on the
domestic country’s terms of trade. This might subsequently impact on the sustainability of a
current account deficit. However, countries with larger export sectors are able to service a
given external debt more readily. The more reliant an economy is on international trade, the
less likely it is to default on its external debt commitments due to the threat of default
reprisals. However, the more open an economy is, the more vulnerable it will be to external
shocks such as terms of trade fluctuations or falls in foreign demand.
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There is also a clear link between the sustainability of the current account and deviations of
consumption, investment or government expenditure: high levels of domestic investment that
are not met by domestic savings weaken the current account balance. In this situation,
individuals acquire foreign debt in an attempt to finance investment opportunities while
avoiding sharp drops in their consumption. Higher levels of investment may suggest higher
future growth rates, which might enhance intertemporal solvency. However, higher savings
and investment levels do not necessarily translate into higher output levels. Investment
projects may be allocated inefficiently. Under these circumstances, high levels of public
investment may not enhance external sustainability. The picture is very complex: positive
productivity shocks can cause investment to rise, as it raises the expected path of future
output directly. This tends to worsen the current account balance as domestic residents
borrow abroad to finance the additional capital accumulation. The productivity increase may,
however, also increase saving, which tends to offset the impact of increased investment on
the current account balance, with uncertainty on the net effect on the current account balance.
Thus, we have mentioned at least three categories of influential factors: (i) external debt and
its composition imbalances, (ii) external trade imbalances, (iii) domestic factors – savings and
investment - and public budget spending1.
Referring to the last point, the net effect of fiscal deficits on the current account and on the
overall balance of payment remains an empirical issue, but econometric modelling is highly
limited in its ability to predict or forecast a pending external crisis. The interrelations between
saving-investment gap, deficit spending, trade imbalances and external debt must be more
adequately investigated.
2. Fiscal deficit spending and development
A research approach to current accounts has focused on analysing current account
determinants and the response of current accounts to different types of shocks2. Chinn and
Prasad (2000) use a large panel that includes both industrial and developing countries to
examine the medium-term determinants of current accounts. They find that, in developing
countries, current accounts are positively correlated with government budget balances,
measures of financial deepening and initial stocks of net foreign assets3.
Most African external debt represents either direct loans to governments (and government
owned firms) or publicly guaranteed loans to the private sector (i.e. loans that the government
agrees to be responsible for in case the private non-payment).  The interaction between
external payment problems and government budget problems is a consequence of the
government responsibility for paying the nation's debt.
                                                
1 A. North (1999), “Current account sustainability: Evidence from South Africa”, in LSE-Crefsa Quarterly
Review, N. 1.
2 For related work examining the dynamics of the trade balance in response to different types of shocks, see E.
Prasad and J. Gable (1998), "International Evidence on the Determinants of Trade Dynamics," IMF Staff
Papers, Vol. 45, No. 3; and E. Prasad (1999), "International Trade and the Business Cycle," The Economic
Journal, October.
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167.
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And this clearly reflects the specific context of SSA countries. Given the small share of
government expenditure (both current and capital ones)4 that can be financed through
government revenue (mainly taxes), due to the administrative, political and social constraints,
SSA countries need sources of deficit financing.
In theory, budget deficit (= government expenditure [=G] - government revenue [=T]) can be
financed by borrowing from the private sector, from the monetary system or from abroad.
The first option, that is based on domestic saving, is limited by the fact that African private
capital markets are small, the risk of government default prevents bond buyers from being
particularly interested in lending to the governments, the real rates of return are very low due
to regulation over interest rates, exchange rate overvaluation makes foreign currency assets
more convenient. Moreover, in SSA there is evidence of a particular form of “forced” private
lending represented by deferral of government payments to suppliers and employees.
The second option, being money printing and monetary expansion, tends to increase
inflationary pressures, as the mechanism of seignorage makes it possibly to expand money
supply without inflation up to a certain point, then the real value of money falls and it implies
an “inflation tax” to be paid.
Thus, the third option, external borrowing, was the most available solution to SSA countries,
particularly when the availability of abundant and cheap international credit, in the late
1970s, was a very attractive opportunity. Differently from other regions, debt burden problem
of Sub-Saharan African countries is essentially a public sector problem, governments have
dramatic problems in collecting the needed revenue for paying debt service and debt service
payments risk to be a drain on budget resources, which are subtracted to investment purposes.
It seems to suggest a strong relationship between external debt and fiscal problems in SSA,
and possibly a fiscal origin of the external debt itself, due to the need of financing an
expansionary fiscal policy through international borrowing5. These relations imply the need
of focusing on the relationship between domestic debt, debt capacity and development, rather
than exclusively on the Balance of Payments dimension of debt crisis. Put simply, we can
argue that an increasing external public debt in relation to tax revenues can represent a
disincentive and resource constraint to investment, thus leading to negative development
implications. An emphasis on the domestic fiscal dimension of external debt, in the Sub-
Saharan African countries, requires starting from some considerations on the relationship
between domestic debt and development.
Most governments have traditionally found it necessary to borrow to finance part or all of
their expenditures for development programmes. The assumption is that as the economy
develops, the increased government revenue derived from taxes on growing incomes as well
as from government-owned productive investments will enable the government to pay off
these debts, both external and internal.
The excess of government expenditure over government revenue (the so-called primary, or
noninterest, fiscal balance), which must be financed either by domestic or foreign borrowing
or by printing money (that is issuing monetary liabilities) is the so-called «deficit spending».
Keynesians have advocated that governments should run budget deficits during recessions in
order to stimulate aggregate demand. The expansionistic effect of deficit spending on real
economy is due to the multiplier effect of deficit used to finance productive investments. An
                                                
4 Particularly when SSA countries, not only financed the big push of development and war expenditure, but also
decided, in order to maintain their political legitimacy and to solve potential conflicts, to tax too little and to
spend too much, favouring some “sensible” interest groups.
5 P. Hjertholm (1997), An Inquiry Into the Fiscal Dimension of External Debt: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa,
PhD dissertation, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
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increase in investment will raise national income by an amount equal to its monetary value,
but in addition it will have a wider positive feedback effect by stimulating other parts of the
economy, thus creating new jobs and additional demand for goods. From this perspective, the
aim of developing countries is to attract much more debt rather than reducing it. Quite the
opposite, monetarists and new classical macroeconomists argue that budget deficits simply
stimulate inflation and crowd out private investment. This idea is based on the neutrality of
budget deficit, as in the inter-temporal horizon any immediate expansion of real economy due
to debt is not true in the long run. If current expenditures increase because of debt, in the long
run it implies increasing taxation to insure the pay-back debt. Thus, the net present value of
expenditure must always be equal to the present value of income.
In empirical terms, it is not always the same the effect of deficit spending on the economy. It
depends on the nature and composition of the given deficit spending. It can be due to a
reduction of tax revenue or to an increase of public expenditure. If deficit spending is aimed
at increasing public expenditure, its effect will depend on what kind of expenditure is
involved. The positive effect, measured in terms of increasing aggregate demand, will be
higher and direct, if deficit spending will be devoted to finance the purchase of goods and
services or public investment. The effect will be lower and indirect if deficit is due to finance
transfers (such as pensions and subsidies). The same effect occurs when deficit responds to a
reduction of direct taxation, which determines an increase of disposable income. A reduction
of indirect taxation determines a reduction in the price of goods and services, thus directly
benefiting demand from households and firms. Obviously, there is no automatic passage from
higher aggregate demand to higher production and to higher real national income. Any supply
constraint can prevent aggregate demand from inducing positive effects on income.
The way of financing deficit spending can itself determine the effects on development. As
indicated, the supply of money in order to finance deficit can induce inflation pressure, which
reduces the purchasing power of money, and produce a vicious circle of higher deficit
spending6. Hyperinflation (defined as an inflation rate of 50 percent per month or higher) is
characterised by large fiscal imbalances and lack of credibility in the policymakers’ ability to
stabilise. Thus fiscal imbalances and pressures to monetise budget deficits may lead the
economy to a stable inflation equilibrium or high inflation trap.
Otherwise, the government can finance deficit through fixed-interest securities issued as
short- or long-term bonds. Nowadays it has become common for governments of
industrialised countries to borrow funds from their own citizens and institutions such as
banks, insurance companies and investors. The interest payments are raised from taxes on the
community and paid back to members of the same community. These are therefore transfer
payments. The impact of these transfer payments on income distribution depends on which
group pays the taxes as determined by the structure of the taxes paid and which groups and
institutions hold the public debt. The securities issued by governments feel the effect of a
globalised financial market: it can induce inflow of foreign investments and affect the foreign
exchange.
                                                
6 The conventional fiscal deficit can be very sensitive to inflation, through the effect of inflation on nominal
interest payments on the public debt. Moreover, inflation can have a sizeable effect on the conventional deficit
when the domestic public debt (and, consequently, the interest rate bill) is high. The inflation-induced part of the
nominal interest bill is a sort of amortisation payment that compensate holders of government debt for the
erosion of the real value of the debt stock, maintaining real debt at the previous level. See V. Tanzi, M. I. Blejer
and M. O. Teijero (1993), «Effects of Inflation on Measurement of Fiscal Deficits: Conventional versus
Operational Measures», M. I. Blejer and A. Cheasty (eds.), How to Measure the Fiscal Deficit: Analytical and
Methodological Issues, IMF, Washington D.C.
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In general terms, rising debt is not necessarily a bad thing. Long-term economic growth will
be faster if spare savings are channelled into productive investment rather than sitting idle
under the mattress. It is natural that, as financial systems have become more efficient in
channelling funds from those with surplus income to those who need to borrow, a developing
country’s ratio of public sector debt to GDP increases. The problem is that, within this trend,
a sudden, excessive surge in debt can have negative consequences.
The sensible level of debt for an economy depends on interest rates, expected future growth
in income, and the variability of growth. Families or industries with a more stable cash flow
can afford to take on bigger debts than highly cyclical businesses. Only if the business cycle
really has been made more stable and there is little risk of recession, firms and households
can safely borrow more. The same counts for countries: a country with declining terms of
trade can derive high problems from debt. Short-term debt must be used for investment being
productive in the short-term.
But even if the optimal level of debt is higher, a sudden surge in borrowing can leave
households, forms and countries horribly vulnerable to shocks, such as higher interest rates, a
fall in asset prices or an economic slowdown. One of the three is possible, indeed likely, in
Sub-Saharan African countries.
High debt levels are unlikely by themselves to trigger an economic collapse, but they do
threaten to amplify any downturn, turning it into a deeper recession if debtors are forced
suddenly to cut their spending in order to service or reduce their debts.
There are three major contending interpretations on the linkages between public deficit and
savings:
1. The conventional view asserts that a fall in government saving (due to a tax cut or deficit
spending) tends to raise consumption and reduce saving by people who care only about
the present, by shifting the burden to future, thus reducing national saving.
2. The Keynesian view asserts that higher temporary government dissaving will raise
consumption and income, in the presence of under-utilised production capacity,
proportionally to the inverse of the marginal propensity to save, as predicted by the
multiplier effect. Higher income will raise private saving, which can be – but non
necessarily is – large enough to offset the initial decline in government saving.
3. The Ricardian view asserts that, as the individuals are rational and far-sighted, they
assume that a permanent rise in government spending today will be paid later, thus they
will increase saving by an equivalent amount (the so-called Ricardian equivalence) and a
rise in the budget deficit will have no effect on the national saving rate. The Ricardian
idea that the timing of taxes does not influence household consumption behaviour implies
that the choice between debt financing and tax financing of fiscal deficits is irrelevant.
And a large ratio of public debt to output may have an adverse effect on private investment
through various channels.
· Resources used to service debt may crowd out government investment, which could be
complementary to private investment, thus reducing national private investment;
· A high debt-to-output ratio (with a high debt service ratio) may induce domestic agents to
transfer funds abroad because of the uncertainty and fear of future tax liabilities to service
the debt, thus raising the domestic cost of capital goods and lowering national private
investment;
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· A high debt-to-output ratio can discourage foreign direct investment because of the fear
that government may impose restrictions on external payment obligations, thus reducing
the national domestic investment, which are complementary to FDI;
· The risk of nominal depreciation affects firms that hold stock of foreign-currency
liabilities, because of the reduction of their net worth induced by the raising debt burden
due to depreciation, thus domestic banks tend to tighten credit restrictions and depress
investment.
Given these premises, very high level of public debt are considered dangerous, because of
three different traps:
1. The «crowding-out effect», determined by the fact that high public borrowing pushes
up interest rates and crowds out alternative productive private sector investment.
2. The «inflationary pressure», due to the government attitude to print money in order to
reduce the real value of public debt. This phenomenon was deeply analysed in
developed countries because of the risk in the 1960s and 1970s of inflationary spiral -
i.e. linkages between cost-push factors and demand-pull ones: higher prices induce
higher wages translated in higher costs which determine much higher prices and so
on-7.
3. The «debt trap», due to rising interest payments which increase the government’s
budget deficit. Thus, even though the government is reducing public spending, total
debt continues to grow in a spiralling of its own. If interest rates exceed nominal GDP
growth (real growth plus inflation) and there is a primary budget deficit (government
spending other than interest payments minus tax revenues), then the country is
enveloped in a indefinitely growing spiral of debt-to-GDP ratio, and balancing the
budget would not be enough to stop it.
Particular consequences derive from the decision to finance deficit spending through
international savings, which is external debt: the commitments of one government to other
governments or banks or to other financial institutions abroad. In this context, which seems to
be the most adequate for SSA countries, the analysis of fiscal deficit can be translated into the
analysis of external debt. However, we have to remind that “...the relationship between higher
public savings and growth is not clear cut. In the face of such ambiguity it can only be
concluded that examining how aid inflows affect government behaviour will not necessarily
provide any concrete answers to the nature of the aid-growth relationship”8.
                                                
7 Barro focused on the positive relationship between expected inflation and budget deficits. Higher inflation
expectations imply higher real interest rates and therefore higher debt service costs. See R. J. Barro (1979), On
the determination of the public debt, J. Polit. Econ. 87. This phenomenon is linked to the Ricardian hypothesis
on debt neutrality (in order to finance a war, a government can choose new debt or new taxes, but the difference
is only inter-temporal, because current debt will imply new taxes in the future to pay back debt) and rational
expectations (i.e. recognising the inter-temporal constraint of budget). In fact, the Ricardian hypothesis has been
revived recently by Barro (1988). According to this viewpoint, which has been used by monetarists and new
classical macroeconomists, changes in budget deficits cause offsetting changes in private savings through
anticipations of changes in future taxation. Therefore, they have no effect on national savings and, consequently,
on the current external account. See R. Barro (1988), «The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits», NBER,
Working Paper, no. 2685.
8 H. White (1992), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid”, The Journal of Development Studies,
vol. 28, N. 2, January, p. 190. On “savings debate”, Keith Griffin stresses the risk that foreign capital is not
additional to domestic saving. Whereas, Eprime Eshag says that the basic assumption which is made by Griffin
is that the elasticity of supply of labour and goods and services in underdeveloped countries is zero... Once the
assumption of zero elasticity of supply is removed, as indeed it has to be in any realistic discussion of the impact
of the inflow of foreign capital on savings, the whole picture is radically changed... There is in fact every reason
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3. From domestic debt to foreign debt
Some developed countries, such as Italy9, demonstrate how different is the concept of public-
sector debt from external debt. The public sector debt is perceived by citizens as an
ambiguous fact: when interest rates decrease, it has positive effects on the national accounts,
but negative effects on the private investors who hold Treasury bonds. At the same time,
citizens are borrowers and lenders in the case of public-sector debt. Quite differently, debt
owed to foreign lenders is external debt.
For all countries, total payments in international transactions must equal total receipts. When
all items, both visible and invisible, have been taken into account, each country must cover its
current payments with its current receipts. A surplus in the Balance of payments (BoP) may
be inserted as a credit and added to the country’s reserves of foreign currencies accumulated
over time. A deficit must be covered:
(a) by payments out of accumulated reserves of foreign currency;
(b) by borrowing or obtaining investments from another country;
(c) by acquiring import from suppliers for credit;
(d) by using exports receipts;
(e) by obtaining assistance from the IMF in the form of credit;
(f) by receiving ODA flows.
In general terms, a country could not go on paying for deficits over a prolonged period out of
its accumulated reserves of gold and foreign currencies.
The balance of payments of a nation is a double-entry accounting statement of its transactions
with the rest of the world during a specified time period. Net (of amortisation) inflows are
recorded as a plus (that is receipts, credits), outflows are a minus (that is debits or payments).
The 5th edition of the IMF BoP manual provides for the separate reporting of financial
capital inflows (liabilities) and outflows (assets). Both the capital inflows and outflows of the
BoP are reported net of repayments. One advantage of these data is that they distinguish three
types of capital flows: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and other
financial flows - comprised primarily of bank loans 10. This enables to study, for example,
whether FDI is «different» from loan inflows. A second advantage of this source is that the
consistent accounting framework enables us to relate capital inflows to other components of
the balance of payments: in particular, the current account, reserve accumulation, capital
outflows and reserve accumulation.
                                                                                                                                                       
to expect domestic savings will increase on the assumption that some domestic resources, which would
otherwise have remained unemployed, are used in conjunction with foreign resources”. See K. Griffin (1970),
“Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic Development”, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 32, N. 2, May, pp.99-112; K. Griffin and J. Enos (1970), “Foreign Assistance:
Objectives and Consequences”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 18, pp.313-327; E. Eshag
(1971), “Comment”, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 33, N. 2, May.
9 In 2000, Italy had the largest public-sector debt in Europe, worth 110 percent of GDP. Italy is bound by
European Union rules to balance its budget in the medium term: Italy pledged in 2000 to cut 2001 deficit to 0.8
percent of GDP, and to stop borrowing more money than it earns by 2003, whereas its debt should be reduced to
100 percent by 2003.
10 Usually, the three types of capital inflows (FDI, portfolio, and loans) are not significantly correlated with one
another over time or across countries. That is, there is little tendency for countries with large amounts of
portfolio capital or loans to receive correspondingly large amounts of FDI.
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Tab. 1 - Summary of international transactions
Line Item (effects on the Balance of Payments)
1
2
Exports of goods and services
Imports of goods and services
(+)
(-)
1+2 Merchandise balance of trade
3
4
5
6
Government grants
Investment income, net (bonds, stocks,...)
Debt-service payments
Remittances, pensions, other transfers
(-)
(-)
(-)
(+/-)
1+ …+6 Current account balance
7
8
9
10
11
12
FDI and portfolio assets, net
Short term loans, net
Long term loans, net
Official assets, net
Official reserve assets, net
Allocations of special drawing rights
(-/+)
(+/-)
(+/-)
(-/+)
(-/+)
7+…+12 Capital and financial account balance
13 Changes in reserves, net (+/-)
14 Statistical discrepancy (errors-omissions)
Foreign aid (bilateral and multilateral) is largely classified as a transfer in the BoP and
excluded from capital inflows, but some forms of concessionary finance are included.
Exceptional finance transactions and IMF credits are included with total reserve
accumulation (RES). Such transactions could be classified as capital inflows; but because
they are frequently associated with crises, debt forgiveness and debt restructuring, they are
negatively correlated with other inflows. Errors and omissions are frequently associated with
capital flight.
The following identity provides a simplified overview of the different types of transactions in
the BoP accounts:
0 = (CA + KA) + FINI + FINO + ERR + RES (2.1)
where:
CA = Current account balance,
KA = Capital account balance,
FINI = Financial inflows,
FINO = Financial outflows,
ERR = Errors and omissions, and
RES = Reserves and related items.
As usual, sources of foreign exchange, such as financial inflows and exports, are denoted as
positive (credits) while uses of foreign exchange, such as financial outflows and imports, are
negative (debits).
Thus, we have a current account, a financial account and a reserve account. What used to be
referred to as the capital account now corresponds most closely to the sum of the financial
account and the reserve account. Within this simplified framework, inflows of financial
capital can either be set aside in reserves, used to finance current account deficits, or be offset
by financial capital outflows.
If a country runs a trade deficit by having an excess of imports over exports, a number of
offsets may take place: increasing liabilities to foreigners, decreasing claims on foreigners,
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liquidating the pressures that would result if payments in foreign currencies had to be made
immediately. Similarly, a country that is increasing its investments abroad will improve its
investment position, but it will be creating minus entries in its current balance of payments
statement. But the long-run outlook for a country that is making substantial foreign
investment should be favourable, as a result of the future income that may be generated from
those investments.
From a very broad point of view, a common characteristics of Ldcs is a structural current
account deficit, where debt service payments represent a major and growing component –
together with imports -, which is not adequately contrasted by the value of exports, flows of
the net investment income received from abroad, net private and public remittances and
transfers. In the case of the capital account, most Ldcs remain fundamentally dependent on
foreign loans by private and public creditors (also in the form of foreign aid), net of
amortisation, to adequately contrast the relevant flows of capital flight (to Western bank
accounts, real estate ventures, stock and bond purchases) and the resident capital outflow.
The international reserve account, or cash account, is the balancing item, along with the
errors and omissions item, which reconciles statistical discrepancies, that is lowered in most
of Ldcs, because total disbursements on the current and capital accounts exceed total receipts.
In fact, Ldcs should balance any purchase of goods and services abroad and re-payments to
foreign countries – including debt-service payments (in the current account) and debt
amortisation (in the capital account), which represents the gradual liquidation (i.e. its
reduction) of the principal of former loans. But during the 1980s, the outflow to repay
accumulated debts exceeded the inflow of both public and banking loans, determining a
negative net transfer (or a perverse flow of financial flow transfer from poor to rich
countries). Moreover, debt-service payments must be made with foreign exchange; thus, they
must be covered through export earnings, curtailed imports, or further external debt.
From the BoP perspective, international reserves (which consist of gold, a few major foreign
currencies and SDR at the IMF) can be drawn on to pay bills and debts. But the poor
countries – as the SSA countries are - are likely to have a very limited stock of reserves, thus
the overall BoP deficit can inhibit the country’s ability to continue importing needed capital
and consumer goods. In these cases, there are some policy options:
(1) To seek to improve the balance of current account by promoting export expansion (by
supporting potentially competitive sectors) or limiting imports (through import
substitution policies, selective tariffs, physical quotas) or both of them (through a
currency devaluation or a structural adjustment and stabilisation policies to reduce
domestic demand – in order to lower imports – and to avoid inflationary pressures, which
contributes to an overvalued exchange rate that discourages exports).
(2) To seek to improve the balance of capital account, encouraging FDI and more
international borrowing, which implies the necessity of future repayments of principal
and interest.
(3) To seek to improve the stock of international reserves11.
A very simple and useful way of describing external debt, clearly referred to the BoP, is
through the usage of the concept of the basic transfer12. It is the net foreign-exchange inflow
                                                
11 Linked to this purpose, the Ldcs as a group are now exerting pressure at international level to agree to the
creation of supplementary SDRs, as the present forum for distributing current SDRs gives 75 percent of the total
to the 25 industrialised nations.
12 F. Stewart (1985), «The international debt situation and North-South Relations», World Development, N. 13,
February.
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or outflow related to its external debt. It is measured as the difference between the net capital
inflow (i.e. the difference between the gross inflow and the amortisation on past debt) and
interest payments on the existing accumulated debt. Thus, the basic transfer concept
represents the amount of foreign exchange that a country is receiving or losing each year
because of international borrowing.
FN = dD
Where:
FN  is the net capital inflow
D is the total accumulated foreign debt
d is the percentage rate of increase of debt
BT = dD – rD = (d – r)D
where:
BT is the basic transfer
r is the average rate of interest (and rD is total annual interest payments).
If  r < d, then BT will be positive and the country will be receiving foreign exchange;
if  r > d, then BT will be negative and the country will be losing foreign exchange.
From these relations, it derives that in the early stages of debt accumulation (when D is
relatively small), d is likely to be high and r is low (at least lower than d); exactly the
opposite to the situation when the accumulated debt becomes large and determines a self-
reinforcing phenomenon, into a downward spiral of negative BT, dwindling foreign reserves,
expectations of currency devaluation and substantial flight of capital, BoP deficit.
4. Foreign debt and development
In the 1990s, by analysing foreign debt and economic performance in an aggregate context,
economic literature has found a fairly robust statistical relationship between high foreign debt
burdens and poor economic performance13. What has not been adequately studied is that in
poor countries fragile budgetary systems may entail difficult fiscal policy tradeoffs. There is a
link between the effects of public debt on economic development and the effects of foreign
debt on economic development.
In fact, possible channels that can transmit negative effects of the fiscal burden of foreign
debt on economic performance are:
(i) Cash-flow effects stemming from public expenditure crowding-out. Public
expenditures could have complementary effects on private investment, but as these
expenditures are crowded out by public debt service, poor countries miss out on these
complementarity effects, and thereby experience lower levels of private investment
and growth than it would be possible.
(ii) Cash-flow effects stemming from import compression. In fact, as the ability of poor
economies to substitute between imported and domestic capital goods is limited, a
reduction in capital goods imports will lead to a decline in investment activity and
growth. Moreover, import compression occurs both at the balance of payments level
                                                
13 P. Hjertholm, J. Laursen, H. White (2000), Macroeconomic Issues in Foreign Aid, DERG-Institute of
Economics, University of Copenhagen.
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and at the budgetary level (i.e. the effect of public debt service on the import-content
of government expenditure). Reductions in the import capacity of the government, as
a result of debt service, can reduce government investment activity.
(iii) Disincentives associated with a large debt overhang. Investors hope that their
expected return will be realised. An «overhang» of public debt can affect this
«incentive structure», because the tax disincentives associated with high debt burdens
(part of any future increase in output will go to repay foreign creditors: this will be
perceived domestically as a «tax» on investment returns, which in turn will
discourage investors)14 and broad measures of macroeconomic instability (there is a
lack of the element of certainty guaranteed by macroeconomic stability, which is
enabling for investment planning).
(iv) As a result of higher debt burdens, uncertainty about international creditworthiness
may produce restrictions on access to international capital markets.
Moreover, debt can increase the overall fiscal deficit directly by increasing debt service
payments15. It can lead to exchange rate depreciation, for balance of payments reasons,
whereby the fiscal deficit widens because the home currency value of public debt service may
increase relatively to public revenue. An increase in the part of the fiscal deficit that is
monetized (through higher government credits), can lead to monetary expansion and inflation
(exactly the same as in the budget deficit case described above). Exceptional financing, such
as payment arrears and rescheduling of debt payments maintains uncertainty about the future
debt servicing profile of the public sector, while at the same time disrupting ordinary trade
flows. Debt-induced fluctuations in macro indicators as inflation and exchange rates may
signal fiscal distress, thus reducing the incentive to invest16.
In more general terms, external debt may have adverse effects for the savings, foreign
exchange and fiscal gaps in the longer term, that is negative effects for economic
development. These aspects should be part of any serious analysis of debt sustainability,
which is described in the next chapter.
5. Foreign debt and two-gap models
First of all, as a premise to this paragraph, it must be reminded that political motivations have
been by far the more important for official aid and loans, especially for the major
industrialised countries17. Creditors and donors give resources because it is in their political,
strategic, or economic self-interest to do so. Some assistance may be motivated by
                                                
14 As such, debt stock reduction may benefit debtors and creditors, and may thus be described as an efficient
«market-based» debt reduction. However, it must be added that the general state of the empirical evidence on
the link between debt overhang theory and poor investment performance of poor indebted countries appears
inconclusive.
15 In budget account this phenomenon is well known: at the beginning there is negative primary deficit (for
example, 10 US$ bn), that is a difference between expenditure and revenue, net of interests. In the following
year, if there is an interest rate equal to 10 percent, no new primary deficit, no budget surplus (revenues bigger
than expenditures), no monetary expansion to cover past deficit, then there will be new debt to cover non-
primary deficit (equal to interest rates: 1 US$ bn), and total debt stock will amount to 11 US$ bn. This
exponential spiral will lead to an increase of debt stock equal to 10 percent every year (the following year total
debt stock will amount to 12,1 US$ bn), that is the interest rate. The way to face this problem, taking in account
the inter-temporal constraint of budget, is to reverse this trend, inducing a positive primary surplus.
16 P. Hjertholm, J. Laursen, H. White (2000), op. cit.
17 It is very impressive the figures of US ODA at the beginning of the 1990s, when US assisted Israel with $176
per poor person, compared to $1,7 to Bangladesh, $2,7 to Tanzania, $3.6 to Mozambique.
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humanitarian desires, but there is no historical evidence to suggest that over longer periods of
time, rich nations assist others without expecting some corresponding benefits (not
necessarily financial: it may be military) in return. Nevertheless, the economic rationale has
been given lip service as the overriding motivation. And the principal economic argument18 is
that external finance can play a critical role in supplementing domestic resources in order to
relieve savings or foreign-exchange bottlenecks. This is the so-called two-gap analysis, which
requires specific attention.
Theoretical literature has analysed why most of the countries have had to supplement
domestic savings with foreign finance. This phenomenon shows the link between national-
income balance (the problems of internal imbalances in the macro-economy) and balance of
payments (external imbalances) analyses.
In fact, from an internal imbalance derives an external disequilibrium. In national income
analysis, the uses of national income must equal the disposal of national income:
(C+I+G+X-M) = (C+S+T) ® (I+G) – (S+T) = (M-X) (2.2)
where:
C = consumption, I = gross investment, G = government expenditure
X = exports, M = imports, S = gross savings, T = taxes.
From the identity 3.1, it derives that:
(I+G) >(S+T)  ®  M > X (2.3)
The relationship 2.3 means that if a government is spending more than it is earning, it will
imply a resource gap within the economy, and then imports will be greater than exports.
The model has two important features:
(A) The Harrod-Domar idea that investment requirements to achieve a given growth rate are
proportional to the growth rate by a constant known as the Incremental Capital Output
Ratio (ICOR)19.
                                                
18 Another important economic rationale is derived from the first one: external finance can facilitate and
accelerate the increase of domestic savings as a result of the higher growth rates that it induces. Another
rationale assumed to be important (but scarcely considered in the reality by the creditor countries) is the so-
called absorptive capacity of the recipient country, that is its ability to use funds wisely and productively.
19 In the neo-classical growth model of Solow with labour-augmenting technical change, the ratio of capital to
output will be constant in steady state. Both output per worker and capital per worker will increase at the rate of
technical progress. The level of output, not the growth rate of output, will be a function of the investment rate in
steady state. One can derive a constant ICOR in steady state - it will be given by the ratio of the investment rate
to the sum of population growth and the rate of labour-augmenting technical progress. A high ICOR here could
reflect a high investment rate and a low population growth rate - both thought to be desirable - not necessarily
low efficiency of investment. The constant ICOR in the Solow steady state does not signify a causal,
proportional relationship between investment and growth. An exogenous increase in investment will raise
growth temporarily during the transition from one steady state to another. In the endogenous growth models of
recent years, the ICOR also does not fare well. A decrease in the ICOR also does not necessarily imply
improved quality of investment. It may mean simply a lesser quantity of capital invested relative to other
factors. The endogenous growth models stress a multitude of inputs besides physical capital, such as human
capital, intermediate «new goods», and organisational capital. The ICOR is constant in the steady state of the
endogenous growth model, as in the Solow model. However, the constant ICOR reflects the endogenous steady
state response of both growth and investment to the model parameters and to policies like the tax rate. It does
not represent a linear causal relationship between physical capital and output, because any increase in physical
capital with human capital held constant will run into diminishing returns. See W. Easterly (1999), «The Ghost
of Financing Gap. Testing the Growth Model Used in the International Financial Institutions», Journal of
Development Economics, No. 60, December.
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(B) External finance requirements are given by the «Financing Gap» between the investment
requirements and the financing available from the sum of private financing and domestic
saving.
(A) and (B) imply the following testable propositions:
(1) aid/loans will go into investment one for one 20, and
(2) there will be a fixed linear relationship between growth and investment in the short
run. The constant of proportionality is one over the ICOR.
As in the Harrod-Domar model, output depends on the investment rate and on the
productivity of that investment. Investment is financed by savings, and in an open economy
total savings equal the sum of domestic and foreign savings.
This model simply repeats what the Harrod-Domar model stressed. Every economy must
save (total national savings = S) a certain proportion of its national income, in order to
replace capital goods (buildings, equipment, materials), and to grow. New investment (= I)
represent net additions to the capital stock (= K), and it will bring corresponding increases in
flow of national output, GNP (= Y). The relationship between K and Y is the capital-output
ratio (=K/Y=k). S is some proportion (= s) of Y; I is defined as the change in the capital stock
(=DK=kDY). As we assume S=I, thus S=sY=DK=kDY=I and, if sY=kDY, then DY/Y (= the rate
of change or rate of growth of GNP, i.e., the percentage change in GNP) = s/k. Thus, the rate
of growth of GNP is determined jointly by the national savings ratio and the national capital-
output ratio: the more an economy is able to save – and invest (and not to consume) – out of a
given GNP, the greater the growth of that GNP; the higher k is, the lower the rate of GNP
growth will be. Moreover, 1/k, i.e. the inverse of k, is simply the output-capital or output-
investment ratio, that is productivity. Multiplying the rate of new investment (s=I/Y) by its
productivity (= 1/k), will give the GNP growth rate. This is what Rostow and others defined
the take-off stage: to increase s in order to have a self-sustaining development, which is
simply a matter of increasing national savings and investment.
From (2.3), in order to fill the domestic resource gap (insufficient domestic resources to
permit domestic expenditures), a foreign exchange gap is needed and created (imports
exceeding exports). It requires to fill the foreign exchange gap. This can be done through the
usage of foreign exchange reserves or through external financing (foreign aid, gross-border
sovereign lending by commercial banks, private foreign investment – foreign direct
investment and portfolio investment – loans from the World Bank, access to the drawing
rights in the IMF).
Trade gap, which is based on the further assumption that not all investment goods can be
produced domestically, is in addition to the savings gap. If the savings gap is directly linked
to the Harrod-Domar model, the foreign exchange gap derives from the assumption that
production is constrained by inputs, which are provided by imports. In this case, the foreign
exchange gap can be described as a technological gap and the filling of this gap is useful to
buy these needed inputs, rather than being complementary to national saving. Hence a certain
level of imports is required to attain desired investment (i.e. once again the investment
                                                
20 In an endogenous growth model, a lump sum transfer like aid/loans would have no effect on the rate of
investment. There is also a moral hazard problem with giving aid/loans on the basis of a «financing gap».
Recipient countries will have an incentive to maintain or increase the «financing gap» by low saving (i.e. high
consumption) so as to get more external resources. Even if the donor/lender puts savings conditions on the
aid/loans, the conditions may not be credible if the recipient perceives the donor as soft-hearted (donor
conditionality has indeed turned out to be ineffective in changing recipient behaviour). All of these theoretical
perspectives are inconsistent with the one-to-one aid/loan to investment link postulated in the Financing Gap
Model. See W. Easterly (1999), ibid.
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required to achieve the target growth rate). The import bill is financed either from export
earnings or foreign capital inflows (e.g. external debt and aid). If exports are not sufficient to
cover the whole bill the availability of foreign exchange (forex) to purchase imported capital
goods (rather than the supply of domestic savings) may become the binding constraint on
growth. Hence, there is binding trade gap, also called the foreign exchange (forex) gap21.
Through foreign finance it is possible to fill the foreign-exchange gap, which allows the real
capital transfer in the form of imports greater than exports. The more domestic investment is
high, the more the foreign finance must be large.
The amount of needed foreign finance depends on the target level of GNP: at the given level
of GNP, foreign finance must cover the balance of trade deficit (=M-X), plus servicing of
external debt, outflow of interest, dividends and profits on private foreign investment, capital
flight, and the desired build-up of foreign exchange reserves. The net capital inflow is
equivalent to the net resource transfer, which finances the resource gap and the foreign
exchange gap. In filling the resource gap, foreign capital provides an equivalent increment to
the capital stock and, in filling the foreign-exchange gap, makes it possible to complement
domestic capital in production with imports (current account deficit).
Ldcs face either a shortage of domestic savings to match investment opportunities (= savings-
gap, or gap of domestic real resources) or a shortage of foreign exchange to finance needed
imports of capital and intermediate goods (foreign-exchange gap).
In order to facilitate econometric analysis, but at cost of being unrealistic, these two gaps are
assumed to be unequal in magnitude and independent, that is there is no substitutability
between savings and foreign exchange. In this case, one of the two gaps is dominant at a
given time.
If the savings gap dominates, then the country is not using all of its foreign-exchange
earnings, because of lack of sufficient productive resources (labour included) to carry out
additional investment through imports of additional capital goods from abroad. It means that
if the import occurs, then it will lead to inflation and to redirect domestic resources. Savings-
gap countries therefore do not need external debt.
Most Ldcs are assumed to fall into the second and worst case, when the foreign-exchange gap
is dominating. These countries have excess of productive resources (particularly labour) and
all used foreign-exchange is used for imports. They have complementary domestic resources,
which can not be used for new investment projects because of lack of external finance to
import new capital goods. Thus, they do not reach the potential real rate of economic growth.
Obviously, such gaps forecasts are quite mechanistic and even if exports (=Ex) and capital
inflow (=F=M-Ex) seem substitutable, they have different indirect effects, especially
considering that F represents loans that need to be repaid.
Given the Harrod-Domar model assumptions, savings and trade limited performance can
prevent countries from dynamic growth process. If in a given country exports earnings make
it possible to get all the foreign exchange needed to buy imports and foreign capital, then
GNP growth could be constrained by the domestic savings gap22. Whereas, if the country is
                                                
21 The two gaps are combined in the two-gap model. Growth will be constrained by the larger of the two ex ante
gaps. If aid is insufficient to fill the larger of these gaps the desired growth rate cannot be attained. That is, the
gaps are not additive: aid simultaneously fills both gaps (by paying for imported capital equipment a single aid
dollar relaxes both the savings and the forex constraint).
22 The idea of a gap only makes sense given an exogenously determined target growth rate. A distinction is thus
made between the ex ante savings gap (the difference between desired investment and domestic savings) and the
ex post savings gap (the difference between actual investment and domestic savings).
50
not able to export enough, then the external gap will be the main constraint, and the economy
can not reach an higher productive capacity, because it can not augment the capital stock, and
it induces reduction to the rate of growth. Within the context of the Harrod-Domar model,
this corresponds to the situation in which the warranted growth rate (Gw = s/v = saving
propensity/capital-output ratio), which satisfies the Keynesian condition for macro
equilibrium, is lower than the natural growth rate (n = l+t = population growth + progress of
technological knowledge), which allows the continuous maintenance of full employment. In
this situation there is a growth path which is warranted (actual investment and saving =
desired investment and saving), providing the equilibrium between demand and supply in the
long run, without fully employment of labour force. The problem of knife-edge balance
between warranted and natural rates of growth that was introduced by Harrod and Domar, has
attracted a number of comments23. Foreign finance creates the situation, which satisfies the
condition for steady-state growth that is full employment, contrasting the resource and/or
foreign exchange gaps.
Chenery and Bruno introduced this two-gap model, based on internal and external balance, in
its theoretical aspects24 in 1962, and it was clearly described by McKinnon25 in 1964, within
a neo-classical framework, based on the importance of financial support to growth. Then, in
1966, Chenery and Strout stressed, through an explicit model, the importance of expansion of
productive structures, in order to increase domestic investment and production, that is the
pre-condition to repay external finance and close the foreign exchange gap, through the rise
of exports26.
Still today economists at the World Bank use some variant of the Financing Gap model to
make growth and financing gap projections. According to the Spring 1995 reference guide to
the standard World Bank model, «the ICOR and prior investment determine GDP». Country
economists make assumptions about ICORs and national saving and calculate the Financing
Gap corresponding to a target growth rate. World Bank staff presents the result of this
calculation at meetings where aid donors agree upon aid amounts for a specific country. The
World Bank is not alone; virtually all international institutions addressing the needs of poor
countries stress the short-run necessity of both investment and aid for growth. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) today trains developing country officials to project
investment requirements as the «target growth rate times the ICOR» 27.
As the World Bank (1991) noted, «This so-called two gap model of the domestic saving and
foreign exchange constraint to growth guided external aid and lending agencies in judging the
extra resources that developing countries would need to finance imports and investment».
Economists computerised Chenery’s version of the Financing Gap model at the World Bank
in 1971, where Chenery was now the chief economic adviser to Bank President Robert
                                                
23 Robinson and Kaldor treated saving propensity as a variable depending on the distribution of income, whereas
Solow and Swan considered the capital-output ratio as a variable. See A. Sen (ed.) (1970), Growth Economics.
Selected Readings, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
24 H. B. Chenery and M. Bruno (1962), «Development Alternatives in an open economy: the case of Israel»,
Economic Journal, No. 72.
25 R. I. McKinnon (1964), «Foreign exchange constraints in economic development and efficient aid
allocation», Economic Journal.
26 Chenery and Strout (1966) called their model the Two Gap model. The investment-savings gap was one of the
Two Gaps. The other was the trade gap which ex post is equal to the investment gap, but ex ante might be a
constraint in an import-constrained economy with fixed prices. IFI staff still occasionally use the trade gap
instead of the investment-saving gap, but this is of little consequence since the two are equal.
27 See W. Easterly (1999), op. cit.
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McNamara. Although Chenery and Strout were vague over what time horizon to use their
model, the computerised version of the model had a lag of one year from investment to
growth28.
6. The IMF and the World Bank approaches
Given the links between external disequilibrium, fiscal disequilibrium and inflation pressure,
it is useful to describe and examine the basic macroeconomic models utilised by the IMF for
«financial programming» of stabilisation plans. This approach, called the monetary approach
to the balance of payments29, ensures consistency between the monetary impact of policy
changes and the desired balance of payments outcome. It is aimed at closing external
disequilibrium and ensuring inflation control, through budget control. The IMF mandate is to
finance temporary balance of payments disequilibria; when deficits are not temporary they
must be rendered so by corrective policy measures. The basic assumption is that inflation is
due to an excess of money supply, caused by deficit spending. The core idea is that austerity
reduces demand and, given the production level, prices decrease.
Real GDP is taken to be exogenously determined and quite stable, the velocity of money is
assumed to be constant, whereas the change in the domestic price level is the endogenous
variable.
Economy is divided into four sectors: public, private, banking and foreign sector. Public
sector neither invests nor produces and it uses receipts for consumption and foreign assets
accumulation; private sector has no domestic financial asset, can borrow from commercial
banks and accumulates asset-holdings abroad through capital flight. The balance of payments
is expressed as the difference between the private sector’s flow demand for imports and the
flow of domestic credit. Increases in domestic credit will be offset by decreases in foreign
reserves; a reduction in the rate of expansion of domestic credit will improve the balance of
payments performance and reduce domestic inflation, with any given rate of inflation. But
through changes in the rate of expansion of domestic credit, it is not possible to choose
independently the targets for the balance of payments and domestic inflation: in Tinbergen
terms, two targets can not be achieved with a single instrument. The use of the exchange rates
(the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency) as a policy tool provides the way
out of this problem. With two instruments at disposal, a government can attain the targeted
values for both the balance of payments and the rate of inflation.
Any increase in domestic real GDP and in domestic price raise spending on imports, while
devaluation will reduce imports if the volume of imports is responsive to relative prices30.
The volume of exports is assumed to depend on the relative price of foreign goods in terms of
domestic goods.
                                                
28 See W. Easterly (1999), op. cit.
29 See J. J. Polak (1957), Monetary analysis of income formation and payments problems, IMF Staff Papers,
Vol. 6, Washington D.C.; W. E. Robichek (1967) "Financial Programming Exercises of the International
Monetary Fund in Latin America", Address to a seminar of Brazilian professors of economics, Rio de Janeiro;
IMF (1977a), The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments. Washington D.C.; IMF (1977b) "Theoretical
Aspects of the Design of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs". IMF Occasional Papers, September; H. G.
Johnson (1977) "The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments - A nontechnical guide", Journal of
International Economics, vol.7; F. Hahn (1977) "The Monetary approach to the Balance of Payments", Journal
of International Economics, vol.7.
30 But a common problem for developing countries is that a fall in the value of national currency relative to
other currencies makes terms of trade worse, reducing the real value of local resources for consumption, as
imports become more expensive, and increasing the cost of debt service, which is expressed in foreign currency.
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Money demand rises in proportion to the inflation rate and the growth rate of capital stock (or
capacity). Higher money demand due to capacity growth is «seignorage»: it is the money that
the banking system gets to create without inflationary complications.
The IMF approach is focused on inflation and foreign reserves, which is the instruments to
solve the problem of balance of payments disequilibria. The foreign exchange problem is
assumed to be the core issue, whereas the fiscal problem is not a priority within this model.
Foreign exchange and domestic total credit are the basic instruments. A ceiling level of
budget deficit is fixed. A limited increase in total domestic credit (instrument 1) should affect
domestic equilibrium, while devaluation of foreign exchange (instrument 2) should affect the
external equilibrium. But, in this model, the domestic effect induced by the foreign exchange
policy is not clear: income rate growth changes derived by this policy can be inversely
correlated to price changes.
Polak’s basis for the IMF approach to stabilisation policies
The basic assumptions are:
Y = vMs
M = mY
Where:
Y = GNP Ms = money supply M = imports
v = marginal propensity to keep money m = marginal propensity to import
These assumptions, based on the quantity theory of money (MV=PT, where V= velocity of
circulation; P= price level; T= the number of transactions in the period), imply a constant
velocity of circulation of the quantity of money, which is the central pivot of monetarism: for
a given number of transactions, the relationship between the quantity of Money (=Ms) and the
price level (=p) is direct; thus, any increase in the money supply will lead to an increase in
the price level, i.e. to inflation31.
The changes in the quantity of money and balance of payments are:
DMs = B + DD
B = X – M + K
Where:
B = changes in the balance of payments D = total domestic credit
X = exports K = total capital inflow, net
In equilibrium:
Y=Y -1  M s =M s-1 B=B-1 DY=DY-1
Thus, any increase in domestic credit induces an higher level of imports (in order to keep the
monetary and income equilibrium), which reduces foreign reserves, without affecting real
production, employment and domestic rate of inflation.
                                                
31 «The principal tenet of monetarism is that inflation is at all times and averywhere a monetary phenomenon.
Its principal corollary is that only a slow and steady rate of increase in the money supply – one in line with the
real growth of the economy – can ensure price stability». G. Macesich (1983), Monetarism, Theory and Policy,
Praeger Special Studies, New York, p. 3.
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For any level of K and X, the increase of domestic credit is dependent on the desired target of
balance of payments. Money demand is always stable, linked to income changes:
DM s = f (DY)
Any change of credit or quantity of money should be based on inflation and balance of
payments target.
Assuming a balance of trade deficit in a given Ldc, the IMF approach implies a stabilisation
plan to correct the external unbalance. Given the level of real production, domestic inflation
and employment, money demand is estimated, on the basis of the reduction of credit, needed
to correct the balance of payments. A reduction of fiscal deficit is the way, which can
improve trade account, through a reduction of domestic absorption; a reduction of the
quantity of money is another way, which operates through a reduction of inflation and
imports.
The main limitations of this model are:
(a) it is based on monetary variables, without taking in account any real variable (production,
employment);
(b) it is based on the flexibility of nominal wages and on the link between domestic and
international inflation and interest rates (at least, a linkage referred to tradable goods
prices);
(c) it does not consider the possibility of a Keynesian context, where a reduction of domestic
credit is not the correct way to reduce the balance of payments disequilibria, because it
can produce, in the short-term, a change in production, employment and inflation. Also
devaluation can produce positive or negative effects in the short-term, according to the
change induced on nominal wages, and it determines domestic inflation pressure, in the
case of full employment.
This IMF approach can be combined to the World Bank model, which is a variant of the two-
gap growth model and is defined within the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM).
If the IMF approach is based on financial variables, the World Bank focus is on real
variables.
If the IMF is concerned with temporary balance of payments disequilibria, the World Bank is
charged with the financing of growth and development over the medium-term. The basic
approach of the World Bank stresses the relationship between savings, foreign capital
inflows, investment and growth. The RMSM is an accounting framework linking the national
accounts and the balance of payments, focussed on the foreign financing gap and on the need
of foreign borrowing. Inflation, in this case, is not considered an endogenous variable within
the model. The incremental capital-output ratio, private sector savings rate and exports are
assumed as exogenous variables. The growth of real GDP is based on the available level of
investment (or the required level, consistent with a desired rate of growth), thus the basic
relationship is between changes in output and investment. An increase in output increases
both domestic savings according to the given saving rate, and the inflow of foreign saving,
according to the marginal propensity to import. In order to raise domestic savings the policy
tool available in the World Bank model are public consumption and tax receipts:
(a) A reduction in public consumption increases public sector saving while leaving private
saving unchanged.
(b) An increase in tax revenues raises public sector saving while reducing private saving, but
this reduction is smaller than the increase in public sector saving, as the private sector
responds to the decline of disposable income by reducing both saving and consumption.
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The RMSM framework is used, in the context of the two-gap growth models, to determine
the growth effects of different levels of foreign financing. For a given growth rate the
incremental capital-output ratio determines the required level of investment; if foreign
savings is constrained, domestic savings is determined residually. Nothing can ensure in this
model that this domestic savings level is consistent with the real level. With the introduction
of the exchange rate, the model is determined even with a constraint on foreign inflows:
through an exchange rate depreciation, an increase in exports can be induced to produce the
foreign exchange needed to purchase the «required» minimum level of imports.
The model developed by Moshin Khan, Peter Montiel and Naadem U. Haque 32 in 1990 is an
attempt to merge the IMF and the World Bank approach within a common framework, in
designing adjustment programs to support lending activities.
Another interesting study, presented by Khan and Knight33, simulated two different
approaches, referred as a «standard» short-term-oriented stabilisation program and an
«extended» version. Both of these models are aimed at improving the balance of payments
situation; what is different is time horizon. The standard approach is searching for an
immediate improvement (a coherent outcome is expected within one year), whereas the
extended version is a less intensive, but more prolonged strategy. What the comparison,
based on 29 Ldcs, shows is that any reduction in domestic credit and fiscal deficit affects real
variables and that different time horizons produce different real costs of adjustment. The
shorter is time horizon, more drastic is intervention (strong recession followed by strong
improvement of balance of payments) and higher are social costs, in terms of unemployment,
and less durable is performance34. In the long run, a gradual approach seems to produce an
higher income growth rate and/or lower external deficit35.
7. A three-gap model
Even as its use spread throughout the World Bank and other International Financial
Institutions (IFIs), the run of the Financing Gap Model in the academic literature was
                                                
32 M. Khan, P. Montiel and N. U. Haque (1990) "Adjustment with Growth: Relating the Analytical Approaches
of the World Bank and the IMF", Journal of Development Economics, vol.31.
33 M. Khan, M. D. Knight (1981), «Stabilisation Programs in Developing Countries: A Formal Framework»,
IMF Staff Papers, Washington D.C.
34 «(...) It took the United States seven years to reduce its fiscal deficit from 6 percent of GNP to below 4
percent. IMF stand-bys, meanwhile, can require lowering a 6 percent fiscal deficit to 3 percent in only one year.
Is it logical to ask others to do what one is unwilling to do oneself?». P. Meller (1990), «Comments to "What
Washington Means by Policy Reform"», J. Williamson (1990),
Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Institute for International Economics, Washington
D.C.
35 A. Buira (1983), «IMF Financial Programs and Conditionality», Journal of Development Economics, No. 1.
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closing36. A «gap» segment of the literature still exists today in the three-gap model of Bacha
1990 and Taylor 1993, but the spirit of the three-gap model is far from the two-gap model37.
The basic idea is that on growth analysis, it is important not only to look at the efficient
allocation of resources, but at the amount of savings (Adam Smith’s approach) and if and
how it is translated into productive investment (the Keynesian problem). In the same way,
debt crisis can not be reduced to a conventional problem of Balance of Payments, given its
structural nature and fiscal implications (which are neglected by the IMF approach). From
these main limitations of the two-gaps approach, focused on the abstract idea of savings and
operating on the foreign exchange problem, it derived the so-called third gap. As current
account deficits become structural, because of the huge amount of foreign debt compared to
domestic economy stock and flows, it then implies a fiscal problem, when foreign debt is
public or publicly guaranteed, as it is in SSA case. There is a structural gap between fiscal
revenue and debt service, which induces a structural constraint on public budget, imposing
drastic cut on expenditures and investment. This gap, which can be linked to hyperinflation
that induces demonetisation38 and dollarisation39, represents a main feature of permanent
foreign debt crisis and can be modelled as a much more flexible approach.
In the three gap models, output is an adjustment mechanism in Keynesian fashion and so it
has not a stable relationship to investment. As Taylor 1993 (p.19) puts it, the three gaps
model drops «the older gap models’ maintained hypothesis that output is predetermined by
capital accumulation» 40.
The amount and maturity of foreign debt repayment obligations in poor countries create
dramatic disequilibrium of balance of payments, which should be financed by trade balance
surplus. Moreover, given the public nature of foreign debt, foreign disequilibrium is linked to
public finance problems, which have exacerbated the problems. The solution of these two
                                                
36 The majority view in the literature is based on the 1980s neo-classical critics of development policy: resource
allocation is more important than resource quantity. Neo-classical critics emphasised «getting prices right».
They pointed out growth failures who had high investment but «wrong» prices. The Financing Gap model had
no role for prices in resource allocation and so the neo-classical approach seemed to rule out reliance on the
Financing Gap model. The defenders of the use of the Financing Gap model in the IFIs responded that aid and
investment were necessary but not sufficient conditions for growth. The idea seemed to be that the Financing
Gap model gave the financing requirements for the «necessary» investment in the short-run, while IFI-imposed
conditions on getting prices right and other policies would give you the «sufficient» conditions for short-run
growth.
37 Over the years a number of other gaps have been proposed, such as the skills gap (lack of technical expertise
constrains the level of investment which could be attained.), technology gap, the food gap, the gender gap and
the environment gap.
38 Financial component of indebted economies have a role in the vicious circle: because of national
macroeconomic crisis, the private sector’s portfolio is much more attracted by foreign assets, inducing an excess
of domestic assets supply and increasing demand of international assets. Linked to the problem of tax evasion
and elusion, which are increased by the presence of credit rationing in international markets, government is not
able to finance its debt and it is obliged to cut expenditure. Taking in account the important flows of capital
flights, the net result may be a resource transfer from indebted to foreign countries.
39 Dollarisation (or currency substitution) refers to a situation in which a foreign currency is used, concurrently
with the domestic currency, as a unit of account. It may involve a loss of seignorage revenue (i.e. the extraction
of real resources by means of base money creation, which reduces the purchasing power of private holdings of
cash money balances due to inflation: an inflation tax), because the demand for domestic base money is lower
than otherwise, thus leading to increased monetary financing and high inflation, which induces a further
reduction of domestic money balances and an inflationary spiral and full dollarisation.
40 See L. Taylor (ed.) (1993), The Rocky Road to Reform: Adjustment, Income Distribution, and Growth in the
Developing World, MIT Press, Cambridge and E. L. Bacha (1990), « A Three-Gap Model of Foreign Transfer
and the GDP Growth in Developing Countries», Journal of Development Economics, No. 32.
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transfer problems linked to debt servicing – from State (through budget surplus, the increase
of public debt and/or creation of money) to abroad (through foreign debt) – produced
conflicts between targets and instruments. The double disequilibrium induced and interacted
with macroeconomic instability, such as capital flight, high inflation, and financial system
weakness.
Given these premises and contrasting the monetarist approach of the IMF, an alternative
approach focused on other interpretations of inflation process rather than being simply due to
a monetary supply expansion. Indexed contracts determine inflation inertia and behaviour of
social actors does not correspond to rational expectations theory.
But, especially when the tax system is not indexed to inflation, its efficiency drops as
inflation goes up. It is due to lags between tax assessment and tax collection, as real receipts
progressively decline as inflation runs faster (Olivera-Tanzi effect)41. Thus, inflation may
increase government spending on entitlement programs (such as subsidies and transfers), or
lead to an increase in tax revenue if tax rates are progressive, but it can also reduce real
revenue in the presence of collection lags.
The resource and foreign exchange gaps are not the only constraints. Based on the
Gerschenkron hypothesis 42 that emphasised the crowding-in effect between private and
public investment, Bacha in 1990, a few years after the Chenery and Bruno work appeared,
stressed the role of fiscal gap. Fiscal limitations can open a gap between desired and feasible
growth rate through the public sector accounts. From one side private investment can be
crowded in by public capital formation through complementarities, rather than assuming the
presence of a crowding out effect (as in neo-classical and monetarist approaches). And, from
another side, public investment is drastically cut after a debt crisis, because foreign
obligations owed by the government induce to channel its own resources to honour them.
The fiscal gap is a subset of the savings gap, the former may be the binding constraint if there
is some limit on public spending (say, through a borrowing target) and private investment is
linked to public investment through a crowding in (or out) relationship.
Capacity utilisation, i.e. the extent to which new and existing productive capacities (derived
from past investments) are utilised, is of major importance for growth in developing
countries. Government efforts to increase capacity utilisation are thus important, and involves
spending on infrastructure, education, health services etc. Curbing these efforts to increase
capacity utilisation can occur when government resources for investment and imports are
insufficient, inter alia, as a result of large public debt service; indeed, evidence is available
suggesting that government expenditure in the sub-Saharan African region has been curtailed
by foreign debt service43. External resources directed to the government budget could thus
facilitate filling this fiscal gap44.
                                                
41 The lack of considerations on exact timing of all the effects of macroeconomic policies proposed by
monetarists is one of the main weaknesses of their approach. That is why the importance, stressed by M. Khan
et al., of introducing expectations on the analysis of adjustment policies: «The introduction of short-run dynamic
behaviour, say through lags in adjustment of prices to monetary disequilibrium or through slow revision of
expectations to future inflation, while perhaps not changing the overall conclusions, would nonetheless yield
useful insights on the time path of prices and thereby the adjustment process». M. Khan, P. Montiel e N. U.
Haque (1990), op. cit.
42 A. Gerschenkron (1965), Economic Development in Historical Perspective, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
43 See D. Fielding, (1997) «Modelling the Determinants of Government Spending in Sub-Saharan Africa»,
Journal of African Economies, No. 6.
44 P. Hjertholm, J. Laursen and H. White (2000), op. cit.
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In such a way, the available resources to finance investment are:
[(S-I) = private component] + [(T-G) = public component] + [(Ex-IM) = external
component] = resources to finance investment (2.4)
Given the presence of inter-linkages between all the components of available resources, the
reduction of external resources can induce a reduction of domestic public components (public
investment), thus discouraging also the private ones. In the case of both fiscal gap and
resource gap, government can try to increase the primary surplus (i.e. the difference between
taxation earnings and public expenditures) in order to balance the reduction of net foreign
transfer. If the government can not move in this direction, then it can try to use deficit
spending, but this option can provoke hyper-inflation pressure, particularly when devoted to
consumption expenditures, which can be more appropriate than investment if they are less
dependent on imports than investment. This will affect less negatively the balance of
payments equilibrium. Also when fiscal gap and foreign exchange gap coexist, there is a
reduction of investment due to the reduction of foreign net transfer, which can be faced in the
short run through the usage of foreign exchange reserves or export-promotion policies.
Chisari and Fanelli45 have stressed the inter-dependence between fiscal gap and investment
level (which induces capital stock formation), by conceptualising the idea of an hysteresis
effect on capital formation in the long-run46. A reduction in capital stock, due to falling
foreign resources, in fact may imply the fallacy of any policy devoted to restore the previous
situation. Not only do the stabilisation policies for reducing expenditures appear problematic,
but it also leads to an increasing need of foreign resources to restore growth, particularly in a
                                                
45 O. O. Chisari and J. M. Fanelli (1990), «Three gap models, optimal growth and the economic dynamics of
highly indebted countries», Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia Politica, N. 101, Università degli Studi di
Siena, Siena.
46 Hysteresis  represent the history dependence of physical systems. If you push on something, it will yield: when
you release, if it does not spring back completely, it is exhibiting hysteresis, in some broad sense. The term is
most commonly applied to magnetic materials: as the external field with the signal from the microphone is
turned off, the little magnetic domains in the tape don't return to their original configuration. Hysteresis happens
in lots of other systems: if you place a large force on your fork while cutting a tough piece of meat, it doesn't
always return to its original shape: the shape of the fork depends on its history. Hysteresis loops happen when
you repeatedly wiggle the system back and forth (cycle the field up and down). The magnetisation of a tape will
“lag behind” as the field sweeps up and as it sweeps down. The memory in the tape is the magnetisation
remaining as the field is released to zero from a large value. In magnetic tapes, this lag is repeatable: the shape
of the loop after the first cycle is roughly the same as it is after many cycles. (This is convenient for doing
multiple recordings on the same tape). Hysteresis was an unpopular subject for decades. Experimentalists
generally tried to get rid of it, so they could get publishable equilibrium data. Theorists cringed from thinking
about non-equilibrium, dirty materials with long-range elastic or magnetic forces. But styles change: dirt and
non-equilibrium are now a major focus of research in physics.  See: J. P. Sethna, K. Dahmen, S. Kartha, J. A.
Krumhansl, B. W. Roberts, and J. D. Shore (1993), «Hysteresis and Hierarchies: Dynamics of Disorder-Driven
First-Order Phase Transformations», Phys. Rev. Lett., N. 70, 3347.
The concept of hysteresis (i.e. history dependence, persistence, memory) is linked to that of irreversibility (i.e.
temporal asymmetry), as the main state of nature, which represents the basis of the new theories on dynamic
equilibria and is directly derived from termo-dynamic literature. Quite interestingly, economic literature has
followed the main shifts in physics paradigms: neo-classical equilibrium corresponded to dynamic models of
classical physics, both being based on determinism, reversibility, steady-state and predictability; whereas new
challenges for social sciences are specifications of dynamic and complex systems, based on uncertainty,
bifurcation, probabilities, chaos. These dimensions correspond to theories of physics that emphasise
irreversibility, probability, coherence, and they imply the importance of specific history (which means time and
institutions) in determining every social phenomenon. Consequently, economics has increasingly devoted its
attention to the so-called path dependency, historical inertia, dynamic equilibrium. See N. Georgescu-Roegen
(1971), The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard University Press, Cambridge; N. Georgescu-
Roegen (1976), Energy and Economic Myths, Pergamon Press, New York; R. Brunetta and R. Turatto (1992),
Disoccupazione, isteresi e irreversibilità, Etas Libri, Milano.
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context of limited capital stock. A dramatic exogenous shock can not be easily
counterbalanced by a political reaction aimed at restoring the previous state.
What makes the three-gaps model particularly useful as referred to Sub-Saharan African
countries is the fact that it recognise the crucial importance of fiscal problems, rather than
emphasising the use of external borrowing for investment purposes (filling the savings gap)
in light of the expected future growth path of the economy or addressing the issue of external
solvency in order to service debt obligations with foreign exchange (filling the foreign
exchange gap). To stress the point written at the beginning of this chapter, it is important,
particularly in the Sub-Saharan African countries, to remember that governments borrow to
finance fiscal deficits, whereas countries borrow to finance Balance of Payments deficits. The
importance of fiscal deficit has a particular nature in Sub-Saharan African countries, where
the decision-making process leading to government budget is not based on the planning
mechanism experienced in developed countries. In the latter case, in fact, governments fix a
desired level of public expenditure, forecast ordinary revenue and define how to finance the
residual gap. In Africa, on the contrary, fiscal deficits may reflect a surge in public
expenditure, imposed by various lobbies as a way to escape from political conflicts, and in
these cases decisions on expenditure and «easy and readily available» rather than optimal
financing are simultaneous, at the best47. The need of resources as a way of war finance,
support to a big push, nationalisation of private sector problem debt, finance of current
expenditure implies the risk of excessive public spending financed through external debt.
This phenomenon reflects the weakness of fiscal system in Africa, an heritage of structural
political, economic and social problems that limits the ability of African governments to
generate domestic revenue. The lack of a broad tax base is the most evident limitation, at this
regard. Since the 1970s, the expansion of urban population to be subsidised rather than taxed,
the increase of recurrent expenditures48, the sharp decline of export earnings which followed
an initial commodity boom linked to the oil price dynamics, the mechanisms of quasi-fiscal
deficit (originated from debt of public sector enterprises), the gradual dismissal of
parastatals49 concurred to increase fiscal deficits. These aspects will be investigated in
chapter 4.
8. Some complicating macroeconomic factors. The fungibility argument
Reality of foreign borrowing is always complex, as the amount and nature of debt
significantly affect domestic savings, government expenditure and revenue (i.e. financing
patterns). Debt is not simply financial amounts originated abroad, which are added to funds
originated from domestic resources. Fiscal behaviour of governments that receive debt is
directed affected by debt itself.
An approach of development literature devoted to these complicating factors is the so-called
«fungibility» argument 50, which has been widely used to discuss aid. If an African
government has $100 million to be allocated between building hospital or buying arms and it
decides to build hospital, when a donor offers the government $100 million of soft loans for
health programs, then the African government can free its own resources to buy arms.
                                                
47 V. Tanzi (1985), «Fiscal Management and External Debt Problems», H. Mehran (ed.), External Debt
Management, IMF, Washington D.C.
48 Unproductive expenditures, such as military ones, crowd out development spending.
49 In a lot of African countries, the use of parastatals was an effective way of broadening the revenue base,
through the taxation of agricultural exports.
50 H. Singer (1965), «External Aid: For Plans or Project ?», Economic Journal, No. 75.
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Without any diversion of fund, the actual impact of debt, measured by the marginal
expenditure that is related to it, is to increase military expenditures. Thus, fungibility implies
an impact on the types of government expenditure supported, but it also affects the increase
of consumption or investment. In fact, Griffin51, considering inter-temporal consumption
decisions and aid fungibility, demonstrated that future consumption (in time t+1) will be
(1+r) times the value of savings in time t (r being the return of capital).
In the case of soft loans owed to bilateral donors, external debt can be treated like any other
income, and shared between consumption and savings according to their marginal
propensities (i.e. recipient
wishes), rather than assuming
that it is used to increase
investment only. For a given
level of income, there is a
budget constraint (in the
figure is KL, whereas
consumption is at point P and
domestic savings is L-C1t).
External debt moves
consumption to Q and
domestic savings fall to L-C2t.
Thus, there is no one-to-one
relationship between debt and
savings-investment, as in the
gap-models.
Another approach used to
analyse the complicating factors is focused on the fiscal response to external debt. Empirical
evidence has been used to test how external debt induces higher capital expenditures
(=investment), lower recurrent expenditures (=consumption), lower tax effort (=revenues).
As a consequence, these effects can increase or decrease the budget deficit.
9. The additional problem of Dutch Disease
Concerns on Sub-Saharan development perspectives have come to be focused around
concepts of a «Dutch disease»52, which describe potentially negative outcomes associated
with an economically significant minerals export sector. As a result of these concerns and
other factors, most oil exporting countries have adopted conscious policies of diversification
aimed at increasing the economic contribution of other sectors.
These concerns are corralled under the term «Dutch disease», which made its appearance
when Holland’s manufacturing sector experienced a loss of competitiveness, particularly
export competitiveness, following the Schlochteren natural gas discoveries in the 1960s53.
                                                
51 K. Griffin (1970), «Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic Development», Bulletin of the Oxford
University Institute of Economics and Statistics, No. 32.
52 W.M. Corden (1984), «The booming sector and Dutch disease economics: survey and consolidation», Oxford
Economic Papers, No. 36(6).
53 J.J. Struthers (1990) «Nigerian oil and exchange rates: indicators of Dutch disease», Development and
Change, No. 21.
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The problem has been mainly laid at the door of an overvalued currency, the appreciation of
which, in turn, was blamed on the strength of Dutch hydrocarbon exports54.
The Dutch disease or, in its more generic format, the «booming sector model» is therefore the
description of an economy in which there is co-existence of a booming minerals sector and a
lagging or shrinking sector. The latter was initially identified as manufacturing, but the ideas
have also been extended in other economies to cover agriculture.
In fact, the standard Dutch disease model incorporates significant movement of resources out
of manufacturing into the mineral boom sector. Developing countries have very little
manufacturing and therefore few capital or labour resources that would move out even if oil
were not an enclave. Main exports, being based on an export enclave model, have little or no
connection with domestic economy. On the basis of the particular nature of such
manufacturing as does exist in developing countries, Benjamin et al. therefore argue that the
developing country variant of the Dutch disease model sees the resource-movement (and
spending) effect adversely affecting agriculture rather than manufacturing.
In any case, «Dutch disease» hypothesises a wider set of costs to be associated with a
booming mineral sector.
From the literature55, one can distil three main effects/problems that have been associated
with a booming mineral exports sector:
a) The spending effect. This occurs when part of the additional income generated thanks to
the mineral boom is spent in-country on non-traded goods and services (education, health,
welfare, construction, other services), leading to excess demand for these since imports
cannot flood in to meet demand and since domestic supply constraints exist. As a result,
there is price (and, hence, profit) appreciation. In comparative terms, local production of
traded goods becomes relatively less profitable and this encourages its relative
contraction.
b) The resource-movement effect. This occurs when the boom in the minerals sector causes
the marginal product of factors employed in that sector to be raised. In other words, as the
output price of the extracted mineral rises, so does the apparent productivity of production
factors such as labour and capital. Where these resources are mobile, they will be drawn
out of other sectors into the booming minerals sector. Put more simply, investors will
invest capital in minerals rather than other sectors because their investments will bring
higher returns, and workers will also prefer this sector because they will be paid more.
c) The currency appreciation effect. According to the standard description, the mineral
boom will cause the local currency to strengthen and appreciate. This will hinder exports
by increasing their price and will encourage imports by reducing their price, thus
discouraging import substitution. In particular, this is felt to create problems for the
manufacturing sector as it did in Holland 56.
Referred to foreign debt, the Dutch disease phenomenon basically describes a situation where
an inflow of foreign exchange in any form (i.e. from export earnings, loans or grants) puts
                                                
54 N.C. Benjamin et al. (1989) «The Dutch disease in a developing country», Journal of Development
Economics, No. 30.
55 A. Jazayeri (1986), «Prices and output in two oil-based economies: the Dutch disease in Iran and Nigeria»,
IDS Bulletin, No. 17(4) and M. Fardmanesh (1991), «Dutch disease economics and the oil syndrome: an
empirical study», World Development, No. 19(6).
56 R. Heeks (1998), « Small Enterprise Development and the Dutch Disease in a Small Economy: The Case of
Brunei», IDPM Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 56, University of Manchester.
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upward pressure on the real exchange rate of the recipient country by stimulating more rapid
domestic inflation. Thus, a large inflow of foreign debt may therefore result in a loss of
competitiveness of exports, counteracting other efforts to increase exports. The inflationary
effects of foreign debt, however, may be mitigated by the inflow of foreign commodities
purchased that increases the supply of commodities in general or reduce supply bottlenecks in
the economy, have a deflationary impact, which may exceed the upward pressure on the real
exchange rate as a result of the debt. Thus, there are some counteracting effects, and it is not
possible a priori to determine what effects an increase in foreign funds will have on the
recipient country’s exchange rate, and hence, on the competitiveness of its exports. In any
case, in countries where foreign debt plays a crucial role in covering external deficits, it is
dangerous an induced real appreciation of the rate of exchange and it is clear that the release
of foreign exchange into the domestic economy needs to be in accordance with the absorptive
capacity of the economy.
An important general rule is that debt must help close resource gaps in the long run, rather
than merely filling these gaps in the immediate future. While foreign loans may well be
needed to help finance investment, imports and public expenditures, the longer-term
perspective should always involve using loans for enhancing recipient countries’ ability to
mobilise their own resources. This would imply provision of financial and technical support
for mobilisation of the domestic savings needed for investments (closing the savings gap)57.
The same rule must be applied to closing the forex-gap (the long-run development objective
must be that a country’s own export earnings should be sufficient to meet import
requirements58) and the fiscal-gap (the long-run objective of aid is that a country’s revenue
efforts should be sufficient to cover its public expenditures59).
Other general rules seem to be much less evident: a case-by-case analysis is the most
appropriate way to investigate the relationship between debt and development, as the context
and its specific dynamics do matter a lot.
10. Last but not least, the important role of all the players
The importance of all the players involved in the «debt game» is a further element to be
seriously considered in order to define a more complex map of the inter-relationship between
foreign debt and development. And these players change over the countries and years: official
lenders prevail in SSA, whereas commercial banks are the bulk of lenders in Latin America.
The importance of players’ behaviour in determining the real relationship between debt and
development is demonstrated by a further element: the nature, effectiveness, stability and
reputation of institutions involved in the debt game as creditors, which facilitate the
mechanism of financial intermediation.
As analytically described, economic theory assigns a basic role in development process to
national and international finance. Loans are viewed as vital inputs in the resolution of
growth problems. Since many people and firms are assumed to have unmet credit needs, the
delivery of targeted loans becomes a major feature of development activities.
                                                
57 J. Kovsted (2000), «Financial Sector Aid», in F. Tarp (ed.) (2001), Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons
Learnt and Directions on the Future, Routledge, London.
58 It means that debt should be used to support a conducive policy environment; to finance infrastructural
development, and to direct support export promotion.
59 It means that debt should be used to increase government revenue in a manner, which minimises the
distortionary nature of taxation, and to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditures.
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In the theoretical Arrow-Debreu world, based on no information or transaction costs, there is
no need of financial intermediation. However, this world is clearly built upon unrealistic
assumptions. Intermediaries are essential once imperfections and frictions are introduced in
the model: market conditions are not perfect, the economic exchange is costly, information is
costly and asymmetrically distributed across agents, technological frictions prevent
individuals from having access to economies of scale. Financial intermediaries relax the
frictions mobilising savings, better allocating resources, facilitating the trading, hedging,
diversifying and pooling of risks.
The work of Joseph Schumpeter60 introduced the idea that the services provided by financial
intermediaries are essential for technological innovation and economic development.
Empirical work by McKinnon61 and Shaw62 illustrated the close ties between financial and
economic development, whereas influential economists such as Lucas63 said that the
relationship between financial and economic development is «over-stressed».
Some recent studies64 tested the positive relationship between financial depth and growth.
They were based on regression analysis for large cross-sections of countries, having the
following form:
yt = b0 + b1FDi + b2Xi + ei (2.5)
where yt is the rate of growth of country i, FDi is an indicator of financial depth, Xi is a set of
control variables, and ei is the error term.
Market imperfections are justification for national and international financial institutions.
These perceived imperfections include both fairness and efficiency aspects. Centrally planned
economies have been extreme examples of this where free markets are distrusted to do what
it is efficient and fair, and where lending is often an integral part of fiscal policy. In mixed
economies, imperfections in both financial and non-financial markets are cited to justify
administered credit. These include – at national and international level – usurious
moneylenders and institutions, dispersion in interest rates on loans, poor people and countries
who lack access to market loans, asymmetric information, and bankers who fail to recognise
the social and global positive externalities of lending to people and countries with credit
needs. This perspective leads to the conclusion that there are many potential borrowers who
are credit constrained, because of badly performing financial markets65.
Given the failures of fifty-years directed loan programs - subsidised loans that are allocated
by administrative decisions -, which have been used by governments and donors as broad-
spectrum policy tools and fuelled foreign debt trap, since the 1980s a contending view
emerged. This switch to a new focus to the role, behaviour, interests and responsibilities of
financial intermediaries, due to the failure of international borrowing mechanisms, was
                                                
60 J. Schumpeter (1912), The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (English
version, 1934).
61 R. I. McKinnon (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development, Brookings Institutions, Washington
D.C.
62 E. Shaw (1973), Financial Deepening in Economic Growth, Oxford University Press, New York.
63 E. R. Lucas Jr. (1988), «On the Mechanics of Economic Development», Journal of Monetary Economics,
XXII.
64 See R. G. King and R. Levine (1993), «Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right», Quarterly
Yournal of Economics, vol. 108, No. 3 and M. Khan and A. S. Senhadji (2000), Financial Development and
Economic Growth: An Overview, IMF Working Paper, No. 209, Washington D.C.
65 See J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss (1981), «Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information», American
Economic Review, vol. 71.
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reinforced by general economic and financial reforms in numerous developing countries that
provided an enhanced environment for financial markets. Nowadays, both the traditional
Directed Credit Program approach, based on lending mechanisms, and the new Financial
Market Paradigm, stressing developing durable and sustained relationships among financial
intermediaries, creditworthy clients, and depositors and being much more concerned with the
well-being of financial infrastructure, co-exist. That is why, in the meantime, on the
international agenda, there are both the issue of debt relief and new lending and the issue of
reforming the international financial architecture. The crisis of debt can not be simply
reduced to borrower responsibilities. The nature, composition and strategies of lenders to
SSA must be seriously considered in analysing debt problems, as they are main players of the
“game”, and they are not the same players who play the “game” in Latin America.
Referring to the SSA case, as external debt is basically owed to official lenders, political
motivations of donors in providing aid and soft loans are particularly important. Quite apart
from the measurement difficulties, quoting statistics on the volume, direction, and trends in
development assistance is of little relevance without an understanding of the ultimate
objectives of foreign aid. In fact, “there is no historical evidence to suggest that over longer
periods of time donor nations assist others without expecting some corresponding benefits
(political, economic, military, etc.) in return” 66. ODA from the DAC countries has been
generally allocated according to such criteria as strategic foreign policy interests, historic ties,
rather than per capita income. “Granting aid to another country is basically a political
decision and as such, therefore, a nation’s aid programme is first and foremost a tool of its
foreign policy. The historical record of foreign aid provided by traditional donors has amply
proved this point. Among the objectives they have tried to achieve through aid, thus serving
as its primary motivations, most important have been those in the realms of security, politics,
ideology, and economics”67. Besides, the biggest simple misconception about foreign aid and
debt is that lenders send money abroad. They don’t. Ninety-three per cent of AID funds are
spent directly in the United States to pay for equipment, raw materials, expert services, and
food...
                                                
66 M. P. Todaro (1989), Economic Development in the Third World, Longman, New York, p. 485.
67 S. Hunter (1984), OPEC and the Third World: the Politics of Aid, Croom Helm, London, p. 53.
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3. Stock, Burden and Sustainability of Debt
1. Classification of economies
For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying
economies is now gross national income (GNI) per capita.
For the first time, the 2001 edition of the World Development Indicators uses terminology in
line with the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA).
Tab. 1 - From the past to the new terminology for classifying economies
Previous terminology New terminology
Gross national product, GNP Gross national income, GNI
GNP per capita GNI per capita
Private consumption Household final consumption expenditure
General government consumption General government final consumption expenditure
Gross domestic investment Gross capital formation
Many countries continue to compile their national accounts according to the 1968 SNA, but
more and more are adopting the 1993 SNA. A few low-income countries still use concepts
from older SNA guidelines, including valuations such as factor cost, in describing major
economic aggregates.
GNI (formerly referred to as gross national product, or GNP) measures the total domestic and
foreign value added claimed by residents. GNI comprises GDP plus net receipts of primary
income (compensation of employees and property income) from nonresident sources. The
World Bank uses GNP per capita in U.S. dollars to classify countries for analytical purposes
and to determine borrowing eligibility. When calculating GNP in U.S. dollars from GNP
reported in national currencies, the World Bank follows its Atlas conversion method. This
uses a three-year average of exchange rates to smooth the effects of transitory exchange rate.
Thus, based on its GNP per capita, every economy is classified as low income, middle
income (subdivided into lower middle and upper middle), or high income. Other analytical
groups, based on geographic regions and levels of external debt, are also used.
Low-income and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing
economies. The use of the term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in
the group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached a
preferred or final stage of development. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect
development status.
The Bank's analytical income categories (low, middle, high income) are based on the Bank's
operational lending categories (civil works preferences, IDA eligibility, etc.). These
operational guidelines were established three decades ago, based on the view that since
poorer countries deserve better conditions from the Bank, comparative estimates of economic
capacity needed to be established. GNP, a broad measure, was considered to be the best
single indicator of economic capacity and progress; at the same time it was recognized that
GNP does not, by itself, constitute or measure welfare or success in development. GNP per
capita is therefore the Bank's main criterion of classifying countries.
The process of setting per capita income thresholds started with finding a stable relationship
between a summary measure of wellbeing such as poverty incidence and infant mortality on
the one hand and economic variables including per capita GNP estimated based on the Bank's
Atlas method on the other. Based on such a relationship and the annual availability of Bank's
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resources, the original per capita income thresholds were established. Thereafter, the original
thresholds have been updated every year to incorporate the effect of international inflation,
which is now measured by the average inflation of the G-5 countries ("SDR deflator"). Thus,
the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time.
The economies whose per capita GNP falls below the Bank's operational cutoff for "Civil
Works Preference" are classified as low income economies, and those economies whose per
capita GNP is higher than the Bank's operational threshold for 15-year IBRD Loans and
lower than the threshold for High-income economies are classified as Upper-middle income
economies.
But as late as 1989, there were some anomalies in the countries included in the middle-
income group (a holdover of earlier listings of what constituted "developing" vs. "industrial"
countries). An explicit benchmark between the middle-income and high-income countries
was established in 1989 at $6,000 per capita in 1987 prices.
In general discussions in Bank reports, the term “developing economies” has been used to
denote the set of low and middle income economies. Bank publications with notes on the
classification of economies state that the term “developing economies... does not imply either
that all the economies belonging to the group are actually in the process of developing, nor
that those not in the group have necessarily reached some preferred or final stage of
development.”
These preliminary remarks are aimed at stressing the importance of being very cautious, not
only because of problems of availability and reliability (transparency) of data referred to poor
countries, but also because the euristic value of statistical concepts, measures and values are
subject to criticism, too.
2. Definitions of groups
The World Bank tables classify all World Bank member countries (183), and all other
economies with populations of more than 30,000 (207 total).
In terms of income group, economies are divided according to 2000 GNI per capita,
calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups, taking in account the 48 Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries, are:
Tab. (a) Low-income economies, $755 or less (63 countries, 38 from SSA)
Angola Gambia, The Nigeria
Benin Ghana Rwanda
Burkina Faso Guinea Sao Tome and Principe
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Senegal
Cameroon Kenya Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Lesotho Somalia
Chad Liberia Sudan
Comoros Madagascar Tanzania
Congo, Dem. Rep Malawi Togo
Congo, Rep. Mali Uganda
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania Zambia
Eritrea Mozambique Zimbabwe
Ethiopia Niger
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 (b) Lower-middle-income economies, $756- $2,995 (54 countries, 4 from SSA )
Cape Verde Namibia
Equatorial Guinea Swaziland
(c) Upper-middle-income economies, $2,996- $9,265 (38 countries, 6 from SSA)
Botswana Mauritius Seychelles
Gabon Mayotte South Africa
 (d) High-income economies, $9,266 or more (52 countries, 0 from SSA).
Thus, considering developing countries only (a+b+c), there are:
Ø 23 from East Asia and Pacific
Ø 8 from South Asia
Ø 28 from Europe and Central Asia
Ø 32 from Latin America and the Caribbean
Ø 17 from Middle East and North Africa
Ø 48 from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Linked to the poor social and economic performance of countries, there is another sub-group
of countries. Forty-nine countries1 are currently designated by the United Nations as the
"least developed countries" (LLDCs). The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) review
the list every three years. The criteria underlying the current list of LLDCs are:
1. a low income, as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita;
2. weak human resources, as measured by a composite index (Augmented Physical
Quality of Life Index) based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita
calorie intake, combined primary and secondary school enrolment, and adult literacy;
3. a low level of economic diversification, as measured by a composite index (Economic
Diversification Index) based on the share of manufacturing in GDP, the share of the
labour force in industry, annual per capita commercial energy consumption, and
UNCTAD's merchandise export concentration index.
Different thresholds are used for inclusion in, and graduation from, the list. A country
qualifies to be added to the list of LLDCs if it meets inclusion thresholds on all three criteria.
A country qualifies for graduation from the list if it meets graduation thresholds on two of the
three criteria. For the low-income criterion, the threshold on which inclusion in the current
list is based has been a GDP per capita of $800, and the threshold for graduation has been a
GDP per capita of $900. In its July 2000 review, in the light of recommendations by the
Committee for Development Policy, ECOSOC declared the eligibility of Senegal for
designation as an LLDC (subject to the Government so desiring) and decided to postpone its
consideration of Maldives' graduation.
In such a way, there is a partial overlapping with the World Bank economic criterion, in fact
most of the  Low-income economies and only a few of the Lower-middle-income economies
                                                
1 In early 2001, following the triennial review of the list of LLDCs, Senegal was placed in the category, bringing
the total to 49.
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are within the LLDC group. The criteria for determining the list of LLDCs are under review.
The Committee for Development Policy has recommended that the Economic Diversification
Index be replaced by an Economic Vulnerability Index reflecting the main external shocks to
which many low-income countries are subject, and incorporating the main structural elements
of the countries' exposure to the shocks, including their smallness and lack of diversification.
Within the LLDCs group, there are some 34 countries from SSA:
(e) LLDCs (49 countries, 35 from SSA: 32 out of 38 from [a] and 3 out of 4  from [b])
Angola Ethiopia Rwanda
Benin Gambia, The Sao Tome and Principe
Burkina Faso Guinea Senegal
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone
Cape Verde Lesotho Somalia
Central African Republic Liberia Sudan
Chad Madagascar Tanzania
Comoros Malawi Togo
Congo, Dem. Rep Mali Uganda
Congo, Rep. Mauritania Zambia
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique
Eritrea Niger
Real GDP per capita in the LLDCs grew at only 0.9 per cent per annum during the 1990s, and
excluding Bangladesh, by only 0.4.
3 - External debt stock
Developing countries can raise external funds from the international financial community and
finance their development through a number of instruments, including attracting equity and
foreign direct investment, receiving grants from donors or borrowing from foreign lenders.
The Debtor Reporting System (DRS) was set up in 1951 to monitor these statistics by the
World Bank, who used the DRS data, in combination with information obtained from
creditors through the debt data collection systems of other agencies, such as the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Recently, the international task-force on financial statistics has been
reorganised: a group of international agencies working together under the auspices of the
Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics (TFFS) - an interagency task force endorsed
by the UN Statistical Commission which was re-convened in 1998 to co-ordinate work
among the participating agencies to improve the quality, transparency, timeliness and
availability of data on external debt and international reserve assets - has produced a new
Guide2. The purpose of the Guide is to provide comprehensive guidance for the measurement
and presentation of external debt statistics; it can be considered an update of the Grey Book,
which was published in 1988 by the BIS, IMF, OECD, and World Bank 3. The Guide also
provides advice on the compilation and analytical use of external debt statistics, and it is
intended to contribute to an improvement in, and a greater understanding of, external debt
statistics. In drafting the Guide, existing international guidelines are drawn upon, notably the
Grey Book, the System of National Accounts 1993, and the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance
                                                
2 TFFS (2001), Draft of the External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users, Washington D.C.
3 BIS, IMF, OECD, and World Bank (1988), External Debt: Definition, Statistical Coverage and Methodology,
Washington D.C.
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of Payments Manual (1993)4. The World Bank is the main repository for statistics on the
external debt of developing countries on a loan-by-loan basis.
The outstanding external debt has several important characteristics. A basic distinction is
between total debt stocks and total debt flows.
Fig. 1  – Total external debt stock of Ldcs (1980-2000)
 Source: Global Development Finance, 2001
Concerning total debt stocks, for operational and analytical purposes, we have to consider:
Ø The maturity: Short-term ( one year), medium and long-term (> one year) and IMF
credits (very short debt). The problems of liquidity and temporary Balance of
Payments deficits should be faced by short-term, whereas development strategies
should require long-term debt, which is defined as debt that has an original or
extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed to non-residents and
repayable in foreign currency, goods, and services. The use of IMF credit denotes
repurchase obligations to the IMF with respect to all uses of IMF resources (excluding
those resulting from drawings in the reserve tranche) shown for the end of the year
specified.
Ø The nature of debtors : a sovereign government, a public or a private debtor.
Ø The presence of guarantees: Referring to long-term external debt, available data
permit a distinction between private nonguaranteed debt, public and publicly
guaranteed debt. Private nonguaranteed debt is an external obligation of a private
debtor that is not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity, differently from the
publicly guaranteed debt. Public debt is referred to a public debtor, including the
national government, a political subdivision, and autonomous public bodies.
Ø The nature of creditors : Official or private creditors. Among the official creditors,
there are multilateral creditors (The International Financial Institutions such as the
IMF, the World Bank or Regional Development Banks) and bilateral creditors
(governments or their appropriate institutions through [a] soft loans, which is an ODA
                                                
4 IMF (1993), IMF's Balance of Payments Manual, Washington D.C.
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component, [b] commercial credits insured and indemnified by Export Credit
Agencies, and [c] commercial banks’ debts guaranteed by State). Multilateral debt has
a preferential status, i.e. it is the first to be repaid. Bilateral credit of industrial
countries is negotiated by the informal group called the Paris Club 5, as well as the
London Club is the forum through which some commercial banks negotiate their
credits.
The Paris and London Clubs
There are two main forums for debt renegotiations. The first one deals with the debt granted from
official source, that is from governments or governmental agencies, regardless of whether the debtor
is a public or a private entity. This forum is called the Paris club. On the other forum, which is known
as the London club, the debtor governments negotiate with their commercial bank creditors. This
categorisation reflects that the negotiations are organised from the perspective of the creditor, not the
debtor. Neither club has a formal or permanent institutional structure, but a set of procedures is
associated with each club. These procedures are used for negotiating agreements with debtors who are
unable to meet their external debt obligations.
The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find co-ordinated and
sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor nations.
There are 19 Paris Club permanent members, who are governments with large claims on various other
governments throughout the world (all the G8 members are within the 19 permanent governments),
plus other official creditors invited on a case-by-case basis (South Africa is among them). Paris Club
creditors agree to rescheduling debts due to them. Rescheduling is a means of providing a country
with debt relief though a postponement and, in the case of concessional rescheduling, reductions in
debt service obligations.
The first Paris club was convened in 1956 in response to Argentinean request for official debt relief.
The main incentive was to ensure uniformity of treatment among numerous European creditors, to
avoid time-consuming parallel bilateral negotiations and to make the bargaining power of lenders
stronger for negotiations.
Since then, the Paris Club or ad hoc groups of Paris Club creditors have reached 336 agreements
concerning 75 debtor countries. Since 1983, the total amount of debt covered in these agreements has
been $374 billion. In spite of such an activity, the Paris Club has remained strictly informal. It is the
voluntary gathering of creditor countries willing to treat in a co-ordinated way the debt due to them by
the developing countries. It can be described as a “non institution” with a strong power over
institutions.
Although the Paris Club has no legal basis or status, agreements are reached following a number of
rules and principles agreed by creditor countries.  The creditor countries meet 10 to 11 times a year,
for negotiation sessions or to discuss among themselves the situation of the external debt of debtor
countries or methodological issues on the debt of developing countries. These meetings are held in
Paris. The Chairman is a senior official of the French Treasury. This informal organisation has made
it possible for the Paris Club to work with limited staff and a flexible structure.
Traditionally in the Paris club negotiations the debtor is a developing country and on the other side of
the table are the governments of the country's official creditors which commonly are OECD members.
Although in theory all official creditors can attend the restructuring negotiations of a given debtor, in
practise only the largest ones do.
The Paris club negotiations can be characterised with three interrelated principles: imminent default,
conditionality, and burden sharing.
The first principle determines that the club will not enter into negotiations before the requesting
country shows evidence that it will default on its debt unless relief is given. In the beginning the club
provided only short-term relief, but with the deepening of the debt crisis also restructuring agreements
                                                
5
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including partial debt forgiveness, low interest rates, and extended maturity periods have been
concluded. The second principle, conditionality, is implemented with the assistance of the
International Monetary Fund. In practise, the club does not enter into negotiations with a debtor
country, which has not concluded a standby agreement with the IMF covering the period for which
the relief is requested. The existence of the IMF agreement is an ensurement for the creditor that the
country will enact policies that improve the ability to service its debt. In addition, the IMF provides a
monitoring mechanism, which benefits the creditor to some extent. The last principle requires the
debtor countries to seek comparable relief from all of their various creditors.
Similar principles are applied in the London club. The key difference between the London club and
the Paris club is the status of the creditors. The former ones being commercial banks, they are more
concerned with profit margins than the official creditors and thus the terms of the agreements are
often less concessional. The London club, for instance, almost never reschedules interest obligations.
Unlike the Paris club negotiations, the London club restructuring must include all commercial banks
with exposure to the debtor country, even the minor ones. The agreements are concluded as concerted
actions in order to eliminate the free rider problem among the creditors. Due to a great number of
participants, the negotiations are time consuming and costly - they tend to be drawn over several
months while the Paris club negotiates a comparable deal within a day.
Regardless of some major differences in the procedures of the two clubs, they share the common
purpose of controlling and restructuring developing country debt in the most timely and efficient
manner possible. Because a good deal of emphasis is put on the comparability of treatment among the
creditors, the restructuring exercise for a given country necessitates some degree of co-ordination
between the two creditor clubs. The multilateral financial institutions often offer the forum for the co-
operation and thus have a central role in the debt restructuring process. Participation of the IMF and
the World Bank is seen to have a catalytic effect on the availability of funds as well as relief for the
developing countries from both official and unofficial creditors. Their involvement in the debtor
countries can reduce the cost debt restructuring to the creditors, because of the concessional nature of
the IMF and World Bank loan packages. Also, as mentioned before, the existence of the standby
agreement with the Fund is a precondition for creditor clubs to enter into restructuring negotiations.
Fig. 2 - External debt stock and its components
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Over time, the share of private debt (debt owed by private debtors) and the share of private
claims (debt owed to private creditors) has increased, reflecting the increased role of the
private sector in world economy.
As of December 31, 1999, the total debt of developing countries (including countries in
transition) was estimated by the World Bank 6 to be $2,550 billion, out of which 2,070 billion
of medium-and-long-term debt, broken down as follows:
Tab. 3 - total debt of developing countries
1999
Long term debt outstanding 2 070,7 100%
   - Public-and-publicly-guaranteed 1 580,1
            - Official-creditors 875,5
                      - Multilateral 345,7
                      - Bilateral 529,7
            - Private creditors 704,6
76%
   - Private non-guaranteed 490,6 24%
Source: World Bank 2001/b
Medium-and-long-term debt can be broken down in bilateral, multilateral and private.
Medium-and-long-term debt
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This picture shows the prevalence of private over public debt (58% vs. 42%), and within
public debt, the higher percentage of bilateral over multilateral debt (25% vs. 17%). Within
the private category, the main components are commercial banks’ lending and government
bonds. Particularly interesting is the role of private banks based in offshore centres.
Public-and-publicly-guaranteed medium-and-long-term debt can be broken down as follows:
                                                
6 World Bank (2001/b), Global Development Finance, Washington D.C.
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According to the IMF7, the total debt of developing countries has increased as follows over
the past eight years:
Source: IMF (2000)
Concerning total debt flows, there are some components to be considered:
Ø Disbursements : drawings on loan commitments during the year specified;
Ø Principal repayments : the amount of principal (amortisation) paid in foreign
currency, goods, or services in the year specified;
Ø Net flows on debts: disbursements minus principal repayments;
Ø Interest payments : the amount of interest (that can be fixed or variable, that is
floating with movements in a key market rate such as the London inter-bank offer rate
– LIBOR – or the US prime rate) paid in the year specified;
Ø Net transfers on debt : net flows minus interest payments (= disbursements minus
total debt service payments)
Ø Debt service: the sum of principal repayments and interest payments made in the year
specified.
                                                
7 IMF (2000), World Economic Outlook, Washington D.C., October.
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However, the absolute stock and flows of external debt are not enough to define the profile of
debt burden, particularly referring to SSA economies.
4. Debt Burden indicators and country classification
Among the external sources of finance (FDI and portfolio equity flows, ODA and debt), debt
results directly in future obligations for the borrower (debt must be repaid). This makes it
necessary for the borrower to make sure that it will be in the future in a position to repay its
debt, notably through an efficient use of the loans, in order to generate funds that will be used
to repay the debt. This is why debt is often considered as a development tool.
Traditionally, external debt was considered as contractual obligations, which had to be met in
full and on time. If a country could not meet its service payments it was assumed to have
adopted bad budgetary and monetary controls and fiscal discipline. Debt relief was only
invoked in exceptional circumstances, to be treated on its own merits and without prejudice
to other cases: an ad hoc and last resort measure, to be limited to the minimum amount
necessary to restore the debtor’s credit-rating and to resume service payments, defined to
minimise creditors’ losses. For the poorest and most indebted countries, the accumulated debt
burden had become a drawback for development; this is why the international financial
community designed mechanisms to rescheduling or cancelling debt.
Without taking in account the possibility of debt repudiation, which arises when a debtor
country refuses to recognise the legitimacy of the debt contract, indebtedness always implies
the risk of default. This risk can induce to:
1. moratorium: service payments, on all or parts of its obligations, are (temporarily)
suspended;
2. Deferral: a debt treatment may defer some debt due immediately or in the near future
to a later date;
3. refinancing: creditors make a new loan that is used to repay the existing debt,
particularly referred to long-term structural debts;
4. Reprofiling: part of the debt may be reprofiled over a few years, instead of a long-
term period of time. The duration of a reprofiling is an intermediate between a
deferral and a long term rescheduling;
5. rescheduling: creditors change radically the terms and conditions of the existing debt
(through partial cancellation, extended maturities, concessional interest rates), without
reducing the total debt outstanding;
6. swaps: debt conversion schemes such as buy-backs, or the discounted value of long-
term bonds that were issued in exchange for outstanding debt realised to reduce debt
stock.
7. forgiveness/cancellation: part of the claims or total debt (interest or debt stock) is
written off, as the final stage in the process of debt consolidation.
Any mechanism can imply concessional terms, if there is a reduction of the net present value
of the claims.
In the context of a concessional treatment, creditors may usually choose among a number of
options to provide the required debt reduction in net present value of debt stock. When the
creditor chooses the debt reduction option, the net present value reduction is achieved
through a cancellation of part of the claims.
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Otherwise, creditors can choose a debt service reduction, with which the net present value
reduction is achieved through a rescheduling of the claims at an interest rate lower than the
appropriate market rate.
Interesting mechanisms offered to creditors by financial market are debt swaps. These
operations may be debt for nature, debt for aid, debt for equity swaps or other local currency
debt swaps. These swaps often involve the sale of the debt by the creditor government to an
investor who in turn sells the debt to the debtor government in return for shares in a local
company or for local currency to be used in projects in the country8. Paris Club creditors and
debtors regularly conduct a reporting to the Paris Club Secretariat of the debt swaps
conducted.
Given the default risk and its implication in terms of debt relief and creditor’s costs,
international financial community introduced some indicators in order to monitoring the
capacity of debtor countries to service their debt.
These indicators are usually based on two ratios:
Ø The ratio of the present value9 of total debt service to GNP (EDT/GNP). This is
considered a proxy of debt burden in terms of the broadest measure of income
generation in an economy.
Ø The ratio of the present value of total debt service to exports (TDS/XGS)10. This ratio,
called debt service ratio, is considered a proxy of debt burden in terms of the
activities, which provide foreign exchange to service debt. It captures the impact of
debt-service obligations on foreign exchange cash flow. This is a measure of a
country’s foreign exchange constraint, taking in account debt relief provided by debt-
service rescheduling and arrears on payments. A limitation of this indicator is that,
given the uncertain nature of debt relief, a low value may reflect an unwillingness to
pay. As a very rough rule of thumb, a ratio of 15-20 per cent or over has been
considered the danger point, that is the limit beyond which debtor countries
experience severe difficulties in servicing their foreign debts while maintaining
existing levels of services domestically. But debt service ratios are essentially an
index of short-term liquidity, and do not take in account of other major parameters
such as changes in imports and new capital inflows, export potentials, foreign
exchange reserves11.
These two ratios measure two important aspects of an economy’s potential capacity to service
the debt. Standard World Bank definitions of severe and moderate indebtedness are used to
classify economies.
Severely indebted means either of the two key ratios is above critical levels: present value of
debt service to GNP (80 percent) and present value of debt service to exports (220 percent).
                                                
8 As in the strategy adopted in 2000 by Vatican – in particular through the Comitato Ecclesiale italiano per la
riduzione del debito estero dei Paesi più poveri, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana -  for Zambia and Guinea.
9 The net present value (NPV) of debt is a measure that takes into account the degree of concessionality. It is
defined as the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and principal) on existing debt, discounted at
the appropriate market rate. Whenever the interest rate on a loan is lower than the market rate, the resulting NPV
of debt is smaller than its face value. The NPV of debt makes it possible to sum up loans with different
maturities.
10 Earnings from goods and services, including worker remittances and without including official grants.
11 Moreover, in SSA countries, the improvement in the ratio occurred in the last 15 years is not due to any
improvement in the ability to service the external debts, but to consolidation of debts or transformation into
arrears.
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Moderately indebted means either of the two key ratios exceeds 60 percent of, but does not
reach, the critical levels: that is 48 % for the present value of debt service to GNP and 132%
for the present value of debt service to exports.
If both ratios are less than 60 percent of the critical value, the country is classified as less
indebted.
Combining these criteria with the definition of countries in terms of income group, there are
six categories of economies12:
(f) Severely indebted low income (33 economies, 27 from SSA)
Angola Ethiopia Nigeria
Benin Guinea Rwanda
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Sao Tome and Principe
Cameroon Liberia Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Madagascar Somalia
Comoros Malawi Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Tanzania
Congo, Rep. Mauritania Uganda
Cote d'Ivoire Niger Zambia
(g) Severely indebted middle income (10 economies, 1 from SSA)
Gabon
(h) Moderately indebted low income (19 economies, 9 from SSA)
Burkina Faso Ghana Senegal
Chad Kenya Togo
Gambia, The Mozambique Zimbabwe
(j) Moderately indebted middle income (24 economies, 1 from SSA)
Mauritius
(k) Less indebted low income (9 economies, 2 from SSA)
Eritrea Lesotho
(l) Less indebted middle income (41 economies, 7 from SSA)
Botswana Namibia Swaziland
Cape Verde Seychelles
Equatorial Guinea South Africa
The use of critical values to define the boundaries between indebtedness categories implies
that changes in country classifications should be interpreted with caution. If a country has an
indicator that is close to the critical value, a small change in the indicator may trigger a
change in indebtedness classification even if economic fundamentals have not changed
significantly. Moreover, these two basic indicators do not represent an exhaustive set of
indicators of external debt.
They may not capture the debt servicing capacity of countries in which government budget
constraints are key to debt service difficulties. Countries that allow the use of free conversion
of foreign currency - such as the Franc Zone countries - can face government budget
difficulties, related to servicing external public debt, which are not reflected in balance of
payments data.
                                                
12 Among the 48 low, lower-middle and upper-middle income SSA countries, only Mayotte is not classified by
indebtedness.
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In other countries, the servicing of domestic public debt may be a source of fiscal strain that
is not reflected in balance of payments data. Raising external debt may not necessarily imply
payment difficulties, especially if there is an increase in the country’s debt servicing capacity.
Referring to debt service ratio, even an high value can be “sustainable” in the long-run if the
export revenues are high compared to import demand. Moreover, where debt service is a
fiscal concern – as it is in SSA – and export receipts are not totally translated into public
income, then this ratio may be misleading. And, if the structure of debts’ maturity, in a given
country, implies that most of them are grouped in the same years, then what is really a
liquidity problem may be confused with an excessive indebtedness problem.
Thus, there are some other indicators, which are used to assess the external situation of
indebted developing countries:
Ø Total external debt to export (EDT/XGS);
Ø Total interest payments to export of goods and services, called the interest service
ratio (INT/XGS);
Ø Total interest payments to GNP ratio (INT/GNP);
Ø The international reserves to total external debt ratio (RES/EDT);
Ø The international reserves to imports ratio (RES/MGS);
Ø The Short-term debt to total external debt ratio (STD/EDT);
Ø The Concessional debt to total external debt ratio (CTD/EDT);
Ø The Multilateral debt to total external debt ratio (MTD/EDT);
Ø Total external debt to total debt service ratio (EDT/TDS)
Ø The fixed imports to total imports ratio (INT/MGS);
Ø The total imports to GNI ratio (MGS/GNI)
Two other conventional measures aim at capturing the fiscal impact of the external debt
burden, which is relevant in SSA context:
Ø The ratio of scheduled interest payments to government revenue, which measures the
country’s capacity to repay as scheduled (INT/T). This ratio is considered low of it is less
than 0.2, high if it is above 0.5;
Ø The ratio of scheduled interest payments to government expenditure, which measures the
constraint imposed by debt servicing to the country’s ability to expand other (current and
capital) expenditures.
An alternative measure takes in account the discounted present value of future debt-service
obligations. This measure is obtained by taking all future debt service obligations (including
interest payments at the original rate of the loan and amortisation payments) until full
repayment of the debt, and dividing them by a factor based on a given discount rate. For
example, the World Bank uses the ratio of this value to current exports. The problem of these
specific measures is that this measure is highly sensitive to the discount rate assumed to
calculate present values, it does not provide information about the debt-service profile and it
does require complex data (given the huge uncertainty on the future).
For economies that do not report detailed debt statistics to the World Bank Debtor Reporting
System (DRS)13, present-value calculation is not possible14.
                                                
13 Namibia is not reported in the World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System (DRS)
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Tab. 4 – Debt Indicators, 2000
East Asia
and Pacific
Europe
and
Central
Asia
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean
Middle
East and
North
Africa
South Asia
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
EDT/XGS 74,8 114,4 172,6 93,8 156,0 180,2
EDT/GNI 32,6 46,4 38,5 31,2 26,5 66,1
TDS/XGS 10,8 14,6 35,7 10,9 13,1 12,8
INT/XGS 4,0 5,3 11,8 4,7 5,4 4,3
INT/GNI 1,7 2,2 2,6 1,5 0,9 1,6
STD/EDT 17,0 15,4 15,6 24,3 3,6 16,5
CTD/EDT 16,5 5,8 3,7 29,3 54,7 41,2
MTD/EDT 11,8 7,4 11,6 11,1 37,3 26,1
Source: World Bank, 2001
Tab. 5 – Income and Indebtedness classification criteria
Income
classification
PV\XGS higher
than220% or
PV\GNP higher
than 80%
PV\XGS less
than220% but
higher than 132%
or PV\GNP less
than 80% but
higher than 48%
PV\XGS less
than132% and
PV\GNP less than
48%
Low income: GDP
per capita less than
$785
Severely indebted
low-income
countries
Moderately
indebted low-
income countries
Less indebted low-
income countries
Middle income:
GDP per capita
between $786 and
$9,655
Severely indebted
middle-income
countries
Moderately
indebted middle-
income countries
Less indebted
middle- income
countries
Source: World Bank, 2001
5. Creditworthiness. Another concept which varies from country to country
The creditworthiness of a country is the estimate by potential lenders of the capacity of the
country to repay its external debt. Being creditworthy is a key to success for developing
countries, as this makes it possible for them to borrow larger amounts to finance growth
development. In addition, a creditworthy debtor is in a position to borrow funds used to
refinance its existing debt obligations. Governments of debtor countries have a significant
impact on the creditworthiness of all borrowers of developing countries, since default of the
government can have consequences for the capacity of other borrowers to repay their debt.
A number of factors influence creditworthiness. Some are linked to economic factors, such as
the capacity of the country to generate balance-of-payment receipts, the volatility of these
receipts. Others are financial factors, such as the debt repayment profile. Political factors also
play a role in the creditworthiness of a debtor country, when its government considers the
cost of paying debt to be too high.
                                                                                                                                                       
14 In this case, the following methodology is used to classify the non-DRS economies. Severely indebted means
three of four key ratios (averaged over 1997-99) are above critical levels: debt to GNI (50 percent); debt to
exports (275 percent); debt service to exports (30 percent); and interest to exports (20 percent). Moderately
indebted means three of the four key ratios exceed 60 percent of, but do not reach the critical levels. All other
classified low- and middle-income economies are listed as less indebted.
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Creditworthiness usually takes a long time to build, as lenders tend to assess over time the
capacity of the debtor to repay its debt before entering into large lending. In contrast, non-
payment of debt obligations can rapidly damage creditworthiness. Under the circumstances
where debt restructuring cannot be avoided, countries that do not accumulate arrears15 and
take preventive steps to reach a co-ordinated solution with their creditors, notably in the Paris
Club, can restore their creditworthiness more rapidly afterwards. In contrast, debtors that
declare a unilateral moratorium tend to lose access to new financing for some time.
Some organisations publish estimates of the capacity of debtors to repay their debt. For
debtors with debt market exposure, rating agencies estimate creditworthiness.
External debt as % of GNP, 1998
Source: OECD
6. The ambiguous concept of External Debt sustainability
Implicitly, two different aspects can be considered to evaluate the sustainability of external
debt:
(1) debt capacity problems, in which the debtor is unable or unwilling to pay debt
obligations;
(2) economic development problems, in which a country’s external debt adversely affects
development process, independently on the fact that it is well serviced or not.
Obviously, it is not sufficient to consider sustainable a debt with a negative growth rate of
indebtedness16. In fact, in economic literature three different approaches, partially
corresponding to the three gaps approach, have been experienced to analyse debt capacity.
                                                
15 Debt due and not paid as of a given date. Arrears may be late payments as well as debt due a long time before
16 M. Simonsen (1985), “The Developing Country Debt Problem”, in G. Smith and J. Cuddington (eds.),
International Debt and the Developing Countries, The World Bank, Washington D.C.; L. Spaventa (1987), “The
Growth of Public Debt”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.34, N. 2, June, pp.374-399.
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(1) Growth-cum-debt literature, to analyse whether foreign debt is supported by output
growth. As development proceeds, changes in domestic income, rates of savings,
accumulation of capital stock, and rates of return on investment can be expected and
countries move from a debtor position to that of the creditor. But there is no automaticity
in this process: the main condition to be met is high level of economic growth: it must
exceed (or at least equal) the rate of interest.
(2) External performance literature, to analyse external solvency through the focus on the
external performance of an economy dependent on external borrowing. The basic idea is
that preservation of debt capacity requires more than growth (even if it is high): foreign
borrowing is conducted in foreign exchange, thus the savings surplus has to be converted
into foreign exchange in order to effect the transfer of debt payments. Export
performance relative to the cost of borrowing is of great importance. To maintain debt
capacity, the rate of growth of exports must exceed (or at least equal) the rate of interest.
When exports grow faster than debt, the borrowing country does not have to contribute
any of its domestic resources when servicing debt. The debt dynamics approach stresses
the need for adjustments in the trade balance in order to maintain debt capacity.
(3) Fiscal dimension literature, to analyse the links between public debt and public revenue.
In fact, exclusive focus on the balance of payments ignores internal constraints on debt
capacity, even though in poor countries these constraints can be of a structural nature.
This approach is focused on the “internal transfer problem”. If the government uses
external debt for investments in infrastructure, education, health, the sustainable level of
debt will depend, not only on the relationship between the marginal social return on these
investments and the marginal cost of borrowing, but also on the governments ability to
appropriate domestic resources for debt service (i.e. an expanding tax base).
The first study, sponsored by the World Bank, to analyse debt capacity of Ldcs was written in
1958 by D. Avramovic17.
In the context of post-war development policies, which involved both Europe and Ldcs, the
main concern was the repayment flows due to increased international lending through the
World Bank, among others. This issue was an extension of the macroeconomic rationale for
external resource flows, described in the previous chapter.
As Salop and Spitäller said 18, debt capacity issue was mainly referred to the identification of
the optimal level of debt, given the terms and conditions of available money, as it seemed to
adequately adhere to the economic literature on optimisation. The basic theoretical idea was
that the optimal level of debt is that at which the marginal benefits and costs of foreign
borrowing are equalised. However, the translation of this idea into operative terms referred to
specific countries was not easy.
Quite differently, derived from the literature on the links between debt and development
originated by the Harrod-Domar growth model, another approach considered debt capacity in
terms of effects induced to growth and development. From this point of view, debt role
changes as development process changes. Again, the basic condition to maintain debt service
capacity is that the growth rate of output should equal or exceed the cost of borrowing (equal
to the rate of interest).
Debt capacity analysis is focused on debt servicing problems, in order to:
                                                
17 D. Avramovic (1958), Debt servicing capacity and post-war growth in International indebtedness, Johns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
18 J. Salop and E. Spitäller (1980), “Why Does the Current Account Matter?”, IMF Staff Papers, No. 27,
Washington D.C.
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(a) find the critical level, that is the values of some particular ratios at which the economy
shifts from performing to non-performing;
(b) assess the amount of debt relief needed to solve the problems;
(c) define appropriate policy remedies.
Many countries – both developing and developed – continue to face the challenge of a
sustainable pattern of debt. A portfolio review of debt must be assessed according to:
(a) different debt characteristics, which have been previously described: external and
domestic debt; short and long term; public, publicly-guaranteed and private lender-based;
by the sector and type of project being financed; average life and duration; present
value/grant element;
(b) existence and percentage of non-debt financing: aid grants19, foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, bank flows, returning flight capital; the terms, sources and
currencies of these flows; the destination sector and projects; the type of investors.
Obviously, it is not recommended to rely on simplistic assumptions, nevertheless simple
hierarchies of volatility among different flows (foreign direct investment and long-term
loans are more stable than portfolio and short-term loans) can be a useful first step. The
currency composition and maturity profile and the nature of foreign liabilities are other
important concern: coeteris paribus, a higher incidence of foreign-currency denominated
debt, a higher ratio of short-term debt to total debt, the bunching of debt redemption, and
variable interest rates increase the risk of an external crisis.
Based on this type of analysis, there are some preliminary broad rules to be taken in account:
· firstly, the so called “Golden Rule”: government should not conduct net borrowing to
fund recurrent spending over the life of an economic cycle;
· secondly, the IMF rules: ceilings on overall borrowing, non-concessional loans and short-
term debt must be set, linked to the per capita GDP of the country;
· thirdly, grants or soft loans should be used for projects without any direct economic rate
of return.
Then, some static ratios of external indebtedness can be considered20. All the debt ratios
previously described can be adopted. The key issue is to define the levels considered
sustainable for the various ratios.
Tab. 6 – Unsustainable ratios
World Bank HIPC-1 HIPC-2 DFID/EFA
Present value/export 220 200-250 150 140
Present value/budget revenue n.a. 280 250 155
Present value/GNI 80 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nominal debt stock/exports 275 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt stock/GNI 50 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt service/exports 30 20-25 15-20 13
Debt service/budget revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. 12
Interest/exports 20 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: M. Martin, 1999.
                                                
19 A useful concept is the aid dependence, measured in terms of budget by aid as a proportion of capital or
recurrent expenditure, or in terms of balance of payments as a proportion of imports.
20 M. Martin (1999), “Analysing the sustainability of development financing”, LSE Crefsa Quarterly Review, n. 1.
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Table 6 shows the levels of some debt ratios that are considered “unsustainable” according to
different institutions. The first criteria (World Bank) have been set by the World Bank in
classifying severely indebted countries and based on the average ratios during 1980-87 for
countries that fell into arrears or rescheduled during the 1980s. The World Bank and the IMF
have set the second criteria (HIPC-1) in 1996 in defining Heavily indebted poor countries, an
initiative that will be deeply described in chapters 7 and 8. The third criteria (HIPC-2) derive
from the HIPC-1 and have been adjusted on the basis of negotiations between the G-7 and the
IMF and the World Bank, assuming the potential cost of different levels of ratios and the
availability of resources. The fourth criteria have been used in a study by External Finance
for Africa undertaken in 1999 for the UK Department for International Development,
covering the 1980s and 1990s and examining the ratios associated with occasions of default
by low-income developing countries.
In all these criteria, the averages on which the levels are based hide wide variations for
individual countries, given different servicing problems, different changes in macroeconomic
prospects and in domestic and international markets. Wide differences are related to the
nature of the indebted country (low-income or middle-income country) and of debt (short-
term or long-term: when short-term is high, other indicators are more important, such as
short-term external debt as a ratio of foreign reserves, or as a ratio of total external debt).
Moreover, other institutions have set other levels of “sustainability”: one of the Maastricht
convergence criteria set by the EU is the ratio of government debt no high than 60 percent of
GDP. The UK government looks at the net position, assuming that net public debt must not
exceed 40 percent of GDP. Recently, in the United States, both Congress and Administration
have proposed budgets designed to reduce the deficit and reach a zero debt target by the years
2002 and 2015, respectively. Sustainability of debt and fiscal policies is one of the major and
controversial issues in macroeconomics.
Given these limitations to general rules, we have to consider another problem: the numerators
are not very reliable. Present value is used to measure the concessionality degree of debt,
considering the cost of future debt service payments against the alternative cost of borrowing.
But the discount rates used to calculate the value are based on those used for OECD export
credits, which do not represent a real alternative source of borrowing for poor countries.
And the denominators are not very reliable as well. GDP is a vague and broad measure of
national payment capacity, whereas export revenues are not very significant as the
governments have scarce access to them in poor countries. Budget revenue and the present
value of export seem to be more useful in the African country case.
Usually and implicitly, all these ratios are referred to public and publicly guaranteed debt,
without considering other types of debt (domestic debt and private sector debt). But the total
level of government debt, total level of national external debt, total short-term debt are very
important in order to better assess the sustainability of debt. The problem of domestic debt
(Cameroon) or private sector external debt (Nigeria), respectively due to domestic over-
borrowing by government and to external over-borrowing by the private sector can introduce
dramatic fiscal, balance of payments and currency problems as well as public external debt.
In many African countries, domestic debt is not represented by treasury bills and bonds, but
is due to the existence of payment arrears or liabilities contingent on the occurrence of some
events (state guarantees of loans, insurance schemes on bank deposits, exchange rate
guarantees, the assumption of debts of entities being privatised). Thus, external government
debt service must be summed up to domestic debt service (including principal rollovers on it)
and measured as a ratio of budget revenue to have a signal of risk of incurrence of arrears,
default or rescheduling, because of the difficulties of fiscal adjustments in Africa. This
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approach contradicts the so-called Lawson doctrine 21, according to which current account
deficits that result from a shift in private-sector behaviour (in the sense that they do not
reflect government budget deficits) should not be a public policy concern.
The Mexican crisis in December 1994 and the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 have shown
that large and persistent current account deficit, basically financed through short-term capital
inflows, can create a fertile environment for external crises. Obviously, it is not possible to
define an optimal current account deficit in a normative sense: Norway, during the 1970s, run
high current account deficits, but international capital markets did not press Norway, and no
interest rates increase or krona depreciation occurred; Australia and Canada have experienced
since the 1950s high current account imbalances, without any serious negative consequence.
However, there are some indicators of potential difficulties22:
(a) Inter-temporal solvency, that is the ability of the debtor country to repay in the very long-
run its external debt, assuming that deficit of the current account represents the change in
a country’s net foreign assets and that the present discounted value of future trade
surpluses must equal the present value of foreign debt23. Expectations of the future stream
of current account imbalances, future productivity growth, interest rates and access to
foreign capital determines financial markets’ reaction, as international capital mobility
opens the opportunity to trade off present levels of absorption against future absorption.
The “equilibrium” response of the current accounts depends crucially on the expectation
of whether the productivity surge is temporary or permanent (only a permanent
productivity surge induces investment and a higher future capital stock, also causing
consumption to rise more than output, lower savings, resulting in a strong current account
deficit).
(b) The path of sustainability, given by trade imbalances and debt dynamics. In this case,
willingness to pay may be an important issue for external creditors. At this regard, it is
not only important to know the sources of the current account deficit, but also the size and
the time profile of the balancing adjustment. The currency composition and maturity
profile of external debt can contribute as much to vulnerability to external shocks as does
the total volume of debt24.
Considering an economy in steady-state, d are the liabilities as a fraction of the country’s
GDP that foreigners are willing to hold in equilibrium (i.e. total external debt/GDP as an
equilibrium portfolio share) and they are assumed to be constant in equilibrium and they are
equal to the current account deficit (=CAD) plus the net accumulation of international
reserves as a proportion of GDP (=FX), in proportion to long-run GDP growth (=g).
                                                
21 In 1988, commenting the UK balance of payments situation in a speech to the IMF, the British Councillor
Nigel Lawson said that, if in the past UK current account deficits were always associated with large budget
deficits, low reserves and exiguous net overseas assets, the present situation is completely different. But, in a
forward-looking rational-expectations framework, current account balances are always the result of private-
sector decisions, with or without public-sector deficits. And current private-sector liabilities are often contingent
public-sector liabilities: foreign creditors may force governments to turn private-sector debt into public-sector
obligations, as happened in Latin American countries after 1982, and private-sector losses tend to be absorbed
by the public sector, in terms of tax revenue.
22 A. North (1999), “Current Account Sustainability: Evidence from South Africa”, in LSE Crefsa Quarterly
Review, n. 1.
23 G. Milesi-Ferretti and A. Razin (1998), “Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises: Empirical
Regularities”, IMF Working Paper, No. 89, Washington D.C.
24 Financial markets’ concerns about Mexican risk were attributed primarily to the currency composition and
maturity structure of the public debt rather than its size. See S. Griffith-Jones (1997), “Causes and lessons of the
Mexican Peso crisis”, WIDER Working Paper, No. 132, Helsinki.
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gd = CAD + DFX = net liabilities (3.1)
Long-run GDP growth (=g) indirectly impacts on debt dynamics through two other effects:
(1) as the economy grows, the desired level of international reserves, which also depends on
the level of imports, grows; thus, with h denoting real annual import growth:
gd = CAD + {[(1 + h)/(1 + g)] FX - FX} (3.2)
(2) relative growth induces real exchange rate appreciation (=e), which is driven by the
evolution of productivity differentials between traded and non-traded goods in the
domestic economy and in the rest of the world, that reduces both debt and foreign
exchange reserves as a fraction of GDP. This is called the Balassa-Samuelson effect and
it implies that also the e factor should be taken in account, measuring (g + e)d.
In any case, even if we use a system of structural equations, econometric models remain
highly limited in their ability to predict a pending external crisis, as unforeseen shocks may
show an external balance position to be unsustainable only ex-post.
In sum, there is no simple rule to determine when a current account deficit is sustainable 25.
The East Asian crisis showed that an high exposure of domestic and international lenders and
suppliers of non-debt capital flows can induce large government contingent liabilities for
bailouts. Thus, the ratios of government liabilities to assets (considering the current stocks
and the present values of associated flows compared to present values of future expenditures
and revenues) must be seriously taken in account. There is always a risk of interaction
between external and domestic financial crises, particularly when the domestic banking
system holds high proportions of its liabilities or assets in foreign currency and foreign
reserve cover is relatively low. Thus, foreign currency deposits to M2 ratios and M2 to
reserves ratios can be useful indicators, too.
Linked to the macroeconomic balances, it is important to monitor the non-interest current
account deficit, the primary fiscal deficit, and the savings-investment gap, even though they
are not directly related to the assessment of genuine demand for debt. But the current account
balance reflects the difference between a country’s savings and investment, thus these levels
have implications for the sustainability of the external position. Nonetheless, high savings
and investment levels do not necessarily mean high output levels, as they may be allocated
inefficiently. Under these circumstances, high levels of public investment do not
automatically enhance external sustainability; its composition is very important.
The same refusal of simplistic assumptions must be adopted referring to the importance of
openness degree and trade issues. Propensity to import and export influences the
sustainability of debt: countries with larger export sectors are able to better service external
debt and implies large domestic constituency interested in good external relations (that is to
avoid defaults on external debt commitments), but the more open an economy is, the more
vulnerable it will be to external shocks. Exchange rate policy, fiscal and monetary policy
have great importance in determining a country’s external competitiveness, but there is no
definitive answer to the question of whether regime is the most adequate: it clearly depends
on the relationship of the given economy within the global economic system, the structural
characteristics of the economy; the susceptibility to external shocks.
Caution is valid in analysing external factors, capital flows and the capital account regime as
well. There is a critical relationship between the current account and the capital account, and
                                                
25 H. Reisen (1998), “Sustainable and Excessive Current Account Deficits”, OECD Development Centre
Technical Paper, No. 132, Paris.
86
issues of flexibility and openness are very important to the sustainability of a current account
deficit. But there is no regularity. Increased capital flexibility increases the country’s
vulnerability to sudden capital reversal, but international investors perceive it as a more
disciplined and responsible economy. On the other hand, the experience in Chile showed the
importance of selective capital controls in order to mitigate the excessive volatility in capital
flows.
A deep analysis of debt sustainability should use also dynamic ratios, as all the ratios we have
considered are static ratios, whereas debt problems are basically linked to the dynamic trend
of payments. The growth of nominal debt, the effective interest rate (including all interest
payments and other charges), present value compared to the growth of export revenues,
budget revenue, domestic savings, GDP can represent the basic dynamic ratios. If debt
growth is lower than revenue growth, then debt is becoming more sustainable. However, the
same criticisms of static ratios must be referred to dynamic ratios using similar variables as
numerators and denominators.
Dynamic analysis represents an evolution of static approach, but it does not solve the
practical problems in assessing the sustainability of debt. The models based on the savings-
investment gap simply say that debt strategy can work if there is sufficient economic growth.
Given that external financing requires foreign currency, as debt must be repaid in foreign
currency, a more accurate analysis of external solvency considers also the relationship
between export performance and the cost of borrowing. In fact, as the value of exports gives a
more accurate measure of repayment capacity than GDP, the conclusion is that the rate of
growth of exports must equal or exceed the rate of interest, in order to maintain debt service
capacity. But, in reality it is wrong to assume a time-invariant growth path for income exports
and the rate of interest, as all follow time paths. Given that also imports play an important
macroeconomic role in the growth process, it should be more appropriate to include also the
time path of imports. It leads to an extended debt dynamic model to define the conditions to
maintain debt service capacity, where imports are treated as an endogenous variable.
Solvency occurs if the growth rate of exports is higher than the growth rates of both the rate
of interest and imports. When time is considered the analysis becomes more precise but also
more complex and vague: the time paths of the considered variables are very difficult to
predict.
7. High debt burden and debt overhang
New lending and rescheduling of payments might only provide an indebted country with
short-term relief. Resulting from the short-term relief the country might fall deeper into debt
if the country's ability to service its debt does not improve in the future. In such situation it
can easily be assumed that the debt servicing capacity of a country is dependent on the size of
its debt. Thus the more new lending is granted to the country, the heavier its debt burden
grows and the more difficulties it will have in keeping current with its external obligations on
outstanding debt. When the difficulties grow too big to be handled, the country has only the
options of either repudiating or requesting for a restructuring agreement.
High debt burden can also be seen as an obstacle for growth. Empirical data shows that as a
result of developing country debt crisis the net investments in those countries have suffered
an extensive reduction. It seems that there is a two-way causality between the growth and the
debt burden. Heavy debt burden can be seen to hinder capital formation and slow down
economic growth through two channels: the illiquidity effect and disincentive effect.
Illiquidity effect can be characterised by situation in which a heavily indebted country
struggles with having to allocate the scarce resources between consumption, investment and
external transfers to service outstanding debt. In such situations funds used for investments
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are likely to reduce substantially because maintaining a certain level of consumption and
keeping current in debt obligations easily exhaust most of the resources. Extensive cut-downs
in funds used for consumption are politically very hard to make and thus short-sighted
politics which cut down investments is often the easy way out for the country's leaders. The
low level of investments is of course in the long run a severe obstacle for growth. An extreme
situation of illiquidity is called a liquidity trap. Then ever larger and larger share of the
country's output is spent in consumption, investments are driven down, and thereby also the
future output. A country in a liquidity trap, due to external credit payments, which have not
been serviced, is hardly able to receive financing for new, even productive, investments. This
is because the new potential creditors realise that the senior debts will be serviced prior the
later issued, and thus the senior creditors would pocket the profits from the productive
investments. As the productive investments cannot be financed, the growth rate of the
economy will further diminish.
Debt overhang can develop as a result of a combination of the disincentive effect and the
illiquidity effect or as a result of either one of the two effects. Debt overhang occurs when the
effects are strong enough to discourage the country from fully exploiting its growth prospects
unless some relief is granted by its creditors. In a country that suffers from debt overhang
potentially productive investments are left unexploited. In such a situation also the country's
creditors suffer as future income is sacrificed. Beyond a certain point, a high level of external
debt acts as a marginal tax on investment because a fraction of the gains in output, resulting
from increased capital formation, accrues to creditors in the form of debt repayment. High
indebtedness can therefore lead to low investment, low growth, and ultimately to low
repayment.
Debt overhang has been divided to a weak version and a strong version. A country is said to
suffer from a weak debt overhang when the debt burden is so large that simply issuing further
financing for the country cannot solve the situation. In the case of a strong debt overhang, the
debtor postpones the implementation of profitable investment projects until at least part of the
debt is forgiven. The leaders of the debtor country have no incentives to participate in
extensive structural adjustment program because the benefits of increased growth would end
up to creditor’s pocket while the short-term cost would have fall solely on the debtor’s
shoulders. The existence of a debt overhang can thus distort the incentives of a debtor.
Krugman (1989)26 defines debt overhang in terms of resource transfers.  A country suffers
from debt overhang if the expected present value of potential future resource transfers is less
than its debt.  The key is that the potential repayment of the country is not independent of its
debt burden. When a country's obligation exceeds the amount it is likely to pay, these
obligations act as a high marginal tax rate on the country because if the country succeeds in
doing well, most of the benefits will go to the foreign creditors.  This, of course, discourages
the country from doing well.  The government borrower is less likely to implement painful
corrective policies if the benefits of improved economic performance go to foreign creditors.
In addition, the burden of national debt will fall on domestic residents through taxation (in
particular taxation on capital); therefore, debt overhang deters investment.
Krugman postulates a relationship between the face value of the debt and the market value of
the expected repayment.  At low levels of external debt, creditors expect that the debt will be
repaid in full.  The secondary market price (which is equal to the market value of expected
repayment divided by the face value of debt, ignoring risk and transaction costs) will be one
and the value of the debt will lie on the 45-degree line.  At higher levels of debt, the
                                                
26 P. Krugman (1989), “Market-based debt reduction schemes”, in J. Frenkel et al. (eds.), Analytical issues in
debt, IMF, Washington D.C.
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probability of non-repayment increases as the country has less incentive to invest; hence, the
expected payments are below the 45-degree line.  From a given point onwards, any level of
debt is associated with lower secondary market price and at first, the market value of
expected repayment would still rise.  At very high levels of debt the disincentive effects of
doing well are so large, that the curve turns down and the market value of the debt starts to
fall when the face value of debt increases.
8. The solvency-liquidity problem of External Debt and need of debt relief
Different features of sovereign lending compared to domestic lending, especially because it
involves a sovereign state as a debtor cause the complexity of breakdowns in international
debt contracts. In domestic debt the creditors are able to demand collateral to secure their
outstanding claims, and the collateral is quite easily enforceable in the event of repudiation.
While in sovereign lending, where the amount of principal is often much larger than in
domestic lending, the collateral is often insignificant, and, in addition, the creditors have very
limited instruments for attaining the possession of debtor’s assets due to lack of enforcement
mechanism. In any case, if a sovereign debtor repudiated, it would more often be a case of
unwillingness to pay than inability to pay. Another main difference between the domestic and
sovereign lending is that the domestic bankruptcy negotiations are mostly held only once,
when sovereign debtors renegotiate with their creditors time after time. The continuous
nature is caused by the creditors' inability to make the sovereign debtor commit into a legally
binding agreement.
From the sovereign debtors’ point of view, bankruptcy implies further problems, as no new
loans would be extended to sovereign states, thus the sovereign debtors must have some
incentives to repay. Moreover, as international debt is a system of facilitating foreign trade,
the more open the country’s economy is the more dependent it is on external credits.
Therefore it is in the interest of an open sovereign state to build up a good reputation as a
trustworthy debtor and thereby sustain the ability to enjoy the services. A rationally reasoning
sovereign debtor will service its debts or enter into restructuring negotiations only if it is less
costly than repudiating.
Renegotiations of debt contracts as a preferred way of dealing with debt-service difficulties is
a post World War II phenomenon. Prior to this, defaults on sovereign debt were common
occurrence. In the past the difficulty in attaining the control of a debtor country’s resources to
the creditor was often dealt with so-called “gunboat diplomacy”, that is with a use of armed
forces. The main reason for the change in a way of dealing with the issue is that in the pre-
1930 period lenders in the international financial markets were mainly individual
bondholders who did not co-operate with each other, while after the World War II, the
lenders have rather been governments and banks who have been able to reach co-operative
agreements through informal clubs, such as the Paris and London ones. Also the
establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has influenced
the international financial markets towards more co-operative direction. Another influential
matter was a change in the relative bargaining strengths between the creditors and the
debtors. Earlier the creditors were represented by private bond-holder committees which had
limited option for retaliation and thus little power to force the debtor to service its debt. Now
the creditor governments are able to intervene by imposing conditionalities, in order to
influence the economic development and the structural adjustment programs of debtor
countries. The fact that most credits granted from unofficial sources are syndicated loans, in
which cross-default clauses are included, has increased the bargaining power of the creditors.
In a situation when a country is unable to meet its debt obligations out of present income, the
creditors have two options. They can either reschedule the payment stream or finance the
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country in the hope that it will repay its debt or they can forgive part of the debt and reduce
the debt to a level that the country can repay. The choice between the alternatives is a trade
off. Refinancing and rescheduling give the creditor an option value: if the country turns out to
do well in the future the creditors will not have written down their claims unnecessarily. On
the other hand, heavy debt burden can distort the country’s incentives for development and
growth and thus be detrimental to the creditors.
Quite often, during the explosion of foreign debt crises, such as in the 1982-1987, a basic
distinction in made: debt crisis can be due to liquidity rather than solvency problems.
Countries can be seen as basically solvent, if they are able to repay (in terms of present value
of future output flows), but illiquid, that is lacking at present the cash to service its debt.
Paul Krugman expressed the fallacy of such an argument to explain debt crises: “If it is
known to be solvent, a country can find voluntary lending, and there is no liquidity problem.
The liquidity problem arises precisely because there is a possibility that the country will not
be able fully to repay its debt”27. Agenor and Montiel28 pointed out two factors, which can be
useful to understand the solvency-liquidity problem: the distinction between the ability and
willingness to pay and the difference between the concept of solvency of a country at
aggregated level and of the government of the country. As a consequence of this solvency
problem, external debt can be sold at a discounted value on the secondary market that values
debt below its face value. Hence, each kind of debt issued by that country will be discounted
on the secondary market, on a par with existing debt, and new lenders would not enter in the
market and no credit will be available for the country.
Public sector is perceived to be solvent if the present value of its future resources available
for debt service, currently discounted, is at least equal to the face value of its initial stock of
debt.
TDE/GDP = pd/GDP – sr/GDP + (ri – n)TDE/GDP (3.3)
Where:
TDE/GDP = total (domestic plus foreign) public debt over GDP
Pd/GDP = primary deficit over GDP
Sr/GDP = seignorage revenue over GDP
ri = real rate of interest
n = rate of growth of real GDP
If (ri - n) < 0, then the government could do an “honest Ponzi game”29, i.e. it could borrow
new credit for debt service since the outstanding debt contributes to the grow of total debt at a
decreasing rate.
If (ri - n) > 0, then it infers a debt growth without bound and it requires that the public sector
is able to service the debt using their own resources, i.e. running sufficiently large primary
surpluses and with seignorage revenues in order to limit debt spiral.
At this regard, evidence suggests that in Sub-Saharan Africa voluntary lending from the
private sector is very limited, the level of seignorage revenue is quite low and that money
                                                
27 Page 290, P. Krugman (1989), ibid.
28 P. R. Agenor and P. Montiel (1995), Development Macroeconomics, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
29 The debt burden can be assessed by evaluating external solvency, in a manner analogous to the assessment of
fiscal solvency: the no-Ponzi game condition prevents a country from rolling over its external obligations
indefinitely. Under this condition, external solvency requires the present discounted value of trade surpluses to
be sufficiently large to repay the existing net stock of foreign liabilities.
90
printing is likely to increase inflationary pressure quickly and to evolve in a inflation-deficit
vicious circle.
t t
TDE/GDP TDE/GDP
 ri - n < 0  ri - n > 0
As suggested by Agenor and Montiel, external debt crisis may arise as an effect of the
perception of lenders that public sector of debtor countries are insolvent ex ante, i.e. the fiscal
adjustment necessary to restore the solvency constraint are not forthcoming.
In this case, the amount of debt is sold at a discounted value equal to the prospective debt
service and secondary market values the debt below its face value. In presence of discounted
debt on the secondary markets, the ability of collecting new credit on the market is reduced.
Given these premises, the idea that a reduction in debt burden could be a Pareto improvement
and therefore beneficial for both debtors and lenders has its theoretical justification in the fact
that debt overhang would act as a marginal tax on the future output of a country. On one side,
the government will have less incentive to implement policies to improve economic
performance, especially if these are painful for the country, as it realises that the future
benefits of such policies, in terms of increasing output, will mostly go to creditors. On the
other side, private investors forecast increases in taxation of domestic income to repay debt
and this acts as a powerful deterrent to investments. There are situations in which reduction
of debt would be also in the interest of the creditor. For example, if the market value of the
outstanding debt is increased by partial debt forgiveness then the creditor can benefit from the
restructuring provided that the value of the claims is increased by more than what the
restructuring has cost the creditors.
The optimality of debt relief can be
examined in a debt-relief Laffer curve
-framework30.
From this figure, we consider the
present value of a country’s debt
obligations on the horizontal axis, and
the expected present value of its
future debt service on the vertical
axis. At a low level of Debt, expected
repayments increase one for one with
the contractual value of debt (i.e.
                                                
30 P. Krugman (1988), “Financing versus Forgiving a Debt Overhang: Some Analytical Notes”, Journal of
Development Economics, N. 29, December; E. Helpman (1989), “Voluntary Debt Reduction: Incentives and
Welfare”, IMF Staff Papers, N. 36, September; J. Sachs (1989), “The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries”,
R. Findlay, G. Calvo, P. J. Kouri and J. B. de Macedo (eds.), Debt, Stabilisation and Development, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford.
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there is non-risk of default). Beyond point R (the inefficient portion of the debt Laffer curve,
with potentially sizeable losses) it is more efficient for the creditor to reduce its claims on the
country and pass on at least part of the secondary market discount as the overall value of its
debt will increase. This is because the loss of the option on the future output of the country is
more than offset by the effect of the reduction of debt overhang on the incentives for the
country and therefore on perspective payments to the creditors. A high debt burden can be a
potent disincentive to investment, especially in the presence of uncertainty about future
output (which captures the likelihood of being able to service debts in the next period). Debt
relief, a form of aid, can then encourage higher levels of investment: within this framework,
in certain situations partial debt forgiveness can be a Pareto improving solution.
In fact, debt-relief Laffer curve suggests that the debt relief is beneficial to the creditors if the
debtor lies on the falling part of the curve, which is often called the wrong side of the debt-
relief Laffer curve. But in practice there are difficulties in ascertaining on which side of the
curve a debtor country is: a useful technique is the comparison between the secondary market
price of debt and the face value of debt claims, but unfortunately for poor countries there is
no secondary debt market31. Despite of these difficulties, the framework has been seen as an
useful way of organising thinking and arguments when dealing with issue of developing
country debt crisis.
Infinitely large debt is comparable to a high marginal tax on efforts to expand debtor's foreign
exchange earnings. Thus like a tax (that’s why the curve is comparable with the Laffer curve
used in taxation models), the high debt burden has disincentive impact on domestic
investment. As government may sometimes increase tax revenue by decreasing tax rates,
creditors may increase expected payments by forgiving part of a country's debt.  Therefore,
debt reduction might be in the interest of both borrower and creditor if the borrower is on the
wrong side of the Laffer curve. This can be illustrated by examining a situation when the
currency income of the country increases with growth of the economy. The country being
heavily indebted, a great deal of the increased currency income goes to servicing the earlier
accumulated debt and does not rise the welfare of the country's citizens. Therefore political
decision-makers of the indebted country will have little incentives to allocate funds to
investments as the fruits generated by the investments would be pocketed by international
creditors. They will much rather spend more on current consumption and thereby try to
ensure their tenure in power. This effect of debt burden is what we called the disincentive
effect of debt overhang. It arises from expectations that future debt burden reduce the
incentives for current investment and adjustment. It can be argued that large external debt is a
bottleneck to growth and development. If this is the case, then by reducing the debt of heavily
indebted countries, the expected amount of repayments would eventually be increased. If the
creditors committed themselves to absorbing a smaller part of the country’s output, the debtor
country would be more likely to pursue the types of investment-orientated policies that lead
to higher future levels of output, thereby increasing the total resources available to both
parties. Sachs (1989) argues that most of these economic inefficiencies that hamper economic
growth could be overcome by partial debt forgiveness so as to improve the position of both
debtors and creditors.  That is, debt forgiveness could in fact increase growth in the borrower
country and increase the eventual repayments received by the creditors. This argument shows
that debt relief initiative can have economic motivations, without implying any moral or
solidarity priority over selfish.
                                                
31 Because of the relatively small proportion of debt owed to commercial creditors by these countries.
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As an alternative to debt forgiveness to deal with the debt overhang problem, Paul Krugman32
observed that under adverse circumstances a “defensive lending” argument can justify quite
substantial increases in creditor exposure. New lending that reduces the interest burden, even
if it is at a loss (i.e. the expected loss on the new lending), may be worthwhile because it has
a benefit, improving the expected value of the initial debt (i.e. the increase in the value of
existing claims).
As for debt relief, the free-rider problem can create a difficulty with defensive lending: it is to
the advantage of any single creditor not to lend more and simply gain from the collective
claims on previous debt; negotiating procedures and institutional arrangements are
consequently required. Non-participation creates a “prisoner’s dilemma” in which it may well
be to the collective advantage of all the creditors to forgive debt or to lend defensive funds
but no individual creditor has the incentive to do so.
Defensive forgiveness and defensive lending confront operational difficulties: how much debt
should be forgiven or how much to lend?  Forgiven by whom, within the map of all the
lenders? At what level does outstanding debt become sustainable?
A general rule may be that it is quite difficult to imagine the existence of a general rule,
which is valid in presence of all the differences among debtors and lenders.
9. Free riding and moral hazard problems with restructuring debt
Thus, a central problem with restructuring of debt is an accomplishment of co-ordination
among the numerous creditors of a single debtor: this is a typical phenomenon that is linked
to the problem of debt overhang and sustainability analysis. Even though debt reduction can
be beneficial to creditors collectively, every single creditor has an incentive to withdraw from
granting debt relief to a named debtor. This is because with other creditors cutting down the
face value of the debt owed to them, the debtor’s ability to service the remaining debt
increases. Fruits of this can be enjoyed also by the creditor not participating in the
restructuring. Then, if one can ride free, why would another one pay for the same benefit? As
a result it might be that nobody will participate in debt restructuring and agreements are
simply not concluded. To provide the creditors with incentives to participate, equal treatment
among them has to be ensured. In reality the free rider problem is partially eliminated with
existence of the creditor clubs and the rules they implement to the restructuring agreements
negotiated under the auspices of the clubs.
When analysing the debtor’s incentives for debt restructuring, the related moral hazard
problems cannot be ignored. The first moral hazard problem arises form a situation when a
debtor country is granted debt relief. Then other countries struggling with debt servicing
difficulties will have little incentives to keep current with their repayments but rather default
and request for restructuring. All debts will not, however, be forgiven nor restructured. Often
the decisions on which countries are eligible for debt restructuring are made on political
bases. Of course the economic situation in the country and its past performance are also
matters of concern. But, we can’t say that economic motivations legitimate a given choice by
themselves. The complexity of economic systems of variables and determinants obliges us to
identify a priority, which will orient our political strategy. The real priority can be the
objective (we want to cancel all debt of the poorest countries) or the financial constraint (we
have a limited amount of money at disposal) or a compromise between them. In any case,
basically there is a political decision, which can be only supported by some “scientific”
                                                
32 P. Krugman (1988), “Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors”, J. Sachs (ed.), Developing Country Debt
and Economic Performance, vol. 1.
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motivations. To think that this causal relation can be completely reverted is an illusion.
Another moral hazard problem arises from the existence of debt relief system. Heavily
indebted country that has been granted some relief has little incentives to mend its behaviour
and utilise the whole potential of the economy if the decision-makers in the country can count
on the availability of debt relief also in the future. To reduce the effect of moral hazard
problems that arise from debt restructuring programs the relief is often made as una tantum
and conditional on both past and future performance.
The standard approach adopted in the debt renegotiations is a multilateral one. This is
sensible because there are typically several creditors who have extended loans to the same
debtor. The multilateral approach is able to ensure the equal treatment of all creditors
involved. It also allows the restructuring process to be conducted in timely manner.
Variety in the outcomes of restructuring negotiations suggests that there are major
distinctions among the issues, interests and instruments which different debtor countries can
bring to the bargaining table. It has been suggested that the difference in the bargaining
outcomes of different countries can be explained with three factors: the size of the country's
debt, its strategic and political significance, and its access to non-conditional resources.
Large debtor countries such as Brazil and Mexico have been able to negotiate favourable
deals with their international creditors. They have received lower interest rates, longer
maturities, larger principal reductions and longer grace periods in their debt restructuring than
countries with relatively smaller debt burden. This has happened partly because the large
debtors have been in a position to threaten the international financial system as a whole. Thus
they have been given more attention and have been taken more seriously as a result. Large
debtor countries are often large economies as well, and hence capable of sustaining autarkic
policy measures for longer time periods than small countries. Therefore the credibility of
their threats to resist required policy reform is greater than the credibility of smaller
countries. SSA countries are small debtors, in absolute terms, and they represent the easiest
target of debt relief. To cancel their debt is not to threaten the international financial system.
It is not expensive, it is manageable and it does not involve a lot of private lenders. And it can
demonstrate the effectiveness of global governance guided by ethical principles and common
responsibilities.
Even more important than the size of the debtor country, might be the strategic significance
of it. Due to strategic and political concerns creditor governments have used their influence in
the boards of the IMF and the World Bank to press for greater leniency and to lobby bank
advisory groups for expeditious settlement of restructuring negotiations. As an evidence of
strategic importance it can be pointed out that the United States have been relatively more
concerned with relief for Latin-American countries, the Germans for Eastern Europe, the
French for their former colonies in Africa, and the British for indebted members of the
Commonwealth. Latest implication of the strategic significance is the generous debt relief
provided to Pakistan following its involvement in the allied coalition against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.
The access to non-conditional financial resources such revenues from scarce natural
resources or proceeds from commodity price booms influence the debtor country's bargaining
position and the financial terms it is likely to receive. The presence of additional resources
can render a country less vulnerable to external pressure because it will probably have fewer
political incentives to make difficult economic adjustments which a restructuring agreement
or timely repayments would require. The credibility of a debtor country’s bargaining position
is likely to increase if its creditors realise that it has access to non-conditional financial
resources.
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Also a number of different domestic factors can influence the outcome of the international
financial negotiations. The political climate in the country can influence the leaders’
willingness the settle a deal with the creditors - if the length of their tenure in power is
endangered, they are not likely to make hard decisions on restructuring of debt but rather
ignore the external obligations of the country. On the other hand the economic situation
determines the country's ability to withstand sanctions.
The particular nature and condition(alitie)s of each debt re-negotiation directly affects the
relationship, which is established, in the long-term, between debt and development.
10. An additional problem. The operationalisation of debt sustainability
There is a clear gap between the conceptualisation of debt sustainability in theoretical
literature and its operational guidance for designing adequate monitoring policies. That’s
why, in the empirical literature, debt capacity is seen from an ex-post perspective, that is
verifying tangible problems (failure to service external debt, accumulation of payments
arrears, debt rescheduling), rather than from an ex-ante definition.
Inter-temporal dynamic analysis must be extended to other crucial variables, which have been
mentioned in the context of the static description. In fact, the use of external debt goes
beyond the possibility to finance investment and imports, as it can also be used to maintain
high level of consumption.
Moreover, a complete analysis of debt sustainability should take in account lender countries
as well. A debt situation may be consistent with the inter-temporal budget constraint of the
borrower, but it may become unsustainable if the supply conditions change. Borrowers’
behaviour affects the behaviour of lenders and vice-versa. The decision-making and
behaviour of lenders and of the institutional framework of international finance are very
relevant to determine the sustainability of debt. Particularly when commercial lenders are
involved, the perspective of creditors, using the concepts of creditworthiness and country risk
(as well as a measure of the borrowers access to international capital market), should be an
additional component to the solvency issue. In the credit-rationing context, directly linked to
commercial lenders, a measure of the secondary debt market values can be used as a proxy of
past difficulties or anticipation of future problems (a para-dynamic approach).
The sustainability itself should be referred to both the borrowing and lender countries. What
may be sustainable from the borrower’s point of view, it may result unsustainable from the
lender point of view. To define the financial cost of any given debt relief initiative is a
legitimate request from donor’s side. Given the financial constraint of the initiative, that is the
amount of pledged resources, we can consider an initiative as “sustainable” only when its
implementation does not incur in extra-costs. This is a correct way of defining the sustainable
nature of a financial initiative, from the lender point of view. Obviously, taking account of
such considerations makes the empirical application of theory much more difficult. Not only
debtors’ situation interferes with sustainability, but lenders’ too. And we have to admit it.
Unfortunately, rhetoric pushes international agencies to present to public opinion the
sustainability as uniquely referred to debtors’ situation33.
Wherever possible, on the basis of the results from debt sustainability analysis, the idea
should be to reduce reliance on debt to sustainable levels of the static ratios, with dynamic
ratios moving in the correct direction.
                                                
33 Public opinion thinks that sustainable level means a level of debt, which can be managed by debtor country
without negatively affecting development process. Donor countries prefer to hide the important lender
component of sustainability, in order to demonstrate their high degree of responsibility towards the poor.
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At this regard, a simple model of debt sustainability, can be derived from Jeffrey Sachs 34.
Given that:
DSt = IPt + PRt (3.4)
NBt = NDLt + INPt (3.5)
Bt = NBt – PRt  = Dt+1 - Dt = DD (3.6)
NTt = Bt – IPt = NBt - DSt (3.7)
Where:
Dt = disbursed debt IPt = interest payments PRt = principal repayment
DS = debt service NBt = flow of new debt NDLt = new disbursed loans
INPt = past interests to be paid NTt = net transfer rDt = interests on current stock
DD = variation of nominal debt stock
And assuming the simplest economy, which produces only one tradeable good (=Q), there is
a typical inter-temporal optimisation problem to be solved. What is the needed amount of
debt in order to maximise the sum of utility/preferences of population?
First, there is a national budget constraint: disposable resources must be enough to finance
consumption and to pay interests on past debt:
Qt + Bt = rDt-1 + Ct (3.8)
Ct = Qt + Bt – rDt-1 = Qt + NTt (3.9)
Second, if we assume the rationality of lenders constraint, which implies that borrowers can
not continue receiving indefinitely new lending to repay past debt, then we have to take in
account the solvency constraint. The value of what is produced (i.e. the stock of financial and
real assets = Wt), measured by income growth rate, can not be –at least in the long run - lower
than the amount of debt:
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This implies that discounted present value of debt can not be permanently positive:
Limt®¥ Dt/(1+r)t = 0 (3.12)
Resource transfer from borrower to lender must be considered normal, if lender wants to
realise a non-negative profit. If resource transfer from borrower to lender is never registered,
then debt stock increases at least as much as interest rates, thus violating (3.12).
Some points to be mentioned can be derived from these conclusions.
Debt makes it possible to separate consumption growth from income growth. Thus, a country,
which is serving the interests of people who do not want to postpone their consumption, can
use debt. If a country has permanently high rate of growth, it can choose to maintain high
levels of consumption, accepting debt in the short-term and paying it back in the long run,
                                                
34 Based on J. D. Sachs (1981), “The current account and macroeconomic adjustment in the 1970s”, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.12, No. 1.
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with increased income. A country can have sustainable present debt, in order to finance
tomorrow investment, which will produce permanent increase of income growth rate.
In terms of sustainability, it is important, even if quite difficult, to consider the political
component too. Alesina and Tabellini35 analysed political determinants of indebtedness. Berg
and Sachs 36 tested the link between debt and political components, using Probit analysis on
24 middle-income countries and they showed that the level of inequality of income
distribution is much more important to predict the probability of refinancing debt, rather than
any other economic variables. In fact, due to inequality, there is more political instability and
social unrest; governments are more exposed to strong pressure and budget discipline is less
important. In these conditions, time horizon is quite short for both government and
population, and indebtedness becomes a useful tool to keep high popular consensus. SSA
continent seems to be an interesting area where these assumptions can be tested.
The nature of sovereign debt implies the presence of specific sovereign risk. In case of
insolvency, in fact it is unlikely that lenders can confiscate any real guarantee provided by the
government. Nevertheless, contract enforcement can be provided by the presence of other
nations or international organisations, which can use commercial sanctions, conditionalities,
and the importance of reputation within international financial markets.
11. Debt sustainability in developed countries
Given longer-term sustainability considerations and short-term aggregate demand conditions,
the International Financial Institutions, and particularly the IMF, recommend appropriate
fiscal policies.
Tab. 7 – General Government Fiscal Indicators, at the end of 1998 (in percent of GDP)
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA
Gross debt 95.8 58.2 61.1 118.7 117.9 62.2 62.1
Net debt including social security assets 62.3 48.4 52.4 112.4 30.5 42.4 48.4
Net debt excluding social security assets 62.3 48.4 52.4 112.4 79.1 42.4 56.1
Overall balance including social security 0.9 -2.7 -2.0 -2.7 -5.3 0.3 1.3
Overall balance excluding social security 2.9 -2.6 -2.3 1.3 -7.5 .. -1.7
Structural balance including social security 1.6 -1.3 -0.7 -1.5 -3.8 -0.3 1.3
Source: IMF, 1999
In the previous table, estimates of debt indicators that are used to assess debt sustainability in
formulating fiscal policy advice are reported for the G-7 countries.
The first row refers to Gross debt, that is the government’s stock of outstanding financial
liabilities. Italy and Japan are the most indebted G-7 countries, with gross debt of 119% and
118% of GDP respectively.
The second row subtracts all government financial assets from gross debt, including assets of
the social security system37, often in the form of government debt. Japan is the only country
                                                
35 A. Alesina and G. Tabellini (1989), “External debt, capital flight and political risk”, Journal of International
Economics 27 and A. Alesina and G. Tabellini (1990), “A positive theory of budgets deficits and government
debt”, Review of Economic Studies 57.
36 A. Berg and J. D. Sachs (1988), “The Debt Crisis: Structural Explanations of Country Performance”, Journal
of Development Economics, Vol. 29 (November).
37 This indicator does not include the future claims of the social security system against government assets , thus
it may provide a very partial measure of the government financial situation. Chand and Jaeger (1996) add net
future public pension liabilities – equal to the present value of future pension liabilities less the assets of the
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where the latter is sizeable: when social security assets are included in government debt,
Japan is the least indebted country; whereas Italy is always the highest (because the social
security system holds no assets).
The third row consider the social security system as independent, thus the debt held by
government is not considered part of the government asset. In this case Italy is the most
indebted country, followed by Japan.
The forth, fifth and sixth rows indicate that the G-7 countries start with different fiscal
balances
The Japanese debt
Japan is an example of huge public-sector debt.
By the end of 2000, the Japanese government will be the biggest debtor (as a percentage of
GDP) that has ever been among developed countries in peacetime38.
The Japanese government is the champ in the public-sector debt-to-GDP ratio.
This main characteristic has recent origin. Given the 1980s difficulties due to excessive
private-sector borrowing, in the 1990s the government tried to re-start growth by spending
and borrowing massively. It did mean a stimulus through an aggressive monetary expansion,
after a long deflation and recession period. Public debt has increased rapidly as a result of the
large deficits incurred during the current downturns and financial market concerns about the
sustainability of this trend is shown by upward pressure on long-term interest rates39.
As a result, in 2000 Japan’s general government deficit has widened to more than 8% of
GDP; gross public debt amounts to 128% of GDP (compared to 69% in 1990)40.
During past forty years non-industrialised country reached a public-sector debt higher than
135% of GDP, even though some developed countries such as Italy, Belgium and Ireland
have been very deeply indebted public sector.
The IMF forecasts that, by 2004, even though he government will reduce its budget deficit to
1.4% of GDP, debt will have increased to 150% of GDP, making Japan by a considerable
margin the most indebted G-7 country. Net debt also increases.
If we consider other potential liabilities, such as the government’s guarantees on bank loans,
and the present value of future state-pension commitments (condemned to increase rapidly
because of the ageing of Japanese population), then Japan public debt reaches 400%.
Among developed countries, comparable levels of public debt were registered in United
Kingdom at the end of the second war, when the ratio of public debt to GDP reached 250%.
However, the Japanese situation is not very worrisome, particularly in comparison to SSA
countries. Why?
1. Above all, Japan is the biggest creditor nation in the world: two decades of current-
accounts surpluses have produced $1.2 trillion of overseas assets, equal to 31% of
                                                                                                                                                       
public pension system – to net debt excluding social security to provide an indicator of net debt including future
public pension liabilities. Their estimates, based on the 1995 juridical framework and on projections up to 2020,
demonstrate that Italy and Japan would remain the most indebted G-7 countries. See S. K. Chand and A. Jaeger
(1996), Aging Populations and Public Pension Schemes, IMF Occasional Paper No. 146, December.
38 The Economist (2000), “A tale of two debtors”, in The Economist, January 22nd 2000, p. 15.
39 IMF (1999), World Economic Outlook. October 1999, Washington D.C., p. 11-13
40 IMF (2000).
98
GDP. This is a very important characteristic, also compared to other developed
countries having current-account deficits.
2. The Japanese are the biggest savers in the world. Thus the government can finance its
deficit, through national investors rather than foreign ones. Foreigners hold only 10%
of Japanese government securities, whereas this ratio is equal to 40% in the US and
23% in Italy. In terms of financial behaviour, we can assume that residents’ flows are
less volatile than foreigners’ flows and they are not likely to give bonds up suddenly.
3. Moreover, half of all the outstanding government securities are held in the social-
security funds, owned by the government itself.
4. Net public-sector debt is only 40% of GDP, the lowest among developed countries.
Nevertheless, a permanent growth in Japan’s debt is not sustainable in the long run: the rapid
aging of Japanese population is pushing up social expenditures (health and pension costs),
thus exacerbating the problem of deficit spending. However, it could be possible to increase
revenues, broadening its tax base (as suggested by OECD) or raising tax rates, as Japan has
the lowest tax revenues among developed countries. It is equal to 29% of national GDP,
compared to 39% of other rich countries (and the European Union tax burden at 42% of
GDP). The OECD also suggested to cut spending on public works, but reducing public
investment, in order to reduce national budget deficit, while the economy is still fragile risks
to generate recession, as the 1997 policy demonstrated.
The Japanese case is instance where long-term and short-term aspects point to conflicting
advice: short-term fiscal stimulus can effectively attack the weakness in aggregate demand,
whereas the long-term unsustainability suggests that Japan need to return to fiscal
consolidation.
US Debt
Compared with Japan, The US government looks like a paragon of fiscal virtue. After heavy
borrowing in the 1980s, its budget has moved into surplus, allowing the government to repay
some debt. When Bill Clinton moved into the White House in 1992, the US economy was
starting to gather strength but the federal budget deficit was only getting bigger, leaving the
new president with very limited room when it came to fiscal policy. His successor, George
W. Bush, has inherited a very different situation. He has become president at a time when the
economy is weakening, but the budget surplus seems to increase with each new calculation.
As a result, Mr. Bush has more flexibility when it comes to the budget than any president in a
generation. Mr. Clinton had to spend the first year of his first term pushing tax increases and
spending cuts through a reluctant Congress to cut the deficit. Mr. Bush has a long menu of
different choices made possible by the surplus: he can cut taxes, he can pay off the national
debt, he can shore up Social Security and Medicare, he can provide health insurance to
people who cannot afford it. Through most of Mr. Clinton’s two terms, fiscal policy has
become centred on the long run: paying down the national debt, freeing capital for investment
in the private sector and strengthening the federal balance sheet to deal with the costs of an
ageing population. Mr Bush can decide how to pay off the national debt, or at least the $3.4
trillion of it held by the public in the form of Treasury securities (on top of the public debt,
the government owes Social Security more than $2 trillion).
And yet, even as the US government has weaned itself from its old borrowing habits, firms
and US households have been borrowing still more, lifting their combined debts to a record
132% of GDP (compared to 80% in 1960, 93% in 1970, 102% in 1980, and 126% in 1990).
The total debts of non-financial firms increased due to different reasons. First, to finance a
high-tech investment boom. Second, to finance share buy-backs: during the past two years,
non-financial corporations increased their debts by $900 billion, while they retired a net $460
99
billion of equity, in order to pay employees in share options without depressing the share
price. Rising share prices have made households feel wealthier, and so encouraged them to
borrow still more: total household debt has passed from 85% of personal income (1992) to
103% (1999). This increase in private debt may imply some elements to be worry about.
Measures of corporate leverage, such as the ratio of debt to companies’ net worth (the value
of tangible assets minus debt) have increased. Moreover, debt is fixed in value, whereas the
value of assets, such as shares and property is not. Debts can only be serviced from income;
assets can pay the interest bill only if they are sold, and if lots of debtors are forced to sell at
the same time, asset prices will fall. A better measure of the debt burden therefore is debt-
service payments as a percentage of disposable income. Despite low interest rates,
households’ debt-service ratio is currently close to a record level (more than 13%).
US’ private sector debt problem may not yet be as serious as Japan’s in the late 1980s, when
banks engaged in imprudent lending on a massive scale. But US are vulnerable in a way that
Japan never was, and it is more similar to the SSA countries.
US are the world’s biggest foreign debtors, with net foreign liabilities of $1.5 trillion, around
20% of GDP. As a credit-fuelled spending devoted to more imports, US current account
deficit has widened to about 4% of GDP. If it remained at this level, US net foreign debt
would rise to more than 50% of GDP within ten years. This leaves the US economy
dependent on foreigners’ willingness to hold more and more dollar-denominated assets. If
foreigners’ interest in dollars falls, the currency will fall. US would then need to offer
progressively higher interest rates to convince foreigners to put a growing share of their
wealth into dollar securities. Higher interest rates, and hence lower share prices. Low
inflation has encouraged heavy borrowing: the apparent defeat of inflation, combined with
the expansion of US economy, has created the expectation that the boom will last forever.
This, in turn, has encouraged firms and households to borrow more and lenders to relax their
standards. And low inflation also makes excessive debt more dangerous: borrowers can no
longer rely on inflation to erode their real debt burden if things go wrong.
Given the differences of debt profile between USA and Japan, there is an important aspect, a
part from the international reputation and usage, which makes these cases different from the
SSA ones. Both the US and Japanese debts are almost all in their own currencies, unlike
those of developing countries. And it does matter, too.
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4. Debt crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa
1. - Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) covers the whole of Africa south of the Sahara. Apart from South
Africa1, SSA comprises 47 countries with a total area exceeding 22 million square
kilometres. Obviously, these countries differ in size, population, geographical and climatic
conditions, natural resources and other economic, political, social and cultural characteristics.
Total population is over 600 million, ranging from Nigeria (with 124 million) to Seychelles
(with a population of 80,000)2.
Population of SSA countries, with more than 1 million (,000 people)
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1 Which is considered as a “developed” country by the WTO criteria.
2 Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Mayotte, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles have each a
population less than 1 million.
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Similar disparities are reflected in population densities, with the smaller states in general
having a higher density than the larger ones.
Africa experiences almost every type of geographical and climatic condition, from tropical
rain forests to semi-arid and desert conditions. There are different natural resources:
petroleum (Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria), minerals and precious
metals (diamonds in Botswana, bauxite in Guinea, gold in Ghana, uranium in Niger, iron in
Liberia and Mauritania, copper in Zambia, phosphate in Togo).
There are differences in respect of economic, financial and political systems and forms of
government as well as political “heritage”: francophone and anglophone areas.
Within the same region, there are relevant differences, too. In fact, the European Commission
was establishing, at the end of the 1990s, a new framework for EU-ACP (African, Caribbean
and Pacific) trade relations, in order to define a post-Lome agreement3. Europe de facto
imposed the need for the ACP to define geographical configurations for future trade
arrangements with regional institutions representing these configurations. The EU has
proposed free trade based Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the model for new
trade arrangements and they will be negotiated largely on a regional basis. Unfortunately,
there is a clear absence, in most ACP regions, of the institutional capacity for the negotiation
of reciprocal preferential trade arrangements at the regional level. And there is a clear
absence of the necessary economic convergence to allow the negotiation of region to region
agreements, which accommodate the trade realities and needs of each participating country.
The final appendix of this chapter tries to demonstrate how relevant is the heterogeneity of
existing economic conditions and characteristics within the same SSA regional aggregations,
which are not the final result of a long endogenous process of integration, as the EU is.
Using continent-wide averages for SSA can be misleading because substantial population and
GDP differences exist among the subregions of West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and
Southern Africa, and also within subregions. Considering the whole African continent, the
five biggest economies of the continent (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco)
account for 37 per cent of the population, and 59 per cent of GDP. The 33 least developed
countries have 45 per cent of the population, and only 17 per cent of GDP. From another
perspective, the 11 oil-exporting countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Côte d’Ivoire,
Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Angola and Equatorial Guinea account for
49 per cent of GDP, and 36 per cent of the population.
Notwithstanding this heterogeneity, SSA countries exhibit common economic problems. Low
per capita incomes, high population growth rates, agriculture remaining the dominant sector
and poverty.
                                                
3 According to the new Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, which replaces Lome Convention between EU and
the ACP, the parties agree to a preparatory period of 8 years before moving to new WTO compatible trade
arrangements. Formal negotiations for these agreements will start in September 2002.  The agreements will
enter into force by January 2008 unless both parties agree earlier dates. The 8-years period is supposed to be
used to prepare the ACP States for the EPA trade arrangements. In 2004 the EU will assess the situation of non-
LDC ACP countries in relation to these agreements. If after consultations these countries decide they are not in a
position to enter economic partnership agreements, the EU will examine alternatives in order to provide these
countries with new trade arrangements equivalent to their existing situation, but in conformity with WTO rules.
The ACP and the EU will then carry out a formal review in 2006 of the future arrangements planned for all
countries to ensure that no further time is needed for preparations or negotiations. The ACP is yet to put forward
a model for new WTO compatible trade arrangements, thus the EC's EPAs are the only option for future trade
arrangements on the table at present.
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Tab. 1 - Sub-Saharan Africa (excl. South Africa), Macroeconomic indicators, 1975-1999
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
GDP per capita, (Cur. US$) 326 541 353 392 310 325
GNP per capita (Cur. US$) 320 509 338 381 288 306
Gross dom. savings (% of GDP) 22.61 22.98 16.53 17.37 13.66 13.61
Gross dom. invest. (% of GDP) 22.03 19.307 13.82 15.92 18.017 20.32
Source: World Bank (2001), World Bank Africa Database 2001, Washington D.C.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a decline for the SSA region: this downward trend is reflected in
the very poor growth performance of GDP and GNP levels, which appear to be below those
observed in1980, and being back at the 1975 level. SSA region experienced a “two-lost-
decades”: the saving and investment performance was really discouraging, and the observed
trends much worse than the general trend of developing countries.
Some 80 per cent of Low Human Development Countries - countries with high population
growth rates, low income, low literacy, and low life expectancy - are in SSA. Four of every
10 Africans live in conditions of absolute poverty, and recent evidence suggests that poverty
on the continent is increasing.
At about 13.6 percent of GDP, the current levels of domestic savings are insufficient to
finance the level of investment required for growth and development at the level needed to
reduce poverty. Moreover, despite substantial policy reforms and concerted efforts to attract
foreign direct investment by African governments, the continent’s share of FDI has remained
very low. FDI flows to Africa represent a minuscule 2-3 per cent of global FDI flows4.
Moreover, the flows are concentrated towards a few countries. Only about 20 countries are
beneficiaries of FDI, with Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Angola together accounting
for two-thirds of flows. The flows are concentrated on a few sectors and activities; more than
50 per cent go to support the oil and petroleum industry, and the rest goes to extractive,
mainly mining, activities5. ODA is a basic source of financial inflows6, but it is declining, and
the heavy debt burden of African countries has dampened both private and public investment.
2. Current economic growth, social and poverty trends in Africa
The Lldcs have clearly shown the worst social and economic performance during last years.
Tab. 2 - Human development differences, 1999
areas Life
expectancy
(years)
Adult literacy
rate (% popul.
>15 years)
School enrolment
ratio (% of relevant
age group)
Per capita
GDP (at ppp)
Human
Development
Index (HDI)
High income countries 76.4 97.4 86.0 24,430 0.89
Ldcs 64.7 72.3 60.0 3,410 0.64
Lldcs 51.9 50.7 37.0 1,790 0.43
Sources: UNDP and World Bank, 2000
                                                
4 UNCTAD (1999), Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential, UN, New York.
5 UNECA (2000), Globalisation, Regionalism and Africa’s Development Agenda, Paper Prepared for UNCTAD
X February 12-19, 2000, Bangkok, Thailand.
6 Measured relative to recipient GNP, the median value of aid to African countries now stands at nearly 10 times
the amount received by Western Europe under the Marshall Plan.
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The group of Sub-Saharan African countries still contains the hard core of the problem of
marginalisation in the world economy.
Tab. 3 - World GDP across areas
Per capita GDP % var.
AREA
Per capita
GDP ($)1999 1975-1990 1990-1998 1998-2002*
East Asia and Pacific 3.500
South Asia 2,030
Latin America and the Caribbean 6,280
Europe and Central Asia 5,580
Middle East and North Africa 4,600
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,450
Total, Ldcs 3,410 1.7 3.3 3.8
Total, Lldcs 1,790 - 0.3 0.9 1.1
Total, Industrial countries (Ics) 24,430 2.0 1.5 1.6
% Ldcs/Ics 13.9
% Lldcs/Ics 7.3
*forecast.
Source: World Bank, 2000
According to the latest data, some 300 million Africans live on barely 65 cents a day.
The average GNP per capita for the region is US$492, but in 24 countries GNP per capita is
under US$350, with the lowest incomes found in Ethiopia (US$100), the Democratic
Republic of Congo (US$110), Burundi (US$120), and Sierra Leone (US$130).
This phenomenon is confirmed by the head count ratio measurement.
The head count ratio, as argued by D. Gordon and P. Spicker (1999) is the most common
measure of poverty. It refers to the proportion of individuals, households or families that falls
under the poverty line. If q is the number of people identified as poor an n the total number of
people in the community, then the head-count ratio measure H is q/n. The head-count ratio
ranges from zero (nobody is poor) to one (everybody is poor).
This simple indicator provides useful information on the incidence of poverty and the
distribution of poverty among the population. However, the head-count ratio does not capture
the intensity of poverty, i.e. how far the poor fall below a given poverty line7.
The head-count ratio has been under severe attack for thirty years8. In 1968, H. W. Watts9
noted that it had “little but its simplicity to recommend it” and A. Sen10 has remarked that,
considering its inadequacies, the degree of support commanded by this measure is “quite
astonishing”. The head-count ratio can be dangerous for monitoring the effectiveness of pro-
poor policies. Successful policies aimed at raising the wellbeing of the poorest of the poor
will not affect the head-count ratio if their new living standard is still below the poverty line.
On the other hand, successful pro-poor policies aimed at persons just below the poverty line
will reduce the head-count ratio.
                                                
7 See A. Sen, 1981; A. J. M. Hagenaars, 1986.
8 A. B. Atkinson, 1989.
9 H. W. Watts, 1968, p. 326.
10 A. 
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According to the latest edition of African Development Indicators 2001 - an annual World
Bank compilation of key African social and economic data for the period 1970-99, covering
indicators such as trade and external debt, communications, and aid flows - the slowdown in
growth was the result of regional and civil wars, poor governance in some countries, and
serious external shocks such as the rapid hike in oil prices at the same time that export
earnings from primary commodities collapsed.
Moreover, the report warns that growth is below the annual level needed to prevent a rise in
the numbers of poor people on the continent.
Growth in Africa slowed significantly after 1998, with average per capita GDP falling by
almost 1 percent in 1998-9911.
While growth trends for the region as a whole remain depressed, some African countries are
doing well.
Again, we have to remind that fourteen countries have grown on average by 4 percent a year
during the 1990s, with rising annual incomes of 2-3 percent and even higher, with another 10
countries following close behind with growth rates above 3 percent a year.
Some countries have grown at 7 percent a year or higher (Mozambique and Uganda, 7.1
percent).
                                                
11 World Bank (2001/b), African Development Indicators 2001, Oxford University Press, Washington DC.
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In late 200, the World Bank gave US$155
million in credits to help seven African
countries - Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Rwanda, Zambia, and Uganda - cope
with an unexpected surge in oil prices and
other losses in their terms of trade.
These factors were causing serious hardship
for the poor in terms of rising energy and
transportation costs, which in turn were
jeopardising the success of the countries’
reform programs.
Civil conflict in the region has blunted and
reversed growth prospects for war-torn
countries.
While the trend for many African countries
during the 1990s was one of slow but steady
economic improvement, those in conflict
suffered negative growth and an alarming
deterioration in basic conditions: Angola (-
0.2 percent), Burundi (-2.4 percent),
Democratic Republic of Congo (-4.6
percent), Rwanda (-2.1 percent), Sierra
Leone (-4.6 percent).
Sierra Leone is a striking illustration of this
trend with the region’s lowest life expectancy
rate at just 37 years, and its highest infant
mortality rate at 169 deaths per one thousand.
In the early 1990s, there was the hope that
the globalisation of finance and production,
and the liberalisation of economic activity,
would promote diminuishing income
disparities between countries.
During the 1990s there has been a process of
economic liberalisation in many developing
countries.
Nevertheless, no real progress in increasing
real incomes and social development,
reducing poverty has arrived.
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In view of the international target set by international community in the 1990s in order to
halve poverty in the world by 201512, UNCTAD addressed the question of how long it will
actually take for each poor country to cross the $900 per capita threshold that currently forms
the criterion for graduation from the Ldc category. If the trend growth rates of 1990-1998
persist, only Lesotho, in Sub-Saharan Africa, will cross this threshold by the end of 201513.
                                                
12 See chapter 13 and DAC (1996), Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation,
OECD, Paris.
13 UNCTAD (2000), The Least Developed Countries. 2000 Report, Geneva.
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Tab . 4 - Forecast to escape from poverty, given the current trends, in 30 SSA Lldcs
Already there By 2015 By 2025 By 2050 By 2100 Later than 2100 Negative growth
Cape Verde
Equatorial Guinea
Djibouti
Lesotho
Sudan Guinea
Mozambique
Uganda
Benin
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Mauritania
Burkina Faso
Central Rep. Africa
Malawi
Mali
Angola
Burundi
Chad
Dem. Rep. Congo
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Niger
Rwanda
S. Tomé & Principe
Sierra Leone
Togo
Tanzania
Zambia
Source: UNCTAD, 2000
Projections of social indicators on the basis of the 1990s trends fall well short of the
international targets. Social indicators show mixed progress with a welcome rise in literacy
and school enrolments for girls on one hand, but declining immunisations for children, and a
widening HIV/AIDS epidemic across the region, on the other.
Overall Africa’s demographic transition remains slow. Fertility has started to decline,
particularly in countries with higher incomes and better access to contraception. Still, some
countries in the region have the highest fertility rates in the world: Niger (7.3); Somalia (7.2);
Angola and Burkina Faso (6.7). Even though the age dependency ratio has changed little, the
percentage of the population aged 0-14 has fallen slowly during the past two decades.
Growing urbanisation, and the rapid exodus of rural Africans to the continent’s cities, has
given Africa the largest rate of urban population growth in the developing world. Moreover,
on current trends, the continent’s urban population is expected to outnumber the number of
people living in rural areas by 2025. In countries like Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, there are
now twice as many people living in urban centres today than 20 years ago; in Mozambique,
the percentage has almost tripled during the same period.
Child mortality is a particularly acute problem for many countries in Africa. Infant mortality
is close to 10 percent, and on average 151 of every 1,000 children die before the age of 5,
although in many countries the mortality rate exceeds 200 per 1,000. The region has had the
smallest improvement in under-5 mortality since 1970, and some countries - including
Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique and Côte d’Ivoire - saw infant mortality increase in the 1990s.
This compares with 53 in East Asia and 9 in high-income countries. Even allowing for
Africa’s low incomes, its under-5 mortality rates are exceptionally high.
Although life expectancy has risen slightly in Africa, this is happening at a slower rate than
elsewhere and, since 1990 the HIV/AIDS epidemic has caused it to decline, especially in
countries with high adult infection rates. In Zimbabwe, for example, life expectancy has
fallen by five years, while in Botswana, it has fallen by over ten. Today in 21 African
countries more than 7 percent of adults live with HIV/AIDS, with the highest absolute
number of cases found in South Africa, where one in every five adults has contracted the
virus. Countries like Niger and Sudan, which have some of the lowest incidence of AIDS in
the region, offer great potential for control.
Analysis of income distribution in Africa shows a fairly high degree of inequality. Compared
with other regions of the world, Africa has the second most unequal income distribution next
to Latin America. The Gini coefficient for Africa as a whole is 44.4 per cent. The highest
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values for inequality are for South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe. The lowest are for Northern
Africa (Egypt and Algeria) and Ghana. Shares of total expenditure by quintiles confirm the
picture of relatively high inequality.
3. Domestic financial conditions to meet international development goals
The issue of development finance involves the analysis of three interrelated issues: resource
requirements for economic growth; the efforts to mobilise domestic resources; the need for,
and availability and effects of, external sources of finance.
To reduce poverty by half in Africa by the year 2015, that is the target set by international
community of donors, requires a 4 per cent reduction in the ratio of people living in poverty
each year.
Change in poverty can arise for two reasons: a change due to growth in mean consumption
expenditure (appropriately adjusted for the change in the poverty line); and a change in the
distribution of income (the inequality measure).
For Africa as a whole, GDP growth of about 7 per cent per annum would be required to
achieve this annual reduction in poverty. Increases of 5-6 per cent are needed for North
Africa and Southern Africa, 6-7 per cent for Central Africa, and 7-8 per cent for the West and
East African sub-regions 14.
In order for Africa’s GDP to grow on average at 7 per cent per annum, additional investment
will be needed. An estimate of the amount can be made by employing the Harrod-Domar
model, which uses the savings rate and incremental capital output ratio to derive the rate of
growth of GDP. Thus, for a desired rate of growth of GDP, required investment can be
calculated by assuming an incremental capital output ratio.
Domestic sources of finance are defined as gross net domestic savings, which are measured
as gross net investment minus the net inflow of external finance. Investment is measured as
the additions to physical capital stock, which aims at measuring additions to the production
capacity of the economy15.
The determinants of savings are analysed after being disaggregated into private and
government savings. The average private consumption ratio for SSA countries has fluctuated
at around 85 % of GNP, about 20% higher than the average for other developing countries.
This phenomenon, associated with falling per capita consumption levels in SSA Lldcs during
the past two decades, implies a long period of slow and in some cases declining per capita
income growth. In fact, recent econometric analyses have shown a robust long-term
relationship between private consumption and income, with an income elasticity of
consumption of about 0.816.
For Africa as a whole, investment of 33 per cent of GDP would be needed to reach 7 per cent
per annum growth.
The current domestic savings rate is about 15 per cent.
                                                
14 UNECA (2000/b), Economic Report on Africa 1999: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction and Sustainablity,
Addis Ababa.
15 Even though investment and savings in the national accounts exclude investment in human capital formation,
which plays a significant role in enhancing production capacities in the economy, and therefore miss an
important component of development finance.
16 This phenomenon supports the idea that an important role of foreign aid in Lldcs, which are subject to
external shocks, is indeed the smoothing of consumption. See UNCTAD (2000).
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Investiment shares in GDP (percentage), 1998
 Source: DAC, 2000
Africa must address the key issue of raising domestic savings rates, but in the short run,
expectation of significant change is unrealistic, in view of the existing low levels of income.
Stabilisation of the macro economy will stimulate savings by creating an economic
environment where private agents can plan their future with a large measure of confidence.
Moreover, prudent government behaviour and fiscal discipline will be expected to contribute
to increased savings.
Financial liberalisation will theoretically lead to higher savings through the effects of high
real interest rates on savings. However, most empirical work suggests that the effect of
interest rates on gross savings is weak or non-existent. The most important determinant of
savings in Africa has been found to be the level of real income. Very poor people save little
or nothing and income must rise above the subsistence level before increases in income result
in higher savings. It would take 18 years of 5.3 per cent of GDP growth for sub-Saharan
Africa to reach the income threshold where further increases result in increased savings rates.
More research is needed to advance understanding of the factors determining savings rates in
sub-Saharan countries. Current understanding of the linkage between interest rates and
savings indicates that African governments have few policy instruments to increase savings
in the medium run and for as long as incomes remain low.
Unfortunately, there is significant hysteresis, because there are ‘sunk costs’ in promoting
savings that can operate in such a weak environment, and while such savings ultimately force
an improvement in economic environment, unless a certain threshold is reached, it will
simply perpetuate and entrench the weak environment.
With the prevailing levels of domestic resources available for finance, very low levels of per
capita income and private consumption, and vulnerability to frequent and large external
shocks, the poor economies can only rely on external financing.
4. External financial conditions to meet international development goals
There are three main sources of external finance: aid, private capital flows and external debt.
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According to African Development Indicators 2001, two important sources of finance,
foreign direct investment (FDI) and official aid, are declining in size, and tend to favour those
countries with lucrative mining and oil industries in the case of FDI, or countries with sound
social and economic policies in the case of aid.
Recent foreign resource flows to Africa have been far short of the volume needed to meet the
poverty reduction objective. Commodity prices are beyond the control of African policy
makers, flows and maintaining exemplary domestic economic management can influence
dealing with the debt overhang and Official development assistance (ODA)17 only indirectly.
                                                
17 Foreign aid is conventionally measured on the basis of the OECD’s ODA, a concept introduced in the early
1970s. ODA comprises official financial flows with a development purpose in the form of grants (inclusive of
those tied to technical assistance) and highly concessional loans. Loans are defined as highly concessional when
their grant element - i.e., the subsidy implicitly included in the loan, relative to the loans’ face value - is at least
25 percent, as measured by a formula to be analysed in depth in the next section. The leading measure of foreign
aid flows is the so-called Net ODA, which is the net disbursement amount, i.e. disbursements minus
amortisation, of those flows classified as ODA. Conceptually, international finance flowing to capital-scarce
developing countries may involve efficiency gains even if the flows accrue on market terms as long as the funds
are used appropriately. Such efficiency gains translate into net financial gains for the recipient countries. The
main purpose of measuring foreign aid flows is to assess the portion of those gains that is due to a pure transfer
of resources from donors to recipients through below-market, subsidised financial terms -- i.e. to assess the
donors’ net financial cost, rather than the (presumably larger) recipients’ benefit. Net ODA, however, does not
accurately measure the cost that donors incur in connection with their aid (especially debt) flows, and as a result
the evolution of Net ODA over time, as well as across donors and recipients, likely provides a distorted picture
of aid trends. The five main problems:
(1) ODA includes the full face value of both grants and highly concessional loans without distinguishing
between the two. However, concessional loans entail repayment obligations, and, therefore, the aid
they involve, i.e. the net financial cost to donors, is only a fraction of their face value. The inclusion in
ODA of the full face value of these loans overestimates their aid content. Only grants, that is to say
pure unrequited transfers, should be accounted at full value;
(2) Under the ODA definition, non-concessional loans include loans on market terms as well as
concessional loans with low degree of concessionality. The aid content of the latter – i.e., the donors’
cost involved in these loans – is therefore not captured by ODA.
(3) The inclusion in ODA of official technical assistance grants by their full value can be seen as another
shortcoming. In this case, the donor benefits from payments received in return for the technical
assistance supplied, and this may greatly reduce the donor’s net financial cost.
(4) In order to reflect donors’ opportunity costs, the discount rates used for present value calculations
should correspond to applicable market rates. The fixed 10 percent discount rate utilised in ODA fails
that test on at least three important dimensions to which it should be sensitive, namely time, currency,
and maturity: (a) Time. Discount rates should evolve over time with market conditions prevailing at the
time the aid content of loans is estimated. For example, to measure the donors’ cost as seen at the time
of loan disbursement, the market terms prevailing at that time should be used. (b) Currency. At any
point in time, market rates, and therefore appropriate discount rates, are currency specific. The discount
rate should follow the currency in which debt service is payable. (c) Maturity. At any point in time and
for any given currency, market rates depend on the length of the repayment period according to the so-
called yield curve. Therefore, the discount rates applied to the debt service stream should vary over the
life of the loan according to the timing of service payments.
(5) In the case of variable rate loans, the construction of the future debt service stream requires a forecast
of interest rate charges. This is especially important for floating rates linked to future market conditions
(e.g., indexed to six-month LIBOR). ODA makes no attempt to predict these conditions and implicitly
assumes that, like in the case of fixed-rate loans, variable rates will remain constant at their level at the
time of disbursement.
For more details, see C. Chang, E. Fernandez-Arias, L. Serven (1998), Measuring Aid Flows: a New Approach,
Washington D.C.
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The global environment and exogenous shocks are not changing in Africa’s favour. ODA is
stagnant or declining, little progress has been made in reducing the debt burden, protectionist
tendencies continue in Africa’s major markets, and erratic weather conditions persist.
As investment of 33 per cent of GDP would be needed to reach 7 per cent per annum growth
in Africa, it should be financed partly by domestic savings and the rest by foreign inflows.
Given that the current domestic savings rate is about 15 per cent, a further 18 per cent would
be needed from external sources. ODA for the continent averages about 9 per cent, which
leaves a residual financing gap of about 9 per cent.
Overseas development assistance (ODA) as % of GNP, 1998
Source: DAC, 2000
Africa-wide averages hide large variations among the sub-regions. North Africa needs only
about 5 per cent of GDP in external resources to complete the financing needed to generate a
GDP growth rate high enough to halve the poverty level in the sub-region by 2015. ODA to
the sub-region has averaged about 3 per cent of GDP, leaving a financing gap of about 2 per
cent of GDP. Financing investment for
needed GDP growth is most difficult in
Central Africa where the residual financing
gap is about 27 per cent. Policy issues that
can be addressed directly by African policy
makers relate to domestic savings and
external resource inflows other than
conventional ODA, such as foreign direct
investment, and the causes of capital flight.
Official aid has followed a similarly
selective trend over the same period, and
falling in terms of total volumes. Aid levels
in 1999, for example, were US$10.8 billion
compared to US$ 17.9 billion in 1992 when
development assistance to Sub-Saharan
Africa reached its highest-ever  levels.
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The World Bank report shows that during the 1990s the region attracted an annual average of
US$15.8 billion dollars in aid (nominal). As in keeping with FDI flows, most of this
development assistance went to a small number of countries, which bilateral and multilateral
donors considered to have adopted modern economic and social policies and were performing
well. These included Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique,
Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, all of them received well over US$500 a year.
Tanzania was the leading recipient of official assistance during the period with more than
US$1 billion a year.
The report also reveals how official aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has been falling from US$32
per head in 1990 to US$19 by 1998.
Africa has suffered massive capital flight, estimated to total $22 billion between 1982 and
1991. At the end of 1991, the average ratio of capital flight to debt was estimated at over 40
per cent for a sample of 18 countries for which data were available. For four countries, the
rate exceeded 60 per cent: Nigeria (94.5 per cent); Rwanda (94.3 per cent); Kenya (74.4 per
cent); and the Sudan (60.5 per cent).
Another important source of external funds is foreign direct investment (FDI) that is needed
as a non-debt-creating form of resource inflow. But experience shows the share of FDI flows
to Africa is very small and that it is highly biased in favour of mineral-rich countries. FDI in
Africa seems to be caught in a vicious circle since it requires a hospitable economic
environment and sustained high growth. Yet, FDI is needed to help create that environment
and achieve that rate of growth. Moreover, FDI is the bulk of neo-liberal approach.
The underdeveloped human resources base - exacerbated by out-migration of skilled Africans
- and the weak physical infrastructure of the continent deter foreign direct investment.
Furthermore, political and civil instability, weak institutional capacity and inefficiencies have
not created an investment-friendly climate. These conditions have had important negative
implications for resource mobilisation and utilisation in Africa, including exacerbating capital
flight. They will therefore need to be given urgent attention.
Of the US$2.52 billion in FDI that flowed into Sub-Saharan Africa during the last  decade,
just three countries accounted for much of that total¾Angola (US$626 million), Lesotho
(US$170 million), and Nigeria (US$876 million). If South Africa is excluded (as both a
recipient and source of FDI), five other countries accounted for another US$576 million -
Republic of Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, and Sudan - leaving the
remaining 40 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to compete for just $US275 million in annual
FDI flows.
Given the slowdown of ODA and the particular difficulty in attracting FDI18, SSA economies
have heavily relied on external debt. This picture demonstrates that debt relief is important as
well as to guarantee new lending for the future. Thus, in empirical terms, it can be very useful
to investigate the complex relationship between development and debt in SSA, in terms of
both three-gaps approach and links between different sources of external finance. The
combination of a large number of different types of variables, the complex interrelationship
between “levels” of actors, the emphasis on qualitative factors, all make the empirical
verification or falsification of theoretical propositions particularly difficult. The situation is
made even more difficult by the fact data availability and reliability is a critical point.
                                                
18 See N. Bhinda, J. Leape, M. Martin and S. Griffith-Jones (1999), Private capital flows to Africa: Perception
and Reality, Forum on Debt and Development, The Hague.
114
5. - The African Problems of Balance of Payments
International relations are of enormous importance to Sub-Saharan African countries. The
limited relatively “modern” sector of the economy of the African states shaped in the era of
colonialism has been highly dependent on international trade. The way the international trade
has expanded in the past has affected the distribution of income and investment both within
and between African countries.
The concept of the balance of trade is based on the notion that in the long run a nation should
export to all countries a total amount of goods and services equal in value to its total imports
from all other countries. The balance of trade of African countries shows that most of the
African states have been importing an amount of goods and services as great by value as they
have been exporting in recent years.
It is not an unexpected result, particularly referring to the whole SSA region. Quite simply,
what this shows is that we have an ex-post balanced pattern of trade in goods and services,
which could clearly reflect the fact that imports are constrained by the limited amount of
available resources and by the need of financing debt servicing rather than imports. In fact,
the servicing of the external debt erodes the meagre foreign exchange available for imports:
this has led to the import compression problem that adversely affected both public and private
investments. Moreover, the cited differences among SSA countries do matter.
T o t a l  M e r c h a n d i s e  S S A  E x p o r t s  a n d  I m p o r t s  ( c u r r e n t  U S $ )
0
10 .000 .000 .000
20 .000 .000 .000
30 .000 .000 .000
40 .000 .000 .000
50 .000 .000 .000
60 .000 .000 .000
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
Expor t s
Impor ts
Source: World Bank (2001), World Bank Africa Database 2001, Washington D.C.
More interesting, we can compare trade balances of each of the SSA countries, taking in
account some possible outcomes, simply measured through the arithmetic mean of the 1965-
1999 period and concerning:
- Net trade in goods that is the difference between exports and imports of goods. Trade in
services is not included19.
- Net trade in services.
                                                
19 This category includes goods previously included in services: goods received or sent for processing and their
subsequent export or import in the form of processed goods, repairs on goods, and goods procured in ports by
carriers.
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- As a way of weighting the absolute value of the African economies, we can consider Net
trade in goods to total Trade Balance ratio and external Size of the economy.
Tab. 5 – Comparison between trade balances of all the SSA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Liberia J L M ..
Somalia L L H ..
S. Tome &Principe L L M 17
Comoros L K H 34
Guinea-Bissau L L H 56
Burundi L L M 62
Eritrea L K H 66
Sierra Leone L L M 92
Rwanda L L M 109
Cape Verde L K H 135
Central Afr. Rep, L L L 178
Gambia, The L K M 199
Lesotho L K H 226
Chad L L L 260
Niger K L M 290
Burkina Faso L L H 292
Mauritania K L L 370
Seychelles L J M 378
Togo L L M 511
Benin L K H 518
Malawi L L H 542
Mozambique L K H 586
Mali L L L 650
Equatorial Guinea K K M 711
Uganda L L H 726
Guinea J L M 829
Sudan L L H 832
Zambia J L H 842
Madagascar L L M 908
Ethiopia L K H 914
Tanzania L L H 1.163
Swaziland L L M 1.264
Senegal L K H 1.534
Namibia L L M 1.614
Botswana J L H 1.650
Congo, Rep. J L M 1.730
Congo, Dem. Rep. J L M 1.937
Cameroon J L M 2.244
Zimbabwe J L M 2.545
Ghana L L H 2.567
Kenya L J H 2.600
Mauritius L J M 2.673
Gabon J L H 2.775
Cote d'Ivoire J L M 5.024
Angola J L H 5.467
Nigeria J L H 12.871
South Africa J L H 33.321
The outcomes are:
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(1) Exports of goods > Imports of goods
(2) Exports of goods < Imports of goods
(3) Exports of goods = Imports of goods
(4) Exports of services > Imports of services
(5) Exports of services < Imports of services
(6) Exports of services = Imports of services
(7) Net trade in goods to total Trade Balance ratio: high (H), medium (M), low (L)
(8) 1999 External Size of the economy: Absolute value of Total exports (million US$)
There are some points of significance showed by table 5.
First, South Africa is effectively an outlier compared to other SSA economies, as its external
size demonstrates.
It makes sense to differentiate between oil-importing and oil-exporting SSA countries. All the
five oil-exporting economies (in order of metric tons of exports they are Nigeria, Angola,
Gabon, Republic of Congo, Cameroon, all being in bold and italics fonts) have a net trade in
goods surplus and they have a big external size, compared to other SSA countries. Variations
in export prices and earnings for the five major oil exporting countries (which in the 1980s
have accounted for about half of SSA export earnings) have dominated terms of trade trends
in the region as a whole.
The others net exporters of goods show an export concentration in natural resources
(Botswana: meat and copper; Cote d’Ivoire: oil palm products, cocoa, cotton and coffee;
Democratic Republic of Congo: petroleum and diamonds; Guinea: forest products, and
coffee; Liberia: forest products, iron, coffee, oil palm products; Zambia: copper; Zimbabwe:
tobacco, meat, sugar, cotton), but also manufactured goods (Cote di’Ivoire and Zimbabwe).
In general terms, the performance of the manufacturing sector has been disappointing and not
able to provide the growth and employment which SSA countries need.
Concerning services (previously referred as nonfactor services), which are the economic
output of intangible commodities that may be produced, transferred, and consumed at the
same time, there are only three countries (Mauritius, Kenya, Seychelles) that registered
exports higher than imports. All of them are countries being classified as Medium human
development20 and with an high level of GNP.
There are significant limitations in using the arithmetic mean: for example, Mauritania’s
balance of net trade in goods is in equilibrium because this country has passed from high
negative to high positive balance as well as the Comoros’ balance of trade in services.
Due to the civil war problems, Liberia and Somalia have no data on size of their current
external economy; however in the past the value of total Liberia’s exports was similar to
Madagascar, and the value of Somalia’s exports was similar to Burundi.
                                                
20 Every year since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme has commissioned the Human
Development Report by an independent team of experts to explore major issues of global concern. The Report
looks beyond per capita income as a measure of human GDP per capita (1985 PPP US$). The annually updated
Human Development Index (HDI) ranks 162 countries by a composite measure that includes life expectancy,
educational enrolment and adult literacy, and income per person. In the 2001 Report,  Sierra Leone, where a
child born today will probably die before reaching the age of 39, and only 32 percent of the adults can read, is
ranked last. The bottom 28 countries on the Index are all in Africa. And 19 African countries are suffering
setbacks in the human development index. See UNDP (2001), Human Development Report 2001, Oxford
University Press, New York.
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In any case, in absolute terms, we can affirm that Africa has not experienced the benefits
deriving from globalisation, that is the intensification of the global interdependence of
economies. Africa’s share of global exports of goods and services has declined trend-wise
from 4.2 percent in 1985 to a mere 1.8 percent in 1999.
The comparison of trends of total external debt21 and GNP in SSA shows the existence of a
link between poor economic performance and external debt.
Tab. 6 – Comparison between economic performance and external debt in SSA
(Cur. US$ million) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Total External Debt 19,597 60,612 107,220 177,050 210,160 202,660
GNP 97,605 179,660 138,150 180,110 155,280 183,570
Between 1980 and 1995, the SSA (excluding South Africa) countries’ total stock of external
debt grew rapidly from US$ 60.6 billion to US$ 210.2 billion (1988-89). On the other hand,
gross national product decreased from US$ 179.7 billion (in 1978-79) to US$ 155.3 billion.
In other words, the debt-to-GNP ratio increased from 20.1% in 1975 to 135.3% in 1995. Even
though the rescheduling terms of the Paris Club became increasingly concessional for SSA
countries, and also included more and more debt reduction on eligible bilateral debt, more
and more heavily indebted African countries were unable to pay their debt service due during
the 1990s.
And SSA countries are still facing at least five major possible reasons for weakness and
vulnerability in the balance of trade.
First, the export enclave has come to be dependent on imports of consumer necessities
including even packaged foodstuffs – tinned sardines, milk, tomatoes – because of the
truncated expansion of the domestic economy. Not infrequently, the rich groups in the export
enclave use their incomes to purchase and import luxury items (biased path of development).
And dramatic is now the food situation in a continent that as recently as 1970 was self-
sufficient in food. “Now almost one in four Africans is undernourished and the food deficit is
estimated at more than 30 million tons per year - 10 million tons for SSA alone - and likely to
rise to 50 million tons by the end of the present decade”22.
Second, the prices of the country’s primary exports may relatively fall on the world market,
making it difficult to pay for the imported manufactured consumer goods on which those
living in t he export enclave have come to depend (declining terms of trade). In fact, since the
independence in the 1960s, Sub-Saharan African terms of trade has never registered a
positive trend, except the period between the first (1973) and the second (1979) oil shock23.
                                                
21 Total external debt is debt owed to non-residents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total
external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF
credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and
interest in arrears on long-term debt.
22 UN (1990), Africa’s Commodity Problem: Towards a Solution, UN, New York, p.18
23 Paul Cashin and Catherine Pattillo have examined the persistence of shocks to the terms of trade, using annual
data on 42 SSA countries between 1960-96 and they found that the persistence of terms of trade shocks varies
widely. For about half the countries such shocks are short-lived, while for one-third of the countries (those that
have large shares of petroleum imports in total imports, small shares of non-fuel commodity exports in total
exports, and highly concentrated in exportable commodities) such shocks are long-lived. See P. Cashin and C.
Pattillo (2000), Terms of Trade Shocks in Africa: Are They Short-lived or Long-lived?, IMF Working Paper, N.
72, Wahington D.C.
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”During the period 1980-1987, Africa’s terms of trade deteriorated from 100 to 66 - from 100
to 70 those of SSA -. The share of SSA exports in the total world has declined from 2,4% in
1970 to 1,3% in 1987”24.
International prices for the main export items of African countries, such as coffee, cotton, or
copper, have fluctuated widely creating uncertainty.
The African inability to cope with external shocks has contributed to Africa’s debt problems
and very low rate of economic growth. Many governments such as Zambia responded to
commodity price booms in the late 1970s by sharply expanding public expenditure for
import-intensive public investment programs that they financed with foreign borrowing when
revenues fell with subsequent steep declines in commodity prices, assuming that these
negative price shocks were short-lived.
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Third, there is a high level of concentration of SSA export in a very few items, which
increases the vulnerability to exogenous shocks. As average, three commodities still represent
around 70 percent of merchandise exports.
                                                
24 S. Sideri (1992), “External Financial Flows: The Case of Africa”, African Review of Money Finance and
Banking, N.1, p.93.
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Fourth, any country seeking to implement a development strategy must import capital
equipment and machinery. These imports even if reduced to the critical minimum required to
ensure that development does take place, tend to contribute to a balance of trade deficit
(technological transfer).
Fifth, increased market access for African countries requires a reassessment of priorities on
the part of their developed trade partners, who should focus their efforts on lowering
protectionism in key markets for African exports. The share of African countries in
international trade has been eroding since the 1970s, and even as a proportion of developing
countries’ exports African countries’ share has fallen over the same period.
Compared to a vulnerable situation of trade balance, the perennial imbalance in the services
sector, driven by external debt payments and the cost of transport and financial services,
which can limit the growth rate of imports, continues to put pressure on the current account
balance, and to claim an inordinate share of foreign revenue from merchandise exports.
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From the graph, we see that the trade deficit is usually much smaller than the current account
deficit. It shows that it is not just a trade problem: even with a trade account on balance or in
the positive, this group of countries would have had negative current account, mainly because
of the external debt service. The trade account and in particular the current account and their
deficits give an indication of the size of the external finance needed by these countries. From
the point of view of the ‘foreign exchange constraint’ the current account matters, and it is
important to notice that the trade deficit is smaller than the current one. Thus the trade
balance needs less foreign exchange to match its deficit, which is now due to a debt trap. This
is a clear indication of additional fragility by these countries with respect to trade relations
only25.
Large and persistent current account deficits can create a fertile environment for external
crises, especially when those deficits are financed through short-term capital inflows. While
the specific causes are likely to vary, common precursors to external crises include falling
stocks of foreign reserves, lax monetary and fiscal policies, and rising levels of (especially
short-term) foreign debt.
Periods of external crisis are typically associated with increased exchange rate and interest
rate volatility, falling asset prices, declining foreign reserves. It is in these immediate post-
crisis periods that punitive reductions in both domestic consumption and national output
occur, with associated increases in both unemployment and general socio-political instability.
Private agents and policy makers often view persistently large current account deficits as an
                                                
25 The actual debt service has always been a relevant share of exports, in the range of 20%. These countries have
a negative, large and increasing net factor income. ODA flows have substantially increased from the eighties to
the nineties: the figures seem to indicate that aid has been used to service the debt, at least partially. Moreover,
these data seem to confirm the existence of three gaps in SSA - given the low level of domestic savings (9.26
percent of GDP is the average for the nineties) and public revenues -, and it means that these countries have to
resort to foreign savings to finance their growth process.
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indicator of future difficulties associated with external debt and the balance of payments,
particularly when it is referred to fragile economies.
A structural component of unbalance of SSA economies is surely shown by the fact that there
is an enormous, permanent and pervasive overall budget deficit in all the 47 countries, for all
the 1980-1999 period, apart from the Botswana case (overall surplus) and Nigeria (balance).
And these structural unbalances reach an averaging value of around 20 percent as share of
GDP in Sao Tome, Angola, Eritrea, Cape Verde. We have mentioned the possibility of
interrelations between external and fiscal debt: in Africa servicing of debt placed fiscal
pressure, which has an adverse effect on public investment, inducing their reduction and
concentrating expenditures on current part, which is unable to produce future revenues. Thus,
in the SSA case it is important to analyse the complex link between the fiscal and the external
deficit, in order to define a sustainable escape from debt crisis.
6. – Nature and causes of external debt crisis in Africa
Concerning the causes of external debt crisis in Africa, there is a preliminary point to be
stressed. The problem of foreign debt is neither a specific African problem nor a new one.
Quite the contrary: in absolute terms, SSA debt is 7.8 percent of total world external debt,
which equals to 2,460 US$ billion. In fact total SSA countries’ external debt is around 191.6
US$ billion26; less than the Brazilian external debt, equals to 244.7 US$ billion27. However,
its relative burden is very high: ten countries have the present value of debt (% of GNP)
higher than 100 percent28.
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Therteen countries have debt service ratio higher than 20 percent.
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20,00 21,06 23,68 24,30 25,30 26,24 26,71 28,44 29,08 29,56 29,88 45,61 46,63
Compared to very lower level in 1971: respectively, 20% and 9 %. The importance of debt
servicing component confirms the nature of vicious circle of external indebtedness.
By comparison, the 1995 level of external debt per capita and two other important ratios
confirm the growing problems of SSA.
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Total external debt per capita  (Cur. US$) 68,8 183,5 264,8 377,8 390,5 337,3
Total External Debt to export  ratio, % 82,2 105,9 256,0 327,3 365,3 313,5
Total External Debt to GDP ratio, % 19,7 31,7 74,4 95,4 125,7 103,8
                                                
26 It is 215.8 US$ billion, including South African debt.
27 Among developing countries, the other main external debtors in the world are: Russian Federation, Mexico,
China, Indonesia and Argentina.
28 And twelve other countries have the ratio higher than 60 percent.
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Debt burden is so high that it is only thanks to aid that net flow of international resources is
positive29.
The problems of SSA region with servicing debts are shown by the principal and interest
arrears components of total debt, which have grown from less than 750 US$ million (1975) to
around 62 US$ billion (1995).
Cur. US$ million 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Total stock of arrears (Int. and Prin.) 743.2 3,441 10,722 26,831 61,870 45,125
The arrears/total external debt ratio has shifted from 3,8 (1975) to 5,7 (1980), 10,0 (1985),
15,2 (1990), 29,4 (1995), 22,3 (1999). Thus, the “arrears-burden” has significantly affected
the debt burden, making it unsustainable.
Is it possible to affirm that current SSA debt crisis is an anomaly in history? The contrary is
true. History experienced a lot of external debt crises, as when Haiti’s ratio of debt to exports
was of 484 percent, in the 1890s, without considering the important question of German debt
and debt relief plan during the inter-war period30. For SSA countries themselves, the problem
of debt is not new.
The colonial period witnessed a flow of loans from European centres to the colonies, in order
to finance public infrastructure development - such as railways and roads to link ports to
export the primary commodity production sites – and to fund military presence. The
repayment of this debt by colonial administrators created serious difficulties, because of the
instability in the world commodity market and the vulnerability of the African colonies to
this.
After the 1929 great depression, African exports declined by about 42 per cent, international
credit decreased and the colonies were induced to highly concentrate their production in a
few cash crops to repay their debts. Not only does the pre-II World War situation demonstrate
that debt crisis is not new, but it also justifies some analogies with the current situation and
vicious cycles31.
SSA debt crisis has its origin during the colonial period, which expanded the enclave of
primary commodity exporting economies and generated a situation of vulnerable
specialisation, indebtedness and dependence on external finance and on cash-crops as sources
of foreign exchange required for repaying debt (commodity export-led strategy).
But the current African debt crisis has been exacerbated by some other international factors.
After independence, the inadequacy of domestic capital markets, the inflationary pressure of
monetary expansion, added to the structural inability to generate domestic revenue induced
                                                
29 But 35% of aid goes to expatriate technical experts. And the low level of FDI is partly due to the fact that debt
stock creates a debt overhang problem that affect the confidence of investors who are usually sensitive to
uncertainty.
30 Keynes gave one of the most interesting analyses of the dynamics of debt, which is currently proposed to
solve external debt problems, when he studied the German difficulties to pay its war reparation debts. Keynes
argued that Germany was obliged to extract the necessary funds from domestic resources, that is to cut the
budgetary deficits and reduce the rate of domestic absorption (the budgetary problem) and to convert them into
foreign currency. This induced a loss of purchasing power, by entailing a depreciation of local currency (the
transfer problem), causing domestic incomes and prices to fall but stimulating exports and a surplus of external
account in order to provide additional foreign exchange to meet debt service obligations. See J. M. Keynes
(1929), “The German Transfer Problem”, The Economic Journal, Vol. XXXIX, March.
31 A. Geda (2001), “Debt Issues in Africa: Thinking Beyond the HIPC Initiative to Solving Structural
Problems”, WIDER Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, August 2001.
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the SSA countries to link deficit financing to external borrowing, inducing a fiscal origin of
external debt.
In fact, given the colonial structure, after independence it was needed spending on social and
physical infrastructure, as well as to keep a social consensus and support to governments
(urban-biased expenditure). Most SSA countries engaged in a massive programme of state-
sponsored industrialisation. At international level, SS countries imported capital and
intermediate goods to develop infrastructure. Foreign borrowing supported this process.
The oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79 was followed by the rise in commodity price
and in public expenditure. It was tackled, partly, by resorting to external financing,
particularly the private sources, interested in circulating OPEC-surplus through the
international banking system into productive investments.
The expansion of the Eurodollar market facilitated the access to loan. When the commodity
price fall, as a consequence of the recession in the industrialised nations, African
governments were unable to cut expenditure and projects.
Thus, they were obliged to increase borrowing, also thanks to improved credit worthiness, as
prices of export commodities decline was believed to have cyclical nature. Assuming an
eventual rise in commodity prices and given the prevailing low real interest rate commercial
banks and SSA governments were both attracted by external debt mechanism to finance
massive budgetary deficits.
In addition, SSA governments refused to devalue their currencies, they used tariffs, import
controls and other quantitative restrictions to protect domestic markets, following import-
substituting industrialisation policies, rather than devaluing their currencies, to correct the
distortions.
Consequently, rates of exchanges became seriously over-valued, leading to a loss of markets
and valuable foreign exchange earnings. This contributed to SSA countries’ balance of
payments problems, by over-pricing exports and under-pricing imports.
Public expenditure by African governments following increases in commodity prices during
the early 1970s was maintained during all the decade, because the need of building
independent states.
The situation was reinforced by a second oil price shock, in 1979. The new loans were
characterised by harder terms, with commodity prices continuously deteriorating, exacerbated
by the recession in the industrial countries. It induced a rise in real world interest rate32, due
to fiscal and tight monetary policy of the Reaganomics in the US.
In fact, the adoption of tough anti-inflation monetary policy led to sharp rises in the dollar
interest rate and in the dollar’s foreign exchange market value.  Given that most of
developing countries’ loans had been contracted at floating interest rates and that loans are
denominated in dollars, the real value of the debt service increased substantially. In the
meantime, non-concessional and private credits became the only option at SSA countries’
disposal.
Short-term real interest rates in the United States rose from an annual average of -0.7 per cent
in 1972-1975 to 5.0 per cent in 1980-1982. The index of the terms of trade of non-petroleum
exporting developing countries fell from 110 in 1973-1975 (1980=100) to 94 in 1981-1983
and further to 84 in 1989-1990. The net flows of private capital declined from over US$ 70
billion in 1979-1981 to barely US$ 28 billion in 1985-1986, while capital flight from 13
                                                
32 By 1981 the real foreign interest rate was 17.4% compared to -17.9% in 1973.
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highly indebted countries rose from US$ 47 billion at the end of 1978 to US$ 184 billion at
the end of 1988.
In sub-Saharan Africa excluding Nigeria, the net deterioration in the external financial
situation from these three factors amounted to US$ 6.5 billion per annum over the period
1979-1981 to 1985-1987. These amounts, which take into account debt rescheduling but
ignore capital flight, attained roughly one third of the total annual imports of goods and
services of these countries in the early 1980s and about 45 per cent of average annual export
earnings.
In addition, policy mismanagement in African countries also explains the debt crisis.  Budget
deficits, overvaluation of the currency, capital flight and current account deficits have to be
counted as the domestic sources of repayment difficulties. Inadequate time horizon (short-
term loans to support long-term investments), wrong investment, unproductive investments
(arms) and capital flights contributed to exacerbate the situation.
Both lenders (who were not cautious in their policy) and debtors’ governments were
responsible for the crisis.
In the 1980s, new funds were used in a more defensive manner than in the past: rather than
being used for infrastructure, they were used to avoid social and political discontent due to
cut in public expenditure and to repay arrears.
Significantly, the proportion of non-concessional debt was rising faster than concessional,
which increased the overall debt burden, and there was an increase in short-term debt, too.
Originally, these debts were not considered part of the debt problem, assuming that, as trade-
related credits, they would liquidate themselves in the normal course of events.
Given the drastic reduction in imports, SSA countries had severe problems with financing
their trade flows and an high proportion of short-term debts, also including accumulation of
arrears of interest on public long-term debts, were converted to medium- and long-term debts.
Since the half of the 1980s, SSA countries embarked in structural adjustment programs, but
they faced declining commodity prices and the deterioration of terms of trade.
The 1984-1985 period represented the turning point for SSA region crisis. In 1985 the debt
service to export ratio reached the peak of 26.2 percent (compared to 6.8 percent in 1975 and
11.7 percent in 1980), and then, with the collapse in debt service capacity, this ratio was
pushed to around 20 percent.  Net transfers of debt (being net flows minus interest payments
or disbursements minus total debt service payments), after having been positive, in 1985
became negative (-811.4 US$ million).
A basic measure of the link between GNP and the debt-to-GNP ratio is the statistical
correlation, which is a measure of the strength of association between two variables.  Unlike
regression, it is not necessary to define one variable as the independent variable and one as
the dependent variable33.
                                                
33 The correlation coefficient is a number that varies between -1 and +1.  A correlation of -1 indicates there is a
perfect negative relationship between the two variables, with one always decreasing as the other increases.  A
correlation of +1 indicates there is a perfect positive relationship between the two variables, with both always
increasing together.  A correlation of 0 indicates no relationship between the two variables. The formula of  the
correlation coefficient is:
where covariance is divided by the product of the stardard deviations.
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The (Pearson product moment) correlation coefficient for the entire period from 1975 to 1999
is equal to –0.636, and indicates there is a strong negative relationship between economic
development and debt burden in SSA region, with one always decreasing as the other
increases. But, if we split the entire series into two sub-periods, and we consider the first
period of “sustainable indebtedness” (1975-1983), in this case we have a significant positive
association (+0.487). In the remaining period after the turning point (1986-1999), we have a
significant negative association (-0.794), which is very high if we drop out the period of
implementation of the recent multilateral initiative to cancel debt (Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative), and consider the sub-period 1986-1996 (-0.843).
This result confirms the existence of a complex, non-linear relationship between debt and
development. Given particular conditions, the relation can be positive, whereas it becomes
negative if we assume different context. Again, the crucial issue is how to define the correct
connection between politics and economics, in order to escape from over-simplification on
the links between debt and development and to reconstitute social science, primarily aimed at
overcoming the artificial distinctions between economic-political, on the one hand, and
domestic-international, on the other.
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This picture can be consistent with the existence of debt overhang problem, provided that a
large external debt overhang – corresponding to the 1984-85 turning point, where the curve
turns down and the additional stock of debt implies disincentives to development - affects
negatively economic development.
Moreover, the increase of positive real interest rate and the capitalisation of amortisation and
interest payment through the Paris and London clubs rescheduling had also started pushing
the debt stock upward. African economies became extremely indebted by the 1990s and
dependent on external finance for securing imported intermediate inputs. Northern
protectionism for agricultural products implied an high cost for badly diversified economies,
such as the SSA ones.
In the 1990s, multilateral development banks - particularly the World Bank, IMF and African
Development Bank - replaced commercial banks, to facilitate their bail-out, and to implement
adjustment program, thus becoming the main creditors of SSA governments. The
international financial institutions enjoyed “preferred creditor” status and debts to these
institutions could not be rescheduled: they had to be serviced, irrespective of what was
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happening elsewhere in the domestic and international economy34. In fact, several SSA
countries are net creditors to the IMF.
Nowadays, ten years later, over 80 percent of the SSA debt is a public sector liability, derived
from public sector borrowing and public assumption of past private sector debt. Among the
official creditors, multilateral institutions have gained importance (accounting now for 1/3 of
long-term debt and ½ of long-term debt service, and being 29.9 percent of total debt,
compared to 12.4 percent in 1980). Less than 20 percent are short-term debt accounts.
From this rapid historical review, it derives the importance of several factors, both domestic
and external, which determined a severe debt problem. It seems to confirm the idea discussed
by Keynes on the German war reparation problem, even then the causes of debt crisis were
clearly different. Debt crisis, as managed during the 1970-90s, has created a budgetary
problem, as SSA governments need no only to cut budgetary deficit by reducing the level of
domestic absorption, but also to extract the additional domestic savings out of current
national income in order to secure the necessary domestic resources for servicing external
debt. Therefore, a budgetary surplus needed first to be created, reducing the level of
investment, cutting government social expenditure and restricting the expansion of the money
supply (measures induced by structural adjustment programs, financed by the World Bank
and IMF). In a short-term horizon these measure seemed more feasible than expanding the
tax base, restructuring tax rates and improving system of administration, all of them being
measures, which take time to implement. The implemented measures affected domestic
incomes, prices, wages and savings, creating serious economic, social and political
problems35. Moreover, as creditors do not accept domestic currencies, given the asymmetrical
relationship between a debtor country and its creditors, the mobilised domestic resources
have to be converted into foreign exchanges, and this creates the transfer problem. The SSA
ability to increase the foreign exchange earnings depends basically on the rate of growth of
exports, which in turns depends on the supply performance – very low - and on the creditors’
availability to accept SSA imports – very low -. Unfortunately, inadequate supply and
demand prevented SSA countries from solving the transfer problem, particularly in the given
context of the 1980s and 1990s, when all SSA countries were required to increase exports at
the same time, increasing competition with each other and reducing the space for expansion
of intra-regional trade. Anglo-American neo-liberalism has tended to prevail, based on a set
of institutions and practices, which promote a Social Darwinist reconfiguration of priorities,
policies and outcomes real priority. The Structural adjustment programmes were the
mainstream, promoting the liberal vision of the Washington Consensus; and according to it a
fully integrated and self-regulating developing economy must be based on international links
(FDI inflows). No real priority was given to the building of an efficient, strong, redistributive
revenue system: the third-gap of development financing problem received very marginal
attention.
Given this long history of domestic and external problems, there are three contending
ideological explanations of the current African crisis, which can be derived from the
background theoretical analysis presented in Part I. These explanation provide different
political solutions.
                                                
34 In 1996, the HIPC Initiative, described in chapter seven, changed significantly the situation, introducing the
possibility to cancel debt owed to multilateral banks.
35 The same effects described by Keynes as referred to the reparation of Germany’s war debts. See J. M. Keynes
(1929), op. cit.
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The Washington Consensus approach is based on the World Bank's Agenda for action
(1981)36 report saying that the main determinants of African crisis are domestic:
underdeveloped human resources, political instability, inadequate institutions, geography and
population growth. External shocks - a rise in oil prices in the periods 1973-74 and 1978-80
and deterioration in SSA terms of trade – are not the crucial direct cause, which is the decline
in the volume of exports, volumes, rather than declining prices, due to structural changes in
the composition of world trade, inadequate supply capacity and Northern countries’ trade
restrictions and agricultural subsidy policies. Orthodox macroeconomic management, based
on export promotion and adjustment, represents the road to economic recovery.
An opposite structuralist view is represented by the Economic Commission For Africa
(1989)37, saying that there are some interlinked constraints, being the inadequate economic
and social infrastructure, research capability, technological know-how and human resource
development. Inflation, balance of payments deficit, debt burden and instability of exports, in
a context of an excessive outward oriented industrialisation policy, strongly interact. It
created a structural external dependence and vulnerability of SSA, as a direct continuum with
the colonial experience, still producing raw materials and agricultural goods for Europe.
Exogenous factors, such as terms of trade and world interest rates, have caused the crisis.
Policy implications, which can be derived from this explanation, are improving income
distribution, focusing on the basic needs, reducing import dependence.
Opposed to both the previous approaches, a post-Marxian approach, based on the Wallerstein
idea of world-economy, says that SSA crisis is part of long-term secular effects of
imperialism and of the world capitalist crisis. From this point of view, free market
international system is inherently a source of exploitation of poor countries. Thus, opposite to
the other approaches, free market mechanism, rather than being itself instrument of best
resource allocation and income distribution within a short-term perspective (Washington
Consensus) or being the fundamental instrument to be adequately and structurally
transformed in a long-term perspective (ECA), it is source of systemic problems.
History and data seem to demonstrate that probably it is the combination of internal and
external factors (i.e. a combination of all these different explanations) which has given the
debt crisis in SSA countries its peculiar characteristics. Some additional useful information38:
- total external debt grew nearly 20 fold, from US $12.6 billion in 1971;
- the basic component is now long-term debt outstanding, owed to official creditors;
- bilateral debt is the most important component, followed by multilateral debt. Private
inflows are the residual part, and with a declining trend;
- a larger share of the official debt is on concessional terms;
- since the 1980s, the use of IMF credit became an important support to structural
adjustment;
- capitalisation of interest and principal arrears constitute a quarter of the external debt,
confirming the fact that external debt is now a self-reproductive mechanism.
                                                
36 World Bank (1981), Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington D.C.
37 UNECA (1989), African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic
Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP), Addis Ababa.
38 These figures are useful information, but their interpretation must be cautious, as: (i) problems of data
coverage and reliability, (ii) differences among SSA countries, (iii) there have been changes in the value of the
dollar, (iv) it is not always clear whether data on debt payments represent scheduled (ex ante) or actual (ex post)
payments.
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7. – Fiscal component of external debt crisis in Africa
External debt problem can be due to fiscal reasons. The fiscal nature of the problem is
evident in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hjertholm39 looked at the external debt-financed government
spending experience of SSA, confirming the existence of an abuse of foreign borrowing to
finance large fiscal deficits. He stressed that SSA countries:
· inherited very weak fiscal policy and administration from colonial period;
· were unable to generate domestic revenue, due to structural economic (trade-dependence)
and political considerations;
· experienced very high level of current (urban subsidies) and capital (infrastructure)
expenditure to create political consensus and economic development;
· exploited the international commodity boom (in the 1970s) to expand external debt as the
main source of deficit financing, producing favourable expectations among the creditors;
· when commodity prices fell sharply (in the 1980s), the rigidity of government
expenditures increased fiscal deficit and produced further external debt (particularly
multilateral debt);
· central governments guaranteed the repayment of debt acquired by para-statal enterprises,
the economic failure of many “productive” public sector investments and the high share
of military expenditure (15 percent of total government expenditure) compromised the
repayment of debt.
The aggregate picture of SSA region masks the differences in individual countries,
nevertheless there is a common characteristics, which can be stressed. High levels of external
debt were associated to high and permanent levels of overall deficit.
And central government debt represented the bulk of this deficit, confirming the existence of
a vicious circle between development, external debt and public revenue.
The more developed is a country, the more capacity this country has to generate revenue,
then the more domestic resources are available to finance development and the less external
burden is needed.
Tab. 7 - SSA Overall surplus/deficit, incl. all grants,  No. Of countries
Deficit, as share of GDP (%)
>10% >5% >2.5% >0.1% surplus n.a.
1986-91 7 15 10 4 3 7
1992-95 8 14 12 6 3 3
1996-99 6 9 13 10 7 1
Source: World Bank (2001), World Bank Africa Database 2001, Washington D.C.
In fact, at a more disaggregated level, it is quite clear that the revenue problem is more
evident for the sub-group of SSA countries being classified as “Severely indebted low-
income countries” and, within this group, for the poorest non-oil-exporters countries.
                                                
39 P. Hjertholm (1997), An Inquiry Into the Fiscal Dimension of External Debt: The Case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, PhD dissertation, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
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Tab. 8 - Government revenues, excl. all grants as % of GDP
1985 1990 1995 1999
Burkina Faso 9,8 12,3 10,8 16,5
Burundi 13,4 15,1 20,1 17,9
Cameroon 21,0 14,3 12,9 15,3
Central African Republic .. 10,7 9,2 9,2
Comoros 10,5 17,0 17,4 10,9
Congo, Dem. Rep. .. .. 13,2 12,8
Ethiopia 16,7 17,7 17,5 19,5
Guinea .. 15,8 10,9 10,3
Guinea-Bissau 7,6 18,7 12,7 18,4
Madagascar 12,9 12,0 8,5 11,9
Malawi 22,7 21,0 17,8 16,6
Mali 12,0 17,6 12,9 17,8
Mozambique 9,9 12,8 11,3 10,5
Niger 10,8 10,2 7,2 6,8
Rwanda 9,9 10,1 6,9 9,2
Sierra Leone 5,2 9,2 9,5 10,6
Sudan 9,4 6,3 8,7 8,4
Tanzania 17,4 14,7 11,0 10,6
Uganda 9,1 6,8 9,8 10,9
Zambia 21,9 20,3 19,9 17,6
Source: World Bank (2001), World Bank Africa Database 2001, Washington D.C.
The table shows twenty poor SSA countries with a permanently weak fiscal position, due to
their inadequate revenue performance, which means weak debt servicing capacity. Moreover,
considering the government revenue indicator as compared to a common measure of debt
distress, that is debt service ratio (with an export-based denominator), some interesting points
emerge. Revenue based indicator of debt distress appear higher than the export-based
indicator, confirming that government revenue represented the main constraint in SSA
region. And, as SSA region’s debt is mainly public debt, the revenue constraint is clearly
more stringent, whereas export earnings facilitate the servicing of both public and private
debt and represent an added public debt service capacity solely through their conversion into
government taxation. Conversion that is not complete and transparent, given the
administrative weakness of African countries and discrepancies of data. In sum, revenue-
based debt indicators seem to capture a significant component of external debt burden, at
least as important as the export-based indicators, which are commonly used. A relationship
that should be more deeply empirically investigated, as well as the relationship with
indicators referred to the other side of the public budget, that is government expenditure.
8. – Different components of foreign capital flows to Africa
External debt flows to SSA countries are not the only channels of international financial
resources to Africa. And capital flows are not all the same. We have to consider several
dimensions: equity versus debt, short term versus long term, public versus private.
Considering total external debt, grants, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and
remittances - both private and official finance – as total external financial inflows, we can
compare this aggregate to gross domestic savings (calculated as the difference between GDP
and total consumption).
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During the 1970s, domestic savings represented a growing component to be mobilised to
finance investment in SSA’s economies, and they reached 29.7 percent of GNP in 1979,
whereas external finance was much lower and represented 20.0 percent of domestic savings
in 1979. During the 1980s, this trend has abruptly changed: ruined by the dramatic slowdown
of African economies, domestic savings dropped suddenly and arrived at 10 percent of GNP
in 1992. In the meantime, external finance was still growing and arrived to represent a very
high level of 9.8 percent of GNP (equal to 97.6 percent of domestic savings). Thereafter,
domestic savings went up again but in the last two years both domestic and external flows
have dramatically gone down. This picture is different from the South African experience:
domestic savings were never lower than 17 percent of GNP and external finance was never
higher than 30 percent of domestic savings.
In general terms, in SSA as a whole external finance flows represent a relevant component in
relation to GNP and domestic savings. And Feldstein notes that the close association between
foreign inflows and domestic investment suggest a lack of deep integration in the financing of
investment 40.
But a more precise analysis requires taking in accounts the differences across types of flows
(long-term and short-term or private and official capital flows) and countries.
Intuitively, the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest in an
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, that is the sum of equity
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in
the balance of payments is one thing. And we call it foreign direct investment. External debt,
official aid, portfolio investment and current transfers by migrants are quite different things.
These differences are relevant in terms of impact on development.
                                                
40 M. Feldstein (1994), “The Effects of Outbound Foreign Direct Investment on the Capital Stock”, NBER
Working Paper, N. 4668, Cambridge.
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We can consider a rough picture of all these foreign capital inflows to SSA.
Foreign capital inflows to SSA (Net, cur US$ mill.)
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In terms of flows, from the 1970s external debt has represented the main source of
international capital to SSA up to 1996. In 1996, the international financial institutions
launched an important initiative to reduce the indebtedness of poor countries (the HIPC
initiative, analysed in chapter 7), which has a direct negative consequence, in terms of
dramatic reduction of new lending. What seems to be a great worry is the sudden and parallel
tremendous decline of aid during the last five years. Aid represented the main source in the
1990s and is widely considered a more adequate alternative to debt for poor countries. Quite
interesting is the FDI dynamics, with a recent counter-trend compared to aid and debt.
Obviously, referring to private flows, it is important to consider the between-countries
differences. Remittances represent a growing, stable source of capital inflows, whereas
portfolio investments have always been very marginal in SSA’s case and it reflects negative
investor sentiment.
How should we interpret the recent upsurge in FDI? It is true that, at a very simplistic level, it
could be argued that FDI is a good capital flow from the point of view of the potential
vulnerability of the capital importing countries.  It represents equity rather than debt; it is
long term rather than short term, it is associated with increased domestic capital formation, it
tends to go to the private sector. Thus, it is common to attribute crises to short-term and debt
capital inflows, while FDI is seen as a safer form of finance. In this case ,looking at the
picture of foreign capital inflows to SSA, we should appreciate the recent reversal of
course41. But, at a deeper level, FDI means different things, and different forms of FDI are
likely to have rather different implications for the safety of capital inflows. Debt liabilities are
not inherently less safe than FDI. Fernández-Arias and Hausmann note that the common view
is inappropriate as FDI is not a physical asset of a firm, but only (and simply) one of its
                                                
41 As expressed by the World Bank: “FDI also is less subject to capital reversals and contagion that affect other
flows, since the presence of large, fixed, illiquid assets makes rapid disinvestment more difficult than the
withdrawal of short-term bank lending or the sale of stock holdings”. See World Bank (1999), “Foreign
Investment Resilient in the Face of Financial Crisis”, Chapter 3, Global Development Finance 1999, Analysis
and Summary Tables, Washington D.C.
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liabilities42. And they conclude that the share of FDI in total capital inflows is not a measure
of anything good happening in the economy, in fact in rich countries lower growth prospects
and higher risks lead companies to prefer more equity and less debt in the composition of
their capital. Also, poorly functioning debt markets can make FDI a more efficient way to
access capital. In all of these cases, the fact that the share of FDI in capital inflows is rising is
not bad in itself, but is instead an optimal response to a deteriorating environment.
In order to analyse FDI to SSA, we can start from the Hausmann’s approach43 and look at
two concepts, and consider both total external financial inflows as a share of GNP (i.e. how
large is the flow of liabilities to foreign players relative to GNP) and, second, the share of
FDI in those liabilities. We can also add a time dimension and draw the line of historical
trend (from 1970 to 2000). Thus, we can look at the ratio of FDI to GNP, that is the product
of the first two ratios (= [total external financial inflows / GNP] [FDI / total external financial
inflows] = [FDI / GNP]). We can decompose the share of FDI to GNP as a consequence of a
volume effect (reflected in the total flow of external capital), and a composition effect (the
proportion of FDI).
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The figure shows that external capital liabilities as a share of GNP are low in SSA countries,
with flows reaching no more than 10 per cent of GNP.
In East Asia and East Europe they reach 15 per cent; in Latin American countries they reach
22 per cent; in developed countries they are much higher.
The effect of debt (and aid) reduction is a drastic drop of total capital inflows.
Hence, we find that the proportion of FDI clearly reflect this crisis in new lending, and the
story is reversed. The flow of FDI represent a low percentage of the total external capital
                                                
42 E. Fernández-Arias and R. Hausmann (2001), “Capital Inflows and Crisis: Does the Mix Matter?”,
Development Centre Seminars, Foreign Direct Investment Versus Other Flows to Latin America”, OECD-
IADB, Paris.
43 E. Fernández-Arias and R. Hausmann (2001), “Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?”, Development
Centre Seminars, Foreign Direct Investment Versus Other Flows to Latin America”, OECD-IADB, Paris.
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ionflows in SSA countries, until the recent years, when it goes up to 80 per cent. And the
most important problem is that FDI continue to target a narrow range of SSA countries and
sectors, with extractive industries dominating, though there has been interest in
telecommunications and tourism.
Composition of External capital inflows vs. GNP: SSA
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Then, we can consider the flow of FDI as a share of GNP. In SSA there is a growing trend in
the recent years. And the figure shows that the recent experience has been different. But we
have to consider that Latin America and the industrial countries share a similar reatio of
slightly over 7 per cent, followed by East Asia with 6.5 per cent. Africa and Asia are still
below 4 per cent of GNP.
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In sum, total capital flows tend to increase with the level of development. But the share of
those flows that take the form of FDI tends to decline with the level of development. The
ratio of FDI to GNP is high in industrial countries because it is a small share of a very large
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total volume of external capital inflows. In SSA the ratio of FDI to GNP is still low, because
low volumes of total external inflows.
From this rough picture, it derives an important aspect to be investigated. The increase of the
share of FDI is not necessarily a consequence of a general improvement in the perception of
development prospects and institution building. Quite the opposite, it can be an indication
that markets are working badly, the institutions are not accountable and the risks are high. In
the context of debt relief, the lenders can be reticent to extend loans. Provided that portfolio
investments are very marginal and that workers’ remittances have their own trend, what about
the interaction between the major inflows, debt, aid and FDI? Their relationship does not
seem to be linear and probably the effect on development depends on their inter-relationship
as well. The effects of external capital inflows on development cannot in general be derived
by their statistical definition (debt vs. equity, private vs. official source) but on the basis of
other considerations as well (such as currency and maturity in the composition of liabilities,
complementarity or substitutability with other sources of finance). The econometric analysis
on the relationship between debt and development should consider this reciprocal effects and
control for other forms of foreign capital inflows. We think that the impact of various classes
of international capital inflows cannot be assessed by looking at each flow separately.
9. – Multidimensional nature of African problems
African case demonstrates that external debt problems are strictly linked to other aspects of
external relations (trade and aid) as well as to domestic problems (fiscal and savings), directly
interacting with poverty reduction policies. The coherence of policies matters and it calls for
political will by all partners.
During the 1980s, 37 countries belonging to SSA underwent at least one adjustment
programmes, due to their external debt crisis. The social, political and economic impacts of
these programmes are direct effects of debt crisis. External debt is not only a financial and
economic problem, but also a social and political problem.
Given these premises, we have found some points to be underlined.
First, as we repeatedly stressed and the following appendix tries to demonstrate, specific
context does matter, thus every country has its own different profile in terms of external
relations, domestic problems, and poverty situation.
Second, poverty reduction, in the context of sustainable development, remains a major
challenge in Africa. Poverty is not a static condition among individuals, households, regions
or countries. Instead, it is recognised that while some individuals or households are
permanently poor, other become impoverished. The dynamic concept of vulnerability must
be used to understand these processes of change. Poverty encompasses different dimensions
of deprivation that relate to human capabilities including consumption and food security,
health, education, rights, voice, security, dignity and decent work. Despite wide consensus on
the importance of poverty reduction strategies, an enormous gap remains between rhetoric
and practice. Social and economic inequality within and between nations is a relevant
obstacle to sustainable poverty reduction. And, in spite of international efforts and Africa’s
urgent needs, performance still falls far short of goals.
Third, in terms of future perspectives, Africa confirms to be the region being much far from
achieving the seven International Development Goals (IDGs). Again domestic and external
components seem to be crucial to address these targets.
Fourth, external debt is a big problem in SSA, and it is related to some structural weaknesses
of the balance of payments.
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Fifth, external debt is not a new problem for Africa. We found some historical structural
components of this crisis.
Sixth, linked to this historical problem and to the external face of debt, being represented by
the balance of payments problem, there is a direct link to the fiscal deficit problem.
At the end, the picture is more complex than it may appear. External debt problem is not a
financial problem in itself; it is a main component  (both source and effect) of the
multidimensional problem of development in Africa. It is not useful to separate domestic and
external causes as opposite determinants. The reality is the interaction between all these
factors. Correctly, Rodrik44 argued that domestic social conflicts are a key to understanding
why growth rates lack persistence and why so many countries have experienced a growth
collapse after the mid-1970s. He emphasises, in particular, the manner in which social
conflicts interact with external shocks on the one hand, and the domestic institutions of
conflict management on the other.
And empirical methods are used by Rodrik to investigate these relationships. Countries that
experienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 were those with divided societies (as
measured by indicators of inequality, ethnic fragmentation, and the like) and with weak
institutions of conflict management (proxied by indicators of the quality of governmental
institutions, rule of law, democratic rights, and social safety nets).
Empirical methods have been widely used to investigate the complex relationship between
external finance (both aid and debt) and development. Chapter 5 will present a survey of this
literature, whereas chapter 6 will present an econometric application to analyse this issue.
                                                
44 D. Rodrik (1997), “Where did All the Growth Go?: External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth Collapses”,
Kennedy School, Harvard University, mimeo.
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5. Review of econometric literature on the linkages between foreign
capital inflows and development
There are a large number of empirical studies that investigated the most relevant
determinants of a Ldc’s development rate. The role of foreign capital has been explored in
this context. However, this literature, mainly based on the usage of comparative cross-
country analysis, has not adequately explored:
(i)  the long-term nature of the relationship between foreign capital and development,
(ii)  the role of different conditions between countries within the same geographical region
(which we stressed through the “flower” ideogram, in chapter 4),
(iii)  the importance of social, political and institutional conditions,
(iv)  the difference between the level and evolution of foreign capital intensity, which implies
that case-specific features may overwhelm any mechanical link between the two.
(v)  the implication for sustainability of different nature and composition of foreign debt
(short-term or long-term debts, its maturity and grace periods, the level of interest rates,
the structure of interest and principal arrears, arrears to actual payments ratio, its front-
loading,…), in fact the total debt outstanding involves debt of varying maturities, varying
interest rates, and varying grace periods; the debt service owed in any given year thus is
only loosely connected to the debt outstanding,
(vi)  the different impact of the various types of capital inflows (foreign debt, aid, foreign
direct investment, portfolio and equity flows, workers’ remittances) on development,
and particularly the relationship between aid and debt,
(vii)  the fiscal dimension of external debt.
Moreover, the bulk of this literature studied the debt experience of Latin American
countries. If we are interested in SSA, then we have to consider a lot of other studies, which
investigated another relationship that is between aid and development. In fact, as SSA
foreign debt is basically concessional and owed to official lenders - differently from Latin
American debt -, most of the empirical studies on SSA were referred to the effectiveness of
foreign aid, foreign debt being implicitly assumed as part of it. Much of the emphasis in the
literature on fiscal implications of external inflows in SSA countries has been on the role of
external aid, rather than debt1. Measured relative to recipient GNP, the median value of aid
to African countries now stands at nearly 10 times the amount received by Western Europe
under the Marshall Plan. This emphasis reflects the historical importance of aid relative to
external debt in these poor countries, compared to the case of Latin American economies2.
The literature has been dominated by cross-section studies using single-equation estimation
                                                                
1 P. Cashel-Cordo and S. G. Craig (1990), “The Public Sector Impact on International Resource
Transfers”, Journal of Development Economics, N. 32;  S. Devarajan., A, S. Rajkumar and V. Swaroop
(1998), “What Does Aid to Africa Finance?”, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Nairobi,
mimeo; T. Feyzioglu, V. Swaroop and M. Zhu (1998), “A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of
Foreign Aid”, World Bank Economic Review, N. 12.; and I. N. Gang and H. A. Khan (1991), “Foreign
Aid, Taxes and Public Investment”, Journal of Development Economics, N. 24.
2 As the external debt burden of African countries has become considerable, however, increasing
attention is being paid to implications of debt for the these economies. In addition to the finding that the
debt burden may have reduced economic growth. See A. K. Fosu (1999), “The External Debt Burden and
Economic Growth in the 1980s: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, Canadian Journal of Development
Studies, Vol. 20, N. 2; C. Lancaster (1991), “African Economic Reform: The External Dimension”, Institute
of International Economics, Washington, DC.
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techniques, producing mixed empirical results. Empirical studies have failed to provide
statistically significant and clear conclusions. What most of all these studies seem to reject is
the complexity of the relationship debt/aid/Fdi-development, the ambiguous nature of
external debt, which can be both positively and negatively related to development. When we
offered a re-examination of the theoretical literature on development and debt in chapters 2-
4, we have stressed this nature, and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion and Howitt
(1998) remind us that the development process depends on an intricate range of interacting
characteristics and dynamics. Nevertheless most of existing studies prefer to assume a strict,
often linear, and ideological relationship to be tested - confirmed or rejected - between debt
and development. Debt (or, separately, aid) is good or bad for development.
If we proceed from an historical point of view, it is clear that, as time goes, empirical studies
reflect the growing complexity of new development theories. Recent advances in growth
theory have allowed more sophisticated empirical growth equations to be specified. The
regressions include more and more variables, as well as the econometric techniques improve
their quality. In other words, the history of econometric analysis is a mirror to the history of
theoretical literature and reflects, given stronger techniques, the same disenchantment.
Because theory is inconclusive, the relationship between foreign capital inflows and
development becomes an empirical matter. But the empirical evidence does not seem to
agree on whether the relationship is generally positive or negative.
Our basic idea, and we test it in chapter 6, is that the assumption of such a simple
relationship is wrong.
In this chapter, we offer a review of those quantitative analyses, which are based on cross-
country (and not on single-country case) studies at macroeconomic level (rather than at
micro- level). This review of methodological approaches is a preliminary step to present, in
chapter 6, our econometric analysis of debt/aid and development relationship in SSA
countries. This chapter reviews econometric applications and takes account of the main
relations, which have been discussed.
Our aim is to stress the importance of recent theoretical and empirical studies and to point
out that foreign capital inflows (external debt and aid) seem to have positive but decreasing
returns and start to have a negative effect on development after a certain level. We think that
this level is not the same for different countries. Debt overhang exists, and a country can
receive too much debt or aid and becomes dependent. We think that theory supports the
idea of an inverted U-shaped relationship (a foreign capital inflow-Laffer curve) between
concessional finance and development. And empirical evidence confirms it. But we also
think that “how high flows should become to have a negative effect on development?” is a
misleading question as historical, social, political, and economic contexts do matter as well.
And that different kinds of foreign capital inflows interact among themselves in affecting
development.
1. The links between national saving and foreign debt
The links between savings and international capital inflows have been the core of the first
analyses, based on the early Harrod–Domar traditional growth theory and saving-gap
approach. Foreign capital was perceived as an exogenous increment to the capital stock of
the recipient country. The implicit causal chain runs from foreign capital to growth via
savings. A huge amount of savings is translated into higher investment (i.e. accumulation of
physical capital), the investment function being governed by the acceleration principle.
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The extent to which shifts in government saving induce offsetting changes in private saving
has been a central issue in much of the 1960 and 1970 literature in macroeconomics.
Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) affirmed that each dollar of foreign resources would induce an
increase of one dollar in national savings and investment. Thus, foreign flows were not
considered as a component of national income adding to both consumption and investment,
and fungibility was not taken in account.
Quite the opposite, Griffin and Enos (1970)3 said that capital inflows from abroad reduce
the rate of growth of the receiving country. Weisskopf confirmed, analysing 38 developing
countries during the 1950s and 1960s period, a negative impact of foreign resources on
domestic saving4. Foreign capital inflows become a substitute for, instead of an addition o
domestic savings.
Chenery and Eckstein5, Landau6, Grinols and Bhagwati7 confirmed the negative correlation
between foreign resource and domestic savings, implying severe critics to the gap theories.
In this case, the foreign resources dependency is the mechanism described to explain the
negative effect of foreign resources on domestic saving, which was assumed as dependent
variable. Foreign resources may support both investment and consumption8, that is they can
replace saving, which becomes a residual component. Given the income level, increasing
consumption implies reduced savings9.
Nevertheless, all these studies realised in the 1970s have simply showed the presence of
correlation, without deriving any causal relationship. In fact, Morisset10 demonstrated that
this correlation does not imply any causality: both national savings and foreign resources are
affected by exogenous (interest rate on debt) and endogenous (public deficit, money supply)
variables, and this creates the illusion of causal relationship between domestic savings and
foreign debt. Thus, in broader terms, an issue that remains unresolved in the empirical
literature is that of causality: external debt may cause policy changes (owing to
conditionalities), but policy changes may also results in higher levels of debt, by increasing
international confidence in the country’s economic prospects.
The general relation assumed by this kind of analysis, combining the acceleration principle
and the multiplier theory, is:
St = a0Yt + b1FFt  and   Yt = d0 + d1FFt (5.1)
St = a0 d0 + a0 d1FFt + b1FFt = a0 d0 + FFt (b1 + a0 d1) (5.2)
                                                                
3 K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos (1970), ibidem.
4 T. E. Weisskopf (1972), “The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in Uncerdeveloped
Countries”, Journal of International Economics.
5 H. B. Chenery and P. Eckstein (1970), “Development Alternatives for Latin America”, Journal of
Political Economy, N. 78, 4.
6 L. Landau (1971), “Savings function for Latin America”, H. B. Chenery (ed.), Studies in Developmental
Planning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
7 E. Grinols and J. Bhagwati (1976), “Foreign Capital, Savings and Dependence”, Review of Economic
Statistics, N. 58.
8 Also Dornbush considered relevant the role of foreign finance in terms of consumption-smoothing,
allowing the indebted country to keep its consumption and expenditures levels inaltered in the short
term. See R. Dornbush (1983), “Real Interest Rates, Home Goods and Optimal External Borrowing”,
Journal of Political Economy, N. 91, 1.
9 K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos (1970), “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences”, Economic
Development Cultural Change, N. 18, 3.
10 J. Morisset (1989), “The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Savings Re-examined: The
Case of Argentina”, World Development, N. 17, 11.
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Where:
St = savings
a0Yt = the average (and marginal) propensity to save
FFt = foreign flows (aid and external debts)
All these studies used only aggregated data on foreign inflows, due to lack of data on
different flows and their inability to separate the various aggregate foreign inflows measures.
Hansen and Tarp (2000)11 compared 131 regressions, identified from 29 articles: they
investigated a sample of 41 aid-savings regressions. Only one study reported an estimate of
a1 which is significantly greater than zero. Thus, the idea of a direct, positive, on a one-to-
one basis impact of foreign inflows on savings is not confirmed. But a negative impact is not
confirmed either, and in only one study does aid lead to lower total savings. The
overwhelming evidence from these studies is that aid leads to an increase in total savings,
although not by as much as the aid flow.
The more recent empirical studies indicate12 that:
· an increase in public saving tends to be associated with higher national saving, rejecting
the Ricardian assumptions (a rise in the budget deficit has no effect on the national saving
rate: the so-called Ricardian equivalence);
· increases in per capita income raises the private saving rate;
· increases in foreign saving (measured by the current account deficit), affect national
saving negatively, but only partially: this suggests that  foreign saving is a substitute, less
than perfect one, for domestic saving, and an increased availability of external financing
support both consumption and investment and however the negative coefficient is less
than one (i.e. less than proportional effect), implying that the crowding out effect is less
than one to one;
· reduction in high external debt burden increases national saving. This result can be due
to the fact that if the public sector’s foreign debt deteriorates, the private sector will
anticipate a significant increase in taxation in the future, and this substitution effect due to
such expectations will reduce consumption. Thus, from this point of view, a high level of
debt will reduce the national saving rate.
In every case, there are some statistical problems linked to his kind of analysis.
Ø There is the problem of assuming as parameters what are in reality variables (for
example, propensity to save).
Ø It is also important to consider the fact that important exogenous shocks are removed by
analysis.
Ø It is not easy to correctly identify the exact amount of foreign resources (for exemple,
there is the capital flight phenomenon) or to combine different forms of flows (grants,
loans, investment)13.
                                                                
11 H. Hansen and F. Tarp (2000), “Aid Effectiveness Disputed”, in F. Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid and
Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future, Routledge, London.
12 P. R. Agénor (2000), The Economics of Adjustment and Growth, Academic Press, San Diego.
13 Sengupta proposed an easy weighting system to determine the length or time horizon to reach
independence from different forms of foreign flows: dependency vanishes faster in the case of grants, it
takes longer in the case of debt and the longest dependency in case of investment. This is simply due to
the fact that grants are free of interest payments, and investment requires an interest rate (equal to
loans) plus a risk premium, which makes it the most expensive. Obviously, this simplification assumes
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In fact, Michaely14 showed the difficulty in estimating a dependency indicator (equal to the
foreign resources divided by total resources). Bhaduri15 stressed the nature of complex
system: a dependency effect linking foreign resources and domestic saving can not be
reduced and progressively removed through the correct usage of funds to support
productive investment, if a foreign exchange gap exists as well. He reflected the fact that the
original Harrod–Domar model, assuming only a savings constraint on growth, was expanded
in the sixties in the influential Chenery and Strout (1966) two-gap model. In this case some
bifurcations are possible, and both domestic structure and trade balance should be
addressed.
If the trade gap is the larger of the two, actual savings are supposed to fall short of potential
savings, and if the prospective savings gap is the larger, actual imports will be greater than
those needed for growth (see Chenery and Eckstein 1970).
Robinson (1971) introduced the trade balance in a cross-country growth regression. He
found that the trade balance variable was highly significant and that foreign exchange can
operate as a limiting factor for growth, lending support to the two-gap model. It represented
a step towards the definition of a more complex set of relations, which link foreign debt and
development.
2. The links between investment and foreign debt
Foreign inflows can raise investment rates or, alternatively, they may be used to raise current
consumption, potentially reducing saving. In the past decades, there has been a long-
standing interest in the extent to which the resource inflows are invested or consumed16.
The decision to invest in Ldcs has been shown to depend on a variety of factors. An
ambiguous effect seems to have foreign debt on national private investment, because from
one side, by increasing the fiscal deficit and reducing available credit, it crows out private
capital formation, but from another side public investment (for example, in infrastructure
projects) may be complementary to private investment. Considering the relationship
between investment and foreign debt, the empirical studies assumed that a large ratio of
foreign debt to output has an adverse effect on investment, against the hypothesis of positive
effects. Again, he idea was to test a linear, direct and clear relationship between debt and
investment, rather than assuming a “complex” nature of interactions.
The introduction of investment in econometric analysis did not change the focus on capital
accumulation - investment is the major direct determinant of growth - and it resulted
consistent with both the Harrod–Domar and Solow growth models.
Hansen and Tarp (2000) identified a sample of 72 cross-country foreign inflows-investment
regressions. These equations considered domestic savings and various aggregates of foreign
inflows as separate determinants of investment, which was assumed as dependent variable.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
that there is no difference in the way how the three considered forms of foreign finance affect the
savings/income ratio. See A. Sengupta (1968), “Foreign Capital Requirements for Economic
Development”, Oxford Economic Papers.
14 M. Michaely (1981), “Foreign Aid, Economic Structure and Dependence”, Journal of Development
Economics, N. 9.
15 A. Bhaduri (1987), “Dependent and Self-Reliant Growth with Foreign Borrowing”, Cambridge Journal
of Economics, N. 11.
16 M. Obstfeld (1998), “Foreign Resource Inflows, Saving, and Growth”, in K. Schmidt-Hebbel and L.
Servén (eds.), The Economics of Saving and Growth: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Policy, the
World Bank and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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In such a way, the specification of the linear regression included a more detailed set of
explanatory variables:
It = b0+ b1St + b2ODAt + b3FDIt + b4ETDt+ b5PEIt (5.3)
Where domestic savings (=St), aid (=ODAt), foreign direct investment (=FDIt)17, total
external debt (=ETDt), and Portfolio and equity investment (=PEIt) are separate
regressors18.
These regressions suggest that there is a positive link between foreign inflows and investment
whenever there is a positive link between savings and investment. In fact, in the majority of
their regressions, when the foreign inflows coefficients are insignificant, then the savings
coefficient is insignificant, too (b1=0). It should be correct to conclude that foreign inflows
do not work only when savings do work (b1¹0). In these regressions the real paradox is that
savings does not seem to promote growth, giving rise to the suspicion that the underlying
structural model is not appropriate.
Quite recently, Bosworth and Collins (1999)19, attempted to evaluate the implications of
capital inflows for the recipient countries by developing a panel data set covering 58
countries over the period of 1978-95. FDI, portfolio and external debt result not
significantly correlated with one another over time or across countries. The correlations are
all low; indeed, the only statistically significant one (between FDI and external debt in the
time dimension) is just 0.0920. It seems to confirm little evidence of complementarity
between different types of international capital inflows.
Soto21 analysed the effects of the different component of private capital inflows on the
growth of 44 developing countries, during the 1986-97 period. The dependent variable is
the change in the logarithm of GNP. This paper uses dynamic panel with yearly data in
growth regression following the method proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin in their
empirical research22. In fact, there are a certain number of “state” variables (in particular, the
lagged level of GNP), which determine the initial conditions of the economy, and “control”
                                                                
17 Recent literature on the potential role for FDI to raise growth through technological diffusion can be
found in E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio, and J. W. Lee (1998), “How Does Foreign Direct Investment
Affect Growth?”, in Journal of International Economics, N. 45; G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1991),
Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
18 This is the consequence of history. “Although the private international capital market revived in the
late 1950’s, for LDCs capital flows remained almost entirely official. This remained the rule in the 1960’s,
with the notable exceptions of a few dramatically successful countries” (A. O. Krueger [1987], “Debt,
Capital Flows, and LDC Growth”, American Economic Review, Vol. 77, N. 2, May, p. 159). “For a number
of years aid was calculated  as the sum of official and private capital flows, although now these two
items are listed separately” (M. P. Todaro [1989], Economic Development in the Third World, Longman,
New York, p.481) and “...’aid’, a term which had been ambiguously used and sometimes actually applied
to the entire flow, including private investment and export credits.” (W. T. Newlyn [1977], The Financing
of Economic Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.98).
19 B. Bosworth and S. M. Collins (1999), “Capital Flows o Developing Economies: Implications for
Saving and Investment”, The Brookings Institution, Meeting Draft, March 15.
20 This correlation is due to the fact that, since the problem of foreign exchange shortages and external
debt means that spare parts cannot be imported and therefore existing plants are forced to operate
below capacity or are completely paralyzed, any attempt to increase the inflow of DFI depends on the
solution of the debt problem.
21 M. Soto (2000), Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Empirical Evidence, OECD
Technical Paper, N. 160, Paris.
22 R. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill, New York.
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variables, those which determine the steady state. The standard specification include one-
year lagged values of the growth rate, investment rate, government consumption, change in
the logarithm of the terms of trade and the degree of openness to international trade. In other
regressions, the investment rate is replaced by the national saving rate and the current
account among the instruments, so that the effects of national saving and foreign saving can
be distinguished. It is found that a negative sign is associated with national saving and the
coefficient associated with the current account is not significant. The idea of decreasing
returns on saving, which is the excessive saving hypothesis, is modelled by using a non-linear
relationship between the saving rate and growth. Non-linearity indicates that beyond a
certain threshold, additional savings can not be productively absorbed by the economy. A
squared term for the saving rate is introduced The saving rate recovers its positive sign, and
the squared term has a negative one, confirming the hypothesis. The categories of capital
inflows introduced are FDI, portfolio equity flows, portfolio bond flows, bank credits and
trade-related credits. All financial inflow variables are measured as a ratio to GNP. FDI and
portfolio equity flows exhibit a robust positive correlation with growth. Portfolio bond flows
are not significantly linked to economic growth. Bank-related inflows are negatively
correlated with the growth rate. The degree of openness displays a significant and positive
link with growth, confirming Frankel and Romer’s results, who found a positive correlation
between trade openness and growth23. Government consumption presents a negative sign,
which is in agreement with the hypothesis of Barro and Sala-i-Martin about the distortions
introduced in the economy by the government intervention. The terms of trade present a
very strong positive sign: the magnitude of its coefficient (+0.1) shows that a 10 percent
increase of the terms of trade has a short run (= one year later) positive impact of 1% in the
GNP per capita.
Frankel and Rose24 find in a panel of 100 LDCs from 1971 to 1991 that a high ratio of FDI
to debt is associated with a low likelihood of a currency crash. Hence, there is some
presumption that since FDI is determined by long-term considerations, generates positive
externalities and does not exert pressure on the real exchange rate. However, Reisen25
considered this optimism as misleading, as capital is fungible.
The more recent empirical studies on debt and investment relationship, even though they
may be affected by specification bias and spurious correlation results, indicate26 that debt
service ratio has had a strong27, negative effect on private investment. Again, it may confirm
the ambiguous effect of foreign debt on development, which shifts from being positive o
negative when the debt burden and pressure becomes so disproportionately large, given the
specific context of the debtor’s situation, to determine a debt overhang situation.
                                                                
23 J. Frankel and D. Romer (1999), “Does Trade Cause Growth?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, N.
3.
24 J. Frankel and A. Rose (1996), “Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: Empirical Indicators”, NBER
Working Paper, N. 5437, Cambridge.
25 H. Reisen (1999), “Sustainable and Excessive Current Account Deficits”, in J. Gacs, R. Holzman and
M. Wyzan (eds.), The Mixed Blessing of Financial Flows, Edward Elgar Publ., Cheltenham.
26 P. R. Agénor (2000), op. cit.
27 Using the standardised regression coefficients, which are unit free and measure the relative
importance of the independent variables, the debt service ratio has the largest effect on private
investment in poor countries, and also the ratio of external debt to exports has an adverse effect.
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3. Empirical evidence of debt overhang
The empirical evidence on existence of a debt overhang has been rather mixed. Claessens
(1990) only finds a debt overhang for a very limited number of LDCs. Oks and Van
Wijnbergen (1995) test the debt overhang hypothesis for Mexico and conclude that it does
not exist. Borenzstein (1990), based on a simulated growth model for a typical debtor
country, concludes that debt relief does not have important effects on growth. Cohen (1993)
finds no evidence for the general existence of a debt overhang using data for sample of 81
LDCs. Yet, for the Latin American countries he shows that high debt had a negative impact
on their growth performance. This results
is reconfirmed by Cohen (1997), who states that for African countries high debt is not a
major cause for low levels of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and by Weeks
(2000). Desphande (1997) shows that a debt overhang might exist for 13 severely indebted
countries. Kaminsky and Pereira (1996) find evidence for a debt overhang for Latin
American countries, once social inequality and its impact on government policy and
consumption is taken into account.
In current discussions on the need of debt relief for the HIPCs, critics of the debt overhang
hypothesis have pointed out that the adverse incentive effects of high debt cannot be an
important issue for most HIPCs. HIPCs have experienced positive net resource transfers
during the 1990s28.
Some other authors, as an alternative to the debt overhang hypothesis, hypothesise that it is
not the amount of debt that may hamper economic growth, but the uncertainty about the
annual debt service payments. They argue that there is a close link between uncertainty and
instability: the annual instability of payments contributes to uncertainty of debt payments.
Lensink and Morrissey (2000)29 show that instability of annual aid receipts negatively
influences the effectiveness of development aid. Gemmell and McGillivray (1998)30 argue
that aid inflows are more volatile than other government revenues and this volatility influences
government spending and taxation. Bleaney, Gemmell and Greenaway (1995)31 show that
government revenue instability is highest for Sub-Saharan African countries and that revenue
instability is associated with expenditure instability and instability in the sources of deficit
finance.
Oks and Van Wijnbergen (1995)32 stress the importance of the uncertainty of debt service
payments on growth. Sachs et al. (1999)33 stress the relationship between the instability of
debt service payments and economic growth.
                                                                
28 W. Easterly (2001), “How Did Highly Indebted Poor Countries Become Highly Indebted? Reviewing
Two Decades of Debt Relief”, Unpublished Paper, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
29 R. Lensink and O. Morrissey (2000), “ Aid Instability as a Measure of Uncertainty and the Positive
Impact of Aid on Growth”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 36, N. 3.
30 N. Gemmell and M. McGillivray (1998), Aid and Tax Instability and the Government Budget Constraint
in Developing Countries, CREDIT Research Paper 98/1, University of Nottingham, Nottingham.
31 M. Bleaney, N. Gemmell, and D. Greenaway (1995), “Tax Revenue Instability, with particular Reference
to Sub-Saharan Africa”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 31, N. 6.
32 D. Oks and S. van Wijnbergen (1995), “Mexico After the Debt Crisis: Is Growth Sustainable?”,
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 47.
33 J. Sachs, K. Botchwey, M. Cuchra, and S. Sievers (1999), “Implementing Debt Relief for the HIPCs”,
Center for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mimeo.
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Borensztein (1990)34 tested the impact of debt stock on private investment by introducing a
debt overhang effect in an econometric regression, where investment is the dependent
variable. The results were not significant.
Moreover, the basic data are not available or they are very fragile.
4. The links between growth and foreign capital inflows
New growth theory has inspired a more complex analysis in distinct ways.
First, empirical research focuses on growth as dependent variable. A preliminary
consideration must be referred to the importance of adequate indicators of growth. In
measuring national income, economic literature has sometimes shown confusion between
GNP and GDP35. As well shown by King36, different specifications of income can produce
different results: in general, GNP seems to be more appropriate to be analysed in terms of
disposable income (for consumption or investment functions) to be compared to the cost of
indebtedness. In fact, the GDP, measured on the basis of expenditure, income, or value
added, includes interest to be paid on debt arrears. It is an accurate guide as to the
productive performance of the economy, but it does not adequately reflect the welfare of the
population in monetary terms, net of indebtedness costs37.
At the end of 1970s, Wasow38 estimated the relationship between GNP, foreign finance
flows, savings and GDP/capital ratio. In attempting to define an indicator of dependence on
foreign finance, Wasow assumed net foreign flows to GNP ratio as its proxy and its gradual
convergence to zero as the condition to escape from dependency in the long term.
Simulating different situations (constant growth rate of net foreign flow, or equal to GNP
growth ratio, or at constant rate needed to reach a planned GNP growth), this study shows
the existence of a unique condition to escape from permanent dependence. The marginal
propensity to save multiplied by the incremental GDP/capital ratio must be higher than the
growth rate of net foreign flow.
Garavello39 suggested a more flexible approach, that should be based on the nature of the
prevailing gap (saving gap or foreign exchange gap) to select the indicators to be related to
GNP and debt. In case of saving gap, it is useful to consider the relationship between
investment and net foreign flow as well as between domestic and foreign capital stock, but
the results are equivalent to those of Wasow. In the case of foreign exchange gap, export
must be taken in account, and the result is that the condition to escape from permanent
dependence on foreign flows is that export earnings become higher than net foreign flows.
                                                                
34 E. Borensztein (1990), Debt Overhang, Debt Reduction and Investment: The Case of the Philippines,
IMF Working Paper WP/90/77.
35 For example, Solomon specified a consumption function based on GDP, as if it were correct to
consider as part of disposable income for consumption the amount of GDP owed to abroad as interests
on foreign debt. R. Solomon (1977), “A Perspective on the Debt of Developing Countries”, Brookings
Paper Economic Activities.
36 B. King (1968), “Notes on the Mechanics of Growth on Debt”, World Bank Staff Occasional Papers, N.
6, J. Hopkins Press, Baltimora.
37 GNP (=Y) is equal to GDP minus the interests paid on external debt (iTED): Y = GDP - iTED.
38 B. Wasow (1979), “Saving and Dependence with Externally Financed Growth”, Review of Economic
Statistics, N. 61.
39 O. Garavello (1981), “Processi di sviluppo e dipendenza dai flussi esterni di capitale”, Rivista
Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, N. 28.
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Since the 1960s, neo-classical approach to the link between growth and foreign debt has
been widely used. At the end of the 1980s, Eaton, based on the Solow growth model40,
simulated the case of a small economy in open economy that contribute to guarantee an
optimal allocation of world capital in such a way that marginal productivity of domestic
capital is equal to interest rate41. He identified five stages:
1. a first stage in which the country is experiencing a deficit in balance of trade and current
account balance (in order to import capital stock),
2. a second stage in which a trade surplus coexists with a deficit in current account balance
(due to the payments of debt service),
3. a third stage in which there is a surplus in both balance of trade and current account
balance, but the country is still an indebted country,
4. a fourth stage, when the country becomes an international lender, even though income
from interests are lower than the amount of provided loans,
5. a final fifth stage, when the country begins to receive net positive flows from abroad.
Takagi42 criticised the gap-theory and stressed the importance of distinguishing the poor
countries from the middle-income countries in analysing foreign debt, and debt to official
lenders from debt to private creditors. These differences are relevant in order to define the
stages of debt cycle. Poor countries owe their debt to official creditors, who increase their
exposure when a debtor faces crisis (due to saving decrease or interest payments increase),
and the direct consequence is the worsening of debt situation. Differently, middle income
countries owe their debts to private creditors, who reduce their exposure when debt
increases and GDP decreases, inducing recession in the short-term up to the point in which
debt service decreases and growth can start again to grow.
Bhandari, Haque and Turnovsky43 closed the decade with another analysis based on the
neo-classical framework. They assumed, differently from other models, that there is not a
perfect elasticity of money supply, and concluded that interest rate on debt increases as debt
stock increases and that foreign capital supply is upward sloping, rather being constrained.
A conclusion, which has been denied by recent history, when credit supply decreased
becoming downward-sloping in presence of an international credit rationing.
In the 1990s, Boone adopted a standard neo-classical growth model and found no effect of
aid in the long run, because aid is consumed instead of invested44.
The linkage between fiscal policy, foreign finance and growth is another issue, which
received particular attention in empirical studies. In 1975 Dacy45 found a negative
correlation between the amount of foreign finance and the impact of fiscal policy on growth.
Given an increasing rate of growth, consumption increases much more than saving, which is
due to tax revenue, because of the auxiliary role of foreign finance that is devoted to fund
                                                                
40 R. Solow (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
N. 70.
41 J. Eaton (1989), “Foreign Public Capital Flows”, H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of
Development Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam.
42 Y. Takagi (1981), “Aid and Debt Problems in Less Developed Countries”, Oxford Economic Papers, N.
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higher consumption. Ten years later, Singh46 estimated the relationship among the same
variables, analysing two periods (1960-1970 and 1970-1980). Foreign aid seemed to have
positive effect on growth, whereas government intervention (through fiscal policy) resulted
negatively correlated to growth. But whenever the government intervention variable has been
included, the fit of the model has been better (i.e. the multiple coefficient of determination,
R2, has increased) and statistical significance of foreign aid has dramatically dropped. It
means, from Singh’s point of view, that foreign aid is not particularly important in terms of
growth.
But the authors do not seem to agree on this issue. Mosley47 stressed that appears to be no
statistically significant correlation in any post-war period, either positive or negative,
between inflows of development aid and the growth rate of GNP in developing countries.
White48 admitted that the combination of weak theory with poor econometric methodology
makes it difficult to conclude anything about the relationship. Hansen and Tarp49 conclude
that there is strong evidence for a positive effect of aid on investment and growth.
Borensztein50 obtained different results, based on a sample of 30 countries, in terms of the
correlation coefficient, r, as a measure of the degree of association between public
expenditure and foreign debt. The results were quite ambiguous: in 13 cases the correlation
was positive, in 12 cases it was negative. Edwards contribution51 was linked to the role of
fiscal policy in controlling debt and promoting growth. More particularly, it was linked to the
debate on the optimal borrowing tax, which emerged in the 1960s as a way to optimalise the
usage of foreign debt in order to boost limited debt by means of tax. He emphasised the
presence of externalities due to foreign debt, as demonstrated by the high significance of
positive relation between the spread on LIBOR52 and foreign debt/GNP ratio.
During last decade, much of the empirical literature on growth, following the early study by
Barro53, has focused on estimating cross-country regressions in search of a set of stable
relations among the various variables suggested by theory54.
New theory of growth offers different and more complex analytical basis compared to
previous works on saving and investment. Proxies of economic policy, human capital and
the institutional environment are included directly in the growth regressions.
GDPratet = f (St + ODAt + Inflt + ETDt+ Opent + ToTt + BDeft + initGDP) (5.4)
                                                                
46 R. D. Singh (1985), “State Intervention, Foreign Economic Aid, Savings and Growth in LCDs: Some
Recent Evidence”, in Kyklos, N. 38 (2).
47 P. Mosley (1987), Overseas Development Aid: Its Defence and Reform, Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
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The average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP [GDPratet] - rather than GNP,
which seems to be more appropriate - is analysed in terms of:
Ø exogenous factors (such as terms of trade [= ToTt]),
Ø macroeconomic structure (such as saving [= St] or investment, inflation [=Inflt], public
budget deficit [= BDeft]),
Ø policies and structural reforms (such as the degree of openness [= Opent]), institutional
context (through indexes of institutional quality),
Ø human capital quality (through the level of basic education and health),
Ø external relations (such as aid [= ODAt] or external debt [= ETDt]
Ø and the dynamics of the dependent variable itself (such as the logarithm of initial GDP
per capita [= initGDP], capturing the conditional convergence effect).
These studies include a wider set of variables and, in econometric terms, they reflect the
sophistication of techniques, which make it possible to include the endogeneity of growth
theory. The endogeneity of economic policy and aid can be addressed explicitly by lagging
most of the explanatory variables, including foreign aid, one year.
The relationship can be explicitly seen as non-linear, and non-linearity can be captured
through squared terms (such as aid [= ODA2t]) or interaction terms (such as between aid
and economic policies [= Opent  * ODA2t]).
To account for country-wise heteroskedasticity, geographical dummies as unit effects often
estimate the parameters. This solution is aimed to correct the limitations of the constant
coefficient model, in which the relationship between Xs and Y is the same for all cross-
sections and time-points. More recently, studies have adopted weighted least squares o
have a random coefficient or error component model.
This literature suffers, however, from some severe methodological problems. From an
econometric point of view, there is an inappropriate treatment of measurement and
specification errors, and lack of appreciation of the potential for simultaneity bias55.
The first problem is that the data necessary to adequately test the predictions of the models
do not exist or are difficult to construct. In many cases, the quality of the data is inadequate.
There are also considerable variations in data definitions across Ldcs, which implies different
coverage, based on arbitrary conceptual definitions. As a result, the explanatory variables
typically introduced in cross-sectional growth regressions suffer from measurement errors.
Arcand and Dagenais56 argued that results derived from Barro-type regressions are fragile
when such errors are properly accounted for in the econometric procedure. Persson and
Tabellini57 have attempted to gauge the sensitivity to measurement errors of the parameter
estimates obtained in their cross-section studies by using more appropriate econometric
techniques, such as instrumental variables.
Moreover, the basic approach used in many cross-country empirical studies of growth,
which consists of regressing the time-averaged growth rate for a group of countries on a set
of ad hoc explanatory variables, faces other difficulties:
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· Heterogeneity between Ldcs regarding growth patterns may be such that it is
inappropriate to perform cross-country regressions. The practice of using regional
dummies in pooled cross-section time series analyses is based on the assumption that
geographical factors may yield a homogeneous sample58. But appropriate tests for
pooling are rarely applied and in chapter 4 we stressed the lack of homogeneity even
within the same SSA region.
· The behaviour of the actual growth rate of output reflects both a trend (or long-term)
component and a cyclical (transitional movements around the steady state) component.
But trend component is often measured as averaging both dependent and explanatory
variables over a relatively long period, which is a largely arbitrary length, because the
frequency of cycles is not generally known, and it makes difficult to separate the trend
component from the cyclical component. It should be also taken in account that cycles
have different frequencies across countries and across variables; thus using a uniform
averaging period is likely to distort the long-run relationship between variables.
· Explanatory variables are often a combination of time averages of flows and beginning
period of stock variables59. But these variables have different time-series properties:
mixing stationary and non-stationary variables in estimation can lead to spurious
results60.
· Averaging implies that cross-country regressions do not represent typical behavioural
equations and parameter estimates represent cross-country average, which may not be
representative of any individual country.
· Linear models and OLS techniques may produce unreliable results, because OLS
estimates are consistent only to the extent that the individual effects are uncorrelated with
other explanatory variables. This is a condition that is unlikely to hold as well as the
assumption that the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables is likely to
be violated due to the inherently dynamic nature of growth regressions.
· Linear models and OLS techniques may produce unreliable results, because of an
endogeneity or simultaneity bias, resulting from the failure to account for the endogenous
nature of some of the explanatory variables.
· If the relationship between the explanatory variables and dependent variable is non-
linear, then it is difficult to detect empirically a significant correlation.
· A considerable diversity in the country coverage, the periods examined, and the set of
explanatory variables have made it difficult to generalise or to consider any particular
study as more reliable than other studies.
· More generally, the lack of clear theoretical underpinnings for many empirical studies
makes it difficult to interpret adequately the results.
· Most of the cross-country regression results seem to be fragile: any change in the list of
explanatory variables (or countries) often destroys the property of the equation, that is a
lack of robustness, which is related to the omitted-variable bias.
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5. Current debate on the impact of foreign capital inflows on growth
Referring to the last limitation, the study by Burnside and Dollar (1997)61, which tries to deal
with non linear effects of aid, address the endogeneity of aid and links the impact of aid to
economic and institutional policies, has attracted particular attention and discussed
extensively in a number of papers. The important step forward made by Burnside and Dollar
is that they remove the idea that foreign capital inflow has the same (positive or negative)
impact on growth rate of all the countries, after controlling for a specific set of other
additional factors. The main result of this study is that the effectiveness of aid depends on
economic policy and that aid has a positive impact on growth, but only in a good policy
environment. In sum, the effectiveness of aid in the growth process is directly dependent on
the quality of economic policies (good economic management - or good governance - and
“strong” institutions). This is an answer to crucial question raised by Cassen in 198662: does
aid work? Yes, aid works, when it is selectively allocated to those countries pursuing
“good” policies.
Burnside and Dollar’s preferred equation is:
GDPratet = f (initGDP + PolInstt + InsQut + FMt + Polt+ Aidt + [Polt x Aidt])      (5.5)
Where:
Ø Initial GDP [initGDP] is assumed to have negative effects on growth;
Ø Political instability [PolInstt], measured by ethnic fractionalisation, number of
assassinations and the product of the two, is assumed to have negative effects on
growth;
Ø Institution quality [InsQut], measured by rule of law, bureaucracy, corruption, risk of
repudiation and expropriation, is assumed to have positive effects on growth;
Ø Financial market [FMQt], measured by money (M2) relative to income (GDP), is
assumed to have positive effects on growth;
Ø economic policies [Polt], measured by an index of fiscal, monetary and trade policies
(combining a weighted average of budget surplus, trade openness and low inflation), is
assumed to have positive effects on growth;
Ø aid to real GDP [Aidt] is assumed to have very limited effects or to be insignificant by
itself;
Ø an interaction term between foreign aid and economic policies [Polt x Aidt], which
captures the non linear aid-growth relationship and makes aid dependent on economic
policies, is assumed to have positive effects on growth.
The model also includes time dummies and dummies for SSA and East Asia.
Burnside and Dollar show that the results confirm their assumptions and have the expected
signs, particularly the fact that aid marginal contribution to growth depends positively on
good macroeconomic policies.
But numerous scholars question the econometric work in this study.
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The results are very fragile and data dependent. The coefficient to the interaction term
between foreign aid and economic policies is significant and positive, but five observations,
which are excluded in Burnside and Dollar regression as “big outliers”, have critical
influences on the coefficient. These observations are Nicaragua (1986-89, 1990-93),
Gambia (1986-89, 1990-93), and Guyana (1990-93). If they are included, the value of the
parameter becomes small and insignificant. Dalgaard and Hansen63 investigate the nature of
these observations’ influence on the coefficient estimates by regressing the model on a
sample in which the single observation is excluded. They show cross-plots of the changes in
the estimated coefficients for four regressors (Polt, Aidt, Polt x Aidt, initGDP), when
observations are excluded one-by-one. The changes are plotted against the excluded
observation, scaling the change in the estimated coefficient by the estimated standard error,
using   ± 2 / n  as a cut-off point, n being the number of observations. The five
observations are not the only ones outside the cut-off value and none of the scaled changes
exceed one in absolute value. The 5 observations are not outliers in the sense of having
extreme studentised residuals, and other observations in the sample have higher leverage
values. Thus, the 5 observations should not be deleted from the sample other than for an ad
hoc rule (to make the coefficient significant). Interestingly, by excluding five other
observations (Gambia 1986-89, 1990-93, Nigeria 1970-73, 1990-93 and Nicaragua
1978-81) aid results to have high positive impact on growth. If the sample of developing
countries is expanded, and we pass from 40 countries to 56 countries, then the coefficient to
interaction term becomes insignificant. Thus, the Burnside and Dollar specification lacks of
robustness.
Hansen and Tarp64 stress the problem of misspecification of the Burnside and Dollar
regression. A full non-linear model must include five aid-policy terms: aid, policy, aid
squared, policy squared, and interaction term between aid and policy. In fact, only the five
terms define a full, second-order, polynomial approximation of the unknown functional form
of the relationship. The problem of absorptive capacity of SSA (that is the capacity to
manage) and Dutch disease constraints can be based on a Cobb-Douglas function including
foreign capital inflow, which replaces the Harrod-Domar and two-gap models, assuming
decreasing marginal returns to increased aid.
GDPratet = aZt + b1Polt+ b2Aidt + b3Polt2+ b4Aidt2 + b5 [Polt x Aidt] + e t)      (5.6)
Where Zt is a set of controls and e t is the error term.
Burnside and Dollar implicitly set b3 = b4 = 0, without testing this hypothesis. Hansen and
Tarp test this hypothesis and find statistical support for diminishing return (b3 = b5  = 0; b4 
0), preferring the presence of squared terms rather than the interaction term, thus rejecting
the selectivity model. Aid must be evaluated after having conditioned on good policies. Their
results show that the insignificance of the interaction term is not due to collinearity problems
between the three regressors with Aidt.
Another important aspect is that endogeneity of aid (and interaction term) implies that OLS
estimates are inconsistent and requires particular attention to instruments, in terms of
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variation and correlation with the endogenous regressors65. Burnside and Dollar look at a
cross country correlation (having geographical dummies as instruments for aid and
population, which changes slowly over time), but live time series variation in aid unexplained.
Moreover, as we stressed in chapter 4, the assumption of homogeneity within SSA region,
which Burnside and Dollar adopt, is strongly rejected by real data. The fact that most of the
results - including Burnside and Dollar’s results - appear to be sensitive to the countries
included in the sample confirms the importance of specific country contexts. Foreign capital
inflows’ effects on growth depend on specific conditions in each recipient country.
The quality of results improves when the empirical model has a better specification. And
historical evidence suggests that development and the effectiveness of foreign capital inflows
are crucially dependent on external and climatic factors. These components, such as terms
of trade fluctuations, export instability, oil price, droughts are not included in the Burnside
and Dollar’s equation. Consequently, their model is inadequate to capture the complexity of
reality.
Some recent studies have tried to correct for a few of these problems: some studies66 have
provided a proper treatment of country-specific effects; some others67 have addressed the
simultaneity bias, using instrumental variables estimation; others68 have addressed both of
these problems.
Guillaumont and Chauvet69 simply add two variables to the initial Burnside and Dollar’s
regression. They include a vector of external and climatic environmental variables
(normalised on a scale from 0 to 100) and the interaction term between this vector and the
level of aid. They use a two-stage least square (TSLS) procedure, the growth regression
being estimated with simultaneous instrumentation of aid and policy. Assumed that aid and
economic policy (as well as their interactive term) are endogenously determined, the TSLS
methodology is the way to have these variables instrumented. The authors conclude that the
macroeconomic effectiveness of aid is crucially dependent on external factors, rather than on
the economic policy. They reject the original conclusions of Burnside and Dollar’s paper,
based on the selectivity of aid. But another important element they provide is the fact that
one should be cautious regarding the robustness of results.
In fact, in any case, as many studies, following the 1991 seminal work of Barro, have
included a lot of variables to be correlated with economic growth, particular attention must
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be put on the robustness of variables. In fact, Levine and Renelt70 use extreme bond analysis
(EBA) and show that most of the variables are not robust, as their coefficients and
significance change substantially, depending which other variables are included in the
estimated regression71.
Lensink and White72 have examined whether there is an aid Laffer curve in relation to the
growth, of real GDP as dependent variable, running a pooled cross-section time series
analysis, with a basic panel of 138 countries.
GDPratet = b1initGDP + b2initSEt + b3Debtt+ b4[GNPt x Aidt] + b5 [GNPt x Aidt] 2 + b5Ds     (5.7)
Where initSEt is the initial secondary school enrolment, Debtt is the debt to GDP ratio and
Ds are intercept dummies for different regions and sub-periods.
The idea of decreasing returns on aid, that is the existence of an aid Laffer curve can be
modelled by using a non-linear relationship between aid and growth. Non-linearity indicates
that beyond a certain threshold, additional aid can not be productively absorbed by the
economy. A squared term for aid is introduced to model the non-linear link, which is
determined endogeneously by the data and not in an ad hoc way.
The results give an insignificant estimate for [GNPt x Aidt] 2 as they are sensitive to some
outliers and the residuals are not normally distributed. Thus, having re-estimated the equation
without some outliers, the existence of an aid Laffer curve is confirmed, as the coefficient of
the quadratic term has a negative sign. To test the reliability of their results, the authors
include some other regressors and estimate 455 regressions, based on all the combinations
of the set of 15 independent variables. Then, they run the EBA procedure. They find some
evidence for an aid Laffer curve, but the results –including the sign of the quadratic term –
seem  not robust, as they are very sensitive to the exact specification of the model.
Other recent studies have attempted to develop other econometric techniques. Some
studies73 analysed the evolution of the entire distribution, considering inadequate to focus on
cross-section averages over long period of time. Some others74 preferred to analyse time-
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series regressions for individual countries, as time-series technique allows to analyse the
possibility of bi-directional causality, whereas averaging out variables over long periods of
time makes cross-country variations difficult to be interpreted. Other researchers75, even if
using a limited number of observations, used a cointegration approach to analyse the
determinants of growth in an individual-country context, an approach that makes it difficult
to capture changes in the steady state itself.
Pooled time series or panel data econometrics seems to be a promising framework for
integrating the cross-country and time-series approaches76.
6. The links between macroeconomic policies and growth
The important Burnside and Dollar’s paper has led to frequent debates on both
methodological and political implications. It clearly assumes that macroeconomic policies
determine growth. At this regard, some studies had previously tried to test this hypothesis,
including the analysis on the role of foreign borrowing.
Stanley Fischer (1991) aimed to establish that macroeconomic policies matter for growth.
By macroeconomic policies he means, monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies that help
to determine the rate of inflation, the budget deficit and the balance of payments. This is
exactly the set of policies, which have been adopted by Burnside and Dollar.
Fisher’s cross sectional evidence suggests that macroeconomic factors and policy affects
economic performance.
GY = 1.38 - 0.52 RGDP70 + 2.51 PRIM70 + 11.16 INV - 4.75 INF + 0.17 SUR -
0.33  DEBT80 - 2.02 SSA - 1.98 LAC
(5.8)
where:
GY=per capita real growth over the period 1970-85
RGDP70=real income in 1970
PRIM70=enrolment rate for primary school 1970
INV=average share of investment in GDP over 70-85
INF=average inflation rate over 70-85
SUR=ratio of budget surplus to GNP over 75-80
DEBT80=Debt/GNP in 1980
SSA=Sub Saharan Africa dummy
LAC=LACs and the Caribbean dummy
The evidence (data and regressions) supports the view that quality macroeconomic
management (reflected in the inflation rate, external debt ratio and the budget surplus)
matters for growth. Macroeconomic management might affect economic growth because it
might affect investment and thus the rate of change in capital.  It also might affect the
efficiency with which the factors are used. Fischer estimates cross section investment
(average share of investment in GNP) over 1970-85.   The independent variables are GY,
RGDP70, PRIM70, INF, SUR7580, DEBT80, BLAV (average black market premium),
PINV (relative price of investment goods), SSA and LAC (dummy variables to control for
SSA and LAC). Although, none of the set of alternate regressors can provide a
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satisfactory account of the determinants of investment, Fischer argues that at least BLAV
and INF affect investment.
Fischer concludes those macroeconomic indicators (inflation rate, external debt, government
deficit) and hence, macroeconomic policies matter for growth.  The results are less clear on
the mechanisms through which macroeconomic policy affects growth.  The separate role of
macroeconomic variables in the growth regressions implies the existence of other channels,
which need investigation.
X.Sala-I-Martin (1991) stressed that the relation between inflation and growth, and budget
deficits and investment lack foundations. In the absence of theories, the correlation between
inflation, budget deficit and growth might be spurious or the direction of causation is
reversed.  For example, models that relate steady state growth with inflation predict no
relation (superneutrality of money) or a positive relation along the transitional path towards a
higher steady state level of income.  If the latter is the case, then cross country regressions
have little to say about the steady-state growth rate.  Also, either budget deficits have no
effect on growth (Barro, 1974) or have a negative effect on income through high real interest
rate and the crowding out of investment (Blanchard, 1985).  Fischer finds a negative relation
between government surplus and investment (or positive relation between budget deficit and
investment) and this needs a good theoretical explanation.
Sala-I-Martin worries about the endogeneity of the macroeconomic variables, specially the
budget deficit in Fischer’s regressions. He replicates Fischer's growth and investment
regression extending the sample size and excluding the foreign debt variable because it was
never significant.  In the growth regression, INF was not significant.  In the investment
regression, neither SUR nor INF was found significant. Only BLAV and PINV were
significantly negative.  Even when assuming a non linear relation between I and BLAV, the
macro variables remain insignificant.  Therefore, the relation between BLAV and INF and
the growth and investment rates are not as clear as suggested by Fischer. Sala-I-Martin
concludes that the empirical evidence presented by Fischer is weak.  However, he argues
that this does not mean that we should not worry about macroeconomics.  The main
contribution of Fischer’s paper is to highlight the need for a theory that could explain the
relation between short-run macroeconomic management and long-run growth.
Michael Bleany (1996) also worries about the effects of macroeconomic instability on
investment and growth.  He takes similar approach to that of Fischer (1991) but
incorporates robust regressors for his growth and investment equations and then, adds
variables, which capture macroeconomic stability.  He tested the following cross-section
regressions for 41 countries over 1980-1990 :
PCGR = a0 - a1 LGR + a2 INV + a3 XYGR - a4 LYPC79 +a5 BS - a6 SDERER - a7
CPINFL - a8 DEBT79(or HIC) + u1
(5.9)
INV = b0 + b1 XYGR + b2 LXY79 +b3 RERDOL +b4 BS - b5 SDERER - b6 CPINFL -
b7 DEBT79(or HIC) + u2
(5.10)
where the regressors found significant by previous research are:
PCGR= average annual growth rate of per capita output (in logs, 1980-1990).
LGR= average population growth (in logs, 1980-1990).
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INV= investment / GDP (average 1980-1990).
XYGR= average annual growth rate of the exports/GDP ratio (in logs, 1980-1990).
LYPC79= log of the US dollar per capita GDP in 1979.
LXY79= 1979 exports/1979 GDP (in logs).
RERDOL=  index of real exchange rate distortion calculated by Dollar for 1976-85.
And the policy-induced macroeconomic instability variables are:
BS= govt budget surplus (% of GDP).
SDERER= standard deviation of the log of the real exchange rate over 1980-1990, i.e.
exchange rate volatility.
CPINFL=  average annual consumer price inflation over 1980-90 and set to 100% if it
exceeded that level.
DEBT79= end 1979 foreign debt/1979 exports revenue
HIC= dummy variable taking the value of 1 if country was classify as highly indebted by the
World Bank and 0 otherwise.
He found that, for a given INV, BS and SDERER were significantly correlated with growth.
INF did not significantly affect growth negatively.  The policy-induced variables appeared
no to affect investment significantly, although they had the expected signs.  He concluded
that macroeconomic instability affects growth negatively but that it was not clear that it
affected the volume of investment.
In contrast to Fischer (1991) and Bleany (1996), Corden (1990) does not take an
econometric approach but analyses the experiences of 17 developing countries so as to
draw some lessons from experience and pinpoint policies which promote growth.  He
arrives at the following lessons:
- From the 1970s public spending booms caused by the ready availability of funds from
the world capital market:
a) Sound and profitable spending, hence the need for a cost-benefit approach.
b) Beware of euphoria (arising say from liberalisation reforms) since it might lead to
over-borrowing by private investors or the government.
- From de 1980s crisis and adjustment:
c) Unfavourable and surprise shocks can hardly be avoided.  Therefore, countries
should aim to establish favourable initial conditions (e.g. low debt ratios, high
reserves, avoid spending booms) so as to make their economies and policy
reactions as flexible as possible.
d) If the country has a chance, it should plan gradual adjustment but initiate a
comprehensive adjustment program promptly.
- From the effects of inflation on growth:
e) Countries should avoid inflation since it is hard to reduce it without severe both
economic and political costs.
- From the effects of exchange rate policy on growth:
f) It is not necessary to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to make a non-
inflationary monetary policy commitment.  The use of fiscal restraint is usually more
important.
g) Real exchange rate misalignment and variability should be avoided through
appropriate nominal exchange rate adjustments.
h) Devaluation will be ineffective if it is not part of a policy package involving
monetary and fiscal policies.
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Sound macroeconomic policies seem to promote growth in developing countries.  This
becomes evident when studying the experiences of developing countries since the 1970s.
However, both the relation between macroeconomic stability and growth and how it affects
growth, becomes less evident in econometric studies.
Dornbusch (1985) explored the role of disequilibrium exchange rates and budget deficits in
promoting external indebtedness and the 1980s debt crisis.  He analyses the period 1978-
82 for Argentina, Chile and Brazil.  Oil, US interest rates and the 1981-82 world recession
are often mentioned as the causes of the crisis.  However, these factors only made clearer
the underlying disequilibrium in which exchange rate overvaluation and budget deficits were
perpetuated by a continuing and excessive recourse to the world capital market.
Dornbusch proposes a simple framework to analyse the causes of the debt crisis:
GNP = GDP + NFP (5.11)
Where:
GDP = final output produced by residents (nationals and foreigners) of the country within
the territory of the country,
NFP = payments received by residents for factor services (K,L) rendered abroad minus
payments made to other countries for factor services rendered by non residents. For most
LDCs, NFP<0.
CA = GNP + NTR – E (5.12)
Where:
CA = Total receipts (= Total income received by residents + transfers) - total payment (=
Expenditure on goods and services + transfers).
NTR = net transfers. For most LDCs, NTR>0
E = expenditure.
CA = (S - I) + (T - G) since GNP = C + T + S and E = G + C + I (5.13)
These two last identities are crucial to the understanding of external balance issues:
- Current account (CA) deficits reflect and excess of expenditure over income
- Improvement of the CA can be brought only if savings rises relatively to investment or if
the government surplus improves
- There is a direct link between budget surplus (T-G) and the external balance
Let NFA = stock of net foreign assets i.e. all claims by residents on the rest of the world
less all claims by foreigners on domestic residents.  Then the change in NFA is equal to the
current account and just tells that all bills must be paid.  If CA>0, then income>spending, so
we make claims on the ROW.  If CA<0, then income<spending and thus we are borrowing
or selling assets.
 From the way the current account deficit (CADEF) is financed we can derive
 CADEF = ExtDebt + DFI – R – KF (5.14)
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 or
 ExtDebt = CADEF – DFI + R + KF (5.15)
that is, an increase in gross external debt can have three broad sources:  current account
deficits not financed by long-term capital inflows (CADEF-DFI), borrowing to finance
official reserves build-up (R), or private capital flight (KF).
There is a link between CADEF, budget deficit and excess of private investment over
private savings.
Dornbusch concludes that the experience of these countries show that the world debt
problem was not only caused by world recession, dollar appreciation and unexpected
increase in the world interest rates but also by overvalued exchange rates, import sprees or
capital flight financed by external borrowing.
7. The links between ODA and its determinants
Another model specification, which has been extensively studied during the past years, is to
consider foreign capital inflow, in terms of ODA, as dependent variable. Theories and the
use of econometric methods to estimate ODA determinants and allocation can be grouped
into three approaches (Pesenti, 1987).
The first approach, developed by Mosley (1985) and, not long before, by Beenstock
(1980), explains the ODA flows trend through a time series analysis, based on the aid
demand from NGOs and private enterprises of donor countries and aid supply from donor
countries. The empirical results of this kind of analysis cannot be considered adequate,
because of the difficulties in translating the social welfare, demand and supply functions into
variables, in finding an aid quality indicator (proposed by Mosley). Beenstock achieved a
multiple correlation coefficient close to one, but together with a Durbin Watson value of
0.97, which can be interpreted as the presence of a residuals positive autocorrelation or
specification bias of the equation.
The second approach, proposed by Edelman-Chenery (1977), analysed the geographical
bias of aid allocation, considering the impact of such variables as population and GDP per
capita of recipient countries, through the use of cross-country regression analysis. The
empirical results are very partial, because this approach considers just a part of the main
determinants of aid allocation.
The third area, the most prolific and complete, was developed by Dudley and
Montmarquette (1976), and received the major interest in Italy. It is based on the
simultaneous analysis of different determinants of aid allocation, from one or more donor
countries to some developing countries, in a given year. This approach makes it possible to
study the interaction between different interests of recipient and donor countries, and to
suggest some patterns of donor’s behaviour.
The multiple regression analysis, based by Isenman (1976) on the ordinary least squares
(OLS) method to estimate the coefficients, through the step-wise technique, has become the
most used method in this third area of research. Just in two cases, a different analysis was
used: the TSLS method by Mosley (1981) and a non-recursive structural equations system
by Roeder (1985).
In most cases, cross-sectional analyses have been used; recently, some dummies have been
introduced, and just once, pooled analysis was specified to take in account time (Dowling
and Hiemenz, 1985).
160
Usually, the period of time to be investigated has been limited within a decade, and it has
never been adopted a time series analysis. Thus, past studies on aid allocation preferred the
use of comparisons between specific years, estimating the political changes over the time
and using the weighted mean of the considered years. These analyses have examined aid
allocation over the period 1960-1980 (and once beginning with the 1940s).
In terms of recipient countries to be examined, there have always been many developing
countries in the sample, sometimes considering particular groups of Ldcs - Henderson
(1971) excluded the former colonies - or geographical areas. A sample of fewer than 17
Ldcs (Chambas 1986), or more than 93 Ldcs (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976) has
never been considered. Referring to the donor countries, the studies ranged from 1 to 15
(Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976) and 16 (Henderson, 1971) case studies. In actual fact,
the prevailing idea is that, given the absence of a strong homogeneity among the different
political motivations leading donors’ strategies, it is better to limit the analysis to one donor
country. The United States have been the most studied, whereas those who prefer
comparisons - McKinley and Little (1979), and Mosley (1981) - have compared the main
donors (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Japon, besides the United States).
Usually, the dependent variable is a proxy of aid volume. Current or constant US$, total aid
or standardised values of per capita aid or aid as a percentage of GNP, import or export,
bilateral or multilateral aid, ODA or total net financial flows, annual commitments or, in
particular, disbursement. Sometimes, aid flows in logarithmic form, to correct the biased
effect of the outliers.
In terms of independent variables, given the different approaches we have briefly described
above, we have: (a) Ldcs population to measure the level of distribution equality between
developing countries; (b) Ldcs income level (or growth rates) to measure the correlation
between allocation and people’s needs in recipient countries. On the basis of this variable,
the main findings of empirical studies confirm the hypothesis of a biased allocation, benefiting
middle income countries and the small countries.
Some “control” variables, referred to the development and economic integration of recipient
countries, have been introduced. The main regression analyses have included the following
variables:
(a) the volume of merchandise exports to the given donor country,
(b) the volume of merchandise imports from the given donor country,
(c) the flow of foreign direct investment,
(d) gross international reserves,
(e) balance of payments,
(f) direct investment from the donor country,
(g) the number of transnational corporations operating on that country,
(h) availability of raw materials,
(i) the structure of production measured by the sectoral percentage of GDP in current US
dollars.
Moreover, some other “control” variables, referred to political aspects, have been
considered. In particular:
(a) instability,
(b) alignment referred to political blocks,
(c) expenditure on arms and trade,
(d) length of independence,
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(e) security treaties and links,
(f) a dummy variable of the strategic interest in the country,
(g) the number of US army bases.
Some other variables, which have been considered, are those referred to demographic and
social aspect, as:
(a) life expectancy at birth,
(b) infant mortality rate,
(c) protein consumption per capita,
(d) adult illiteracy and education enrolment.
Just once (Wittkopf, 1972), the volume of multilateral aid and bilateral aid - apart from the
given donor - have been included and treated as a proxy of the trend prevailing at
international level, which can be described as a “towing-effect” of the main world aid
strategies and international division of labour. In such a case, a positive coefficient can
indicate the “run” component, that is an imitative and co-operative attitude among donors;
whereas, a negative coefficient can indicate the prevailing effect of the competition or the
division of labour among donors rather than a coherence between the interventions.
In all, the independent variables which have been considered in the analyses vary from six
(Mosley, 1981) to twenty-five (McKinlay e Little, 1979), ten-eleven being the average
number of variables.
The main objective, given this complex set of independent variables, has been to test the
prevalence of egoist motivations of donors - strategic, political, security, trade, historical,
cultural - over the needs and reliability of the recipient countries.
Wittkopf (1972), considering the use of dependent and independent variables, underlines
the fact that empirical results vary a lot in accordance with different measures of the
dependent variable, “aid” (current US dollars or constant, for example). He also points out
the fact that one year is the most appropriate lag to be applied to independent variables
compared to the dependent one.
Most of these considerations seem pertinent to the analysis of external debt, too.
8. The measurement of debt servicing capacity and country risk of default
The empirical research on debt capacity reflects the nature of the theoretical foundations,
and their conceptual problems. The use of external borrowing is not limited to augmenting
investment (first gap) and imports (second gap), but it can be used to fund consumption, in
presence of income fluctuations. McDonald77 stressed an important element to be
considered: debt can be said sustainable from both the borrowing country and lenders’
perspective. A debt situation may be theoretically sustainable from a debtor’s point of view,
if it is consistent with its intertemporal budget constraint, but it may be unsustainable from the
lenders’ point of view, because of international credit rationing. Thus research discovered he
importance of the creditor perspective.
From the creditor perspective, there is a main concern for the willingness of the debtor to
sustain repayment of debt, that is called creditworthiness or country risk.
Since the beginning of the 1970s, several commercial banks introduced their checklists,
based on a long battery of different indicators, to control the country-risk associated with
                                                                
77 D. C. McDonald (1982), “Debt Capacity and Developing Country Borrowing: A Survey of the
Literature”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 29, N. 4.
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their exposure78. The increase in lending to governments of developing countries by private
commercial banks raised questions of country credit-worthiness, that is the capacity of the
borrowing country to service the debt (to pay interest and amortisation in foreign currency).
Most of these techniques lacked of any robust theoretical foundation to select indicators and
used arbitrary criteria to weight different indicators79. They failed to distinguish between
liquidity and solvency problems, too. The problem is that there is no formula or one
definitive approach to determine the borrower’s ability to generate sufficient foreign
exchange to meet debt service obligations. The main challenge is to understand development
process and the way in which the course of development affects the balance of payments.
To determine the capacity to service external debt, some analysts engage in ratio analysis,
examining such ratios as debt outstanding/GNP, debt service/exports, debt service/debt
outstanding, net transfer/imports, imports/international reserves, imports/exports, rate of
growth of debt/rate of growth of exports. If the numerator in the fraction increases, debt
crisis might be indicated. Unfortunately, no one ratio captures the risk of a sharp fall in any
kind of foreign exchange inflow and a rise in import needs, compared with the ability to
offset such risks by compressing imports and using international reserves. Beyond ratios,
country risk analysis monitors some key performance indicators, indicating how national
economic management is affecting the growth of the economy. They are a raising ratio of
savings to national income, a raising ratio of taxes to income, a decreasing ratio of
incremental capital to output, a decreasing current account deficit, high rate of growth in
employment relative to the rate of growth in output, more equitable income distribution.
In 1992, Ngassam80 looked at the empirical determinants of lending to SSA and he
presented a defensive lending model in which an increase in the riskiness of a country
promotes more lending to protect previous loans. The regression consists of 256
observations, eight annual observation per country from 1982 to 1989 for 32 countries. The
dependent variable is the value of the loans disbursed to each country in each year. The
independent variables are the amount of debt outstanding to private creditors, trade ratio to
the GNP, variability of reserves, total debt service paid, real per capita GDP, the number of
deaths from political violence, the length of present political system. The results provide
strong support to the defensive lending model, in opposition to the literature that concludes
that anything that makes the country riskier reduces lending. Lending is strongly correlated
with the amount of debt outstanding to private creditors, more so for commercial banks than
for official creditors, and with debt service payments. As the size of the debt service
payment rises, lending rises. Countries with high trade are lent less since the fear of trade
penalties is sufficient to prevent default and additional lending is unnecessary. The political
pressure variables tend to be less significant than the others. The implications of this study
are quite interesting. As the empirical results support the defensive lending model, debt
forgiveness may be more harmful than helpful for SSA. In fact, the crucial question is
                                                                
78 Within the context of pure theory of country risk, there are three crucial aspects of the problem.
Enforcement (the lack of any international collector of debt service), moral hazard (the incentive to cheat
in the absence of penalties for cheat) and adverse selection (the incentive to conceal information about
one’s true nature).
79 P. Nagy (1978), “Quantitative Country Risk: A System Developed by Economist at the Bank of
Montreal”, Columbia Journal of World Business, N. 13.
80 C. Ngassam (1992), “The Empirical Determinants of Lending to Sub-Saharan Africa”, Dept. of Finance,
University of Delaware, Newark, mimeo.
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whether the creditor governments will continue to make future loans to Africa once the
former loans have been forgiven.
Apart from studies of country risk, an interesting area of studies emerged as concerned with
debt servicing capacity problems, causes and likelihood of rescheduling and arrears.
Because a clear manifestation of debt servicing problems occurs when a debtor country
requests for debt renegotiating, literature ha considered the incidence of debt reschedulings
as a proxy measure for debt capacity problems. Given the dichotomous nature of the
problem (rescheduling is a “yes” or “not” type variable), in this area of studies the classical
regression models are not appropriate. Thus, scholars have implemented other techniques.
(a) Principal components analysis. Dhonte81 used this technique, based on the linear
combination of observed variables, possessing properties such as being orthogonal to
each other, and the first principal component representing the largest amount of variance
in the data, to identify a limited group of dimensions, which capture the main information.
Unfortunately, the economic significance to be given to the components resulted difficult
and the picture remained unclear.
(b) Discriminant analysis. More appropriate than the previous technique to address the
problem of dichotomous variables, this technique was used by Abassi and Taffler,
among others, to study 95 countries from 1967 to 1978, involving 42 variables82. This
method allow you to discriminate between two group, in these case being those
countries having renegotiated debt from one side, and those countries having not being in
another side. Even though the huge amount of variables makes it difficult to synthesise
results, nevertheless the outcome is quite clear: financial component of this problem
(debt/export ratio, inflation rate, domestic credit/GNP) is the bulk of any serious country
risk and liquidity. Also Frank and Cline83, who used discriminant analysis to try to
identify the characteristics of borrowing countries that presage rescheduling of their debt,
found the same basically financial variables to be positively associated with rescheduling.
(c) Logit analysis. This analysis seems to be more appropriate. It takes the logarithm of the
odds ratio in favour of the option of rescheduling (the ratio of the probability that a
country will reschedule to the probability that it will not reschedule), in order to
guarantee that the estimated probabilities lie in the 0-1 range84. Feder and Just85 apply
logit analysis to 41 countries in the 1965-1972 period. They found some financial
variables to be positively associated with rescheduling (foreign capital flows/debt service
ratio, debt service/export earnings ratio, import/international reserves ratio, export
growth, maturity of debt) as well as the main economic indicator (per capita income).
                                                                
81 P. Dhonte (1975), “Describing External Debt Situation: a Roll Over Approach”, IMF Staff Papers, N. 22.
82 B. Abassi and R. J. Taffler (1982), “Country Risk: A Model of Economic Performance Related to Debt
Servicing Capacity”, Working Paper N. 36, City University Business School, London.
83 C. Frank Jr. and W. R. Cline (1971), “Measurement of Debt Servicing Capacity: An Application of
Discriminant Analysis”, Journal of International Economics, N.1.
84 A main statistical problem with logit and probit models arrives when the estimated probabilities differs
from 0 or 1. In this case, it could be useful to fix a cut-off point, considering equal to 1 all the
probabilities > .5 and equal to 0 all the probabilities £ .5. This solution can fail to reach the objective of
minimising the errors, due to the low percentage of rescheduling cases in the sample, which should
suggest having a cut-off point at a lower level than .5.
85 G. Feder and R. Just (1977), “A Study of Debt Servicing Capacity Applying Logit Analysis”, Journal
of Development Economics, N. 4.
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Mayo and Berrett86, applying the same analysis to 48 countries in the 1960-1975
period, confirmed the same results, finding positively associated with rescheduling both
financial (debt/export ratio, import/international reserves ratio, inflation rate) and
economic (gross investment/GDP ratio, Import/GDP ratio) variables. Edwards87 found
that the spread between interest rates on debt payments and LIBOR seemed to be
highly correlated with external debt/GNP ratio, implying the existence of externalities
and adverse selection in the indebtedness process.  Also Cline88 used the logit analysis
and he found the importance of the same variables from the demand side, including the
current account balance/exports ratio square, which implies a weighted measure89 of non
linear relationship90, and some variable from the supply side. In particular, international
credit rationing, within a context of asymmetric information, seems to explain the
rescheduling phenomenon. Bresolin91 applied logit analysis to 15 countries in the 1971-
1986 period and he confirmed the importance of domestic financial and economic
variables (particularly, per capita GNP growth rate).
(d) Probit analysis. This model is related to the logit, the chief difference being that the
normal, or probit, curve is used in place of the logistic cumulative distribution function of
logit analysis to model regressions where the response variable is dichotomous, taking
0-1 values. Kharas92 applied probit analysis to the rescheduling of 43 countries in the
1965-1976 period, and he confirmed the importance of both economic and financial
domestic aspects.
Thus, most of these different studies found that variables which are positively associated with
rescheduling are debt service obligations at the time of rescheduling, ratio of imports to
foreign reserves, stock of debt as a ratio of GNP, and stock of debt as a ratio to exports. In
order to classify the set of variables involved in these studies, it is possible to identify some
main groups:
Ø Debt burden indicators: relating the stock of debt or debt service payments to exports,
imports or GDP.
Ø Other Balance of Payments indicators: rate of growth of exports, the current account
deficit, the stock of international reserves.
Ø Development indicators: GDP growth rate, per capita income, domestic investment on
GDP ratio, inflation.
In a cross-section statistical model, higher income inequality was found to be a significant
predictor of a higher probability of debt rescheduling. This is because political management
becomes more difficult in economies with extreme inequalities93.
                                                                
86 A. Mayo and A. Berrett (1978), “An Early Warning Model for Assessing Development Country Risk”,
S. Goodman (ed.), Financing and Risk in Developing Countries, New York.
87 S. Edwards (1984), op. Cit.
88 W. Cline (1984), “International Debt. Systemic Risk and Policy Response”, Institute for International
Ecoomics, Washington D.C.
89 Exports act as the weights, taking in account the absolute weight of the economy.
90 The presence of the square ratio implies a non-linear function.
91 F. Bresolin (1990), “Il rimborso del debito estero dei paesi in via di sviluppo: un’analisi del periodo
1971-1986”, Economia Internazionale, N. 43, 2-3.
92 H. Kharas (1984), “The Long-Run Creditworthness of Developing Countries: Theory and Practice”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, N. 99, 3.
93 A. Berg and J. Sachs (1988), “The Debt Crisis. Structural Explanations of Country Performance”,
Journal of Development Economics, N. 29.
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Other recent techniques involve simulation estimation analysis94 and vector autoregressive
methodology95.
9. The measurement of debt servicing capacity applied to SSA countries
Among the recent studies applied in the specific context of Sub-Saharan African, two
studies appear important. They have included the ratio of debt service to exports as the
dependent variable, considering it as a proxy for a debt crisis, rather than more correctly as
a proxy of the relative burden of debt on the economy measuring the proportion of foreign
exchange which is not free to purchase imports.
The first96 used an ordinary least square regression applied to 17 countries and included real
GNP growth, decline in GNP due to terms of trade losses, maturity of debt as significant
explanatory variables.
The second97 used a TSLS method applied to 11 countries and included level of
development (measured by the ratio of real per capita GDP/average ratio of per capita GDP
of industrialised countries), interest rates, average maturity of debt, degree of openness and
the ratio of domestic prices index/international price index as significant explanatory
variables.
Three other studies have applied the logit analysis, all of them assuming the probability of
debt rescheduling as the dependent variable.
The first98, applied to 8 countries, involved debt service/GNP ratio, amortisation/debt ratio,
revolutions, elections and purges as significant explanatory economic and political variables.
The second99, applied to 45 countries, involved debt service/export ratio, international
reserve/imports ratio, debt service/capital inflows ratio, real GDP growth, domestic inflation
and net government deficit/GDP ratio as significant explanatory variables.
The third100, applied on 39 countries, included a large number of independent variables.
They are Debt/GNP ratio, Debt/Exports ratio, Debt service/GNP ratio, Debt
Service/Exports ratio, Investment/GNP ratio, International reserves/debt ratio, International
reserves/Imports ratio, payment of interest rate on debt/debt ratio, real GDP growth, per
capita income, domestic inflation, share of agriculture in output, terms of trade, export and
import unit value, capital inflow/GNP ratio, real export growth, import/GDP ratio, trade
deficit/GDP ratio, IMF debt/Imports ratio.
                                                                
94 V. A. Haijvassiliou (1993), A Simulation Estimation Analysis of the External Debt Crises of Developing
Countries, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, N. 1057, New Haven, Yale University.
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Another study101, applied to 39 countries, used the ordinary least square regression
combined with random effect technique to explain the amount of debt rescheduling and
interest arrears. The independent variables are changes in interest rate on new lending, long
term debt/total debt ratio, international reserves/debt ratio, international reserves/imports,
investment/GNP ratio, real GDP growth, per capita income, domestic inflation, share of
agriculture in output, terms of trade, export and import unit value, capital inflow/GNP ratio,
real export growth, imports/GDP ratio, trade deficit/GDP ratio, IMF debt/imports ratio.
These studies showed some contradictory results: imports/GNP ratio is statistically
significant, but in the study by Taiwo the sign is positive, whereas the study by Odedokun
has a negative relation. This difference may be due to the period under investigation: the
1970s and 1980s in the first case, when borrowing surged, compared to the 1980s in the
second case, when imports were already compressed.
Another result is the fact that the higher is the relative size of agricultural output, the higher
the probability of debt rescheduling, confirming the idea of agriculture as a proxy of
backwardness.
The fiscal deficits/GDP ratio has statistically significant positive effect in increasing the
probability of debt rescheduling. It confirms what the majority of empirical literature has
neglected: external debt in Africa is predominantly a public sector liability, which can not be
reduced to a problem of only external insolvency, and the fiscal weakness of government is
a key proxy of debt crisis.
10. The links between public sector fiscal behaviour and foreign capital inflows
The state in a developing country is limited in its ability to play an activist role. The available
resources are scarce since tax bases are small and tax administration weak, much of tax
revenue comes from distortionary indirect taxes such as excise duties. With diminishing
official aid and poor private equity flows, external financing of the fiscal deficit has to rely
increasingly on external debt. In developing countries, where the main borrowing agent is the
central government, the fiscal source of deepening external debt problems is evident if the
tax base is not expanded commensurately with maturing debt service obligations102. As the
benefits of increased investment and consumption linked to external borrowing used to
finance deficit mainly accrue to private agents, where the costs of repayment remain with the
government, the problem of sustainability of internal and external debts can be described
and analysed in terms of the “twin deficits”103.
But, when we look at empirical investigations, we have to consider the problem of
measurement of fiscal deficit. Tanzi104 stressed that the conventional measure of the deficit
fails to recognise that different tax and expenditure categories have different effects on
aggregate demand105. Another relevant question is the problem of arrears’ accumulation: the
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105 Expenditure on the infrastructure has a different impact than expenditure due to consumption
subsidies, and within expenditure on the infrastructure there are some expenses productive in nature
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interest payments have specific nature and effects, as public debt is rapidly raising, with new
debt being issued to meet interest payments (the so-called “Ponzi” game). Moreover, tax
revenues are not exogenous of expenditures, as the level of public expenditure determines
national income, which then determines tax revenue, at least in part. Finally, there is a
problem of different sources of financing the deficit106.
The difficulties in measuring and interpreting the deficit notwithstanding, it is quite evident that
SSA countries have considerable difficulties in meeting internal and external deficit
sustainability conditions. Some studies107 have examined the relationship between
government expenditures and revenues in developing countries. Others have studied the
determinants of government expenditures108.
McGillivray and Morrissey (2001a) provide a review of numerous studies on the linkages
between aid and public sector fiscal behaviour. The so-called fiscal response literature was
originated by the study of Heller (1975). Current literature is on the effect of aid on various
categories of public sector revenue and expenditure.
Some studies are interested on the fungibility problem of aid (Pack and Pack, 1990, 1993;
World Bank, 1998; Feyzioglu et al., 1998).
Other studies simultaneously analyse interactions between aid, taxation and expenditure
decisions.
The public sector borrowing requirement net of aid loans, being a component of the public
sector budget constraint, receive marginal attention. It is simply assumed to be a substitute
for aid. When aid increases, borrowing decreases.
Borrowing can be considered financing of last resort, as it covers a gap between
expenditure and revenue, which is not covered by aid.
But, a survey109 of the empirical results of literature on aid and public sector fiscal behaviour
finds that the results of a number of studies are consistent with aid leading to increases in this
borrowing. Further investigation, in the form of econometric analysis of panel data, also
points to this outcome. Aid may lead to an increase in external borrowing.
11. The econometric evidence of fiscal dimension of external debt
Different studies have analysed the links between fiscal deficit and external debt
accumulation. Tanzi110 found that, during the first years of the 1980s, external debt financed
more than half of fiscal deficit in a sample of 30 developing countries. He found that 64
developing countries had used, during the 1980-1983 period, external borrowing to finance
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and others wasteful in nature. Thus, we should distinguuish between revenue or current deficit and
capital deficit
106 In 1990, de Hann and Zelhorst found a positive correlation between inflation and the fiscal deficit in
developing countries only when inflation rate is high and there is a clear seignorage motive to get
additional revenue from money creation. See J. de Hann and D. Zelhorst (1990), “The Impact of
Government Deficits on Money Growth in Developing Countries”, Journal of International Money and
Finance, Vol. 9, N. 3.
107 M. Bleaney, N. Gemmel and D. Greenaway (1995), “Tax Revenue Instability, with Particular Reference
to Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of Development Studies, N. 31.
108 D. Fielding (1997), “Modelling the Determinants of Government Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa”,
Journal of African Economies, N. 6.
109 S. Feeny and M. McGillivray (2000), Aid, Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour and Developing Country
Debt
110 V. Tanzi (1985), «Fiscal Management and External Debt Problems», H. Mehran (ed.), External Debt
Management, IMF, Washington D.C.
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more than half of the deficit in half the cases. This relationship between fiscal deficit and
external debt seems to be very strong, even though a clear causality is far from evident. In
fact, the link works in the opposite direction too: the abundance of international capital at
very low cost pushed developing countries to maintain and expand public consumption and
investment. This conclusion was confirmed by Zaidi, as referred to 20 developing
countries111. Dornbusch112 explored the role of disequilibrium exchange rates and budget
deficits in promoting external indebtedness and the 1980s debt crisis. He analysed the
period 78-82 for Argentina, Chile and Brazil, studying the underlying disequilibrium in which
exchange rate overvaluation and budget deficits were perpetuated by a continuing and
excessive recourse to the world capital market. The increase in external debt in Brazil is
largely attributed to failure to adjust the budget to the external shocks of high world interest
rate and increase in real oil prices.  Government subsidised the price of oil to maintain it low
and also the government borrowed to finance the increased debt service. The budget deficit
absorbed all the shocks. Tanzi and Blejer113 found that fiscal deficits had the strongest effect
determining changes in external debt - particularly referred to debt from official sources - in
a sample of 15 developing countries.
Also Schmidt-Hebbel114 found a high correlation coefficient (-0.62) between fiscal deficit
and external debt in a sample of 49 countries.
Ojo115 found a statistically significant and positive relationship between external borrowing
and budget deficit, analysing 39 Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1978-1981
period. The same result, referred to the Tanzanian case and referred to the 1970-1991
period, was showed by Kilindo116.
Berthélemy117, referring to the poor heavily indebted countries, has tried to stress the
importance of fiscal dimension of external debt. The idea is to demonstrate that the most
adequate indicator of debt sustainability is the indicator that measures the cost of debt in
terms of public revenues.
The three debt sustainability indicators analyzed are (a) the debt-to-export ratio [DEXP],
(b) the debt-to-GNP ratio [DGNP], and (c) the debt-to-government revenue ratio [DREV].
In algebraic terms, the authors estimate the following three regressions:
INVFIPR = a0 + b1log(INTLEN) + b2HESLAG + b3log(DEXP) (5.17)
INVFIPR = a0 + b1log(INTLEN) + b2HESLAG + b3log(DGNP) (5.18)
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INVFIPR = a0 + b1log(INTLEN) + b2HESLAG + b3log(DREV) (5.19)
Where
INVFIPR = the ratio of fixed private domestic investment to GDP,
INTLEN = the nominal lending interest rate,
HESLAG = the lagged real growth rate (based on PPP adjusted GDP).
It turns out that - among the three debt sustainability indicators - the debt-to government
revenue ratio (DREV) is the most significant determinant for private fixed investment,
followed by the debt-to-GNP (DGNP) and debt-to-exports (DEXP).
The author has also tested the robustness of the relative significance of the three debt
sustainability indicators by substituting the three debt ratios (DEXP, DGNP, and DREV)
with three corresponding debt service ratios:
(a) the debt service-to-export ratio [DSEXP],
(b) the debt service-to-GNP ratio [DSGNP], and
(c) the debt service-to-government revenue ratio [DSREV].
Hjertholm, in analysing the fiscal dimension of SSA countries’ external debt, provides two
models118.
The first model is an error component specification of pooled time-series cross-sectional
analysis applied to 23 countries and 5 years. The regression parameters are estimated using
generalised least square (GLS) method, whereas the Fuller and Battese estimation method is
used to add the individual country and time-specific effects to the random disturbances
(error term [uit] is equal to a cross sectional component [vi], a time-series error component
[et] and a random error component [e it]). This model has the debt service performance,
represented by the level of exceptional financing (corresponding to the discrepancy between
actual and scheduled debt service payments) relative to the stock of total external debt, as
dependent variable (EF). A group of independent variables is expected to have positive sign:
the debt-to-government revenue ratio (DR), the debt-to-export ratio (DE), agriculture-to-
GDP ratio (AG). Another group of variables is expected to have negative sign: the
international reserves-to-debt ratio (RD), the level of GNP per capita (GNP). Two
variables are expected to have positive and negative signs as possible: import-to-GDP ratio
(IG) and the share of concessional debt in total debt (CD).
EFit = a0 + b1DRit + b2DEit + b3AGit + b4RDit + b5GNPit + b6IGit + b7CDit + vi + et + e it (5.20)
The results confirm the hypothesis that the budgetary burden of debt contributes to the
explanation of the debt service performance of SSA. In fact, DR has a low positive sign (+
0.005) and is significant, whereas the conventional indicator DE is not relevant when DR is
included. The correlation matrix of the estimated coefficients confirms the existence of a
highly correlated relationship (-0.80) between DR and DE. Thus, external debt servicing
capacity can not be separated from the issue of the government budget constraint, which is
more important than export earnings.
The second model tests the effects on gross private investment in percentage of GDP (GPI)
of four groups of independent variables, in a debt overhang context. In fact, debt overhang
                                                                
118 P. Hjertholm (1997), “An Inquiry Into the Fiscal Dimension of External Debt: The Case of Sub-Saharan
Africa”, Ph.D. Thesis, N. 68, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
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theory assumes that investment (and thus growth) is hampered and discouraged by public
debt (and, thus, debt relief can improve growth of debtor country). Public debt variables
represent the first group, with expected negative signs: debt-to-government revenue ratio
(DR), debt service-to-government revenue ratio (DSR). A development indicator represents
the second group, with expected positive sign: the level of GNP per capita (GNP). Public
investment indicator represents the third group, with expected positive sign: gross public
investment-to-GDP ratio (PIn). Some macroeconomic instability indicators represent the
fourth group, with expected negative signs: the standard deviation of annual inflation rates
over the preceding four-years period (SDI), the standard deviation of annual changes in the
real effective exchange rate over the preceding four-years period (SDE), the average annual
ratio of exceptional financing in percentage of long-term public debt (EF).
GPIit+1 = b1DRit + b2DSRit + b3GNPit + b4PInit + b5SDIi + b6SDEi + b7EFi + vi + et + e it         (5.21)
The model is conducted in two-steps. First, the model is run with GPI as dependent variable
and various combinations of explanatory variables (and one or two-years lagged ratios), in
order to determine the direct effects of public debt on investment. Then, the model is run
with those (non-debt related) variables found to be significant determinants of GPI in the first
step as dependent variables, and various combinations of debt and other variables to
determine the extent of influence of public debt on these variables. This second step
determines the indirect effects of public debt on investment.
From the first step, two years lagged PIn is determinant of GPI, together with GNP (with
limited magnitude) and combinations of one-year lagged DR and DSR. The influence of the
variability of inflation is not relevant, whereas the variability in the real effective exchange rate
is a relevant determinant of investment. Uncertainty about future debt servicing, derived from
a huge amount of unpaid debt service obligations, seems to discourage investment. This step
confirms that public debt burden has a direct negative effect on investment.
In the second step, public debt is always a relevant determinant of GNP as the dependent
variable, however it is more confused when we include both DR and DSR as regressors.
The cash-flow effect (=DSR) and its overhang effect (=DR) are not cumulative effect on
GNP. One-year lagged DSR is clearly (and more clearly than DR) associated with a
crowding effect on public investment (=Pin), as a dependent variable. In such a way, public
debt indirectly reduces private investment. With regard to two-years lagged public debt
data, the results are not clear. High DR clearly leads to high level of unpaid debt service
(=EF), as dependent variable, but again the effect of DSR tends to dominate over the DR
effect, as reflected by the larger sized of the estimated coefficients. Also the variability of
inflation (SDI) results to determine the level of exceptional financing and it is itself affected
(when it is assumed as dependent variable) by the level of public debt. Finally DR has a
significant influence on SDE, as dependent variable, whereas DSR is not so relevant. From
the second step, external public debt seems to deter private investment also indirectly, by
aggravating investment disincentives, provided that debt influences non-debt investment
determinants. What this analysis is not able to demonstrate is the relative importance of the
crowding-out effect, which can be addressed only in a country-specific context.
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12. A basic model on the relationship between aid, growth, government
expenditure and debt
In 1999, Grosskurth proposed a very simple model to investigate the relationship between
aid, growth, external debt and government expenditure119. Its simple structure
notwithstanding, the model is useful because it tries to investigate the relationship between
four dimensions of development, which have been rarely taken in account simultaneously as
the only factors to be tested. In fact, the author examines four important characteristics of
recipients of development aid and debt.
The dependent variable of a model is the amount of ODA received as a share of its GNP in
per cent. Explanatory variables include GNP per capita and the Human Development Index
(HDI) as measures of poverty and development, and they are expected to have a negative
sign. Per capita level of external debt as a share of GNP and of military spending as shares
of GNP are independent variables to test the arguments of the critics of ODA, and they are
expected to have a negative sign.
The model uses cross-sectional data, to produce marginal extra precision (none of the
variables involved are subject to high volatility over a few years across a larger set of
countries).
The data may suffer from a selection bias as it could be argued that countries that receive
development aid are often tied to report national data to international agencies. A higher
dependency on aid would then result in a higher likelihood of inclusion in the study.
The set of data obtained also suffers from multicollinearity. The exogenous variables ‘HDI’
and ‘GNP’ are highly correlated (Pearson correlation: 0.748). This is partly due to the fact
that income is a relevant component of the HDI. As a result of this the significance of the
coefficients for ‘HDI’ and ‘GNP’ are likely to be underestimated.
The model is:
aidt = a + b  1 HDIt + b  2 GNPt + b  3 debtt + b  4 militaryt + ut (5.22)
The null hypothesis is: b  1 = b  2 = b  3 = b  4 = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that the null hypothesis is not true, and therefore the model has
explanatory power.
After a test-run, Sierra Leone was excluded from the sample. Its high level of aid received
(‘aid’=164.4% of GNP) strongly biased the regression. The exclusion of Sierra Leone
significantly increased the explanatory power of the model, as captured by higher values of
the ‘R-squared’ (adjusted) and ‘F’ statistics. The F-value more than doubled. No sign
changes took place.
Table 1 summarises the adjusted regression output. The null hypothesis may be rejected at
the 0.1% level (F= 22.41). The explanatory power of the model is moderate (adjusted R-
squared= 55.7%). The coefficients of the variables ”HDI”, ”debt” and ”military” exhibit the
expected orientation.
Table 1. Summary of Main Regression Output
Aid = 22.1 – 41.0 hdi + 0.00174 gnp + 4.58 debt + 1.24 military
Predictor Coefficient t-Ratio (p value)
                                                                
119 J. Grosskurth, (1999), “Where does development aid go?”, Student Economic Review 1999, Trinity
College, Dublin.
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Constant 22.066 5.33 (0.000)
HDI -40.995 -5.42 (0.000)
GNP 0.0017369 1.76 (0.084)
Debt 4.575 4.55 (0.000)
Military 1.2408 2.13 (0.037)
F = 22.41 R-sq. = 58.3% R-sq. (adj.) = 55.7
The intercept value of 22.1 suggests a high level of aid being granted. However, the negative
coefficient of ‘HDI’ (-41.0) is relatively large. The debt coefficient of 4.5 has to be seen in
relation to an average level of debt of 1.02 times GNP. This makes the impact of debt on
the level of aid received rather small compared to the HDI. The average level of military
expenditure (2.67) has on average even less influence, with a coefficient of 1.2.
Against prior expectations the coefficient for ‘GNP’ is positive. It is, however, very small
(0.0017). Even the high average GNP of 1300.9 does not help GNP to overcome the status
of the least influential variable with an average impact of 2.6 percentage points on aid. With
a t-value of 1.76 (p=0.084) it is also the least significant variable. The variables ‘HDI’ and
‘debt’ are significant at the 0.1% level (tHDI= -5.42; tdebt= 4.55). The variable ‘military’ is
significant at the 5% level with a t-value of 2.13.
Applying White’s general heteroskedasticity test, the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity
may be rejected at the 0.05% level. This significantly exceeds the relevant critical value of
31.32 at p=0.005. The Spearman rank correlation test suggests heteroskedasticity in the
variables ‘HDI’ (t-value of the Spearman rank test = -2.97), ‘GNP’ (-3.96) and ‘debt’
(4.59). Thus, the value for the standard deviation and consequently, the t-ratios and the
significance levels of the respective variables are biased. The size and the direction of the
bias depend mainly on the exact relationship between the true values of the observed
variable and the true variance.
There are several potential causes of the heteroskedasticity. The low R2 of model suggests
that an important variable might be omitted. Possible omitted variables include variables
capturing the political situation, the occurrence of natural disasters and the degree of
dependency on foreign trade. Another potential cause is outliers that strongly bias the
regression. Mozambique is a likely candidate. However, the exclusion of Mozambique from
the sample would only marginally reduce the level of heteroskedasticity.
A closer look at the suspected relationship between the observed variable and its residual
may help to transform the data in order to reduce the level of heteroskedasticity.
In order to further examine the properties of the four explanatory variables each of them was
individually used as regressor against ‘aid’. The coefficient of ‘HDI’ has very high
explanatory power (R2(adj)= 39.5%). The ‘HDI’-model is very significant with an
impressive F-value of 45.4%. Its coefficient slightly decreases, but it is still the single most
useful variable to explain the amount of aid received.
The coefficient for ‘GNP’ changes its orientation and is now negative. This makes ‘gnp’ the
most unreliable variable of the model. The R2(adj) of 17.1% is disappointing, even though
the model and the coefficient are significant at the 1% level.
The influence of “GNP” on ”aid” might be more significant below a threshold level of
roughly $1800 per capita. In order to check this, a Chow test was applied to test the
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alternative hypothesis that there is a structural change in the aid-GNP relationship at a level
of $1800.
The null hypothesis that there is no structural change may be rejected at the 1% level. The
F-value of 9.87 is significantly larger than the critical value of 4.98. For the set of 16 rich
countries ‘gnp’ is not significant at the 10% level (p=0.158).
For the 53 countries with a GNP smaller than $1800 the variable ”gnp” is significant at the
0.1% level. Its coefficient increases significantly to a value of -0.015.
The rationale behind this characteristic might be that richer countries only get aid under
exceptional circumstances. These might for example be political reasons or the occurrence
of natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes.
The amount of military expenditure does not have large explanatory power (R2(adj)=5.3%).
However, both the restricted model and the coefficient of the variable ‘military’ are
significant at the 5% level.
The low explanatory power might be due to the low number of strategically important
LDCs. It would be interesting to check the parameters of this variable during the height of
the cold war.
The regressor ”debt” is again highly significant while exhibiting an R2(adj) of 28.0%. The
level of external debt seems to be an important factor. After all, debt is the one problem that
can definitely be solved with money. The altruistic argument for ODA may very well be
questioned. It is in this light that ongoing campaigns for debt relief as a means to achieve
long-term economic development should be viewed with some sympathy.
However, this variable should be interpreted with care. As ODA consists mostly of loans it
would be logical to assume that the relationship is two-fold.
A Hausmann specification test was applied to test the null hypothesis that there is no
simultaneity problem concerning ‘aid’ and ‘debt’. The null hypothesis may be rejected at the
0.1% significance level.
The consequence of this is that the estimated parameters are biased and not consistent. A
simultaneous equation method of estimation would be more appropriate to estimate the
relationships at hand.
174
Bibliography
B. Abassi and R. J. Taffler (1982), “Country Risk: A Model of Economic Performance
Related to Debt Servicing Capacity”, Working Paper N. 36, City University Business
School, London.
P. R. Agénor (2000), The Economics of Adjustment and Growth, Academic Press, San
Diego.
J. Aizenman and N. P. Marion (1993), “Policy Uncertainty, Persistence and Growth”,
Review of International Economics, N. 1, June.
J. L. Arcand and M. G. Dagenais (1995), “The Empirics of Economic Growth in a Cross
Section of Countries: Do Errors in Variables Really Not Matter?”, CRDE Discussion Paper
N. 4195, University of Montreal, October.
P. Arestis and P. Demetriades (1997), “Financial Development and Economic Growth:
Assessing the Evidence”, Economic Journal, N. 107, May.
A. M. Assiri, R. A. Parsons and N. Perdikis (1990), “A Comparative Analysis of Debt
Rescheduling in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa”, Scandinavian Journal of
Development Alternatives, Vol. 9, N. 2-3.
R. J. Barro (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, N. 106, May.
R. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill, New York.
M. Beenstock (1980), “Political Economy of Official Development Assistance”, in World
Development, n. 1.
A. Beltratti (1989), “Empirical Estimates of the Capacity to Repay a Foreign Debt: A
Vector Autoregressive Methodology”, The European Journal of Development Research,
Vol.1, N. 2.
A. B. Bernard and S. N. Durlauf (1996), “Interpreting Tests of the Convergence
Hypothesis”, Journal of Econometrics, N. 71, March.
A. Berg and J. Sachs (1988), “The Debt Crisis. Structural Explanations of Country
Performance”, Journal of Development Economics, N. 29.
J. C. Berthélemy (2001), “HIPC Debt Relief and Policy Reform Incentives”, Unu/Wider
Conference On Debt Relief: Helsinki, Finland 17-18 August.
A. Bhaduri (1987), “Dependent and Self-Reliant Growth with Foreign Borrowing”,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, N. 11.
J. S. Bhandari, N. U. Haque and S. J. Turnovsky (1990), “Growth External Debt and
Sovereign Risk in A Small Open Economy”, IMF Staff Papers, N. 37, Washington D.C.
M. Bleaney, N. Gemmell, and D. Greenaway (1995), “Tax Revenue Instability, with
particular Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 31,
N. 6.
P. Boone (1996), “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”, European Economic
Review, Vol. 40.
175
E. Borensztein (1990), Debt Overhang, Debt Reduction and Investment: The Case of the
Philippines, IMF Working Paper WP/90/77.
E. R. Borensztein (1989), “Fiscal Policy and Foreign Debt”, Journal of International
Economics, N. 26.
E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio, and J. W. Lee (1998), “How Does Foreign Direct
Investment Affect Growth?”, in Journal of International Economics, N. 45.
B. Bosworth and S. M. Collins (1999), “Capital Flows o Developing Economies:
Implications for Saving and Investment”, The Brookings Institution, Meeting Draft, March
15.
F. Bresolin (1990), “Il rimborso del debito estero dei paesi in via di sviluppo: un’analisi del
periodo 1971-1986”, Economia Internazionale, N. 43, 2-3.
C. Burnside and D. Dollar (2000), “Aid, Policies and Growth”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 90, N. 4.
C. Burnside and D. Dollar (1997), “Aid, Policies and Growth”, Policy Research Working
Paper, N. 1777, World Bank, Washington D.C.
F. Caselli, G. Esquivel anf F. Lefort (1996), “Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New
Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics”, Journal of Economics Growth, N. 1,
September.
P. Cashel-Cordo and S. G. Craig (1990), “The Public Sector Impact on International
Resource Transfers”, Journal of Development Economics, N. 32.
R. Cassen (1986), Does Aid Work?, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
H. B. Chenery and P. Eckstein (1970), “Development Alternatives for Latin America”,
Journal of Political Economy, N. 78, 4.
G. Chambas (1986), “Les facteurs explicatifs de la Repartition de l’Aide en Afrique. Le cas
Francais et Japanais”, Monde en Developpement, n. 53.
W. Cline (1984), “International Debt. Systemic Risk and Policy Response”, Institute for
International Ecoomics, Washington D.C.
P. Collier and D. Dollar (1999), “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reducion”, Policy Research
Working Paper, N. 2041, World Bank, Washington D.C.
D. C. Dacy (1975), “Foreign Aid, Government Consumption, Saving and Growth in Less
Developed Countries”, Economic Journal, N. 85.
C. J. Dalgaard and H. Hansen (2001), “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies”, The Journal
of Development Studies, Vol. 37, N. 6.
J. de Hann and D. Zelhorst (1990), “The Impact of Government Deficits on Money Growth
in Developing Countries”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 9, N. 3.
S. Devarajan., A, S. Rajkumar and V. Swaroop (1998), “What Does Aid to Africa
Finance?”, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Nairobi, mimeo.
P. Dhonte (1975), “Describing External Debt Situation: a Roll Over Approach”, IMF Staff
Papers, N. 22.
176
R. Dornbusch (1985), “External Debt, Budget Deficits, and Disequilibrium Exchange
Rates”, in G. W. Smith and J. T. Cuddington (eds.), International Debt and Developing
Countries, World Bank, Washington D.C.
R. Dornbush (1983), “Real Interest Rates, Home Goods and Optimal External Borrowing”,
Journal of Political Economy, N. 91, 1.
J. M. Dowling and U. Hiemenz (1985), “Biases in the Allocation of Foreign Aid: Some
New Evidence”, World Development, n. 4.
L. Dudley and C. Montmarquette (1976), “A model of the supply of Bilateral Foreign Aid”,
American Economic Review, n.1.
W. Easterly (2001), “How Did Highly Indebted Poor Countries Become Highly Indebted?
Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief”, Unpublished Paper, The World Bank,
Washington D.C.
J. Eaton (1989), “Foreign Public Capital Flows”, H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.),
Handbook of Development Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam.
J. A. Edelman and H. B. Chenery (1977), “Aid and Income distribution”, in J. M. Bhagwati
(ed.), The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate, MIT Press,
Cambridge.
S. Edwards (1984), “Ldc Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk. An Empirical Investigation,
76-80”, American Economic Review, N. 9.
G. Feder and R. Just (1977), “A Study of Debt Servicing Capacity Applying Logit
Analysis”, Journal of Development Economics, N. 4.
S. Feeny and M. McGillivray (2000), Aid, Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour and Developing
Country Debt, mimeo.
T. Feyzioglu, V. Swaroop and M. Zhu (1998), “A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of
Foreign Aid”, World Bank Economic Review, N. 12.
D. Fielding (1997), “Modelling the Determinants of Government Expenditure in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Economies, N. 6.
A. K. Fosu (1999), “The External Debt Burden and Economic Growth in the 1980s:
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 20,
N. 2.
C. Frank Jr. and W. R. Cline (1971), “Measurement of Debt Servicing Capacity: An
Application of Discriminant Analysis”, Journal of International Economics, N.1.
J. Frankel and D. Romer (1999), “Does Trade Cause Growth?”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 89, N. 3.
J. Frankel and A. Rose (1996), “Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: Empirical
Indicators”, NBER Working Paper, N. 5437, Cambridge.
I. N. Gang and H. A. Khan (1991), “Foreign Aid, Taxes and Public Investment”, Journal of
Development Economics, N. 24.
177
O. Garavello (1981), “Processi di sviluppo e dipendenza dai flussi esterni di capitale”,
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, N. 28.
N. Gemmell and M. McGillivray (1998), Aid and Tax Instability and the Government
Budget Constraint in Developing Countries, CREDIT Research Paper 98/1, University of
Nottingham, Nottingham.
W. H. Greene (2000), Econometric Analysis, 4th edition, New York, Prenctice Hall.
K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos (1970), “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences”,
Economic Development Cultural Change, N. 18, 3.
E. Grinols and J. Bhagwati (1976), “Foreign Capital, Savings and Dependence”, Review of
Economic Statistics, N. 58.
J. Grosskurth, (1999), “Where does development aid go?”, Student Economic Review
1999, Trinity College, Dublin.
G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
MIT Press, Cambridge.
P. Guillaumont and L. Chauvet (2001), “Aid and Performance: A Reassessment”, The
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 37, N. 6.
H. Hansen and F. Tarp (2001), “Aid and Growth Regressions”, Journal of Development
Economics, Vol. 64.
H. Hansen and F. Tarp (2000), “Aid Effectiveness Disputed”, in F. Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid
and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future, Routledge, London.
V. A. Haijvassiliou (1993), A Simulation Estimation Analysis of the External Debt Crises of
Developing Countries, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, N. 1057, New Haven, Yale
University.
P. D. Henderson (1971), “The distribuiton of Offical Development Assistance
committments by recipient countries and by sources”, Bulletin of the Oxford University
Institute of Economics and Statistics, n. 1.
P. Hjertholm (1997), “An Inquiry Into the Fiscal Dimension of External Debt: The Case of
Sub-Saharan Africa”, Ph.D. Thesis, N. 68, Institute of Economics, University of
Copenhagen.
P. Isenman (1976), “Biases in Aid Allocation Against Poorer and Larger Countries”, World
Development, n. 8.
R. Jha (2001), “Macroeconomics of Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries”, The Australian
National University, Camberra, mimeo.
H. Kharas (1984), “The Long-Run Creditworthiness of Developing Countries”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, N.3.
A. A. L. Kilindo (1993), “Budget Performance and Foreign Indebtedness in Tanzania”, M.
S. D. Bagachwa and A. V. Y. Mbelle (eds.), Economic Policy under a Multiparty System in
Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam Press, Dar es Salaam.
178
B. King (1968), “Notes on the Mechanics of Growth on Debt”, World Bank Staff
Occasional Papers, N. 6, J. Hopkins Press, Baltimora.
M. Knight, N. Loayza and D. Villanueva (1993), “Testing the Neo-classical Theory of
Economic Growth”, IMF Staff Papers, N. 40, September.
A. O. Krueger (1987), “Debt, Capital Flows, and LDC Growth”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 77, N. 2, May.
S. Lall and G. Perasso (1989), “Determinants of the Debt Problem in eastern and Southern
Africa: A Statistical Analysis”, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali,
Vol. 36, N. 10-11.
C. Lancaster (1991), “African Economic Reform: The External Dimension”, Institute of
International Economics, Washington, DC.
L. Landau (1971), “Savings function for Latin America”, H. B. Chenery (ed.), Studies in
Developmental Planning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
R. Lensink and O. Morrissey (2000), “ Aid Instability as a Measure of Uncertainty and the
Positive Impact of Aid on Growth”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 36, N. 3.
R. Lensink and H. White (2001), “Are There Negative Returns to Aid?”, The Journal of
Development Studies, Vol. 37, N. 6.
R. Levine and D. Renelt (1992), “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth
Regressions”, American Economic Review, Vol. 82, N. 4.
A. Mayo and A. Berrett (1978), “An Early Warning Model for Assessing Development
Country Risk”, S. Goodman (ed.), Financing and Risk in Developing Countries, New York.
D. C. McDonald (1982), “Debt Capacity and Developing Country Borrowing: A Survey of
the Literature”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 29, N. 4.
R. D. McKinlay and R. Little (1979), “The Us Aid Relationship: a test of the recipient need
and the donor interest models”, Political Studies.
M. Michaely (1981), “Foreign Aid, Economic Structure and Dependence”, Journal of
Development Economics, N. 9.
J. Morisset (1989), “The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Savings Re-
examined: The Case of Argentina”, World Development, N. 17, 11.
P. Mosley (1987), Overseas Development Aid: Its Defence and Reform, Wheatsheaf,
Brighton.
P. Mosley (1985), “Towards a Predictive Model of Overseas Aid Expenditures”, Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, February.
P. Mosley (1981), “Models of Aid Allocation Process. A comment on McKinlay and
Little”, Political Studies, n.2.
C. Mukherjee, W. Howard and M. Wuyts (1998), Econometrics and Data Analysis for
Developing Countries, Routledge, London.
P. Nagy (1978), “Quantitative Country Risk: A System Developed by Economist at the
Bank of Montreal”, Columbia Journal of World Business, N. 13.
179
W. T. Newlyn (1977), The Financing of Economic Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
C. Ngassam (1992), “The Empirical Determinants of Lending to Sub-Saharan Africa”,
Dept. of Finance, University of Delaware, Newark, mimeo.
C. Ngassam (1991), “Factors Affecting the External Debt-Servicing Capacity of African
Nations: An Empirical Investigation”, Review of Black Political Economy, Vol. 20, N. 2.
M. Obstfeld (1998), “Foreign Resource Inflows, Saving, and Growth”, in K. Schmidt-
Hebbel and L. Servén (eds.), The Economics of Saving and Growth: Theory, Evidence and
Implications for Policy, the World Bank and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
M. O. Odedokun (1995), “Analysis of Probability of External Debt Rescheduling in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 42, N. 1.
M. O. Odedokun (1993), “Econometric Analysis of External Debt Burdens of African
Countries: Debt Rescheduling and Arrears of Interest”, African Development Review, Vol.
5, N. 2.
K. O. Ojo (1989), “Debt Capacity Model of Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Issues and
Perspectives”, Development Policy Review, Vol. 7.
D. Oks and S. van Wijnbergen (1995), “Mexico After the Debt Crisis: Is Growth
Sustainable?”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 47.
M. H. Pesaran and R. Smith (1995), “Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of Econometrics, N. 68, July.
T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1994), “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?”, American
Economic Review, No. 84, June.
P. Pesenti (1987), L’aiuto Pubblico allo Sviluppo: teorie e verifiche econometriche dei criteri
di determinazione e di allocazione, CESPRI, Working Paper n. 5; Milan.
D. T. Quah (1996), “Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence”, European
Economic Review, N. 40, June.
H. Reisen (1999), “Sustainable and Excessive Current Account Deficits”, in J. Gacs, R.
Holzman and M. Wyzan (eds.), The Mixed Blessing of Financial Flows, Edward Elgar
Publ., Cheltenham.
D. Rodrik (1998), “Trade Policy and Economic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa”,
NBER Working Paper N. 6562, May.
P. G. Roeder (1985), “The ties that bind: aid, trade and political compliance in Soviet-Third
World relations”, International Studies Quarterly, n. 29.
J. Sachs, K. Botchwey, M. Cuchra, and S. Sievers (1999), “Implementing Debt Relief for
the HIPCs”, Center for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Mimeo.
X. Sala-i-Martin (1997), “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 87, N. 2.
A. Sengupta (1968), “Foreign Capital Requirements for Economic Development”, Oxford
Economic Papers.
180
K. Schmidt-Hebbel (1995), Fiscal Adjustment and Growth: In and Out of Africa, Special
Paper, N. 19, Afrfican Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi.
R. D. Singh (1985), “State Intervention, Foreign Economic Aid, Savings and Growth in
LCDs: Some Recent Evidence”, in Kyklos, N. 38 (2).
R. Solomon (1977), “A Perspective on the Debt of Developing Countries”, Brookings
Paper Economic Activities.
R. Solow (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic growth”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, N. 70.
M. Soto (2000), Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Empirical
Evidence, OECD Technical Paper, N. 160, Paris.
I. O. Taiwo (1991), “Commodity Prices and Debt Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Eastern
Africa Economic Review, Vol. 7, N. 2.
Y. Takagi (1981), “Aid and Debt Problems in Less Developed Countries”, Oxford
Economic Papers, N. 33, 2.
V. Tanzi (1993), “Fiscal Deficit Measurement: Basic Issues”, in M. Blejer and A. Cheasty
(eds.), How To Measure the Fiscal Deficit, IMF, Washington D.C.
V. Tanzi (1985), “Fiscal Management and External Debt Problems”, H. Mehran (ed.),
External Debt Management, IMF, Washington D.C.
V. Tanzi and M. I. Blejer (1988), “Public Debt and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries”,
K. J. Arrow and M. J. Boskin (eds.), The Economics of Public Debt, St. Martin’s Press,
New York.
J. Temple (1999), “The New Growth Evidence”, Journal of Economic Literature, N. 37,
March.
M. P. Todaro (1989), Economic Development in the Third World, Longman, New York.
B. Wasow (1979), “Saving and Dependence with Externally Financed Growth”, Review of
Economic Statistics, N. 61.
T. E. Weisskopf (1972), “The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in
Uncerdeveloped Countries”, Journal of International Economics.
H. White (1992), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey”,
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 28, N. 2.
E. R. Wittkopf (1972), “Western bilateral aid allocations: a comparative study of recipient
state attributes and aid received”, AAVV, Sage Professional papers in international studies,
SAGE, London.
World Bank (1998), Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, The World
Bank, Washington D.C.
I. M. Zaidi (1985), “Saving, Investment, Fiscal Deficits, and the External Indebtedness of
Developing Countries”, in World Development, Vol. 13, No. 5, May.
181
6. Exploring the complex relationship between foreign capital inflows and
development in Africa
1. Introduction. Hypotheses to be tested
Our basic idea is that the relationship between different channels of foreign capital inflows and development
is complex by itself, and the existence of some interactions between these channels is part of the
complexity, too. Moreover, Sub-Saharan African countries do not represent a homogeneous aggregate.
Thus, heterogeneity across countries and conditional hypotheses of the effect of aid, debt and foreign
investment are the restricted focus of our analysis. We think that this issue is very interesting, even though
the translation of these ideas into empirical analysis is not easy and it was not adequately investigated.
Most work in the growth literature relies simply on cross-country regressions. The reason is that many
effects are long-term and cannot be found in the short-run effects of the time-series framework.
Furthermore, the data for Sub-Saharan Africa might simply not be good enough for sophisticated
econometrics. If we embark on the time series approach, we may simply analyze “what the World Bank
random number generator has produced”.
However, we don’t adopt cross-country regression as a reliable method of empirical  argumentation
relating to African development. We agree what Bhagwati and Srinivasan recommended1: the most
compelling evidence on these issues can come from careful and patient in-depth case studies of individual
countries. Weak theoretical foundation and specification of functional forms for the relationship, poor
quality of data bases and errors and biases of measurement, inappropriate econometric methodologies are
common problems. In the context of relationships that have both a temporal and cross-sectional
dimensions, there is the problem that the estimated impact from a cross-section need not be the same as
that from time-series data. Regressions and their conclusions are strongly dependent on the period, sample
of countries, and variables chosen.
Thus, we adopt two different techniques, in order investigate the heterogeneity across countries and the
interactions across channels of capital inflows in terms of development.
The first is an ideogram statistical technique. Another area of interest is pooled time-series. The
proliferation of cross-country samples for econometric analyses is partly due to the scarcity of time series
data available for adequate analysis, especially for the poorest African countries. Moreover, cross-country
data allow us to identify aggregate relationships, or correlations in the data that appear to hold ‘on average’
over a wide sample. As we mentioned, the weakness of this approach is that what appears to hold on
average is rarely an adequate explanation of what is happening in a particular country, given the importance
of country specific context. Furthermore, the macroeconomic relationships of interest are typically dynamic
in nature, so that we are interested in what is happening in countries over time. Thus, the pooled time-series
and cross section technique provides us with a useful approach to treat these two dimension in parallel.
Our basic idea is that the relationship between external debt – and, in general, foreign capital flows – and
economic development is complex and non-linear. It does clearly depend on the specific country’s context
(a cross-section component) and on the specific past history (a time-series component). Moreover, and we
think that it does represent the bulk of this work and the implicit mainstreaming of all the chapters, we
disagree with the conventional wisdom, which attributes to some kind of foreign capital inflows to be good
or bad in itself for development. An implicit recommendation of this conventional wisdom is that a large
                                                
1 T. N. Srinivasan and J. Bhagwati (1999), “Outward-Orientation and Development: are Revisionists Right?”, September,
mimeo.
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share of FDI in total capital inflows is a measure of something good happening in the economy, as well as a
large share of debt is bad. We think that the real effects are associated with the nature, size and
composition of each capital flow, in addition to the cross-section and time-series components, and with the
interaction component among different kind of foreign capital inflows. We believe that foreign capital
inflows enter multiplicatively rather than additively into a development equation.
It has direct policy implications. First, it is hard to argue that the rise in the share of external debt is an
indication of good health. But this does not mean that the rise in debt is bad in itself. Hence, there is no
reason to say that, in the next future, debt must be totally replaced by grants – as it was recently and
authoritatively affirmed2 - or that in perspective FDI should be the bulk of foreign capital inflows, for the
sake of private sector promotion.
We discovered that, fortunately, two very recent papers share the same idea and strongly confirmed it
econometrically, using common cross-countries regressions. These are the work of Ricardo Hausmann3,
from the Harvard University, and of Henrik Hansen4, from the University of Copenhagen.
Thus, we would like to enlarge the set of financial flows, which can be multiplicatively linked, in order to
include the main international financial flows to SSA (debt, grants and Ide).
We agree that reasonable levels of external debt and aid inflows are expected to have a positive effect on
growth. In traditional neoclassical models, there is an incentive for capital-scarce countries to borrow and
invest since the marginal product of capital is above the world interest rate. And it is true that experience
showed that over-borrowing becomes a negative spiral and, if the costs of high taxes to service the debt
are not internalized, both aid and new loans serve debt repayment without any positive impact on growth.
Moreover, if the expectations are that future debt will be larger than the country’s repayment ability, the
expected debt service will impose a high (and distortionary) marginal tax on investment and output level as
well as the introduction of inflation-tax, the implication being that new domestic and foreign investment will
be discouraged, even if we don’t consider the crowding out effect (debt overhang theory). It is very reliable
that, in highly uncertain environments, investors will continue to exercise their option of waiting and will not
realize long-term, high-risk, irreversible investment. High levels of external debt (and high levels of aid
required to pay debt back) are expected to have a negative effect on growth, through the reduced
efficiency of capital accumulation (i.e. investment).
Thus, we can assume that there is a range of values after which the impact of foreign capital inflows on
investment become negative. Given this premise, it should be possible to identify the optimal level of foreign
capital inflow: a level after which the marginal impact of further capital accumulation becomes negative (the
so called “wrong” side of the Laffer curve, in case of external debt, where increases in the face value of
debt will lower expected debt repayment).
Given these premises, it is clear that we want toto test the impact of aid and debt on growth through their
impact on investment, analyzing how much they are level dependent and how complex is their interplay.
This approach implies that foreign capital inflows may have nonlinear effects on economic development.
                                                
2 A. Meltzer (2000), International Financial Institution Advisory Commission Report, US Congress, Washington D.C.,
March.
3 Development Centre Seminars (2001), Foreign Direct Investment Versus Other Flows to Latin America, Oecd- Iadb,
Paris.
4 H. Hansen (2001), “The Impact of Aid and External Debt on Growth and Investment: Insights From Cross-Country
Regression Analysis”, WIDER Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, August.
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In the present chapter the focus is first on the usage of an original ideogram statistical technique to describe
the SSA sub-regional heterogeneity (that is the importance of the cross section component, which cannot
be adequately captured by a Sub-Saharan African dummy). Then the focus is on the application of pooled
time series and cross section model to show how external debt and foreign capital inflows affect
development (investment and growth) in SSA.
2. An ideogram statistical technique. The “flowers” of SSA regional development
2.1 - The Flower ideogram of regional heterogeneity
Through the usage of an ideogram, based on the flower symbol, we want to analyse and graphically
describe the SSA sub-regional lack of homogeneity, in terms of economic variables, which are represented
by the shape of petals and pistils. It aims at providing synthetic information on quantitative economic
dimensions of some fundamental variables referred to some SSA sub-regions, compared to the EU area. It
is a way to investigate and present data through pictorial representations, for immediate and easy reading.
2.2 - Considered SSA sub-regions
We compare the benchmark of 15-members EU area with four African sub-regions (UEMOA – Union
Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine -, CEMAC - Communauté Economique et Monetaire en
Afrique Centrale -, EAC – Eastern African Community -5, SADC - Southern African Development
Community -), which have been explicitly mentioned during the post-Lome negotiations as possible
counterparts for the future EU-ACP trade agreements6. Current Cotonou agreement, agreed in 2000,
explicitly mentions the importance of these sub-regions.
Tab. 1 –SSA sub-regions defined by the EU-ACP Cotonou agreement
UEMOA CEMAC EAC SADC
LLDCs Benin
Burkina Faso
Guinea Bissau
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
Chad
Equat. Guinea
Centr. Afr. Rep.
Tanzania
Uganda
Angola
Lesotho
Malawi
Mozambico
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Tanzania
Zambia
no-LLDCs Cote d’Ivoire Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
Gabon
Kenya Botswana
Mauritius
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
                                                
5 The EAC integration, launched in 1967, was aborted in 1977 after 10 years. Efforts to revive the community began in
1993 with the heads of state signing an agreement to establish a commission for East African cooperation and in
November 1999 the principles for economic, monetary and political union were set out. In January 2001, the three East
African heads of state inaugurated the East African Community.
6 Tanzania is the only country being in two regions: EAC e SADC. Ghana and Nigeria are the non-LLDCc excluded by
these regions. And Nigeria is the main African trade partner for EU, which import basically oil. Sixteen LLDCs are
excluded by this sub-regions: Horn of Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, Madagascar, Mauritania and some small countries. In
Africa, the sub-regional architecture, apart from the EU pressure, is considered a way to gradually implement the Lagos
Action Plan (1980), in order to create an African common market.
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A first proxy of development level in these regions is provided by the Human development index (HDI),
wich has been proposed, since the first Human Development Report, published in 1990, by the UNDP.
This is a composite index based on three indicators:
(i) longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth;
(ii) educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two.third weight) and the
combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (one-third weight);
(iii) standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita (PPP US$).
With normalization of the values of the variables that make up the HDI, its value ranges from 0 to 1 – the
highest possible value – and also allows for inter-country comparisons.
There are countries in the high HDI category (“H”: with a value equal to or more than 0.800), in the
medium HDI category (“M”: 0.55-0.799), in the low category (“L”: less than 0.500).
Tab. 2 – HDI in SSA sub-regions
UEMOA Eight countries. Mean: 0.297
All the members are in “L” group
CEMAC Six countries. Mean: 0.439
Two countries are in “M”, four are in “L” group
SADC Fourteen countries. Mean: 0.516.
Two countries are in “H”, five in “M”, seven in “L” group
EAC Three countries. Mean: 0.383.
All the members are in “L” group
From a commercial point of view, intra-African trade is still only about 7% of Africa’s total trade.
That said, there are important sub-regional variations in the progress towards integration, as is well
summarised in the report of a recent study by ECA and others7. In the east and south, SADC has
undergone significant institutional changes since the 1990s, with potential positive effects. South Africa has
joined SADC, and there has been a series of successful negotiating sessions aimed at reaching agreement
on a SADC Free Trade Area following the ratification of the SADC Trade Protocol in 1998. Thus, The
most dynamic are is the SADC, where almost all of the intra-area trade is due to the South Africa-
Zimbabwe bilateral flows. Moreover, in the SADC, the growing role of intra-area trade is direct result of a
“political” change in the South African regime.
Tab. 3 – Intra-area trade in SSA sub-regions (percent, 1995)
UEMOA CEMAC EAC SADC
intra-area 8.7 3.2 7.9 11.5
With EU-15 49.6 52.0 36.3 36.4
With others 41.7 44.7 55.9 52.1
total 100 100 100 100
Source: IMF (1999), Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington D.C.
                                                
7 World Bank, African Development Bank, ECA, OAU and African Economic Research Consortium (2000), Can Africa
claim the 21st Century, Addis Ababa.
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2.3 - Considered variables
We take in account ten variables, referred to the 1995-97 period, which was the period when European
Commission negotiated with the ACP the future of Lome agreements, and we consider their arithmetic
mean.
The variables are:
1. population,
2. per capita GNP (corrent US$),
3. Annual percentage growth rate of per capita GNP,
4. Annual percentage growth rate of inflation,
5. Gross domestic savings as a share of PPP GDP,
6. Gross domestic investment as a share of PPP GDP,
7. Foreign direct investment net flow as a share of PPP GDP,
8. Trade in goods as a share of PPP GDP,
9. Budget deficit as a share of PPP GDP,
10. External debt as as a share of GNP.
2.4 - Comparison between pistils
The first variables (population and per capita GNP) are in absolute terms (million of people) and in
comparable relative wealth (per capita US$) and they make it possible to define market potentialities of
sub-regions: population as a proxy of consumers and per capita GNP as a proxy of wealth.
Figure 1 is a comparison between the weighted economic profile of different areas. We have data easily
represented by circles (population is the grey circle, whereas per capita GNP is the black one).
Sadc
EU
Cemac
Uemoa
Eac
Figure 1 - The absolute weight of sub-regions
Population
Per capita GNP
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The UE market is the most developed, richest and biggest market, and it is the natural benchmark for other
sub-regions, which look at EU as the model to be reproduced. Thus, through normalisation of the values of
the variables, we have considered the EU as the unit of measure. SADC seems to be the only SSA sub-
region with a potential significant market.
2.5 - Comparison between petals
As a second and very different step we consider the other eight variables, represented by petals. For every
variable (=vi) we get:
i) The arithmetic mean of 1995-1997 period for each member country,
ii) The weighted Arithmetic Mean (m = S vi GDPi / S GDPi) of the sub-region,
iii) The weighted standard deviation Statistics (s = S-1/2 = S [vi - m]2 GDPi / S GDPi) of the sub-
region.
The usage of weighted values makes it possible to correct the summary descriptive statistics of mean and
standard deviation through the effective weight of single economies within their regions. In fact, to consider
the dynamics of German domestic investment equal to that of Greece makes no sense. The problem is
simply that the relative percentages in such a context do not represent fractions of the same total, so they
can't be added, unless we assign the correct “weight”, linked – for example – to the GDP.
For every couple of the variables, we associate weighted arithmetic mean and standard deviation to get a
diagram of Cartesian co-ordinates (or rectangular co-ordinates), given by two real numbers. These two
numbers indicate the length of the perpendicular projections from the central point to two fixed,
perpendicular, graduated lines, the x-axis and the y-axis, provided by weighted arithmetic mean and
standard deviation. Then, we proceed to the parametric transposition of the ellipse, the dimensions of
which are the weighted arithmetic mean and standard deviation, in order to get a petal.
We find a position of the eight ellipses angles to the plane through a rotation of 45° one from another, in
order to cover a circle.
All the different flowers, representing different sub-regions, keep the same order of petals, in order to
facilitate the visual comparison.
The horizontal and vertical axes of flowers are defined by four domestic macroeconomic variables (n. 3, 4,
5, 6), whereas the diagonals are defined by budget deficit (n. 9) and three external variables (n. 7, 8, 10).
Looking at the petal dimensions, its length measures the weighted mean of the sub-region, whereas its
width measures the heterogeneity within the sub-region (i.e. the weighted standard deviation).
Excepted the “bad” petals of external debt and inflation, which are dark petals, the more the petals are
long and narrow (i.e. more homogeneous) the more the flower is “nice”.
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Gross domestic savings 
as a share of PPP GDP
Gross domestic investment 
as a share of PPP GDP
Annual percentage growth rate of inflation
Annual percentage growth rate of per capita GNP
Budget deficit 
as a share of PPP GDP External debt as as a share of GNP
Foreign direct investment net flow
 as a share of PPP GDP
Trade in goods 
as a share of PPP GDP
per capita GNP 
Figure 2 - Petals of development 
The symptoms of the flower illness are the dark petals as well as a withdrawn petal, which assumes a dark
colour because it means that the region is experiencing a negative growth rate of the given variable.
By assumption, normalisation of the values of the variables has been solved using the EU area data as the
benchmark: the weighted mean of EU corresponds to 1 and its weighted standard deviation to 0.3.
Moreover
Thus the EU flower is by assumption the “nice” flower.
The dark petal representing external debt is absent, as EU has zero external debt. We define a way to treat
the “inflation” variable and to solve the problem of no-zero values for the EU (being equal to 2.5 percent)
and very high values (numbers of two or three figures) for the SSA sub-regions, which should imply
respectively the presence of “dark” petal for the EU flower and too much long petal for other regions. We
don’t consider the level value, but the logarithm of the standardised value of this variable. Thus, we get no
petal for the EU flower (as the standardized value of the level value of 2.5 percent is equal to 1, and the
logarithm of 1 is zero) and treatable length of petal for other regions.
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UE
SADC
UEMOA
 n.
a.
CEMAC
  n
.a.
EAC
Figure 3 - The level of homogeneity of SSA sub-regions
It is quite evident the heterogeneity of SSA sub-regions, compared to the EU shape. In order to make the
comparison immediate, we have given the same radius to all the regions, provided that the variables are
relative ones, but we remind that the absolute values are those in figure 1.
Every petal results from two axes with their linear scales. By comparing EU and EAC, the EAC petal of
“annual percentage growth rate of per capita GNP” is twice as long as the EU petal: it means that the EAC
relative value of this variable is twice the EU value. Obviously, it does not mean that EAC economy is
growing twice the amount of EU, as it does not incorporate the absolute dimension of economies.
Moreover, the EAC sub-region is the region with the best result, in terms of width: the petals are quite
narrow, and it means that the homogeneity is higher. But it is simply due to the fact that the number of
countries in the EAC region is very small (only three countries), compared to the other regions, and we did
not include a correction weight for the number of countries. Obviously, the degree of freedom is relevant in
terms of probability of dispersion of values around the group mean.
Looking at the SADC sub-region flower, we have to mention another contrivance we have used. We got
some weighted standard deviation values that are too high to be reproduced in the picture. Thus, we have
arbitrarily fixed a limit of the width of petals and we used a “de-framing” technique (the petals with the
frame that has partially taken away mean “exceptional” values) for investment, savings, external debt and
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inflation variables. Nevertheless, SADC confirms to be the sub-region with a potential market, as its shape
is similar to a “nice” flower, but its necessary enlargement process – up to 14 countries - is at the cost of
heterogeneity. In fact, all the petals are quite wide8.
What seems to represent a common characteristic all over the sub-regions is the presence of a long dark
petal of external debt. Thus, notwithstanding the clear heterogeneity of economic conditions – confirmed by
the studies by Easterly and Levine (1997) and Temple (1998), who point to persistent correlations
between macroeconomic policy indicators and country specific, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics
in developing countries -, all the SSA sub-regions and countries exhibit an overwhelming degree of
similarity in terms of general external debt problem.
2. Pooled time-series cross-section approach
The need for a pooled time-series cross-section model
Most of the studies have attempted to identify changes in the development patterns within the structure of a
cross-sectionally estimated growth model. They analysed differences in point-to-point (or averaged period-
to-period) patterns as a result of different socioeconomic conditions existing among various countries at a
particular point (or period) in time. Cross-sectional models do not provide insights into structural changes
over time. Neither do they reflect sudden changes due to dynamic exogenous shocks. Cross-sectional
analysis, dealing with only one time period and yielding different results in different periods can not lead to
generalisations of the dynamics of development. Thus, the use of single cross-country regressions is
inappropriate, when: (1) we have to consider dynamic dimension as well, (2) single cross-country
regressions suffer from omitted variable bias, (3) one or more regressors may be endogenous. For these
reasons, time-series analysis is appropriate for the estimation of the economic aspects of growth: it allows
the tracing of changes over time in the underlying socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, time-series analysis
make possible to include lagged dependent variables in the model equations. From the analytical point of
view, including the lagged dependent variables in the model equations allows growth to be seen as an
essential dynamic process involving lengthy responses lags where the transmission process is not
instantaneous. From the aspect of model building, to include the lagged dependent variables in the equation
provides a better model specification, as they pick up the effect of unmeasured factors (i.e. omitted
variables) that may have affected development in the previous period and were not included in the model
specification9.
This point is critical. Usually, panels have large number of cross-sections, with each unit observed only a
few times. In panel models, with small T there is no hope of saying anything about the time series structure
                                                
8 Southern Africa has joined the ranks of the world’s leading trading emergent areas. The Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) - member countries of SACU are: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland - figures
among the world’s top 15 exporters for five of the 14 sectors covered by the Trade Performance Index. The Trade
Performance Index ranks the export performance of 184 countries in 14 export sectors, placing export sectors in all
countries on a global competitiveness ladder. The Trade Performance Index, launched in February 2000 in Bangkok at
UNCTAD X, is based on 1998 export performance, as well as shifts in export performance between 1994 and 1998.
Transport equipment is one example of SACU performance, where it ranks ninth, with exports of US$ 1.4 billion and a
high degree of product and market diversification. South Africa, SACU’s largest member, has experienced growing
interest of transnational corporations to invest in the country, as shown by UNCTAD's survey on foreign direct
investment in Africa.
9 We know that (permanent) unobserved country specific effects are likely to be correlated with some of the observed
regressors, such as the initial level of GDP. As Hsiao (1986) shows, omitting unobserved time invariant country effects in
a dynamic panel data model will cause OLS level estimator to be biased and inconsistent. And the lagged dipendent
variable is positively correlated with the permanent effect.
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of data and the units are just a sample extracted from a population. These assumptions can not be assumed
in most of pooled analysis, when data have reasonable sized T and not very large N that are specific units
(countries, in our case). Differently from panel data, the relevant issue of time (the within-country variability
of data: how foreign capital inflows affect investment and growth over time) and heterogeneity of units
(between-country variability of data: how countries with different levels of foreign capital inflows experience
different investment and growth patterns) should be seriously taken in account in pooled time-series cross-
country analysis.
Different Model specifications
Our hypothesis to be tested is that heterogeneity across Sub-Saharan African countries is very important,
as our graphical investigation shows, despite the fact that Africa is often considered an homogenous
aggregate, and that the effects of aid, foreign debt and foreign investment on development are more
complex than additive and linear.
Results are very sensitive to the econometric approach used. Most of the studies rely heavily on the OLS
method of estimation; all of the results reported in Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998) are obtained using
OLS.
In the case of the basic pooled analysis, it is assumed that the parameters are constant, independently from
both the countries and the years. For this reason, it is possible to combine the observations and to calculate
only one regression for all the units in every year, rather than to estimate one given cross-sectional equation
for every considered year or, in alternative, one time series for every country.
The general framework for this regression model has the following form:
yit = a i + bxit + uit for x =1,2,…, K; i =1,2,…,N;  and t = 1,2,…,T (1)
N and T are the cross section and time series dimensions respectively, a i is a scalar being a given constant
term (differences across units are not captured in differences in the constant term), b is the (k * 1)
parameter vector of xit, the vectors of k regressors (k explanatory exogenous variables). The vector of
disturbance terms uit is assumed to be uncorrelated with the xit’s and the a i’s have zero mean and constant
variance. This model restricts the coefficients on x to be common across i and t.
The assumption made about a i has implications for the consistency and efficiency properties of estimates of
b  in equation (1). The model is transformed into a fixed effects (FE) model, or the so-called LSDV (Least
Squares Dummy Variable), if we assume a variation of the intercept from section to section. The dummy-
variable coefficients measure the change in the cross-section and time-series intercepts (with respect to the
first individual in the first period of time) and account for the effects of the omitted variables that are specific
to individual cross section units but stay constant over time, and the effects that are specific to each time
period but are the same for all cross section units. The FE model is a first step to take into account
heterogeneity, but it does not directly identify what causes the regression line to shift over time and over
individuals.
This lack of knowledge about the model can be described through the disturbance term, which is always
the component that determines, with its statistical characteristics (in terms of its nature and structure), the
performance of estimation procedures. The assumption is that the unit specific effects cannot be observed
or measured and they must be treated as part of our “general ignorance”. What this means is that the large
number of factors that affect the value of the dependent variable, but which are not explicitly accounted for
in the model, can be summarized by a random disturbance. Heterogeneity across units can also be
accounted for by treating the individual specific effects as random variables. If this assumption is made then
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we have a random effects (RE) model, or the so-called Error Component Model (ECM)10. It attributes a
random nature - absorbed by the residual term - to the variation in the largeness and direction of the
sectional relations. The Error Component Method is used to allow for the effects to be random and to
improve the efficiency of least squares estimates by accounting for the cross section and time series related
disturbances. Under the error components specification, the uit disturbances takes the decomposed form:
uit = v i +  wt +  zit (2)
where the v i [~ N(0, sv2)] are cross section specific error component, wit [~ N(0, sw2)] are time-series
specific error component and zit [~ N(0, sz2)] is the combined error component. This formulation is
derived  from the FE model, by assuming that the mean effect of the random time-series and cross-section
variables is included in the intercept term, and the random deviations about the mean are equated to the
error components, v i and wt respectively. This model assumes that the pattern of shifting regression
intercepts follows a normal distribution.
Usually, we just do a simple transformation on the observations to make the resulting variance-covariance
matrix of the errors satisfy the Gauss-Markov assumptions. Thus, Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to
eliminate serial correlation is almost Generalised least squares (GLS)11, as is Weighted regression (WLS) to
eliminate heteroscedasticity. The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method, also known as the
multivariate regression, or Zellner's method, estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations, which may affect our
panel: SUR-GLS method is much more sensitive to individual contribution (cross-country heterogeneity),
that is the critical assumption of pooling12. It is estimated using a variant of Generalised Least-Squares
(GLS) regression. The estimation weights observations in inverse relationship to their variances and a two-
stage estimation process is used. In the first stage, OLS is run on the entire pooled sample. The OLS
residuals are then used to calculate sample estimates of the variance components. The estimated variances
are used in the second stage, in which the GLS parameter estimates are obtained. This method takes care
of the twin problems of auto correlation among the time series disturbances and the heteroskedasticity of
cross section disturbances. The idea of GLS is very simple: it is basically a procedure to weighting units by
how well they fit the underlying regression, and so is simply downweighting those that fit poorly. We assign
more weight (importance) to observation with smaller variability, that is more closely clustered around their
mean values.
Obviously, SUR method has some serious limitations. SUR covariance estimator is not consistent if any of
the right-hand side variables are correlated with the residuals (that is they are endogenous). In this case,
3SLS is a system method that estimates all the coefficients of the model to obtain a consistent estimate
derived from SUR. 3SLS is derived from Two stages least squares (TSLS), a special case of Instrumental
variables regression. If we think that some Xs are endogenously determined with Y, then OLS estimates
will be biased and inconsistent, if this were the case. Thus, TSLS specification means that we test using
instrumental variables correlated with the suspect endogenous Xs, but not with the residuals of equation and
then we run two OLS: (1) we regress the suspect endogenous Xs on the contemporaneous values of
                                                
10 G. S. Maddala (1971), “The use of variance components models in pooling cross section and time series data”,
Econometrica, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 341-358.
11 As we don’t know the covariance matrix of the errors, we estimate it by residuals computed from OLS estimates of
coefficients: this procedure is the Feasible GLS method.
12 A potential problem associated with SUR estimation is that the GLS procedure, which is used and is called Parks,
provides wrong standard errors if T is very small. See Beck, N. and J. N. Katz (1995) “What to Do (and Not to Do) with
Time-Series Cross-Section Data”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, 634–647.
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exogenous Xs and on the lagged values of the endogenous regressors themselves (used as instruments)13;
(2) we re-estimate Y fluctuation including the fitted values from the previous regressions. If OLS are
consistent then the coefficients on the (1) residuals are not significantly different from zero. This is a way to
solve contemporaneous correlation due to error of measurement (OLS estimators are biased and
inconsistent) or simultaneous equation bias (we have endogenous variables – values of which are
determined by the system we are observing – and exogenous variables)14. In order to control for
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (similar to SUR) as well as for endogeneity (similar to
TSLS), 3SLS adopt the two stages of TSLS and, in the third stage, it applies feasible GLS to the equations
in a manner analogous to the SUR-GLS estimator.
From a broader point of view, we have to remind that single-equation models assume that a set of various
explanatory factors determine a dependent variable, with no feedback relationship. That is to say: they
hypothesize causality in one direction and explain neither the interdependencies that exist between the
explanatory variables themselves nor how these variables are related to other variables. This is a problem
when the parameter estimates of these  models possess a simultaneous-equations bias that may vitiate the
findings. Because of high interdependence between the causes and the consequences of growth, the
endogeneity of many determinants should push research in the direction of a simultaneous-equations
framework. But, reviewing literature, very few studies have controlled for the endogeneity of the regressors:
for a dynamic panel data model OLS estimation are likely to suffer from biases due to endogeneity and
unobserved country specific effects.
Tab. 4 - The matrix of model specifications given different combinations of assumptions
Gauss-Markov
assumptions
Heteroscedasticity Contemporaneous
correlation
Serial correlation
Exogeneity OLS WLS SUR
Endogeneity OLS-IV 2SLS 3SLS
Differencing,
AR, lagged Y,
VAR, VECM
The model specifications to be tested
A preliminary analysis demonstrates that investment is highly significant in all the growth regressions15. The
derived idea is to test that investment appears to be the main channel through which external capital
promote development. Thus we run new regression with investment as dependent variables and foreign
capital inflows as regressors.
We remind that our hypothesis is that external financial flows are interlinked in their impact on development,
and their effects are level dependent (in terms of current levels of different financial flows), temporal
dependent as well as spatial dependent. Thus, in addition to simple linear regressions, we employ other
specifications to investigate the non-linearity relationship between foreign capital inflows and investment.
These specifications include a model with interaction terms and a quadratic specification. The quadratic
specification would support a debt (or aid) inflows and investment Laffer curve relationship if the coefficient
                                                
13 We use the lagged endogenous variable as an instrument, because it is correlated with the endogenous variable and
not with the residuals.
14 This way is called the Reduced form of the model, as we solve the system for endogenous variables, in order to know
which disturbances influence endogenous variables.
15 The majority of current studies find that the most robust determinant of economic growth is investment. The new
growth theory further emphasises the role of investment in the growth process. See D. Asterious and S. Price (2000),
“Uncertainty, investment and economic growth: evidence from a dynamic panel”, City University, mimeo.
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of debt (or aid) is positive and the coefficient of debt (or aid) squared is negative.
In terms of problems, combining both temporal and space analysis, like the pooled analysis does, the
different problems of these two econometric techniques are combined as well. In particular, we have to
take care of:
· the risk of serial correlation between the data of various periods of time;
· the heteroschedasticity risk;
· the bad specification of the model.
(a) OLS technique
Our basic estimation includes a OLS technique, which does some average of longitudinal and cross section
specific effects (it averages the two dimensions: space and time). Thus, OLS estimation is between the
between and the within estimation. When we keep the mean in using mean value between the variables, it
doesn’t say anything about variation, and our pooled time series has a lot of variation. Thus, we lose a lot
of information. If we correct for both cross-section (=countries) and time (=years) means, we get rid of a
lot of information, both across time and space, simply by including time and period effect dummies. In these
case, we expect to have little left to explain: total variation explained by model, including dummies, is
extremely inflated.
Moreover, OLS is optimal only if the model specification satisfies the Gauss-Markov assumptions. All
errors must be independent and identically distributed. It assumes that all differences between countries are
accounted for by differences in the independent variables (that is, non unmodeled heterogeneity), no effects
of other countries on each other (no spatial effect), all countries obey same equation (pooling
homogeneity), no dynamics (temporal dependence). The OLS errors are wrong if the errors show any of
panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation of the errors, serially correlated errors. Our
hypothesis is that OLS specification is not appropriate and, as heterogeneity is the main characteristics of
our analysis, other specifications are more appropriate.
(b) Fixed Effect technique
We extended the benchmark OLS model, adding country effects and also time effect (time dummies). With
FE model we have different constant for each country, that is we subtract the “within” mean from each
variable and estimate OLS using the transformed data. If intercepts vary by country, slope are invariant.
With Fixed Effects we have some advantages, as we take in account parameter heterogeneity and we get
rid of possibly distorting group effects, as we focus on within group variation. But we have some
disadvantages, too: it eats degree of freedom and doesn’t involve theory in explaining phenomena.
Obviously, to find substantive variables that explain the differences is much better16. FE model is useful if
we have a handful of countries or years which have meaning by themselves in theory. We assume that in
comparing the unrestricted model (with dummies) to OLS restricted model, there is some improvement, as
the residual variation will be lower, which means that OLS did not account for the variation captured by
some variables – it put them, as the country-specific intercept, equal to zero –.
(c) Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique
Usually we try to correct the errors that show any of heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous or serial
                                                
16 That’s why Random error (RE) model is so attractive when one doesn’t know of any explanatory variable which
explains the fixed effects: this model allows intercept terms to vary as well as he slope coefficients to vary from country
to country.
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correlation problems. As we mentioned, the Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is the feasible GLS
specification correcting for both heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated residuals. This
specification uses the OLS residuals to obtain a consistent estimate of the cross-section residual covariance
matrix. In our context, we argue that the SUR method is more appropriate estimation method, than the
previous ones.
Moreover, concern about simultaneity bias in foreign capital inflows-growth regressions, caused by
potential endogeneity of foreign capital, is another common feature in recent studies, as it is difficult to
perceive of foreign capital as a lump-sum transfer, independent of the level of income. If foreign capital
inflows depend on the level of income it cannot be exogenous with respect to growth as traditionally
assumed. A two-way interaction, due to non-clear causality, creates an endogeneity that may lead to
biased coefficient estimates when capital inflows are used as an explanatory variable. A domestic shock
that raises the return to capital may increase both capital inflows and investment. This would tend to bias
the coefficient on capital inflows in an investment equation upwards. In order to uncover the effect of
capital inflows on investment, we use instrumental variables to isolate the flows that are related to
exogenous factors. The problem is solved by using lagged observations of the regressors as instruments.
If we assume significant dynamic effects of capital inflows in the growth relation, then we augment the
growth specification and include lagged values of explanatory variables. But we need also to be attentive to
the econometric issues that arise from the addition of the lagged dependent variable, in the right-hand side
of the investment regression. This is referred to in the econometric literature as the dynamic panel data
problem. In fact, on the lags’ length, Granger admonishes that “using data measured over intervals
much wider than actual causal lags can destroy causal interpretation”17. It has been established that
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term by construction, rendering the OLS
estimator biased and inconsistent. To tackle this problem, we follow the basic idea of Anderson and
Hsiao18, who propose a solution that requires first-differencing all variables and using the lagged differences
as time-varying set of instruments19. In fact, in order to control for the contemporaneous covariance
between first differences (which eliminate the time-invariant individual effects) of regressors and residuals,
they propose to instrument the offending terms by the second lagged level. Thus, their regressors
(particularly, the second lag of the dependent variable) is not contemporaneously covariant with the
equation error. As mentioned by Nat Beck20, we can easily model dynamics and correct for serial
correlation with a lagged dependent variable, which is simpler to estimate and interpret than serially
correlated errors - i.e. AR(1) -.
Concerning the investment regression, we think that the model specification is not affected by the risk of
                                                
17 C. W. J. Granger, (1987), “Causal Inference,” The New Palgrave: Econometrics, W.W. Norton, New York, p. 49.
18 T. W. Anderson and C. Hsiao (1981), “Estimation of dynamic models with error components”, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, Vol. 76.
19 Also timing in the regressions using differences has been addressed by time-series econometricians and for
macroeconomic data the autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) model, in which lags of the dependent variable as well
as the explanatory variables are included in the regression, have proven to be quite useful. We have to experiment with
lags of the growth rate and the explanatory variables in the regressions. Another similar estimator that produces
consistent estimates, but also efficient estimates, is the General method of moments (GMM) estimator, used by Arellano
and Bond, which uses all feasible lags of the dependent variable plus current and lagged values of exogenous variables
as instruments. See M. Arellano and S. R. Bond (1991), “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence
and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58.
20 Nathanial Beck (1998), “Taking Time and Space Seriously (particularly in Comparative Politics and International
Relations): A Short Course on Time-Series-Cross-Section Data”, The Political Methodology Video Series, Richard J.
Timpone, Series Director, The Ohio State University.
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endogeneity, thus we don’t need to run a 3SLS specification, based on the use of some instrumental
variables.
3. Pooled time-series cross-section data description and hypotheses
The purpose of the present analysis is to take a closer look at the impact of foreign capital inflows (aid,
debt and FDI) on economic development in SSA. We wish to make some general statements about the
relation between the variables we are considering, looking at a limited set of countries provided by 30 SSA
countries. Our time periods is determined by data availability from the main sources. The main data source
are the World Bank datasets21. We work with data from 1971 to 1999. We consider a large set of
variables. The ways in which the regressions are specified draw on inspiration from Burnside and Dollar
(2000) and Hansen and Tarp (2001).
The annual growth rate in real GDP per capita (= GDPgt) is chosen as the dependent variable, in the first
set of regressions. It is a readily available output measure and we can draw on a well-established approach
to conduct our analysis, as it (and the ratio of other variables to GDP) does correct for countries and
economies lack of homogeneity.
Referring to the independent variables, first we have the measures of foreign capital inflows, the set of
variables of interest.
Concerning the measures of external debt, related to GDP (in percent), we distinguish between the
resource flow that leads to changes in total external debt, and the debt stock per se. Therefore the initial
level of total external debt to GDP (= EDT1970/GDP1970) is used as a measure of the debt stock. The
hypothesis is that it appears with a significant and negative impact on growth: the resulting impact of
external debt on growth can be related to the standard inverse U-shape found in many studies of external
debt problems and to the hypothesis of negative effect of high external debt stock on growth. The resource
flow generated by external borrowing is calculated as the annual change in the stock: D(EDT/GDP)t=
[(EDT/GDP)t+1–(EDT/GDP)t]. For countries experiencing negative growth the measure of external debt
will increase even without increases in total external debt. The advantage of splitting total external debt into
an initial debt stock and a flow is that the flow must be expected to be endogenous. Furthermore, there is
no ambiguity regarding the expected impact of either of these series on the growth rate in GDP per capita
as well as on investment. A positive flow of external funds should have a non-negative impact while the
impact of initial external debt should be non-positive.
We also include Total debt service as a percentage of GDP (= EDSt/GDPt). This is the sum of principal
repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services, and we expect a negative
impact on growth and investment.
For the aid flows we use Official Development Assistance in current US$ as a percentage of GDP (=
ODAt/GDPt), and we expect a very limited positive impact on growth and investment. As we are
considering SSA countries, we suspect that the well-known issue of impact of aid on growth is misleading.
Referring to poor countries, most of aid is devoted to interventions for humanitarian actions and pro-poor
safety nets and for external debt service repayment. We suspect that it is very unlikely that we can find any
economic significant relationship between aid and GDP growth. In Africa, the majority of people depend
on informal sector’s economy, without any immediate link to monetary market economy and GDP. When
aid was targeted towards the poor, there was no clear effect on growth, being the macroeconomic
                                                
21 World Bank Africa Database, Global Development Finance Database, and World Development Indicators Database,
which provide indicators covering SSA countries from 1965 to 1999.
196
environment positive or not. Aid to poor has been basically devoted to support consumption of the poor:
only in recent years, the approach of introducing strategies of pro-poor-growth defined interventions to
promote investment through a direct targeting of the poor. If we want to demonstrate how much aid did
promote poverty reduction and growth in Africa during the last thirty years, we have to recognize that aid
have had two different aims. Aid to reduce poverty, without positive investment effects; and aid to support
investment and growth, without trickle-down effect on the poor and with very limited results.
A third variable measuring an external resource inflow is foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
(= FDIt/GDPt), and we expect a limited positive impact on growth and investment. As we mentioned,
foreign investment represents very marginal capital inflows to SSA, very dependent on the natural
endowment of countries (i.e. reflecting their heterogeneity).
The majority of studies are not sufficiently informative about the interaction between different components
of external capital inflows. We think that the effects are complex and varied, but that aid tends to be
associated with other external capital inflows. Thus, the aid (ODAt/GDPt2) and debt (FLTDt/GDPt 2)
squared terms (with negative coefficients) allow for the possibility that there may be diminishing marginal
returns to aid and debt, i.e. that at some point the impact of additional aid and debt on economic
development falls as the volume of aid and debt increases. A consequence of this formulation is that
efficiency of aid and debt on development initially rises (other things held constant), up to a turning point at
which the efficiency begins to fall. What this reflects are absorptive capacity constraints.
The interactive term between aid and debt [(ODAt/GDPt)*(EDTt/GDPt)] needs to be interpreted with
some caution, because it can mean both that the impact of aid on development increases with the quantity
of debt, and that the impact of debt on development increases with the quantity of aid. Thus, the inclusion
of an interaction term between foreign aid and economic policies and their squared terms represent the
specification to capture non-linearity in the aid and debt-growth relationship22.
Then, there is a vector of control variables that often appear in the regressions and are based on past
empirical studies and economic theory.
The first fixed variable, introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), is the logarithm of the initial level of
per capita GDP (=logGDP1970). Usually, it is expected to have a significant negative influence on the growth
rate, capturing the conditional convergence effect23. In our specific (SSA) and heterogeneous context, we
suspect that this relationship is not so clear.
Another variable chosen is the average population growth rate (= POPgt). It measures the demographic
                                                
22 The decreasing marginal returns can in empirical work be approximated by a second order polynomial in and debt in the
regression. In general, quadratic terms and interactions represent separate terms in a second order approximation of what
is really an unknown functional form. A more precise, second-order Taylor approximation of the theoretical growth
equation leads to an empirical reduced form where quadratic terms as well as an interaction term (e.g., a cross product)
are present in a linearisation (linearising converts the theoretical growth specification into an empirically manageable
reduced forme quation) of a standard Solow model with convergence effects. Hadjimichael et al. and Durberry et al.
studies include only the squared term, others only include the aid-policy interaction term to capture polynomial effects in
the aid-growth relationship. There are, of course, more complex non-linearities that can be considered, other than
quadratic form.
23 The conventional neoclassical growth model has most often been used in the study of growth until recently. The
model suggests an inverse relationship between a country’s per capita growth in income and its initial level of per capita
income. This result hinges on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital. Countries with low capital to labour ratios
will therefore have higher marginal products of capital, enabling them to grow faster. Conditional convergence suggests
that poor countries tend to grow faster than richer countries holding steady state per capita income constant. This
motivated Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), among others, to develop new growth models in which the sources of
technological (and productivity) progress are endogenized rather than assumed to be exogenous.
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constraint and it is expected to have a negative influence on the growth rate. Again, the SSA context
induces us to doubt the reliability of this relationship.
A very important variable is investment. Among others. De Long and Summers (1991) show that investment
in equipment and machinery is the most important factor in influencing growth. In fact, the average
investment rate is one of the variables that is most widely used in the literature (and one of the fixed variables
in the Levine and Renelt paper). But investment has increasingly been seen as endogenous to growth, and
therefore part of what needs to be explained rather than part of the explanation24. Moreover, if foreign
capital inflows affect growth through investment, once investment is included as regressor, then the foreign
capital inflows variables can become insignificant25 Thus, we include total gross domestic investment as a
percentage of GDP (=INt/GDPt) and it is expected to have a significant positive influence on the growth
rate, but we also estimate equations in which investment is excluded to control for the impact of foreign
capital inflows and, above all, equations in which investment is the dependent variable and foreign capital
inflows are the regressors. In such a specification, where INt/GDPt is the dependent variable, we can
directly measure the impact of foreign capital inflows on the main determinant of growth.
Linked to investment is savings rate. Notwithstanding the problems of measurement, as also savings figures
must be considered tentative, because they are derived as a residual in the national accounts from
expenditure and production data that are themselves quite unreliable, it is quite important as domestic
source for investment. Thus, we include total domestic savings as a percentage of GDP (=St/GDPt) in the
regressions with investment as dependent variable, and it is expected to have a significant positive influence
on the growth rate, through investment.
Then, there is a measure of human capital variable, given by the percentage of adult illiterate rate (=AIR). It
is expected to have a negative influence on the growth rate and investment.
4. Pooled time-series cross-section preliminary analysis
Data exploration and cross-correlations
Our analysis refers to a set annual data, over the 1970-1999 period (due to the presence of missing data in
the period 1960-69), of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries26. We excluded 18 out of the 48 SSA
countries, due to missing data, geographical dimension (very small countries and islands, such as Comore
and Sao Tomè) and anomalies (South Africa).
Summary statistics (Appendix 1, Tabs. 1 and 2) show how limited is the capacity of the first moment (the
expected values) to be a summary statistic of a probability distribution in an heterogeneous context, such as
our phenomenon is. And other summary statistics (Appendix 1, Tab. 3) show that heterogeneity is
particularly evident in the cross-country dimension, whereas time-series dimension indicates that, as in the
majority of economic variables, a dynamic (non-linear, inverted-U shaped, in case of aid and debt service)
trend seems to predominate, even though some interruptions due to exoghenous shocks occurred. Thus,
we need more detailed investigation.
                                                
24 R. Barro (1997), pp. 32-3.
25 Evidence in support of this is provided in R. Lensink and O. Morrissey (2000), “Aid instability as a measure of
uncertainty and the positive impact of aid on growth”, Credit Research paper, University of Nottingham.
26 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep.,
Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The other 18 SSA countries have too
many missing data to be included in the pooled analysis.
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As a first step, divided the series into four sub-periods and considering the average values of each of these
four periods, we explored the bivariate relationship between (i) growth and investment, (ii) growth and aid,
(iii) growth and external debt, (iv) growth and debt service, (v) investment and aid, (vi) investment and
external debt, (vii) investment and debt service, (viii) aid and external debt, (ix) aid and debt service, we
plot the evolutions of the average values over time and cross-country. The figures show that growth appear
positively correlated with investment and negatively correlated with foreign capital inflows during the 1980s
and 1990s, after a positive correlation in the 1970s.
The correlation matrix confirms this evidence (see Appendix 1, tab. 4). The positive correlation between
growth and foreign debt in the 1970s, when the level of debt stock was much lower than the following
decades can be used as a first confirmation of the fact that the impact of foreign capital inflows is level
dependent: during the 1980s and 1990s, when external debt burden increased in a dramatic way the
correlations become negative (level dependence as a way to interpret the time dependence).
After having analysed bivariate correlations, which may be in part spurious, reflecting the effects of third
factors, the next step is multivariate regression analysis. Thus, we tried some empirical analyses over the
last 30 years that make use of cross-country multiple linear regressions in assessing the effectiveness of
foreign capital inflows on investment, and of investment on growth. In fact, as we mentioned, from both
theory and empirical literature27, a reasonably consistent pattern is that investment is the fundamental engine
for growth and that foreign capital inflows are significant regressors on investment.
Having annual data over the 1971-1999 period, we considered the average values of four different sub-
periods: Period I (from 1971 to 1978: the “illusion” stage of increasing indebtedness), Period II (from
1979 to 1985: the “crisis” stage of debt explosion), Period III (from 1986 to 1992: the “cure” stage of
adjustment without reducing debt) and Period IV (from 1993 to 1999:  the “disillusion” stage of lack of
development without reducing debt).
We use the mean values of the given periods for most of the variables.
AIR Adult illiterate rate
EX_GDP Export/GDP
FDI_GDP Foreign direct investment/GDP
FLTD_GDP Foreign long term debt/GDP
GGDPPC Annual GDP growth rate
GPOP Annual population growth rate
IM_GDP Import/GDP
IN_GDP Investment (=Gross domestic capital formation)/GDP
INF Annual inflation rate
LTD_GDP Long term debt stock/GDP
ODA_GDP ODA/GDP
REM_GDP Remittances/GDP
S_GDP Domestic savings/GDP
SCR_GDP State current revenues/GDP
STE_GDP State total expenditure/GDP
TDS_GDP Total debt service/GDP
                                                
27 Particularly, the 1990s new generation of aid effectiveness studies appeared focusing on the relations between aid,
policies, and growth.
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We considered the initial level of some other variables (1971, 1979, 1986, 1993):
INGDPPC Initial level of per capita GDP
INPOP Initial level of population
INTED_GDP Initial value of total external debt
A preliminary analysis of the correlation matrix of the variables shows some elements to be reminded. This
analysis is useful also because very high (partial) correlation matrix coefficients (>.79) can help in detecting
multicollinearity28, to be considered in time series and pooled analyses. In particular, as we expected, the
highest link is between export and import.
Concerning the GDP growth rate, theory of growth is partially confirmed. In fact, investment is correlated
to growth, as expected since Harrod-Domar and Solow models and it is the more relevant findings for our
purposes. The relationship between growth and human capital is not evident (the signs of the coefficients
change from period to period), thus the endogenous growth theory, based on the importance of human
capital, is not clearly confirmed in the SSA case: the negative correlation is confirmed in the first three
periods, with a very low coefficient value, indicating the lack of economic significant relationship. Inflation is
negatively related to growth in all the periods and the level of exports is positively related to growth, as
expected by the Washington Consensus approach. Demographic pressure is negatively related to growth
performance, at least in the last three periods. All the foreign capital inflows seem to be related to growth
with different signs from period to period, however, the stock of foreign debt is negatively related to growth
in the last three periods (when debt burden became unsustainable). In SSA countries’ case there is no
conditional convergence of poor countries to higher growth.
Concerning investment, there is a positive relation with domestic savings, as we expected, even though the
reliability of this aggregate figure is quite low, because of the national account definitions. Investment is
positively related to the openness of countries (expressed by imports and exports). But, given the
persistence of primary sector in the export profile of African countries and the links between domestic
investment and foreign direct investment, this results can be due to the effect of foreign investments
concentrated in export-oriented raw materials. Investment are negatively related to inflation, confirming the
importance of macroeconomic stable environment for attracting domestic investment. The positive link to
human capital endowment seems to confirm the importance of investment in human capital to promote
growth. A negative relation with demographic pressure emphasises the obstacle of demographic growth to
development. No clear relation emerges between investment and aid or debt.
Concerning external debt, there is no clear and permanent link to any other variables, as we expected,
given the different impact of debt due to its high or low level, in absolute and relative terms. Moreover, we
expect heterogeneity among different countries and, above all, a indebtedness spiral. We have to remind
that the mean values (average values for different periods) force heterogeneity to cluster around summary
statistics, which seem to be inadequate in our context. The moderate link between debt and aid derives
from the presence of soft loans in the ODA aggregate and from the expected and complex relationship
between these two flows. A moderate link which is highly dependent on the method of using average values
for sub-periods.
Concerning aid, it is negatively linked to per capita GDP and is positively linked to illiteracy, confirming the
                                                
28 The multicollinearity problem in regression analysis (indicated if the R-square is greater than .75 and only a few t-
values are significant) reflects the weakness of data. It simply means that we are unable to identify a statistical
relationship that is insensitive to the conditioning set of information and we are not able to properly isolate the unique
effect of each variable and the confidence with which we presume these effects to be true.
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basic orientation towards the poor countries. The positive link to demographic pressure seems to confirm
the same point. The negative relation to domestic savings could support the theory of aid devoted to close
the savings-gap, but it is not confirmed by the link to investment, which is negative. It seems to demonstrate
that aid went to African countries to help them to fight against famine, rather than promoting investment.
The negative relation with openness can confirm this compensatory role of aid. There is no clear relation
with other foreign capital inflows, due to the nature of data and inadequacy of summarising them through
average values of sub-periods. Remittances data are not reliable, nevertheless, with caution we note the
positive link between aid and remittances: both of them are attracted by poor contexts (low income, high
illiteracy rates, low exports, low investment).
Concerning foreign direct investment, the second and third periods shows the significant signs of the links,
whereas the other two periods show no significant link. From 1978 to 1992, FDI seem to be linked to
openness, initial GDP, low demographic pressure, higher human capital quality. FDI are positively linked to
domestic investment and growth in Period II and III, but negatively in the other periods. This confirms the
idea of lack of very strong relationship of the FDI flows with other structural variables of development.
The assistance of sensitivity analysis
During all the steps of our analysis, we explored whether the relationship between various measures of
foreign capital inflows and economic development (both GDP growth and investment) are robust or fragile
to small changes in the conditioning information set. Using Extreme bound analysis (EBA), we tried to show
that most of the variables we included in our regressions are robust (i.e. their coefficients and significance
don’t change substantially depending which other variables are included in the estimated equation). We
used the version of Leamer's (1983) extreme bounds analysis as presented by Levine and Renelt29.
The procedure of this version of EBA is as follows. We first select the basic variables to be always
included in the regressions and the variables of our interest (M, in our case being the foreign capital
inflows), and run a base regression that includes only these variables. Then we compute the regression
results for all possible linear combinations of up to three other variables, which have a reasonable
theoretical foundation, and identify the lowest and highest values for the coefficient of the M variables, bm,
that cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance.
For each regression j, we find an estimate bmj and a standard deviation smj. The lower extreme bound is
the lowest value of bmj - 2smj, whereas the upper bound is bmj + 2smj. If the upper extreme bound for
variable M is positive and the lower extreme bound is negative (i.e. the sign of the coefficient bmj changes),
then variable M is fragile. If the coefficient remains significant and it does not change sign, then the
coefficient is robust and we can be confident in that partial correlation.
The robustness of all different regressions have been examined and all the results we will present in the next
paragraphs have passed the EBA robustness test, if no explicit mention is reported at this regard.
Cross-country multiple linear regressions
After this preliminary analysis, for each of the four periods, we run three different regressions. As these
regressions don’t take in account the dynamics of the relationships (we are considering averaged values of
some periods), they are basically instruments to confirm the presence of heterogeneity.
The first regression tries to predict the value of the averaged annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (=
                                                
29 R. Levine and D. Renelt (1992), “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 82.
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GDPgt) from the values of: (1) the variable introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), that is the
logarithm of the initial level of per capita GDP (=logInGDP), (2) total gross domestic investment as a
percentage of GDP (=GDIt/GDPt), being referred – as the first regressor – to the Solow growth model, (3)
a measure of human capital variable, derived from the endogenous growth theory and given by the
percentage of adult illiterate ratio (AIR), (4) a measure of openness, linked to the Washington consensus
approach and given by total exports and imports as a percentage of GDP (=EXt/GDPt+IMt/GDPt). Other
variables, such as inflation (reflecting the Washington Consensus approach) and public budget (three-gaps
approach) did not result relevant30.
The second regression adds simply the foreign long term debt inflows variable (=D(FLTD/GDP)t), aid and
foreign direct investment to the first benchmark regression.
The third regression tries to test the indirect effect of foreign capital inflows on growth, as total gross
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP is the dependent variable, whereas the regressors are: (1) the
average resource flow generated by total external borrowing, calculated as the annual change in the stock,
(2) the average Official Development Assistance flow in current US$ as a percentage of GDP, (3) the
foreign direct investment flows as a percentage of GDP, (4) total gross domestic savings as a percentage of
GDP. This is the basic equation that has to be considered the benchmark also for pooled analysis, when
we will compare it to other specifications, adding other foreign capital inflows variables, as (5) total debt
service as a percentage of GDP, (6) the initial level of total external debt to GDP (= EDT1970/GDP1970),
which is used as a measure of the debt stock,  and including non-linear and additive components, as (7) the
aid (ODAt/GDPt2) and debt (FLTDt/GDPt 2) squared terms, to allow for the possibility that there may be
diminishing marginal returns to aid and debt, and (8) The interactive term between aid and debt
(ODAt*FLTDt).
First, it is extremely important to distinguish between statistical significance and economic significance.
Investigation results depend on substantive not merely statistical significance: in our case, statistically
insignificant results can mean important results, as they confirm the importance of heterogeneity among
countries31.
The first two equations32 show the see-saw of results, in statistical significance: the first and third periods
confirm partially our expectations in terms of relationships among variables, whereas the other two periods
have no statistical significance. The first periods confirm that the initial level of per capita GDP shows
negative relationship with GDP growth (confirming conditional convergence), as well as in the case of initial
population (demographic constraint), whereas the initial level of total external debt has a positive coefficient
(debt as an engine for growth). External debt seems to have positive effect on GDP growth, whereas debt
service and aid have negative effects; FDI is insignificant: however, these results are not statistically
significant as the first moment (the mean) is not a reliable summary statistic (the standard error of the mean
is always high).
In the case of last period (1993-99), the multiple cross-countries linear regression with GGDPPC as
                                                
30 At this regard, we used the so called Extreme-bounds analysis (EBA), which will be presented in the next paragraph, as
we extensively use it in the pooled time-series and cross-section analysis in order to test the robustness of coefficient
estimates to small changes in the conditioning information set.
31 D. N. McCloskey and S. T. Ziliak (1996), “The standard error of regressions”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.
XXXIV, March.
32 The second regression does not improve the general results: statistical significance of the regression is negatively
affected by the added regressor, which shows an insignificant coefficient and denotes the lack of regularities in the
foreign capital inflows and growth relationship.
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dependent variable provides bad results, in terms of t-statistic: there is high probability of being wrong in
concluding that there is a true association between the variables (i.e. the probability of falsely rejecting the
null hypothesis, or committing a Type I error, based on t). In fact, ANOVA detected a significant
difference of variability among the variables (F=14.9)33. Thus, the power of the regression to detect the
observed relationship in the data is not strong in probability terms, and the findings must be interpreted
cautiously. We calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF), as a measure of multicollinearity among the
independent variables: the variables did not have any very severe multicollinearity problem. Data passed
normality tests as well.
It is quite clear that the presence of heterogeneity prevent results from demonstrating a clear relationship
among the variables, and the heterogeneity implies also a dynamic dimension, as it differs consistently from
period to period. The expected relationships between growth, investment and initial rate of growth occur
before the Period II, that is before the second oil shock and financial crisis of African debtor countries, and
less during Period III, after the introduction of structural adjustment programmes. During the big debt crisis
(Period II) and disillusion on convergence (Period IV) the relationship disappeared. Other factors, and
particularly the foreign debt spiral prevailed and made the traditional determinants of growth (physical and
human capital) insignificant (see Appendix 1, tab. 5).
Concerning the regression with investment as dependent variable, given the low statistical significance, the
presence of heteroscedasticity (thus, in place of the standard OLS formula to compute the variances, we
used the White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator which provides correct estimates
of the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form)34 and without
regularity from period to period, there are some results to be stressed, which can be investigated through
further steps of our analyses.
· the forward stepwise regression confirmed that the independent variables that produces the best
prediction of the dependent variable are FLTD/GDP and FDI/GDP, whereas other variables do
not significantly improve our ability to predict the dependent variable.
· The relationship with savings is positive, as we expected, and the partial coefficient is statistically
significant in all the periods, included the Period IV, which presents high R2 and homoscedasticity.
· There is no relation between investment and aid, confirming what the analysis of correlation matrix
of all the variables showed and what was our hypothesis on SSA experience.
The relationship between domestic investment and FDI is quite ambiguous: the sign of partial coefficient is
positive but the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis is high only in the Period III, when the
regression is much better, in terms of ANOVA, F and t statistics, but also when heteroscedasticity is high
as well. The probability is low only in the Period IV, when there is no heteroscedasticity (see Appendix 1,
tab. 5).
The African specificity compared to the prevailing literature on debt overhang effect  was tested in the
1993-99 period (when FDI flows grew around the world, whereas the external debt problem was not
solved): considering both FDI_GDP and IN_GDP as dependent variables and INTED_GDP and
                                                
33 We used all pairwise multiple comparison procedure to determine the differences between groups. Normality test of the
estimated underlying population and equal variance test results showed that the data failed the test of the assumption
that the underlying population or residuals were normally distributed and that the samples were drawn from populations
with the same variance. These basic assumption of most of the parametric tests resulted to be violated.
34 H. White (1980), “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity”,
Econometrica , Vol. 48.
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LTD_GDP as regressors, no significant relationship emerged between these variables. There was no sign
of particular preference of foreign investors for less indebted countries (and for favourable environment): in
the SSA case the main motivations seem to derive from other considerations, namely the opportunity of
runaways or of export-oriented enclaves.
Cross-plot of external debt and aid
We should emphasize at this point that the need of pooled analysis stems from the technical limitations of
repeated cross-section analyses for sub-periods, in a heterogeneous phenomenon as our case is. As the
pooled coefficients take on information from both cross sections and time series, we could assess the
relative impact of these two dimensions and we should try to inspect the heterogeneous nature of the
relationships over time and countries. The limitations of repeated cross-section analyses for sub-periods is
graphically displayed in Figure 3, which provides us with a broad map of the correlation between the level
of external debt and aid inflows in the total sample of observations (a point for every country in every year)
under study. Differently from what the correlation matrix of variables for the four sub-periods (with average
values) indicated, the data show a positive correlation between the level of external debt and aid, but the
figure reveals that the linear relationship is very far from perfect. There is a substantial variation in the aid
inflows, without any significant clustering around the mean and no significant regression with the scatter. In
the more dense area of the Figure, that is when external debt to GDP ratio is lower than 100% and aid to
GDP ratio is lower than 30%, the high level of dispersion of points is confirmed, too.
Figure 3 – Cross-plot of external debt and aid
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The estimated joint levels of aid and external debt, at any level of investment rate (i.e. the cross-plot of
external debt and aid at different iso-investment levels) gives the combination of debt and aid that
correspond to the same investment rate. Within the plotted ranges of investment (see Appendix 1, tab. 6),
even though investment depends on other country characteristics than aid and debt, there is an interesting
basic result: the higher the investment rate, the narrower is the range of external debt ratio (in any case less
than 100% of GDP, when investment rate is higher than 20% of GDP). Obviously, it is not possible any
causal interpretation of the results, and it is important to be aware of the reality of aid and external debt in
SSA. We think, and the Figure confirms it, that aid and external debt are not basically devoted to promote
investment and growth: particularly in case of conflict-affected countries, aid goes to humanitarian
assistance and to pay debt service, whereas external debt go to arms and to feed debt spiral. Thus the
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assumption of any rigid dependence between foreign capital inflows and economic development risks to be
misleading as well as any assessment on the impact of aid on growth and macroeconomic good
environment remedy to attract FDI.
Time-series model identification: equation in first differences
As following step, we constructed our time series model, based on the variables’ underlying generating
process. The most fundamental assumptions in time series analysis is that the time series must be stationary,
and time series component of our panel, as most of time series data dealt with in economics and social
sciences, are nonstationary35.
When we visually examine the graph of the different series, which we are using, there are some key
features: (1) most of these series (apart of INFL, SCR and STE) contain a clear trend (in particular, POP
and OER) and don’t have a time-invariant mean; (2) they seem to go  through sustained periods of upward
and downward trend, with high persistence and no tendency to revert to a long-run mean, demonstrating a
“random walk” behaviour, (3) some series (GDPpc, LTD/GDP, AIR) show a particular tendency to
increase, whereas (4) other series (ODA/GDP, INV/GDP) show marked shocked declines followed by a
resumption, around a given level, thus (5) the volatility of many series (IMP/GDP, INV/GDP, ODA/GDP,
IDE/GNP) is not constant over time, showing a conditionally (or short-run) heteroskedastic behaviour
around a mean. Some series share co-movements with other series.
This confirms current consensus that most macroeconomic time series contain a stochastic trend.
Thus, to begin with, following the Box and Jenkins procedure, we have to transform the time series
employed into a stationary series in the wide sense in order to interpret correctly the autocorrelation
function (ACF). The most common transformation is that of differencing, that is subtracting a past value of
a variable from its current value. We must determine how many lags to be included in the specification,
provided that a first order difference trasformation is sufficient to remove a linear trend. We use the
Augmented DF test, which accounts for a more dynamic specification of the regression than the DF test36.
In most of the series, the regression values of t are less than the critical value, thus the null hypothesis is
accepted that the level series seem nonstationary and they possess a unit root37.
We decided to estimate our equation in first differences, thus reducing the dataset to the 1971-1999
period. The first reason is to do with the non-stationarity of the time series component of our panel38. Given
the large time dimension of the panels one cannot discard the time series properties of the individual donor-
recipient pairs. Since not all the series for the donor-recipient pairs were found to be non-stationary taking
the first differences means over-differencing the data. On the other hand combining the levels and the first
differences of the data will introduce some methodological problems as well as considerable complexity in
                                                
35 Lloyd et al. (2000) established that most of the series for the donor-recipient pairs were non-stationary, i.e. integrated
of order one.
36 This is a Unit Root test: residuals must be a White Noise process, which implies no significant autocorrelation at every
lag. We test the residuals of OLS: if they are not White Noise, we re-do the analysis including some lags of Y in the right
side as regressors. In our case, this test fails to reject test in level, but reject test in first differences. This means that our
series contain one Unit root at I(1), as this test specifies the order of serial correlation to account for in the series.
37 A trasformation is based on the fact that wake stationarity requires that a process must have a constant variance along
with a constant term. If nonstationarity enters through the variance of a process, then heteroskedasticity becomes a
problem. In order to counteract this risk, we can perform a transformation on the sample time series.
38 Yt and Yt-1 are highly correlated in time-series, as series change only slowly over time, whereas differencing data (DYt
and DYt-1) are not highly correlated, as the change of growth is more erratic, without trend (DYt is stationary, whereas Yt
has a long memory – i.e. a trend -, there is no fast drop, and autocorrelation is close to 1: it has a Unit Root)
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interpretation (see Quah, 1994). Therefore, although there will be some loss of information as a result of
differencing, for consistency and ease of interpretation we use the first differences of the entire time series
component for all variables39. There is another reason to use first differences: it is a means of addressing the
problem of lagged dependent variables in panel data analysis (the dynamic panel data problem we have
mentioned). In fact levels are instrumented by first differences of the regressors, considering that in the
presence of fixed effects, the results are biased by the presence of lagged Y among the regressors, as the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is negatively correlated with the residuals40.
A preliminary step of time-series analysis is to compare time series of the 30 countries analyzed. This is an
indicator that more detailed analysis of the data is useful, as well as also repeated period averaged cross-
section analysis demonstrated. In our case, this step confirmed that the adequate way of representing
dynamic relationships is to analyze the whole relationship in differences, but in terms of adequacy of model
specification for all the countries the results stressed the need of caution: within country dynamic variations
of the relationships between variables of interest were frequent, showing the presence of heterogeneity in
terms of relationships between countries and within countries.
Thus, considering that we have to use weighted least squares to account for country-wise
heteroscedasticity, and we attempt to address the potential endogeneity of foreign capital inflows by lagging
most of the explanatory variables one year, this further step should be implemented to demonstrate that the
SUR model improves the quality of results compared to fixed effects and basic pooled time-series models.
5. Pooled time-series cross-section analysis, estimation and results
In order to combine both the dynamic and the cross-country comparison dimensions, which have been
separately analyzed in the preceding section, we used the pooled analysis.
Under evident conditions of heterogeneity, in all the pooled analyses we ran the SUR estimation, which is
much sensitive to individual contributions, proved better than simple OLS regression, Fixed (including
country and year dummy variables) and Random Effects models.
Even though no significant difference appeared in the results of regressions which used annual data
compared to regressions with centered moving averages (each year being replaced by the average of itself
and surrounding observations, the span – i.e. the number of observations – being three), we preferred to
present the pooled analyses with three-year span moving averages, to net out the effects of short run
fluctuations. We also have used seven-year averages to check the robustness of our findings, which was
confirmed.
Pooled GDP growth regressions
The first specification of the models included growth rate of per capita GDP as dependent variable and run
a a complete level regression. Table 5 presents the various basic specifications (corrected OLS and GLS),
assuming a static model in levels and test whether the structure of the error term is adequately captured.
                                                
39 The use of first differences of all variables means to work in terms of rate of change of variables. In such a way the
problems are to ignore information on the levels of variables and to focus on short term relationship between Xs and Y. If
we look at the standard deviations, we can check the variation across countries (level values) compared to across time
(i.e. the variation in the differences). If we find much more variation in the differences, this is an example of divergent
information in the cross-section dimension compared to the time-series dimension. However, as we expect a non-linear
relation between foreign capital inflows and development, it is not correct to infer too much from the pair-wise
correlations.
40 The system-GMM method yields unbiased estimates and simultaneously address the endogeneity issue for some Xs.
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The starting point of our analysis was that we tested the series and found that the process is stationary.
Then, confirming the fact mentioned by Greene that panel data typically exhibit serial correlation, cross-
sectional correlation, and groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2000), we found such a structure in the
residuals. The result of modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in cross-sectional time-series
FGLS regression model (H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i, chi2 (28) = 161.01,Prob>chi2 =0.0000)
showed the presence of heteroscedasticity. And the result of Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence
(chi2(378) =  632.155, Pr = 0.0000) confirmed that there is cross-sectional contemporaneous correlation.
However, the model showed non multicollinearity problem (VIF always smaller than 2.7). In order to
detect serial correlation problem we ran Durbin’s M test on the basic specification and we found the
presence of low serial correlation41. However, we decided to include a lagged dependent variable – which
is based on theoretical foundations – and the serial correlation resulteds completely removed. The GLS
corrected for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation, with lagged dependent variable to
correct for serial correlation confirmed to be a well specified model (even though it may be
overconfident,as the PCSE S.E. values show).
Tab. 5 –pooled analysis: specifications of growth as dependent Variable (GGDPPC?)
PCSE-I PCSE-II P>z GLS P>z GLS-AR P>z GLS corr. P>z
lggdppc 0,12761 0,001
fdi_gdp -10.48871 0,72 -10.337 0,737 -13,80218 0,403 -14,46546 0,399 -11,08647 0,494
tds_gdp -36.53754 0,076 -36.063 0,075 -62,457 0 -58,543 0 -54,64 0
fltd_gdp2 -33.69861 0,609 -31.925 0,619 -3,000615 0,948 -12,10513 0,798 -2,361696 0,959
oda_gdp2 -58.23711 0 -41.204 0,009 -60,907 0 -72,719 0 -58,864 0,001
oda_fltd 66.63817 0,415 56.295 0,482 75,56013 0,169 81,26202 0,148 79,21858 0,149
ex_gdp 2.543563 0,655 1.779 0,753 6,77033 0,051 6,059671 0,126 6,29674 0,067
in_gdp 22.22635 0,054 19.855 0,076 25,7593 0 25,0965 0,001 20,9024 0,002
air .0653652 0,212 .05955 0,243 0,0681 0,014 0,07382 0,022 0,05738 0,038
_cons -2.403198 0,533 -1.8188 0,645 -3,548513 0,144 -3,40922 0,225 -2,867855 0,237
L1* (P>t) 0,001 0 0,543
rho 0,15253
GLS corr. = GLS corrected for heteroscedasticity with lagged Y
PCSE-I = Beck-Katz OLS regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs), with autocorrelation correction via Prais-
Winstein (common rho)
PCSE-II = Beck-Katz OLS regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs), with autocorrelation correction via Prais-
Winstein (unit-specific rho).
* M Durbin test (P>t)
Rho = autocorrelation coefficient
Then, we included both country and time effects and the residuals did indeed reveal the improvement of
panel structure analysis (Table 6). But dummies resulted multicollinear with Xs, implying that the coefficients
of Xs were not good, as there is a sort of trade off between technical-statistical and substantive
specifications. We ran F-Test for the inclusion of country dummies (country effects), of year dummies (time
effects); and for the inclusion of both country and year dummies (country & time effects). It resulted useful
to add dummies as they are significantly different from zero, but if we included both time and unit dummies,
as they probably interact, they become not significant. Thus, we accepted the less efficient results (serial
correlated) as serial correlation is low, and rather than GLS with lagged dependent variable, we used GLS
heteroscedastic panels with AR and unit and period FE (X coefficients resulted less disturbed by FE than
by lagged variable and the full specification of GLS-AR with both dummies removed the low level of serial
correlation, as M Durbin test shows). Moreover, using FE, net improvement occurs in R squared (=
                                                
41 The lagged residual coefficient is very low (.14) to suspect the presence of Unit Root. Thus, even though the serial
correlation persists it does capture a very limited part and we don’t need to be worried about it.
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regression coefficient), which shifts from 0.08 to 0.11 (unit dummies) or 0.42 (period dummies) or 0.45
(both).
Tab. 6 –pooled analysis: Fixed Effects specifications of growth as dependent Variable (GGDPPC?)
FE (within) P>t twoway FE P>t FE GLS-AR P>t FE2 GLS-
AR
P>t FE3 GLS-
AR
P>t
lggdppc 0,059541 0,131 -0,085136 0,031
fdi_gdp 7,531318 0,722 -9,886468 0,58 -1,151699 0,948 -21,49748 0,132 -11,67419 0,443
tds_gdp -37,95206 0,02 -38,87485 0,006 -58,87261 0,002 -36,76116 0,001 -58,79213 0
fltd_gdp2 -26,04567 0,591 -97,89157 0,018 -16,63864 0,734 -87,06568 0,021 -97,5296 0,015
oda_gdp2 -42,37224 0,01 -35,90956 0,01 -2,176088 0,913 5,549322 0,617 4,371541 0,787
oda_gdp -59,45625 0,061 -45,34141 0,04 -44,58846 0,076
oda_fltd 62,84712 0,324 2,511523 0,963 72,99343 0,206 19,72739 0,695 27,36396 0,6
ex_gdp 2,096748 0,821 0,711899 0,927 1,827937 0,829 7,357569 0,009 6,92655 0,299
in_gdp 10,63131 0,288 16,36762 0,054 16,34562 0,091 21,15774 0 22,47253 0,002
air 0,34403 0 0,112291 0,572 0,353753 0 0,012851 0,614 0,064733 0,693
L1* (P>t) 0,153
FE (within) = with unit effects. sigma_u=7,2649; sigma_e=14,5907; Rho (fraction of variance due to u_i)= .1986; F test that
all u_i=0 has Prob > F =  0.2252
Twoway FE = Including both unit and period effects
FE GLS-AR = with unit dummies; FE2 GLS-AR = with period dummies; FE2 GLS-AR= with both unit and period effects
* M Durbin test (P>t)
Further improvement is due to the inclusion of dynamic relationship, considering the lagged Xs (apart from
tds_gdp, oda_fltd, in_gdp).
Tab. 7 –pooled analysis: Fixed Effects specifications of growth as dependent Variable (GGDPPC?)
Dynamic
regression
P>t Dynamic
twoway FE
P>t
lggdppc
l.fdi_gdp -6,91009 0,739 -16,788 0,357
tds_gdp -70,1412 0 -52,1302 0
l.fltd_gdp 47,67193 0 18,09404 0,09
1
l.oda_gdp -18,0502 0,148 52,00182 0,00
2
l.fltd_gdp2 4,64073 0,918 -21,5772 0,586
l.oda_gdp2 80,935 0 0,633768 0,978
oda_fltd -98,1657 0,02 -152,836 0
l.ex_gdp 13,4769 0 39,11913 0
in_gdp 15,72424 0,02
4
11,12123 0,173
l.air 0,054298 0,08
3
0,022923 0,909
Then, we improved our specification by assuming that intercepts and slopes were heterogeneous. In fact,
we ran unrestricted (UR) model, that is unrelated regressions (OLS with cross-section specific slopes). We
estimated cross section- and period-specific intercepts and slope coefficients
 and we compared UR against FE model through Nested F-test and we found that UR could not be
rejected.
Finally, we ran a SUR model and we used use the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier statistic as a test for
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cross-sectional residual correlation, and it supported the idea to use SUR rather than unrestricted OLS42.
However, both of these models stress the importance of heterogeneity, which is clearly demonstrated by
the fact that when we ran the same model specification by codcount43, then we got very different values of
adjusted R squared (from 0. 0.7288 to 0.0074). The signs of coefficients, which are statistically significant,
are what we expected (also showed by Appendix, tables 14-22): negative effects of debt service, aid*debt
interaction, marginal aid and marginal debt; positive effects of export and investment; ambiguous effects of
debt and aid.
8.2 Pooled first difference GDP regressions
The second specification of the models included the first differences of per capita GDP as dependent
variable. We used this variable, rather than using per capita GDP growth, in order to analyze a variable that
is more homogeneous to the independent variables, which are level variables (even though in terms of
GDP). GDP growth rate is more meaningful from an economic point of view but the results do not change
and, as we did not standardize data before performing the regression44 and we are using differences, the
results are complex in interpretation in any case. This specification can include both current values of
independent variables or lagged values, without significant differences in terms of results: the growth
specification that includes lagged values of regressors seem theoretically better founded to take in account
the dynamic pattern in the impact of GDP- determinants, which make the contemporaneous effect less
relevant (see Appendix 1, tab. 7, compared to the following Tab.8 in this paragraph)45.
As part of the relationships may be spurious, reflecting the effects of third factors, we included a set of
conditioning variables, such as the usual determinants of growth (investment, human capital, openness
variables) and, in certain specifications, time and country effects. The pooled specifications were estimated
using simple OLS, instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity (through a two-stage least squares,
using as instruments the lagged values of the endogenous regressors), F.E. model to allow countries to have
different intercepts and with and without time dummies to ensure that the results were not driven by time
specific effects, and GLS-II (or GLS-SUR). The main differences between specifications appeared in
terms of robustness and statistical significance: as we assumed, OLS resulted inadequate, whereas FE
model showed the existence of some specific years and countries importance. The GLS-II estimation
method resulted the most robust and provided the most significant coefficients. Whenever we added fixed
effects to the given specification, we dramatically reduced the residuals variance, due to the importance of
heterogeneity distortions in our dataset.
In order to investigate the impact of external capital inflows on growth we augmented the specification by
adding different foreign capital variables (debt, aid, FDI). To the extent that we controlled for investment
(using an alternate specification that excluded investment), the results were very partially biased toward a
smaller effect on foreign capital inflows on growth. It demonstrates that what is suggested by theory, that is
part of the effect of foreign capital inflows on growth occur through the investment channel rather than
directly, is not so true in the SSA case.
Tab. 8 –pooled analysis: dynamic specifications of growth as dependent variable: D(GDPPC?)
                                                
42 chi2(190) = 282.691, Pr = 0.0000.
43 by codcount: reg ggdppc  fdi_gdp tds_gdp fltd_gdp oda_gdp fltd_gdp2 oda_gdp2 oda_fltd ex_gdp in_gdp air.
44 As we are considering a linear relationship, the mean values of independent variables are very low (differences of
percentage values) compared to the dependent variable: the difference in the magnitude of the values xi variation
compared to the corresponding value change  for y implies the regression coefficients may have very high values.
45 To save space neither the country fixed effects not the period effects are reported in our tables.
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Y = clse D(GDPPC?) OLS FE RE-GLS GLS GLS II
D(GDPPC?(-1)) 0.785 0.689 0.947 0.708 0.678
D(IN_GDP? (-1)) 1.9 88.1 130.4 123.9 91.4
D(AIR? (-1)) 0.489 -4.2 1.2 0.732 -4.4
D(EX_GDP? (-1))+ D(IM_GDP? (-1)) 108.3 97.8 36.8 46.5 98.8
D(FLTD_GDP? (-1)) 208.9 172.6 312.8 89.6 145.5
D(ODA_GDP? (-1)) 34.4 33.4 59.8 34.0 43.5
D(FDI_GDP? (-1)) 399.4 409.4 305.5 203.0 367.4
D(TDS_GDP? (-1)) -47.2 -76.3 -66.4 -17.7 -76.6
Adjusted R-squared 0.619 0.623 0.544 0.529 0.621
Durbin-Watson stat 1.468 1.460 1.456 1.503 1.441
Note: RE-GLS is based on Variance Components, GLS on Cross Section Weights. Underscored and italics values are non
significant, bold values are significant at 1%, bold and italics at 5%, bold and underscored at 10%.
The EBA method confirmed the robustness of the statistical significant coefficients of (IN_GDP) and
D(EX_GDP)+D(IM_GDP), the other coefficients – including D(TDS_GDP) and D(FLTD_GDP) –
resulted less robust, whereas D(AIR), D(ODA_GDP) and D(FDI_GDP) resulted fragile.
We included the initial values of population, GDP and external debt: only INGDPPC was not statistically
significant.
In all the specifications, the regression showed the expected signs concerning investment (positive) and
external debt service (negative), whereas aid coefficient confirmed the difficulty to define a comparable
positive relationship between GDP growth and ODA in the SSA case. The external debt variable showed
a statistically significant coefficient, which may imply the presence of structural relationship between growth
and external loans.
Concerning the problem of underestimating timing in the regressions using differences, for macroeconomic
data the Autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) model, in which lags of the dependent variable as well as
the explanatory variables are included in the regression, have proven to be a useful step to be followed. We
have therefore experimented with lags of the growth rate and the explanatory variables in the regressions.
No particular difference emerged from dynamic specifications of the models (useful to have an
endogeneity/simultaneity correction), compared to the models with current values of independent variables,
which seems better theoretically founded. An important difference is due to the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable46, which dramatically improves the results, in terms of R-squared and D-W statistic.
Thus, the best estimation method was GLS-SUR, by using an estimation technique for dynamic pooled
models with country specific effects.
Pooled Investment regressions
A third group of pooled regressions investigated the investment (as a share of GDP) dependency on some
regressors, following the GDP growth relations. The basic idea was to analyze in detail the dynamic effects
of foreign capital inflows on investment. In this case we investigate the complex relationship, including
interaction effect and squared values of aid and debt. We adopted the same set of estimators used in the
preceding specification.
Tab. 9 – pooled analysis: complex effects on investment. Dependent Variable: D(IN_GDP?)
Y = D(IN_GDP?) OLS FE RE-GLS GLS SUR
D(S_GDP?) 0.235 0.242 0.220 0.259 0.244
D(FLTD_GDP?) 0.170 0.166 0.182 0.109 0.165
                                                
46 We did not include the lagged dependent variable among the regressors in the presence of fixed effects, which
(negatively) bias the results introducing a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the residuals.
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D(ODA_GDP?) 0.127 0.133 0.118 0.108 0.128
D(FDI_GDP?) 0.043 0.024 0.192 0.124 0.058
D(AIR?) -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
D(FLTD_GDP?)^2 -0.572 -0.547 -0.635 -0.024 -0.531
D(ODA_GDP?)^2 0.165 0.216 0.086 0.101 0.153
(LTD_GDP?)*(ODA_GDP?) 0.000 -0.014 0.008 -0.004 -0.003
D(IN_GDP?(-1)) 0.447 0.435 0.529 0.458 0.445
Adjusted R-squared 0.387 0.371 0.332 0.370 0.386
Durbin-Watson stat 1.817 1.818 1.818 1.829 1.812
Note: RE-GLSis based on Variance Components, GLS on Cross Section Weights
Underscored and italics values are non significant, bold values are significant at 1%.
Once again, statistical significance is very low: as a consequence of the heterogeneity of countries, the SUR
specification results the most adequate.
From the economic point of view, our analysis confirms that in SSA countries changes domestic savings is
the main engine of investment, follower by external debt. External debt has a positive impact on growth, but
with diminishing returns (the squared term). A simple explanation of the decreasing marginal impact is that
the debt effect on investment depends on the level of debt. This is probably the result of vicious circles of
indebtedness, which tied external loans to the repayment of preceding loans, without any direct link with
economic development. In terms of debt relief this means that one should not expect the same effect on
growth in countries with an EDT/GDP ratio of 100 percent as in countries with a ratio of 50 percent. The
effect will, on average, be smaller in the highly indebted countries. Unfortunately, the presence of
heterogeneity and the resulting impact of external debt on growth differs from a unique threshold level
(assumed by the HIPC Initiative) or a standard inverse U-shape found in many studies of external debt
problems. In any case, external debt contains usefulinformation about the growth process and this is very
important.
Less important, but significant – both in statistical and economic terms – and positively related to
investment is ODA flow. We remind that a high percentage of humanitarian aid to Africa implies a limited
impact on economic investment, even though it may be very positive in terms of emergency support and
poverty reduction.
Finally, FDI seems to have limited influence of investment. This supports the idea of an ambiguous nature of
FDI in Africa and it is important to criticize the prevailing rhetoric on the positive impact of FDI everywhere
and in any case. The openness is not clearly related to investment.
The complex interplay between the level of external debt and aid flows seem to be confirmed in terms of
statistical significance, but the effect is very small. This is due to the fact that the consequence of this
interplay between aid and debt can not be expected to lead to the same responses (positive or negative) in
terms of the impact on investment from one country to another and from one period to another as it
depends on the levels.
We used an alternate specification that included import, in order to analyze the effects of aid on investment,
controlling for import. If we include Import to the regression, the aid inflows coefficients become much
smaller, this suggests that the impact of aid on investment is also through import, that is the most effective
interventions of development co-operation, in terms of impact on investment, is in Africa through the
Balance of Payment support, rather than through projects. It is due to the fact that aid project are basically
to support consumption and to alleviate poverty rather than promoting investment. AIR is not important
(the coefficient around zero) and it is due to the fact that the education proxy of human capital shows a
positive trend, which is common everywhere (differently from the health component of human capital, due
to the epidemic contagious AIDS in Southern Africa) and is not correlated with other variables (without
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similar linear trend).
6. Conclusions
Lack of homogeneity
Conditional convergence means that all countries, with a common technology, have equal per capita growth
rates in equilibrium. This implies that, in the long run, economic growth is independent of government
policies and social institutions and it is one of the basic messages of the neo-classical growth theory. The
neoclassical argument is that a simple variant of the Solow (1956) model can adequately explain long run,
cross-country economy performance. In fact, one of the outcomes of Solow’s neoclassical growth model is
that, given the same parameters, poorer countries, those with lower initial capital stock and output levels,
will grow faster than richer countries. That is, countries with the same technology, savings rate, and
population growth rate, etc. (i.e. having the same steady-state) should show evidence of the poorer
countries catching up to the richer countries. This issue has been extensively investigated by Paul Evans47
and the empirical evidence of the existence of this convergence has been mixed. As Mankiw, Romer, &
Weil (1992) put it, "given the inevitable imperfections in this sort of cross-country data, we consider
the fit of this simple model to be remarkable. It appears that the augmented Solow model provides
an almost complete explanation of why some countries are rich and other countries are poor". Many
studies, most famously Barro & Sala-I-Martin (1992)48, Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992)49, and Islam
(1995)50, find evidence of conditional convergence when technology, savings rate and population growth
rate are controlled for. Recently, Kevin B. Grier51 showed that studies finding conditional convergence with
a common technology suffer from significant unmodelled country heterogeneity. Specifically, key results are
taken from regressions using data that are not described by a single data generating process. The samples
used are inappropriately pooled: when observations that cannot be combined in a single regression are
treated separately through disaggregated regressions, their claimed empirical support for convergence
vanishes, and estimated production function coefficients are not stable across sub-samples of countries in a
large panel. We confirm this results, because a small group of apparently homogeneous countries from an
ex-ante perspective, namely 30 Sub-Saharan African countries, show significant growth rate divergence.
The African non-convergence finding is a strong counter example. Large samples cannot legitimately be
pooled together without taking account of the heterogeneity and the disaggregated results do not support
the augmented Solow model, whereas provide strong support for more specific endogenous growth
models. Pooling countries with different underlying time series properties (different inherent causality) is
inappropriate and gives misleading results. Moreover, the direction of causality between the variables of
primary interest may differ among countries in the sample: it is therefore an example of what can be termed
                                                
47 Evans, P. (1996), “Using cross-sountry variances to evaluate growth theories”, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 20, p. 1027-1049; Evans, P. (1997), “How fast do economies convergence?”, Review
of Economics and  Statistics, vol. 79, p.219-225; Evans, P. (1998), “Using panel data to evaluate growth theories”,
International Economic Review, vol. 39, p. 295-306.
48 Barro, R. and X. Sala-I-Martin (1992), “Convergence”, Journal of Political Economy,
vol 100, p. 223-251.
49 Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D. and D. Weil (1992), “A contribution to the empirics of economic growth”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 107, p. 407-437.
50 Islam, N. (1995), “Growth empirics: a panel data approach”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, p. 1127-70.
51 K. B. Grier (1999), “Convergence: what does it mean, how can we measure it , and where is it found?”, Department of
Economics, University of Oklahoma, mimeo, April.
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time-series heterogeneity (the underlying causal relationship is not the same for all countries). The problem
to be addressed is  if the efficiency gains of pooling the data outweigh the losses from the bias induced by
heterogeneity. In other words large samples are not necessarily the best samples: to identify aggregate
relationships, or correlations in the data that appear to hold ‘on average’ over a wide sample is not the best
procedure to be followed. What appears to hold on average is rarely an adequate explanation of what is
happening in a particular country. Despite numerous studies and enormous research effort, the results are
disappointing: as Kenny and Williams wrote “the universal failure to produce robust, causally secure
relations predicted by models might suggest … that country growth experiences have been
extremely heterogeneous” (, 2001: 12).
The classical way of assessing homogeneity is an F-test, which compares the sum of squared residuals
(SSE) of pooled equation to the SSE of the unpooled regressions, which are essentially the sums of
squared errors of the N separate unit regressions52. Both equations are estimated by OLS. Some countries
are unlike others and some variables fail homogeneity and, obviously, there is not enough extra explanatory
power in the unpooled model if we keep the same specification. But, if we repeat the test, allowing only
some “variables of interest” to have separate coefficients by countries, the results seem to improve.Another
test of homogeneity of all the countries is cross validation: we left out one country at a time and then
predicted the dependent variable for that country. Countries appeared different, as the model did not
perform equally for all countries. We also tested for whether we need fixed effects by an F-test comparing
the SSE of the two pooled regressions (OLS and FE). FE technique improves the results, but fixed effects
are not good explanatory variables, as they simply confirm the existence of heterogeneity. Moreover, fixed
effects are not only perfectly collinear with independent variables that are time invariant, but also highly
correlated with independent structural variables, which change little (such as AIR). Thus, fixed effects make
it appear that AIR has no impact, as the effect of this variable is controlled for the fixed effects, which
change the coefficient of AIR enormously53.
In our case, the best estimation method was SUR, by using an estimation technique for dynamic pooled
models with country specific effects. Using this approach has several advantages over the cross-section
analysis widely used. In particular, this approach controls for country-specific, time-invariant (over the
sample period) country characteristics. Thus, rather than looking for correlations between external debt and
investment across countries (which could be due to any number of unobservable country characteristics
rather than any causal relationship between the two variables of interest), we are instead asking whether a
change in external debt within country is systematically associated with changes in investment. Spurious
correlation could of course still occur, but the use of multiple time periods for each country and fixed effects
reduces the she risk for these kinds of errors. In addition, this approach can give us some freedom to
explore certain dynamic questions such as whether external debt in one period is linked to changes in
investment in later periods, a useful piece of information for assessing the likelihood of causal relationship.
Moreover, the presence of heterogeneity across periods and countries can be so evident to reduce the
possibility to identify common trends in terms of aid (debt and FDI) and investment or growth relationship
all over the large group of SSA countries. The identification of the heterogeneity and the complexity of
these relationship is itself the main result, which induces us to proceed to country-case studies.
                                                
52 There are other ways to choose between models: the Schwarz criterion, used in time-series analysis, judges models by
their sum of squared residuals plus a penalty for lack of parsimony.
53 It is clear that a time invariant variable tells us little about how the dependent variable in a country changes over time.
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The importance of more homogenous sub-samples
To investigate whether country effects are sufficient to capture the heterogeneity in these data, we split the
sample geographically into 3 and 4 groups (within Sub-Saharan Africa)54 and estimated a separate
regression for each sample. In this way, we relaxed the implicit constraint that the coefficients are the same
in all the countries. We could test whether using one set of coefficients fits the data as well as using 3 or 4
sets. We confirmed there is not a unique set of production function coefficients that can explain the African
economic performance, even allowing for country fixed effects. Further, we cannot place any confidence in
these estimates either. Undoubtedly, each of our sub-regression would still fail tests for coefficient
homogeneity. The point is simply that, because of pervasive heterogeneity, we are not going to learn much
about the existence of clear relationships from regression analysis using a large number of countries. The
assumption of homogeneity of data and relationships between variables, across both countries and years, is
irrealistic, the promising approach is to attempt to model heterogeneity. Further investigation could be to
identify (through the cluster analysis or multi-way analysis) some countries with different dynamic
evolutions55 and then to analyse and compare in details their history. Otherwise, from a lender/donor
perspective, we can deeply investigate the inter-relationship between debt relief and aid policies (see:
Appendix 2).
We also tried to analyze how those observations (countries in a given year) which have had investment
values at least equal to 15% of GDP (see: Appendix 1, tab. 6), compare to other observations with
different characteristics56. Or, we adopted a more conventional approach, creating sub-groups based on
the openness degree, or on other characteristics derived from the available dataset, but the results were not
so self-explanatory. In sum, the relationship between the variables is complex and dependent on the
heterogeneity.
Is heterogeneity the problem or the solution?
Heterogeneity of African countries is the main result of our analysis. This is what we expected. Not only
does it confirm the fact that, across countries and over time, there is no unique relationship between foreign
capital inflows and economic growth, but it also lead to question the appropriateness of the units of
investigation.
Concerning the absence of a common relationship, it basically reflects the complex nature of the
relationship: the impact of foreign capital inflows on economic growth is level-dependent, and it also
depends on the interaction with other flows as well as on the specific national environment. We can assume
that all the African countries experienced the same problems and faced the same challenges, but it can not
                                                
54 We used both Principal Component Analysis and Hierarchical Cluster Analysis.  Principal Component Analysis
attempts to identify underlying variables, or factors, that explain the pattern of correlations within the set of observed
variables. Factor analysis was used in data reduction to identify a small number of factors that explain most of the
variance observed in a much larger number of manifest variables. We also used factor analysis at the beginning of our
research to generate hypotheses regarding causal mechanisms or to screen variables for subsequent analysis (for
example, to identify collinearity prior to performing a linear regression analysis). Principal Component Analysis is a
procedure that attempts to identify relatively homogeneous groups of countries based on selected characteristics among
the variables we considered, using an algorithm that starts with each country in a separate cluster and combines clusters
until only one is left. Distance or similarity measures are generated by the Proximities procedure. Then we used
dendrograms to plot the results, to assess the cohesiveness of the clusters formed and to have information about the
appropriate number of clusters to keep.
55 For example, a country being in the “good performers” sub-group in the 1980s and in the “bad performers” sub-group
in the 1990s versus another country that remained in the same “good-performers” sub-group.
56 We defined an investment weighted dummy which equals to 1 if IN_GDP ³ 0.15, and 0 otherwise.
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mask the fact that factors endowment, historical heritage, patterns of specialization do matter. And all these
factors clearly interact each other, in a non-linear relationship. If we are interested in investigating the nature
of the debt Laffer curve, the sustainability thresholds of debt burden, the marginal impact of aid on
development more deeply, we are obliged to adopt a country-case approach. There is no common rule of
thumb, such as the HIPC criteria imply.
Concerning the appropriateness of the units of investigation, we would like to simply mention that countries
are not necessarily the best units to analyze economic growth, particularly in the new context of
globalization. The importance of both the local development and territorial context from one side, and de-
localization of economies emphasize other dimensions and borders than national ones. Particularly in Africa,
we can use concepts as enclaves, export-oriented and cash-crops sectors. We have also to remind the
importance of informal sector and dual economies. Local strategies for surviving, which are not registered
in national accounts, involve the majority of people, particularly in rural areas. We know that it is impossible
to rely on the fact that African people live with less than one dollar a day: these facts are simply misleading.
The importance of informal sector, the high percentage of rural people and non monetary markets underline
that countries and GDP are not the most appropriate concepts to investigate the lack of homogeneity.
Heterogeneity within countries is at least as important as between countries.
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Appendix 1 – Data results
Tab. 1 – Summary statistics of the set of base variables, levels and first differences
ggdppc? log(gdppc?) in_gdp? air? ex_gdp? im_gdp? inf? log(ingdppc?) log(inpop?)
 Mean 4.4195 0.0326 0.1845 56.9172 0.2986 0.4024 54.3159 5.0705 14.9907
 Std. Dev. 15.2140 0.1477 0.0972 20.9985 0.1796 0.2324 835.3609 0.5763 1.1258
 Maximum 106.5116 0.7252 0.7349 94.3000 0.8791 1.3089 23,773.1300 6.4606 17.7899
 Minimum -54.3679 -0.7846 -0.0340 12.0000 0.0009 0.0630 -13.0566 4.0773 12.9456
d(ggdppc?) d(gdppcg?) d(in_gdp?) d(air?) d(ex_gdp?) d(im_gdp?) d(inf?)
 Mean -0.2026 -0.0021 0.0006 -1.0142 0.0018 0.0016 0.1971
 Std. Dev. 19.7533 0.1940 0.0494 0.4112 0.0536 0.0703 1,124.2550
 Maximum 119.4764 1.2704 0.2927 0.8000 0.2849 0.4486 21,786.2200
 Minimum -115.0233 -1.2587 -0.3771 -3.7000 -0.2815 -0.3423 -23,231.2200
Tab. 2 – Summary statistics of the set of variables of interest, levels and first differences
oda_gdp? ltd_gdp? fltd_gdp? fdi_gdp? tds_gdp? s_gdp? inted_gdp? log(inted_gdp?)
 Mean 0.0893 0.5605 0.0418 0.0114 0.0452 0.1035 1.6298 0.2486
 Std. Dev. 0.0811 0.4415 0.0699 0.0307 0.0466 0.1698 1.2042 0.6901
 Maximum 0.9474 2.6980 0.4326 0.3065 0.7559 0.7898 5.3451 1.6762
 Minimum 0.000009 0.0086 -0.2755 -0.2578 0.0003 -0.8440 0.2968 -1.2148
d(oda_gdp?)d(ltd_gdp?) d(fltd_gdp?) d(fdi_gdp?) d(tds_gdp?) d(s_gdp?)
 Mean 0.0014 0.0253 -0.0019 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0005
 Std. Dev. 0.0470 0.1329 0.0812 0.0267 0.0400 0.0601
 Maximum 0.7655 0.9074 0.5057 0.2724 0.6437 0.4100
 Minimum -0.4016 -0.7621 -0.3940 -0.2624 -0.6792 -0.4589
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Tab. 3 – Mean of the set of variables of interest, cross-section and time specific values
oda_gdp tds_gdp fltd_gdp fdi_gdp oda_gdp? tds_gdp? fltd_gdp? fdi_gdp?
BEN 0.090755 0.018809 0.039966 0.004746 1971 0.057443 0.019147 0.027778 0.012283
BWA 0.092545 0.019295 0.031889 0.02136 1972 0.05899 0.020684 0.028341 0.012499
BFA 0.128398 0.013308 0.024902 0.002645 1973 0.058979 0.024276 0.046356 0.011132
BDI 0.142325 0.023082 0.037822 0.000919 1974 0.077099 0.017992 0.047091 0.009072
CMR 0.040094 0.039033 0.041796 0.006722 1975 0.076629 0.02211 0.036141 0.00025
CAF 0.126304 0.017211 0.033562 0.005556 1976 0.073945 0.022415 0.03438 0.008626
TCD 0.112251 0.00893 0.025275 0.011229 1977 0.074577 0.025472 0.063171 0.008377
ZAR 0.034406 0.02299 0.035647 0.000432 1978 0.091703 0.027787 0.06853 0.015131
COG 0.068094 0.099651 0.093862 0.024739 1979 0.089149 0.031392 0.065124 0.022263
CIV 0.043156 0.105302 0.058497 0.010256 1980 0.086825 0.041499 0.064167 0.011684
GAB 0.028246 0.062179 0.054859 0.019348 1981 0.092146 0.049411 0.027514 0.010395
GMB 0.196903 0.054386 0.063757 0.015614 1982 0.089168 0.050904 0.046097 0.006684
GHA 0.058916 0.043314 0.034808 0.007931 1983 0.090874 0.055066 0.02911 0.004542
KEN 0.067079 0.071124 0.034498 0.004353 1984 0.10457 0.064466 0.005856 0.005327
LSO 0.184418 0.027572 0.045393 0.048189 1985 0.108649 0.072412 0.096174 0.008946
MDG 0.07848 0.043683 0.041088 0.002886 1986 0.127017 0.07763 0.123581 0.003365
MWI 0.168389 0.056996 0.065075 0.009884 1987 0.121054 0.064371 0.146073 0.013433
MLI 0.157651 0.022204 0.056529 0.004565 1988 0.116457 0.062884 0.00762 0.008139
MRT 0.211601 0.09085 0.113727 0.00185 1989 0.125014 0.05503 0.013435 0.012953
MUS 0.027716 0.054505 0.0316 0.005361 1990 0.126542 0.056821 0.071152 0.008675
NER 0.12086 0.040456 0.028995 0.006026 1991 0.12581 0.051567 0.029925 0.007031
NGA 0.005781 0.054739 0.03293 0.024283 1992 0.132824 0.045875 0.006817 0.006682
RWA 0.16986 0.007994 0.027722 0.006172 1993 0.132195 0.045944 0.021058 0.004725
SEN 0.104417 0.051662 0.039256 0.007027 1994 0.181778 0.065408 0.073127 0.011289
SLE 0.085599 0.039722 0.042363 0.001797 1995 0.149472 0.073115 0.050622 0.020187
SDN 0.047204 0.015025 0.03855 0.001626 1996 0.113073 0.050487 -0.01046 0.023224
SWZ 0.06423 0.0365 0.019034 0.045429 1997 0.091717 0.045802 -0.02598 0.021781
TGO 0.102696 0.050991 0.050178 0.011969 1998 0.087386 0.047129 0.046585 0.029771
ZMB 0.120202 0.113368 0.066804 0.013788 1999 0.087878 0.050925 -0.03042 0.02154
ZWE 0.028178 0.045555 0.017534 0.003826
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Tab. 4 - Matrix of selected cross-correlations of variables, mean values of four sub-periods
Ai Ex Fd Fl Gg Gp Im In Inf Ing Inp Int Lt Od S Sc St Td
FDI_Gdp a 0,2 1 0,18 -0,05 0,27 0,28 -0,06 0,21 0,2 0,3 0,1 -0,12 0,47 0,31
FDI_Gdp b -0,22 0,77 1 0,1 0,51 0,32 0,71 0,75 -0,3 0,4 -0,49 0,33 -0,07 0,21 0,65 0,79 0,44 -0,27
FDI_Gdp c -0,31 0,8 1 -0,29 0,87 -0,79 0,92 0,73 -0,37 0,5 -0,49 0,07 -0,32 -0,09 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,41
FDI_Gdp d -0,13 0,29 1 -0,6 -0,5 0,27 0,02 0,01 0,78 -0,27 0,97 -0,02 0,33 -0,59 0,56 0,48
FLTD_Gdp a 0,24 0,18 1 0,37 0,45 0,61 -0,06 -0,04 -0,19 0,38 0,61 0,1 0,43 0,4
FLTD_Gdp b -0,42 0,34 0,1 1 0,32 -0,02 0,4 0,64 -0,72 0,15 -0,41 0,24 0,01 0,21 0,14 0,49 0,63 0,45
FLTD_Gdp c 0,2 -0,15 -0,29 1 -0,34 0,42 -0,27 -0,61 0,76 -0,31 0,8 0,17 0,85 -0,04 -0,23 -0,69 -0,51 -0,09
FLTD_Gdp d -0,36 -0,07 -0,6 1 0,03 -0,36 0,22 0,23 -0,13 0,29 -0,7 -0,1 -0,26 0,17 -0,28 0,35
Ggdppc a -0,23 -0,05 0,37 1 0,22 0,64 -0,43 -0,18 -0,09 0,24 0,1 0,34 0,15 -0,07
Ggdppc b -0,35 0,3 0,51 0,32 1 0,03 0,24 0,51 -0,51 0,3 -0,67 0,03 -0,36 0,03 0,51 0,47 0,3 -0,12
Ggdppc c -0,26 0,84 0,87 -0,34 1 -0,97 0,92 0,84 -0,36 0,77 -0,69 0,09 -0,5 -0,35 0,55 0,34 -0,01 0,13
Ggdppc d 0,24 0,17 -0,5 0,03 1 -0,35 0,33 0,15 -0,79 0,41 -0,59 0,23 -0,54 0,15 -0,15 -0,44
IN_Gdp a -0,34 0,28 0,61 0,64 0,41 1 -0,25 0,27 0 0,51 0,42 0,07 0,46 0,08
IN_Gdp b -0,28 0,8 0,75 0,64 0,51 0,04 0,81 1 -0,77 0,38 -0,68 0,49 0,14 0,35 0,52 0,89 0,71 0,16
IN_Gdp c -0,25 0,68 0,73 -0,61 0,84 -0,88 0,75 1 -0,58 0,72 -0,77 0,2 -0,64 -0,29 0,66 0,6 0,32 0,09
IN_Gdp d -0,09 0,43 0,01 0,23 0,15 -0,81 0,6 1 -0,26 0,57 -0,08 -0,84 -0,89 -0,26 0,62 0,37
LTD_Gdp a 0,01 0,1 0,61 0,1 0,47 0,42 0,06 0,14 -0,23 0,82 1 -0,1 0,38 0,72
LTD_Gdp b 0,25 0,2 -0,07 0,01 -0,36 0,03 0,18 0,14 -0,14 -0,42 -0,05 0,84 1 0,41 0 0,24 0,42 0,64
LTD_Gdp c 0,12 -0,14 -0,32 0,85 -0,5 0,53 -0,27 -0,64 0,88 -0,51 0,97 -0,14 1 0,05 -0,25 -0,52 -0,19 0,04
LTD_Gdp d -0,07 -0,36 0,33 -0,26 -0,54 0,84 -0,59 -0,89 0,65 -0,65 0,41 0,67 1 0,04 -0,38 -0,03
ODA_Gdp a -0,08 -0,12 0,1 0,34 -0,08 0,07 -0,24 -0,63 -0,5 -0,11 -0,1 1 -0,51 -0,31
ODA_Gdp b 0,58 0,1 0,21 0,21 0,03 0,09 0,3 0,35 -0,5 -0,53 -0,37 0,53 0,41 1 -0,19 0,25 0,25 0
ODA_Gdp c 0,74 -0,62 -0,09 -0,04 -0,35 0,34 -0,31 -0,29 -0,09 -0,81 0,19 -0,23 0,05 1 -0,85 -0,44 -0,42 -0,33
ODA_Gdp d 0,78 -0,92 -0,59 0,17 0,15 0,43 -0,76 -0,26 -0,41 -0,56 -0,52 0,07 0,04 1 -0,85 -0,75
S_Gdp a 0,16 0,47 0,43 0,15 0,33 0,46 -0,08 0,51 0,14 0,41 0,38 -0,51 1 0,36
S_Gdp b -0,51 0,49 0,65 0,14 0,51 0,22 0,19 0,52 -0,3 0,53 -0,23 0,4 0 -0,19 1 0,66 0,53 0,18
S_Gdp c -0,76 0,74 0,4 -0,23 0,55 -0,54 0,51 0,66 -0,24 0,88 -0,4 0,4 -0,25 -0,85 1 0,72 0,64 0,45
S_Gdp d -0,51 0,85 0,56 -0,28 -0,15 -0,62 0,74 0,62 0,19 0,6 0,52 -0,53 -0,38 -0,85 1 0,6
TDS_Gdp a 0,17 0,31 0,4 -0,07 0,35 0,08 -0,18 0,06 -0,13 0,67 0,72 -0,31 0,36 1
TDS_Gdp b -0,34 0,21 -0,27 0,45 -0,12 -0,29 0,07 0,16 -0,27 0,02 -0,12 0,62 0,64 0 0,18 0,22 0,56 1
TDS_Gdp c -0,86 0,42 0,41 -0,09 0,13 0,03 0,24 0,09 -0,26 0,29 -0,03 0,32 0,04 -0,33 0,45 0,68 0,64 1
TDS_Gdp d -0,78 0,59 0,48 0,35 -0,44 -0,35 0,57 0,37 0,63 0,34 0,34 -0,21 -0,03 -0,75 0,6 1
a = 1971-78, b = 1979-85, c = 1986-92, d = 1993-2000
Ai = Air, Ex = Ex_Gdp, Fd = Fdi_Gdp, Fl = Fltd_Gdp, Gg = Ggdppc, Gp = Gpop, Im = Im_Gdp, In = In_Gdp, Inf, Ing = Ingdppc,
Inp = Inpop, Int = Inted_Gdp, Lt =Ltd_gdp, Od = Oda_gdp, S = S_gdp, Sc = Scr_gdp, St = Ste_gdp, Td = Tds_gdp
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Tab. 5 – corss-contry OLS regressions’ results (with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard
Errors & Covariance correction)
Period 1971-78
Dependent Variable: GGDPPC
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
IN_GDP 24.41083 10.10535 2.415634 0.0237
INGDPPC -0.021204 0.008385 -2.528725 0.0184
AIR -0.034912 0.044991 -0.775981 0.4453
C 14.46184 4.712778 3.068644 0.0053
R-squared 0.307599     Mean dependent var 13.10807
Adjusted R-squared 0.221049     S.D. dependent var 3.998890
S.E. of regression 3.529349     Akaike info criterion 5.491667
Sum squared resid 298.9512     Schwarz criterion 5.681982
Log likelihood -72.88334     F-statistic 3.553999
Durbin-Watson stat 2.003127     Prob(F-statistic) 0.029328
Dependent Variable: IN_GDP
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
S_GDP 0.444205 0.19059 2.330687 0.0281
FLTD_GDP 0.634448 0.583513 1.087291 0.2873
ODA_GDP 1.172296 0.295704 3.964423 0.0005
FDI_GDP 2.472084 1.090141 2.267673 0.0322
R-squared 0.374272    Mean dependent var 0.208989
Adjusted R-squared 0.299185    S.D. dependent var 0.093381
S.E. of regression 0.078174    Akaike info criterion -2.13232
Sum squared resid 0.152778    Schwarz criterion -1.94373
Log likelihood 34.91869    F-statistic 4.984498
Durbin-Watson stat 1.957165    Prob(F-statistic) 0.007583
Period 1979-85
Dependent Variable: GGDPPC
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
IN_GDP 18.62626 17.02094 1.094314 0.2862
INGDPPC -0.001769 0.004702 -0.376183 0.7106
EX_GDP 1.003702 10.21443 0.098263 0.9227
AIR -0.021127 0.059908 -0.352660 0.7279
C -1.693483 5.886582 -0.287685 0.7764
R-squared 0.126140     Mean dependent var 0.168962
Adjusted R-squared -0.040309     S.D. dependent var 4.803174
S.E. of regression 4.899024     Akaike info criterion 6.186990
Sum squared resid 504.0091     Schwarz criterion 6.428932
Log likelihood -75.43087     F-statistic 0.757828
Durbin-Watson stat 2.136494     Prob(F-statistic) 0.564239
Dependent Variable: IN_GDP
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.14517 0.038262 3.794085 0.0009
S_GDP 0.016219 0.198453 0.081729 0.9356
ODA_GDP 0.053585 0.281328 0.19047 0.8506
FLTD_GDP 0.314678 0.640564 0.491251 0.6279
FDI_GDP 3.479832 1.285744 2.706473 0.0126
R-squared 0.373059    Mean dependent var 0.204103
Adjusted R-squared 0.264026    S.D. dependent var 0.083778
S.E. of regression 0.071872    Akaike info criterion -2.26743
Sum squared resid 0.118808    Schwarz criterion -2.02954
Log likelihood 36.74401    F-statistic 3.421516
Durbin-Watson stat 2.372427    Prob(F-statistic) 0.024636
220
Period 1986-92
Dependent Variable: GGDPPC
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INGDPPC 0.004974 0.002697 1.844377 0.0786
IN_GDP 35.79654 10.28552 3.480286 0.0021
AIR 0.082083 0.046015 1.783837 0.0883
EX_GDP 8.075365 4.952548 1.630548 0.1172
C -10.50056 4.241000 -2.475962 0.0215
R-squared 0.545869     Mean dependent var 5.142483
Adjusted R-squared 0.463300     S.D. dependent var 5.219870
S.E. of regression 3.824069     Akaike info criterion 5.686083
Sum squared resid 321.7170     Schwarz criterion 5.926053
Log likelihood -71.76212     F-statistic 6.611038
Durbin-Watson stat 1.668816     Prob(F-statistic) 0.001187
Dependent Variable: IN_GDP
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.177871 0.065279 2.724768 0.015
S_GDP -0.38804 0.153333 -2.53069 0.0223
FLTD_GDP 0.357974 0.656912 0.544935 0.5933
ODA_GDP 0.099794 0.267722 0.372751 0.7142
FDI_GDP -0.64388 0.929168 -0.69296 0.4983
AIR -0.00139 0.000881 -1.58035 0.1336
EX_GDP 0.240653 0.115383 2.085694 0.0534
INF -6.25E-05 4.52E-05 -1.38216 0.1859
INGDPPC 7.68E-05 7.29E-05 1.053977 0.3076
R-squared 0.631678    Mean dependent var 0.184077
Adjusted R-squared 0.424498    S.D. dependent var 0.084337
S.E. of regression 0.06398    Akaike info criterion -2.37677
Sum squared resid 0.065495    Schwarz criterion -1.89289
Log likelihood 40.89806    F-statistic 3.048923
Durbin-Watson stat 1.439624    Prob(F-statistic) 0.024994
Period 1993-99
Dependent Variable: GGDPPC
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
INGDPPC 0.000914 0.001218 0.750328 0.4618
IN_GDP 13.36158 16.16944 0.826348 0.4184
AIR -0.034494 0.041661 -0.827960 0.4175
EX_GDP -4.186263 5.574594 -0.750954 0.4614
C -1.125452 3.574488 -0.314857 0.7561
R-squared 0.143488     Mean dependent var -1.098421
Adjusted R-squared -0.027815     S.D. dependent var 3.505223
S.E. of regression 3.553637     Akaike info criterion 5.550676
Sum squared resid 252.5667     Schwarz criterion 5.794452
Log likelihood -64.38345     F-statistic 0.837628
Durbin-Watson stat 1.344382     Prob(F-statistic) 0.517384
Dependent Variable: IN_GDP
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.148438 0.05525 2.686653 0.0177
S_GDP 0.623182 0.109161 5.708837 0.0001
FLTD_GDP 0.846821 0.450553 1.879516 0.0811
ODA_GDP 0.305614 0.103847 2.942935 0.0107
FDI_GDP 0.936297 0.960364 0.97494 0.3461
EX_GDP 0.126636 0.091404 1.38545 0.1876
AIR 0.000864 0.000528 1.637166 0.1239
INGDPPC -2.36E-05 1.03E-05 -2.28867 0.0382
GPOP -0.04936 0.019565 -2.52268 0.0244
R-squared 0.842228    Mean dependent var 0.183563
Adjusted R-squared 0.729534    S.D. dependent var 0.061419
S.E. of regression 0.031942    Akaike info criterion -3.74961
Sum squared resid 0.014284    Schwarz criterion -3.2133
Log likelihood 57.8701    F-statistic 7.473567
Durbin-Watson stat 2.483439    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000444
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Tab. 6 – Joint levels of aid and external debt conditioned on some iso-investment rates
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Tab. 7 – pooled analysis: linear effects on growth. Dependent Variable: D(GDPPC?)
Y = D(GDPPC?) OLS FE RE-GLS GLS SUR
D(GDPPC?(-1)) 0.785 0,689 0,947 0,708 0,678
D(IN_GDP?) 1,884 88.1 130.4 123.9 91.5
D(AIR?) 0,489 -4.2 1.1 0.732 -4.4
D(EX_GDP?)+ D(IM_GDP?) 108.3 97.8 36.8 46.5 98.8
D(FLTD_GDP?) 208.9 172.6 312.8 89.6 145.5
D(ODA_GDP?) 34.4 33.4 59.8 34.0 43.4
D(FDI_GDP?) 399.4 409.4 305.5 203.0 367.4
D(TDS_GDP?) -47.2 -76.3 -66.4 -17.7 -76.6
Adjusted R-squared 0.619 0.623 0.544 0.529 0.622
Durbin-Watson stat 1.468 1.460 1.456 1.503 1.441
Note: RE-GLSis based on Variance Components, GLS on Cross Section Weights
Underscored and italics values are non significant, bold values are significant at 1%, bold and italics at 5%, bold and
underscored at 10%.
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Appendix 2 – A case-study of foreign capital flows inter-links: Italian
development aid and debt relief
1. Italian Official Development Assistance in 2000. Volume and instruments
In terms of disbursement of Official development assistance (ODA), the latest detailed data
available are from the year 2000, and compared to the previous three years, 1997 – 1999.
Table. 1: Net payments by Italian ODA (in millions of US dollars). Period 1997-2000
1997 1998 1999 2000
Total ODA
(as % annual variation)
1,265.55 2,355.55
(86,1%)
1,805.72
(-23,3%)
1,376.26
(-23,8%)
of which:
to Sub-Saharan African countries
(as % of total aid)
278.63
(22%)
531.69
(22.6%)
246.53
(13.7%)
261.11
(19%)
Bilateral ODA
(as % of total aid)
453.73
(35.9%)
763.93
(32.4%)
450.72
(25%)
376.80
(27.4%)
bilateral grants
(as % of total aid)
360.78
(28.5%)
332.43
(14.1%)
550.76
(30.5%)
524.81
(38.1%)
of which:
 technical co-operation
(as % of total aid)
  developmental food aid
(as % of total aid)
  emergency and distress relief
(as % of total aid)
57.79
(4.6%)
16.11
(1.3%)
50.25
(4.0%)
40.42
(1.7%)
39.43
(1.7%)
16.57
(0.7%)
53.19
(2.9%)
43.78
(2.4%)
102.97
(5.7%)
27.16
(2.0%)
31.95
(2.3%)
72.36
(5.3%)
Soft loans
(as % of total aid)
92.95
(7.3%)
431.50
(18.3%)
- 100.04
-
-148.01
-
Multilateral ODA
(% del totale)
811.83
(64.1%)
1,591.62
(67.6%)
1,355.00
(75%)
999.46
(72.6%)
of which:
UN system
(as % of total aid)
European Commission
(as % of total aid)
The World Bank Group
(as % of total aid)
Regional development banks
(as % of total aid)
163.60
(12.9%)
613.70
(48.5%)
17.43
(1.4%)
1.35
(0.1%)
172.31
(7.3%)
713.35
(30.3%)
498.78
(21.2%)
193.31
(8.2%)
151.22
(8.4%)
679.00
(37.6%)
302.83
(16.8%)
146.65
(8.1%)
202.36
(14.7%)
637.62
(46.3%)
18.70
(1.4%)
75.89
(5.5%)
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
For the year 2000, as for the preceding years, one may note the Italian predilection for the use of the
multilateral channel. 65-75% of total Italian ODA use the multilateral channel, which is the
opposite of what happens in other donor countries. This policy to provide such a high proportion of
ODA through the multilateral channel is not explicitly set out in the 1995 Inter-ministerial
Committee for Economic Planning (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica,
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CIPE) Guidelines governing Italian development co-operation, although Prospective 20001 states
that 60% of Italian co-operation will be implemented in co-operation with international
organisations. In 2000 Italian resources underwent a serious reduction ($M 1,376.26), and
cooperation via the bilateral channel correspondingly felt the consequences of it ($M 376.8, or
27.4% of total Italian aid).
Quantitative data for 2000 confirm many basic elements, which were already to be seen in the three
years before.
While the Finance Law for the year 2000 was passing through Italian Parliament, the smallness of
resources became apparent. The Foreign Affairs Ministry had been assigned a mere 672 billion Lire
to fund all the year’s activities. 8.2% of the total (55 billion Lire) were destined to running costs in
the Directorate-General for Development Co-operation (DGCS, Direzione Generale per la
Cooperazione allo Sviluppo), which oversees cooperation and development policies in the same
Ministry, and 617 billion Lire was destined to on-site cooperation activities. A further 51 billion
Lire had been assigned to the Foreign Affairs Ministry for making obligatory contributions to
Italian and international organisations. As well as this, 400 billion Lire were transferred – pursuant
to Law N° 266/1999 – from the rotating Fund for aid credits to the cooperation Fund for grants. In
the grants Fund in the year 2000, therefore, 1,068 billion Lire (617 + 51 + 400) were available for
development cooperation activities; in the rotating Fund, on the other hand, monies available for
soft loans in the year 2000 stood at about 2,200 billion. Overall, totalling the sums available for
grants and soft loans, Italian bilateral development cooperation policy in the year 2000 could count
on more than 3,000 billion Lire. From the total sums available, the administrative machine would
not therefore appear particularly able to manage these resources.
Indeed, in terms of concrete disbursements, Italian co-operation has met with difficulties in running
the finalisation of the initial phase, which has often meant the impossibility of paying out what has
been laid aside for this purpose from year to year: if we take, for example, the case of soft loans,
payments are well below budget capabilities. The important tool of credit repayments with long
grace periods for financing joint ventures (pursuant to Art. 7 of Law N° 49/1987), so important in
helping the private sector, and particularly the structure of small- and medium-sized firms, has been
largely under-used. In 2000, approximately 90 billion Lire of funds were available at Mediocredito
Centrale. In 1999, eight finance projects were approved, for a total of 22.8 billion Lire; in 1998,
only seven projects were approved, for a total of 14.8 billion.
Moving forward a major strengthening of the management structure and capacities for Italy’s
development co-operation policy, supporting the work of DGCS, is considered the most urgent
element in making Italian policy work better, as can be seen from the Peer Review of activities
carried out between 1996 and 2000. The Review was made by the Development Assistance
Committee (ODA) of the OECD, together with Canadian and Swedish reviewers between March
and June of 2000.
2. External debt reduction as the main component of Italian ODA
If on the one hand we can see from the data in Table 1 a large reduction in Italian ODA resources
(especially in terms of the bilateral channel), we can also see that this figure has been resized by the
particular nature of operations put in place to deal with funds for development aid. To sum up,
bilateral aid has tended to reduce the importance of operative actions (development programmes
and projects) in order to move over to the cancellation and rescheduling of developing countries’
external debt. Debt cancellation is marked down as a grant, whereas rescheduling is a soft loan. In
Italy, there is no real additional nature to development aid – recommended, among other things, by
                                                
1 Prospective and programmatic report on development co-operation activities for the year 2000 (Prospective 2000) is
the annual report on development co-operation policy. In this report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs established poverty
alleviation as the main priority of the Italian aid programme.
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the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative and subscribed to as an objective by most of donors – of measures for reducing external
debt. In fact, they become the single or main element of bilateral policies for Italian development
co-operation policy. It does represent the main gap between rhetoric and performance.
An analysis of the fifteen main beneficiaries of Italian aid during the year 2000 throws some clear
light on the subject.
First of all, concerning one of the main problems Italian authorities underlined in Prospective 2000,
namely, of a tendency toward dispersion and lack of critical mass resulting from spreading aid over
too many programmes and projects, the fifteen main beneficiaries of Italian cooperation – when
considering both grants and loans – received 94.35% of the net total paid out in Italy (the first ten
beneficiaries received 76.67% of total bilateral aid).
Overall, 89 developing countries are seen to be overall net beneficiaries of the flow of Italian
overseas development aid; eighteen show net overall losses (Croatia, Slovenia, and Turkey in
Europe; Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia in Northern Africa; Ghana and Kenya in Sub-Sahara Africa;
Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Guatemala, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay in
America; China and India in Asia).
Table 2: The fifteen main beneficiaries of Italian bilateral aid during 2000 (in millions of US$)
Country Total net
aid
(a) cancelled
debt
(b) rescheduled
debt
(a)+(b) as % of
total aid
Uganda 82.09 78.82 - 96.02
Bosnia-Erzegovina 32.97 25.03 - 75.92
Cameroun 26.96 24.41 1.92 97.66
Ethiopia 25.97 - - 0.00
Zambia 24.02 22.83 - 95.05
Malta 20.83 - - 0.00
Yugoslavia Fed. Rep. 19.30 - - 0.00
Honduras 19.07 10.49 5.36 83.11
Benin 19.07 18.52 - 97.12
Eritrea 18.61 - - 0.00
Albania 18.34 2.04 0.54 14.07
Senegal 15.21 10.70 - 70.35
Mozambique 13.09 - - 0.00
Palestinian Nat.Auth. 11.78 - - 0.00
Burkina Faso 8.20 6.95 - 84.76
Sub-total 355.51 199.79 7.82 58.40
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
During the year 2000, the only countries which benefited from Italian bilateral aid were those which
obtained a cancellation of their overseas debt (Uganda, Cameroon, Zambia, and Benin), or where
this was the main factor (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Honduras, Senegal, and Burkina Faso). Exceptions
are to be found – if one does not take into consideration the special agreement made between Italy
and Malta – those countries which show the lasting nature of Italian interests owing to their
proximity or the complex emergency pay-out (Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the
post-war emergency situation due to natural disasters in regions where Italy used to have interests
such as the Horn of Africa (Eritrea and Ethiopia), and Mozambique. The Palestinian Authority is a
now-consolidated reality where priority Italian action is required in development and technical
assistance programmes.
An aspect which directly affects the overseas development aid budget regards the emphasis which
Italy, more so than other donor countries, has given to the cancellation of overseas debt in countries
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which traditionally have high debt levels. This was confirmed in Italian Law N° 209, dated 29 July
2000, and its application, passed by Parliament as N° 185, dated 4 April 2001. Italian international
role as a member of the Group of Seven Leading Industrialized Countries (G-7) - with the
Presidency in 2001 -, the European Union (EU) and all of the major multilateral institutions as well
as the particular interest of Italian public opinion on debt relief makes Italy an important actor in the
international commitment toward external debt reduction of poor countries. Moreover, Italy
experienced two important civil society’s campaigns on debt cancellation, one was Campagna
Sdebitarsi, linked to the International Jubilee 2000 network, and the other was  the Campagna della
Conferenza Episcopale Italiana, linked to the Vatican Catholic State.
 Table 3: Share of debt relief2 in Italy compared to DAC total, year 2000 (in millions of US$)
Net ODA Net ODA
debt relief
(as % of
net ODA)
of which:
bilateral
(as % of
debt relief)
for
HIPC
(as % of
debt relief)
Italy 1,376 239 17.3 217 90.8 204 85.4
Total DAC 53,737 2,236 4.2 1,988 88.9 1,180 52.8
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
In the light of these data, the concrete problem to be found today, at an Italian and – more generally
– international level is the ratio between debt reduction/cancellation and development co-operation.
The international debt cancellation initiative is expressly based on the maintenance and
strengthening of overseas development aid’s currently undertaken commitments, to which debt
cancellation should be merely an adjunct. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and in view of the very
long times required in debt cancellation procedures, there is the danger that donor countries budget
for overseas development aid initiatives over many years. This does not necessarily mean that they
actually pay money: they merely budget for it. For the poorest countries, differently from middle
income countries who are still paying-back their debt service to bilateral creditors, no added
resources are freed up as they have already suspended repayments to their bilateral creditors.
The non-additional nature of resources for bilateral cancellation of foreign debt is confirmed in the
given summary, which refers to 1999 and 2000, for items in ODA which can be traced back to this
type of aid. A quick glance at the many items present in the various types of ODA dealing with debt
cancellation is enough to show how much development cooperation is tied up – at least in budgets –
with measures for reducing overseas debts in developing countries. 3
In Italy, the figures for the year 2000 merely underline what had already been understood in 1999,
when the two main beneficiaries of ODA were Congo and Tanzania. They were not the countries
where most aid was destined, nor did they benefit from development cooperation budgets, but they
had their external debts restructured by Italy (78.16 million dollars for Congo, 19.15 million for
Tanzania).
                                                
2 In this case, comparison is made between debt repayment (accounted for as part of grants) and rescheduling (part of
soft loans) in the bilateral channel, and finance from the Trust Fund for HIPC activities in the multilateral channel.
3 The relationship between debt cancellation and overseas development aid is not simple, even when considered from a
purely accounting point of view. Total resources at multilateral level for debt reduction initiatives in poor countries
correspond to the current net value of the foreign debt which shall not be paid back. Accounting in donor countries,
such as Italy, considers cancellation and rescheduling as part of overseas development aid, although they do not
generate new resources. This is because they were registered as ODA flows at the moment of original payment.
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Table 4: ODA items concerning foreign debt reduction for developing countries (1999-2000, in
millions of US$)
Amounts
extended
Amounts
received
Net Amounts
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000
I. ODA 1,998.98 1,598.93 -193.26 -222.67 1,805.72 1,376.26
 I.A. Bilateral ODA 643.98 599.47 -193.26 -222.67 450.72 376.80
 1.  Grants 550.76 524.81 0.00 0.00 550.76 524.81
of which:
i) Debt forgiveness, total (incl. forgiven interest) (a + b + c) 101.92 201.47 / 101.92 201.47
a) ODA claims / 0.00
b) OOF claims 101.92 201.47 / 101.92 201.47
c) Private claims / 0.00
Memo:  Grants for debt service reduction 101.92 201.47 / 101.92 201.47
ii) Other action on debt (a + b + c + d) 0.00 0.00 / 0.00 0.00
        a) Service payments to third partiesi / 0.00
        b) Debt conversion / 0.00
        c) Debt buybacks / 0.00
        d) Other / 0.00
 2. Non-grant bilateral ODA 93.22 74.66 -193.26 -222.67 -100.04 -148.01
of which:
       a) Rescheduling, total (a.i + a.ii) 3.41 15.04 0.00 0.00 3.41 15.04
        a.i. ODA claims (capitalised interest) 3.41 15.04 3.41 15.04
        a.ii. OOF claims 0.00
        b) Other lending 89.81 59.62 -193.26 -222.67 -103.45 -163.05
 c) Acquisition of equity (total) / 0.00
 d) Offsetting entry for debt forgiveness / 0.00
  Memo:           - Loans included in Associated Financing packages 0.00
                      - Interest received / 0.00
                    - Offsetting entry for forgiven interest / 0.00
 I.B. Multilateral ODA 1,355.00 999.46 0.00 0.00 1,355.00 999.46
 1. Grants and capital subscriptions, total 1,355.00 999.46 0.00 0.00 1,355.00 999.46
of which:
             i) IDA 297.06 297.06
             ii) IBRD,IFC,MIGA 5.77 18.70 5.77 18.70
             iii) Regional development banks 146.65 75.89 146.65 75.89
Memo (bilat. +  multilat.):
- HIPC Initiative 23.80 / 0.00 23.80
- IDA Debt Reduction Facility / 0.00
 II. Other official flows (OOF) (II.A+II.B) 189.63 103.01 -170.77 -206.50 18.86 -103.49
 II.A. bilateral OOF 189.63 103.01 -170.77 -206.50 18.86 -103.49
 1. Rescheduling, total 189.63 103.01 0.00 0.00 189.63 103.01
1.1 Non-concessional rescheduling (a + b) 0.00 9.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.48
         a) OOF claims (capitalised interest) 9.48 0.00 9.48
         b) Private sector claims 0.00
1.2 OOF component of debt service reduction 189.63 93.53 189.63 93.53
 2. Offsetting entry for debt relief / -170.77 -206.50 -170.77 -206.50
 II.B. OOF on Multilateral channel 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Memo:      - Interest received on OOF, total, (bil. + multil.) / 0.00 0.00
                   - Bilateral / 0.00
                  - Multilateral / 0.00
                 - Offsetting entry for forgiven interest / -120.77 -88.50 -120.77 -88.50
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
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In the right perspective, overseas debt and poverty reduction policies via overseas development aid
should balance one another out: when the debt crisis has been sorted out via cancellation policies, a
new season of development financing should begin. In this way, developing countries would not re-
start on the downward spiral of debt, but would promote cooperation strategies for effectively
reducing poverty.
On the other hand, improper use of debt cancellation will mean giving up on playing an active role
in development cooperation, which will then become a mechanism for reducing debt, without
offering any active measures for international cooperation.
It is also true that, for Italy, mention may be made in general of prevailing trends on the operating
level of “reducing” commitments. In other words, whereas Italian cooperation tends to be
multilateral, this depends on the freeing up in the bilateral channel of other commitments to
multilateral cooperation. The latter thus become preponderant because the conventional
commitment to bilateral aid lessens. And the same thing can also be seen within the bilateral
channel: Italy’s commitment to reducing developing countries’ external debt becomes ever more
important, not because this item increases in absolute terms, but simply because this money, once
budgeted for, becomes an expenses commitment when other bilateral channel expenses are
drastically reduced. A measure of this is given by the graph which – in terms of annual ODA
commitments – compares trends in Italian bilateral ODA and the amount spent on reduction of
developing countries’ external debt (which is, in turn, broken down into grants and soft loans).
Bi la tera l  ODA commitment ,  technica l  ass is tance  exc luded (US$ mi l l ion)
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Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
Trends in the use of bilateral spending and cuts in developing countries’ international debt follow
their own lines, and do not necessarily coincide, up to the middle of the 1990’s. Until then, indeed,
bilateral spending first follow a progressive tend towards growth (early Eighties), and then enjoy a
period of relative abundance of resources (late Eighties) followed by a crisis period (Nineties). On
the other hand, in the case of bilateral resources for reducing developing countries’ external debt,
the birth of this aid component coincides with the period of abundance of resources, and this is also
the period when external debt rescheduling was implemented after agreements made at the Club de
Paris. Thereafter, during the early Nineties, this commitment was maintained and strengthened, and
the grant element was introduced to lighten debt burdens: this was used to compensate for trends in
the soft loans channel. And so we finally reach the late Nineties: then, bilateral cooperation was
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noticeably reduced, whereas cooperation to reduce developing countries’ external debts became the
locomotive for other commitments. This can be seen in the mirroring of the two paths; developing
countries’ external debt reduction measures became the main ingredient of bilateral expenses
budgeting and, at the same time, took over from the policy of rescheduling (which may be
expressed in terms of soft loans) as debt cancellation (which may be expressed in terms of grants),
as was developed during international debates, and, especially, agreed upon at the G-8 summit in
Cologne in 1999.
In this sense, therefore, the idea of a policy for excluding or reducing commitments means that with
the drying up of resources, new trends in Italian bilateral aid policies – starting with the
commitment to reducing developing countries’ external debt – translate at best into the maintaining
of commitments already undertaken when resources were relatively plentiful.
3. The structure and main components of Italian aid in 2000
The evidently different nature of the two main instruments used in development cooperation (grants
and soft loans) require a closer examination in terms of the trends seen in these two channels of
Italian overseas development aid during the year 2000.
At a resources level, as was mentioned above, the grant channel was “subsidised” by the loans one
over the last two years, and the graph below shows this extremely clearly. What this means is that a
minimum amount of resources was available for making grants, at the cost of a corresponding
reduction in credit resources – as can be seen in the mirroring between the two curves – which
determines for both 1999 and 2000 an overall debt in credit expenditure.
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Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
A general consideration which may be made concerning the Italian situation is a reminder of
development financing, at the centre of the United Nations conference in Monterrey in Mexico.
ODA is not in itself a motor for economic growth, but can be a useful catalyst for mobilising
internal and international resources. Foreign debt crises, although a real and deep danger, risk
making people distrust the tool of credits (even those made on concessional terms) for developing
countries, without finding, in the short term, any other solutions or mechanisms to replace them. In
Italy, over the last two years, the credit system has been widely used as a resource to draw upon to
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keep cooperation grants going, thanks to the success of the rotating Fund, which has seen the return
of capital loans. Thanks are also due to red tape, whereby monies budgeted for were not spent.
Another method for using the rotating Fund set out in Law N° 49/1987 has been the financing of
venture capital operations for the internationalisation of small- and medium-sized Italian
enterprises, especially in the Mezzogiorno. Finally, the law on Italian participation in the stabilising,
reconstruction, and development of the Balkans (Law N° 84, dated 21 March 2001) states that part
of the fund set up for helping companies to take part in the stabilising, reconstruction, and
development process in the area should be paid out by the Ministry for Foreign Trade, in terms of
micro-credits (up to 200 billion Lire) and an increase in rotating Fund credits. These monies are to
be used for long-term investment in factories in countries outside the European Union, by providing
free guarantees for finance to companies damaged by the lack of payments from Yugoslavia after
the war in that area.
The question which must now be asked is this: can this process be sustained in the long term? In
other words, will the monies paid into the rotating Fund be used up quickly, requiring a new input
of funds with future Finance Bills, and in what scenario? Will this tool be used less in financing,
meaning that only the grant channel will be used? Or will it be used to guarantee access to credits
for countries with medium-to-low earnings, as is already the case?
It is easy to imagine an increasing use of the credit component in overseas development aid, in
terms of the interest already seen in economic internationalisation of Italian industry. In this sense,
signs can be seen both in central government (the idea of the “Italian system” involvement in the
Balkans stability pact, and the strengthening of links via measures for promoting foreign trade) and
in the growing interest shown by regional and local government.
In any case, data on the geographical destination of concessions and credits identify a series of
priorities which do not coincide.
As far as grants are concerned (when dealing with those which are not primarily aimed at reducing
external debt), a very worrying trend emerges in the year 2000 in terms of the resources actually
paid out. Based on the general data, as shown in the table giving details for the period 1997-2000, in
view of the small size of resources available, the increase in monies for grants in bilateral aid may
seem interesting. Indeed, the amounts rose from 360.78 million dollars in 1997 to 332.43 in 1998,
rising to 550.76 million in 1999 and then falling again slightly to 524.81 million dollars in 2000.
However, when one removes the money destined for developing countries’ external debt reduction
(which amounted to 38.39% of the bilateral grants total in 2000), one quickly realises that bilateral
grants money has been decreasing over the last two years, and now stands at about 300-320 million
dollars of resources effectively paid out for development aid. An amount, in real terms, much lower
than the bilateral grant total (minus the amount for debt reduction) paid by any other country in G-7,
and most members of ODA. Only Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand,
and Portugal – which can in no way be compared with Italy in terms of riches produced each year in
absolute terms – destined fewer resources.
Table. 5: Net bilateral concessions paid, in millions of US dollars (and percentage of total bilateral
concessions), year 2000
Grants,
total
Project and
programme
aid
Technical
assistance
Food aid Emergency Debt relief Support to
NGOs
Grants, total
(excluded debt
relief)
Italy 524.81 106.57 27.16 31.95 72.36 201.47 35.27 323.34
(20.3) (5.2) (6.1) (13.8) (38.4) (6.7)
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
If one considers the main beneficiaries during 2000 of bilateral grant cooperation, one sees they are
countries which confirm what emerged during the general interpretation of bilateral cooperation.
The “special” nature of absolute continuity over time is only seen in the protocol signed with
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Malta4, and then geopolitical reasons enter into play (Albania, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia),
interest in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea and Ethiopia), Mozambique and Angola in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and Palestine in the Middle East. Bringing up the rear are other countries where the
importance of the grant channel is more due to the follow-on effects of the credit channel (Egypt),
other planning considerations currently underway (Venezuela, Sudan, and Djibouti), or to an Italian
presence in a country with good economic prospects, where the “anti-Western” ideological
connotations have not yet been removed, nor has full integration with the world economy begun
(Cuba). 5
Table 6: The 15 main beneficiaries of bilateral Italian grant, 2000 (in millions of US$)
Grants,
Total of which:
Technical
assistance
Food
aid
Emergency
aid
Ethiopia 26.16 2.02 1.43 1.59
Malta 20.94 - - -
Yugoslavia Fed. Rep. 19.32 0.01 0.19 19.05
Eritrea 16.40 3.29 4.28 6.27
Mozambique 13.09 0.57 - 5.24
Albania 11.82 1.63 - 2.56
Palestinian Nat. Auth. 11.76 5.60 0.95 1.68
Senegal 11.06 0.06 0.95 0.01
Bosnia-Erzegovina 7.95 0.08 - 0.08
Angola 7.23 0.14 2.38 0.10
Egypt 6.42 0.98 - -
Venezuela 6.17 0.16 1.19 4.81
Sudan 5.17 0.10 2.34 0.95
Djibuti 5.12 - 0.01 -
Cuba 4.74 0.04 2.38 1.57
Total 173.35 14.68
(8.47%)
16.10
(9.29%)
43.91
(25.33%)
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
A particularly interesting item, in view of these considerations, is the weight given to emergency
and food aid when debt reduction is not brought up. This is not the place for debating the
relationship between humanitarian or emergency aid, food aid, and development aid. There are
scholars who make a net distinction between them, and those who, on the other hand, say that there
must be complete continuity between the various phases and problems which lead from emergency
to development. In any case, as far as Italian aid is concerned, it cannot be denied that humanitarian
and emergency aid – which make up more than a third of total grants to the main fifteen beneficiary
countries – are the most important part of bilateral aid for poor countries.
When one then moves on to analyse soft loans, even when the monies used for overseas debt
cancellation, and capital and interest repayments on previous loans have been removed (i.e. when
                                                
4 One of the two countries, together with Slovenia, which OECD wants to exclude from the list of ODA beneficiary
countries as of January 2003, because of the high level of economic development now reached. This means that in
future, Italian ODA will feel the negative consequences of perhaps the only stable net paybacks. If calculations are
made, for the year 2000, on total bilateral gifts (524.81 million dollars), not including the aid for reducing overseas debt
(201.47 million, or 38.39% of the total) and gift made to Malta (20.94 million, or 10.30% of a total of 201.47 million),
then the final net figure is barely 302.4 million dollars.
5 Cfr. J. L. Rhi-Sausi (2000), “La via italiana contro le sanzioni: il caso di Cuba”, in Limes, n. 2, 2000, pp. 147-156.
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considering new credits), the picture that emerges shows important differences between the overall
status of bilateral aid (marked by the reduction of external debt) and grants payments.
Table 7: The 15 main beneficiaries of bilateral Italian soft loans, 2000 (in millions of US$)
2000 1999 total
Argentina 15.24 10.69 25.93
Tunisia 12.81 6.84 19.65
China 7.11 - 7.11
Egypt 5.22 1.72 6.94
Syria 4.04 0.41 4.45
Albania 3.94 9.71 13.65
Honduras 2.60 17.42 20.02
Eritrea 2.21 1.41 3.62
Bolivia 1.53 2.30 3.83
Kenya 1.27 4.68 5.95
Lebanon 0.84 0.26 1.1
Morocco 0.72 0.62 1.34
Algeria 0.69 5.04 5.73
Ecuador 0.64 22.43 23.07
Jordan - 5.76 5.76
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
First of all, 2000 appears as a continuation of the preceding year, with confirmation of the priority
given to the same countries, as per the long-term plans for credit aid. In addition to this,
geographical priorities change when one comes to grant channels. Credits continue to be the main
tool in foreign policy: China, Egypt, and Tunisia, as is the case with several South American
countries, appear among the list of the fifteen beneficiaries of Italian aid, whereas Eritrea and
Kenya are the only countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on the list.
Facing up to the reduction in Italian credit aid which, therefore, was positive – it must be repeated –
to the tune of 100.04 million US$ in 1000 and 148.01 million US$ in 2000, one notes that new
credit payments have a different function from grants. This trend began in the late Eighties, when
resources were available, and the whole world was interested in overseas development aid, and it
continued throughout the Nineties.
4. Distribution by sectors of Italian development aid in 2000
As indicated above, Italian payments for development aid over the last years have noticeably
decreased. This is especially the case with resources for bilateral aid, which owes its continuing
financial “existence,” in good part, to the 400 billion Lire subsidy paid from the rotating Fund
(pursuant to Law N° 266/1999) for granting credits to the cooperation Fund for grants. What is
more, these reduced resources can be mostly attributed to forms of external debt rescheduling and
cancellation for developing countries. This means that analysis of resource distribution must start at
this point of departure. It also means much discretion must be used when using the resources
available, a conventional characteristic of Italian overseas development aid, due in part to the fact
that long-term budgeting is not binding, and can indeed change from year to year 6. The scaling
down of resources means more discretion is to be used, and underlying trends are harder to identify.
Indeed, it is often enough for a country to change any sort of plan from one year to the next for
                                                
6 Italy’s new Right-wing government has not moved away from this tradition: the brief career (seven months) of
Foreign minister Renato Ruggiero, and the interim taking on of the office by Premier Silvio Berlusconi, are signs of
potential discontinuity in strategy in this field.
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geographical and sector priorities to change. The time lag between the moment of financial
planning and that of actual payment of monies implies a structural delay of years in terms of
operative application of defined strategies.
It may reasonably be said, as we have done here, that the basic choice made by Italy in 1999-2000
was to “marry” the cause of developing countries’ external debt cancellation. There was widespread
agreement among Italian public opinion on this point, but it tended to mean a reduction in
development aid. At this point, any analysis of real trends in Italian overseas development aid
during the last few years becomes extremely relative, as is the case with any evaluation of its new
planning direction, even though there are many of these. At a political level, the Nineties saw the
fall-off in resources coincide with the re-appropriation by the Foreign Ministry of aid policies, in a
fight-back against what Foreign Minister Colombo defined as “outside incrustations.” 7
Development co-ooperation in Italy has become a powerful tool in foreign politics, largely
occupying the place once held by foreign economic politics. Indeed, what remains of Italian
overseas development aid in South America and Asia (see paragraph above) confirms this view, as
does the proximity to Italy of the main aid areas (Balkans and Mediterranean) in terms of security,
stability, and the control of immigration flows. The decision to take on the ideal of overseas debt
cancellation within the reduced resources of overseas development aid has meant that the ties with
foreign policy have been strengthened. Via its commitment to cancelling external debt, Italy has
played a major role on the international cooperation stage, both during Holy Year 2000, and when
Italy was President of G-8 (2001).
The growing use, over the last few years, of Trust funds held by international organisations
(multilateral development banks, United Nations agencies) and the European Commission –
especially when they are not tied up to funds from other donor countries – help the Italian Foreign
Office in its policy of re-appropriation of development co-operation policies.
At a sector level, fact checking must be considered together with the planned approach of Italian aid
and Italy’s main commitments, last repeated by the then Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero, when
he published the Ministry forecast for ODA for the year 2002. The document laid out the following
eight lines:
1. Poverty reduction, the main objective of development cooperation;
2. Help, via the adoption of the Genoa Plan for Africa, for the New African Initiative, which
centres on democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, food safety, education and
health, international trade, and the promoting of private investments;
3. Help for the private/public partnership initiative for the global AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis
Fund;
4. Education and, in particular, basic primary schooling;
5. The cancellation of developing countries’ external debt;
6. The setting up in developing countries of the right climate for foreign investment;
7. Help for developing countries so they can participate in international trade;
8. Promoting women, children, and the handicapped.
These lines re-affirm the principles that Italy has subscribed to at international level over the last
years, the core mission of which is the reduction of poverty8. Re-affirming the centrality of Africa
and the emphasis given to education and basic health care are an important corollary to it.
In terms of numerical data, however, it is evident that – at least in the year 2000 – the smallness of
overall resources and the absolute predominance of activities bound up with external debt reduction
                                                
7 Cfr. J. L. Rhi-Sausi, (editor) (1994), La crisi della cooperazione italiana: rapporto del CeSPI sull'aiuto pubblico allo
sviluppo, Rome, Edizioni Associate, and J. L. Rhi-Sausi (editor), Ripensare la cooperazione. Rapporto Cespi sull'aiuto
pubblico allo sviluppo, Rome, Memoranda.
8 In CIPE’s 1995 framework, poverty reduction was considered as one among many different goals. In 1999, The
DGCS addressed these issues by developing specific guidelines on poverty reduction, based on the work undertaken by
the DAC Informal Network on Poverty Reduction.
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have slowed down the implementation of the understandings which Italy had been enunciating since
the mid-Nineties.
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Data concerning the division into sectors of bilateral Italian overseas development aid shows that
fully a third of all bilateral payments in 2000 went on operations linked to debt reduction.
On the other hand, 14% was spent on operations that could not be directly linked to others. If, then,
one excludes these two types of expenditure, and considers operations destined to well-defined
sectors, debt-reduction expenditure amounts to 38.4%.
This figure confirms and accentuates the trend first noticed in 1999, when debt reduction
expenditure accounted for 18.5% of bilateral payments. Otherwise, emergency, infrastructure, and
social service expenditure are the biggest part of the total, $M 599.48. This figure is also mostly up
of grants (524.81 million dollars, as shown in table 5, which means that credits amount to a mere
74.66 million, which is even less – as said above – than what is paid back on credits granted
beforehand).
Infrastructure and social service payments could, in theory, show up in items which are considered
proxies for commitments to poverty reduction, especially those on education and basic health care.
However, if one goes on to read the breakdown of these figures, it is easy to see how marginal they
are to the day-to-day reality of bilateral cooperation.
In the education field, indeed, the trend has been from tertiary (1999) to secondary education
(2000), leaving very little over for spending on primary schooling. Exactly the opposite of what a
reading of the intentions would lead one to suppose. The same is true in the health field.
The importance of the objective of reducing poverty, as the main focus of overseas development
aid, nowadays unanimously recognised, and subscribed to by Italy, in fact continues to have a very
ambiguous application in the field.
236
Table 8: Bilateral gross ODA payments, per destination sector (in millions of US dollars)
2000 1999
Infrastructure and social services: 70.18 114.46
Education 25.87 31.88
       - not specified 11.90 19.70
       - basic 0.03 0.78
       - secondary 11.03 1.34
       - tertiary 2.91 10.06
Health 22.59 39.95
       - general 17.50 27.34
       - basic 5.09 12.61
Population and reproductive health 5.71 1.37
Water supply and sanitation 3.51 9.78
Government and civil society 3.66 25.38
Other 8.84 6.10
Infrastructure and economic services: 8.60 24.73
Transport and communications 5.17 18.26
Productive sectors: 33.12 22.44
       - agriculture 27.86 13.60
       - industry 3.35 2.94
Multi-sectors 22.54 43.78
Commodity aid and programme aid: 48.89 78.27
Developmental food aid 31.95 43.78
Debt relief 201.47 101.92
Emergency aid 72.36 102.97
Support to NGOs 35.27 25.69
DGCS general expenses 22.23 22.64
Not specified 84.82 13.85
Total 599.48 550.76
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
An intrinsic risk concerns the general nature and dimension of this definition, which can be used as
a lifebelt to try to save everything and nothing (projects in the field of finance, economics, the
social sphere, and politics). In this sense, what is actually done is particularly important for poverty
reduction. Italian ODA, over the last few years, has been concerned with providing a wide spectrum
of priority strategies for poverty reduction.
The 1999 DGCS guidelines on poverty reduction outline the approach and contents of an Italian
poverty reduction initiative to be implemented with an initial allocation of US$ 120 million. The
initiative will consist of regional programmes in Central America, South America (Brazil and
Andean countries), the Maghreb, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Sahel, Southern Africa and
India. The initiative aims to provide support to the poverty reduction strategies in two/three partner
countries in each of the above regions, within the framework of a consistent regional and
international approach. Such programmes will build on the experience gained in previous
initiatives, financed by the Italian Co-operation through trust funds to international organisations,
mainly the UNDP, and executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). In
operational terms, it is a multi-bilateral initiative subject to direct monitoring by the DGCS. Thus,
on a day-to-day basis, this effort should have been translated into a vast programme of multi- and
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bilateral-type projects, covering seven regions, giving particular importance to the empowerment of
women and childcare. What is new about the programme launched in 1999, specifically aimed at
poverty reduction, is how it faced up to administrative difficulties, which have blocked it in its
tracks until 2001. It is true, though, that in terms of cooperation strategies, the most important
element in Italian cooperation will be the effective definition of what is actually meant by “poverty
reduction” as the core mission of Italian development aid. This choice has been made, and it can be
seen in the homogeneity of Italian aid programmes compared with international commitments and
cooperation (the DAC role is particularly important as a structure for stimulating and coordinating
the main donor countries, including Italy herself). When one examines Italy in detail, it can be
observed that there are some traditional strong points in cooperation practice, and these can be
directly linked to poverty reduction policies. In particular, social, health, and children’s programmes
are a solid asset in the field of experience in the field. 9
5. The presence of tied aid in Italian development co-operation
The mention made just now of Italian ODA reminds the writer of another element of development
cooperation, which was hotly debated over the last few years. By this is meant tied aid, which is
another way of saying credits or grants which imply the provision of goods or services by
companies in the donor country. 10
In other words, with tied aid the tie is made at source, i.e. the beneficiary must use credits and
grants in the donor country. At an international level, the practice of “tying” much bilateral aid has
spread, as have criticisms of the same. Tied aid implicitly reduces the value of aid payments,
because the tie to the donor country reduces the beneficiary country’s freedom in choosing where
the money can be spent on the free market. It means an increase of 20-25%, and the principle of
freedom of competition is violated (if the donor country has placed a tie on the aid given, perhaps
the goods to be acquired are not very competitive).
If, hypothetically, many countries speak out in favour of breaking the tie of this type of aid, in
practice nobody actually wants to take the first step: this would mean that the donor countries could
keep their own ties in place, and take advantage of other countries’ unbonding of aid. This is the
reason why, within DAC, there have been such long debates about eliminating tied aid. On 14 May
2001, DAC  published the agreement signed by donor countries on untying aid to the least
developed countries (the 49 most backward ones, within the category of developing countries). The
agreement deals with types of bilateral aid which currently amount to five billion dollars (of the
eight billion paid out bilaterally to the least developed countries, or 17% of total bilateral aid).
Italy played an important role in the preparatory stages of the negotiations in favour of untied aid,
but this goes against the current tendency in Italian jurisprudence. Law N° 49/1987, which governs
Italian development co-operation policy, forbids untying of credits. During the last Parliament, a
Bill to reform Italian aid policy was not passed, and the implementation of the line adopted is not an
easy task. Even the mechanism of Trust Funds with international organisations helps tying in the
multi- and bilateral channels.
Final data for bilateral cooperation during the year 2000 show that, in terms of actual monies spent,
and excluding technical assistance and administrative costs (which are necessarily tied), 38.15% of
aid is untied, whereas the remaining 61.85% is tied. To be precise, 41.73% of grants and 28.96% of
credits are not tied, while 58.27% of grants and 71.04% of credits are. The percentage of tied aid is
high, but lower than it used to be. A proper analysis shows the reasons why.
                                                
9 The Foreign Affairs Ministry has recently brought out a book called “Italy for Children’s Rights,” which publishes
much information concerning Italy’s aid activities in favour of children.
10 Partially tied aid is the term used when it supply is limited not merely to the donor country, but to several others as
well. This may also include beneficiary countries. With untied aid, there is no obligation towards suppliers in the donor
country.
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Table 9: Italian bilateral development aid commitments, exclusive of technical assistance and
administrative costs (in millions of dollars)
Grants Soft loans Total
Direct financing of import 178.78 175.98 354.76
- Untied aid 2.92 40.29 43.21
- Partially tied aid 0 0 0
- Tied aid (solo all’Italia) 175.86 135.70 311.56
In kind aid (tied aid) 109.50 0 109.50
Debt relief (untied aid) 201.47 15.04 216.51
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
Once again, measures for the reduction of poor countries’ external debt are a significant part of the
overall result. The high percentage of bilateral operations for the reduction of external debt – which
cannot be classified as tied – account for almost all non-tied aid. Compared with the past, and
especially before the late Eighties, when more than 90% of all bilateral aid was tied and Italy was
near the top of the list of countries who offered tied aid, what has changed in the intervening period
is that the amount of monies paid in aid has decreased, but measures for reducing external debt
continue to increase.
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6. Historic evolution of Italian bilateral cooperation aid policy. A comparison with
preceding decades
In percentage terms, the Eighties started with 78.7% of Italian aid going to sub-Sahara Africa
(compared with 2.9% for the Middle East and a deficit in negative terms for European countries).
The same decade closed in 1989 with 54.5% going to sub-Sahara Africa (as against 1.4% for the
Middle East and 0.5% for European countries). During that time, the importance of Latin America
and the Caribbean had increased: from 10.5% in 1980, the figure more than doubled, reaching
22.7% in 1989. A decade, therefore, of greater resources for cooperating in development, and a
greater Latin-Americanisation of the same.
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Geographical distribution of Italian ODA (% of total aid)
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During the Nineties, though, two areas of “proximity” grew and were consolidated. The importance
of geo-politics and security was evident: the Middle East and the Balkans. More than 95% of Italian
aid in 1999 and 2000 was concentrated in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.
Table 10: Relative weight of the three regions who benefited most from Italian Aid (in percent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Africa 58.5 32.5 33.9 31.3 22.7 52.0 43.2 66.1 68.5 57.9 64.6
Middle East 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.8 2.3 3.9 9.2 8.5 4.1 7.3 6.4
Europe 4.1 19.8 10.6 11.8 5.1 9.2 21.8 12.4 8.0 33.1 24.6
Sub-total 64.5 54.1 46.8 45.9 30.0 65.1 74.2 87.0 80.5 98.3 95.7
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
Over the last two years, the Balkans region has jumped up to a third and a quarter of total Italian
overseas development aid. On the other hand, when one considers the final balance after
repayments on aid credits, it can be seen that Asia (which has shown a stable negative balance since
1997) and Mediterranean Africa (which has also shown a negative balance in 1999 and 2000) have
practically disappeared.
North African countries are interesting for Italy. Since these countries have average earnings, the
mostly receive credits, rather than grants. This means that Italian aid offers African nations around
the Mediterranean an essential development tool – credit – which is decisive because it offers
access to credit per se (otherwise hard to find in these countries), and access to particularly good
repayment terms. For Italy too, credit aid to North African countries seems to work rather well,
given that the final balance is negative: debtor countries can be trusted to pay back loans,
presumably because such low interest rates have been applied to them. With this region, accounting
for development aid would appear to be positive for the donor country as well: an important activity
– giving access to credits which are not fully integrated into international finance markets – and at
the same time financially sustainable by the Italian Exchequer, because these countries pay back
their debts (granted on easy terms). It has also allowed Italy to sign agreements – in particular with
Morocco and Egypt – for converting old debts from previous aid into programmes for social and
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environmental programmes. Given that these countries pay back their debts, Italy uses the
repayments for new programmes based on the objective of creating job opportunities, especially for
small- and medium-sized firms. This mechanism is one of the most interesting innovations in the
field of Italian bilateral aid for external debt when swaps are involved. Indeed, it was extended to
Peru and will spread to Ecuador. Negotiations along the same lines are underway with Pakistan, the
Philippines, Yemen, and Djibouti.
An important tool for promoting the private sector is found in concessional credit for the financing
of joint ventures (pursuant to Section 7, Law N° 49/1987), which has been as little applied over the
last three years as it was during the whole decade.
Overall, in the period between 1990 and June 2000, only 56 initiatives had been decreed under
Section 7 of Law N° 49/1987, for a total of 170.9 billion Lire, 28 of which were for Asia, 11 for
Latin America, 11 for the Mediterranean basin and Near East, 5 in Eastern Europe, and 1 in Africa.
Concerning the focus on the least developed countries, they represented the bulk of Italian aid
beneficiaries in the 1980s (around 60% of total aid). Then, in the 1990s, Italian interests and aid
core mission changed – in correspondence with the prevalence of  proximity, security and economic
interests – with a bigger amount of financial resources devoted to aid, and the weight of the poorest
countries decreased. In the last five years, Italy renewed its interest on the poorest countries, as a
way to operationalize the objective of poverty reduction and, again thanks to the effect induced by
debt relief (which is basically targeted to poor countries), recent data can confirm this trend.
Tab. 11: Italian ODA to the least developed countries (as % of total aid)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
62.9 59.6 55.9 41.6 48.7 26.9 28.3 29.6 18.9 37.6 28.3 53.3 69.9 38.4 64.4
Source: Elaborations on DAC-OECD, 2001
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7. The HIPC Initiative: its rationale and implementation
1. – Pre-HIPC Debt relief measures involving SSA countries
Latin American crisis, exploded in 1982 with the Mexican debt crisis, was firstly regarded as
an acute short-term liquidity problem, for which appropriate measures existed within the
framework of conventional debt consolidation exercises1. Because of the possibility that
widespread defaults could be a serious and immediate threat to the stability and efficient
functioning of the international financial system, it was important to provide more time,
required from creditors in order to protect themselves, through partial bail-outs, and save the
credit system from collapse. In fact, it is always important to take in account that traditionally
relief operations are intended to serve and protect the interests of the creditors, not less than
those of debtors, in order to ensure that they get paid and that normal market conditions are
restored. Thus, the mechanism of debt rescheduling was widely adopted.
At the beginning of the 1980s international debt crisis was considered mainly due to liquidity
problems. As a solution to the crisis industrialised countries were pumping more money to
the developing countries as well as rescheduling the payments on the existing debts of the
problem debtors. These exercises provided the countries with short-term relief as
rescheduling of repayments and granting of grace periods slightly reduced the net present
value of the debt but did not greatly affect the size of the debt burden. When country is
suffering form balance of payments difficulties rather than liquidity crisis, it is in need of
long-term relief. Then restructuring even on highly concessional terms might not be effective
enough but debt-stock reduction could be required. By the end of the decade it was obvious
that no sustainable solution would be achieved without further, more extensive relief. It was
becoming more evident that in most of the developing countries debt servicing problems
were not caused by liquidity problems but by substantial balance of payment disequilibrium.
During the nineties the official creditors have provided large debt relief packages and the
commercial banks have taken major write downs in developing country debts.
On the other hand, the debt problem of SSA countries did not represent a threat to the
stability of the world financial system. It was considered the effect of the long-term
development debts of the SSA countries, that is an insolvency crisis, which could wait until
African economies recovered and developed. Unfortunately development did not occur, and
development loans retarded it, by targeting limited foreign exchange resources to debt service
payments, whereas the level of total external debts outstanding has continued to rise.
Differently from Latin American countries, SSA countries had servicing capacity severely
constrained by low growth, poor investment opportunities and low credit-rating.
Notwithstanding the existence of two main types of debtors among the developing countries
(middle-income countries highly indebted in absolute terms vs. low-income countries highly
indebted in relative terms) there was a common response of international system to manage
debt crisis2.
In contrast to middle-income countries, it became increasingly clear that the mounting debt
burdens of low-income countries reflected deeper problems—they were solvency problems
                                                
1 For a discussion of the factors leading to high indebtedness in a sample of ten low-income countries, see D.
Ross and K. Ross (1998), “External Debt History of ten Low-income Developing Countries: Lessons from Their
Experience”, IMF Working Paper, WP/98/72.
2 G. C. Abbott (1993), Debt Relief and Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Edward Elgar,
Cambridge.
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that required not only a temporary reduction in debt service, but also a reduction in the level
of debt. Paris Club creditors began to grant such debt reduction in the form of concessional
flow reschedulings for low-income countries in late 1988 under the so-called “Toronto
Terms” that involved a debt reduction of about one-third of the eligible amounts. The level of
debt forgiveness was subsequently raised in steps: to London terms in late 1991 (50 percent
debt reduction), and to Naples terms (two-thirds debt reduction) at the end of 1994. This
resulted in increasingly longer and lower payment profiles on restructured debt. Bilateral
creditors not participating in the Paris Club - mainly oil exporters in the Middle East, but also
China, Taiwan and a number of other developing countries, including some heavily indebted
poor countries - provided more limited debt restructuring than other creditors, but in turn
often saw their claims increasingly falling into arrears3.
The 1978 Retroactive terms adjustment scheme
At UNCTAD IV, in May 1976, the creditors countries accepted the need of relief, within a
multilateral framework, to countries suffering from debt service difficulties. At the end of a
long discussion, in 1978, Resolution 165 (S-IX), which formalised the concept of the
Retroactive terms adjustment (RTA) and called on donor countries to adopt measures to
support developing countries4. This scheme was very flexible, enabling creditor countries to
employ a variety of possible measures:
? cancellation of all outstanding bilateral ODA loans,
? conversion of past loans to grants,
? cancellation of interest payments for a given period of time on outstanding bilateral ODA
loans,
? provision of new funds on highly concessional terms to refinance existing service
payments,
? adoption of local currency payments and cost financing (the so called “equivalent
measures”).
Basically, Germany, Britain and the United States committed to this scheme. Out of the 58
beneficiary countries, 34 were SSA countries, receiving almost three-quarters of the total
value of relief measures taken (the total nominal value of operations, up to 1986, amounted to
$6.2 billion, mainly for ODA debt cancellation). Tanzania topped the list with RTA from 11
different creditors. However, the amount provided by this scheme was too small to reduce
debt levels, lacked of uniformity in terms of creditor commitment and was not linked to ODA
policies. Nevertheless, RTA was the first mechanism to introduce debt cancellation as part of
the strategy of debt relief5.
In fact, by 1987, all the G-7 member States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium
implemented some bilateral debt relief initiatives to cancel the outstanding ODA debt of the
low-income SSA countries. Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, Tanzania and Zaire were
the main beneficiaries of these initiatives.
                                                
3 For a discussion of the motivations underlying traditional debt relief and the evolution of Paris Club terms see
C. Daseking and R. Powell (2000), “From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: A Brief History of Debt Relief
for Low-Income Countries”, International Economic PolicyReview, Vol. 2, IMF, pp. 39–58.
4 UNCTAD (1978), Resolution 165 (S-IX). Debt and Development Problems of Developing Countries on the
trade and Development Board at its Ninth Special Session”, 494th Meeting, Geneva, 11 March.
5 The 1981 the Berg Report noted that Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Zaire, and Zambia had already experienced
“severe debt-servicing difficulties” in the 1970s and “are likely to continue to do so in the 1980s”.
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The 1987 Lawson initiative
In 1987, the UK Nigel Lawson initiative, recognising that SSA countries could not repay
their debts, were dependent on concessional aid, implied a moral and economic responsibility
of creditors and needed macroeconomic conditionality to introduce economic reforms,
proposed quick actions to reduce interest rates on debts. The 1987 G-7 Venice Summit
recommended to apply lower interest rates, longer repayment and grace periods, in the Paris
Club, to reduce the debt burden. And the Paris Club adopted these new conditions for SSA
countries.
The 1988 Toronto terms
In 1988, the G-7 nations invited, at the Toronto Summit, the Paris Club to define a menu of
options for softening rescheduling terms on non-concessional debt. The Paris Club identified
three options: (A) partial write-off, to provide fewer resources during the grace period, but
more relief later: cancel 33% of the debt service, and reschedule the remainder at market rates
over 14 years with an 8-year grace period; (B) longer repayment terms, to provide relief over
an extended period of time, being the least costly to creditors: reschedule debt service
payments at market interest rates with a maturity of 25 years with a 14-year grace period; (C)
concessional interest rates, to provide more resources up-front, but becoming more expensive
later: reschedule debt service payments at reduced rates of interests – one half of market
rates. All these options were lower than the conventional terms of Paris Club rescheduling. In
order to become eligible to relief, a debtor country was required to conclude a structural
adjustment agreement with the international financial institutions, thus receiving the Fund’s
structural adjustment facility (SAF) and becoming eligible to the Bank’s Special programme
of assistance (SPA). Creditors used all of these three options and some SSA countries had
their debts rescheduled twice. The net present value of service payments was reduced by 20
percent, compared to traditional Paris Club terms6: the level of reduction was defined as
33.33%.
Concerning ODA credits, they were rescheduled at an interest rate at least as favourable as
the original concessional interest rate applying to these loans, with a 25-year repayment
period including 14-year grace. This rescheduling usually resulted in a reduction of the net
present value of the claims, as the original concessional rate was lower than the appropriate
market rate. The reduction in the net present value varied on a case-by-case basis, depending
on the original interest rate of the claims of each creditor on each debtor country.
Thus, the Toronto terms introduced the idea of reducing the stock of official non-
concessional debts, but it was still inadequate: it covered only debts owed to Paris Club
creditors – being 40 percent of non concessional official debts of SSA countries -,
rescheduled one year’s maturities at a time, in a short-term approach, and the process of relief
was slow7. 20 countries benefited from Toronto terms between 1988 and 1991, when these
terms were replaced by London terms.
The 1990 Houston and Trinidad terms
In 1990, the Houston G-7 summit considered “more concessional rescheduling for the
poorest debtor countries”. The UK proposed “Trinidad terms” that would increase the grant
element of debt and debt service reduction to 67 percent, from 20 percent under the “Toronto
                                                
6 Classic terms are the standard terms applied to a debtor country coming to the Paris Club. 57 countries have
benefited from the Classic terms.
7 In 1993, after the G-7 Tokyo summit, the Paris Club applied Enhanced Toronto Terms that were even more
concessional.
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terms”8. These new terms implied the increase of cancellation to two-thirds of the total stock
of eligible debt, a longer repayment period lengthened to 25 years rather than 14 years,
capitalisation of interest payment occurring in the first five years. The Washington
Consensus’ conditionality, represented by the structural adjustment programmes, was
confirmed.
The 1991 London terms
In 1991, Paris Club creditors agreed to implement a new treatment on the debt of the poorest
countries. This new treatment, the “London terms”, raised the level of debt cancellation from
the 33.33% defined in Toronto terms to 50%.
Non-ODA credits were cancelled to a 50% level. Creditors chose to implement the terms
through one of the four following options:
- "debt reduction option" ("DR"): 50% of the claims treated were cancelled, the outstanding
part being rescheduled with 23 years repayment period including 6-year grace and
progressive payments.
- "debt service reduction option" ("DSR"): the claims treated were rescheduled at a reduced
interest rate with 23 years repayment period with progressive payments.
- "moratorium interest capitalisation option" ("MIC"): the claims treated were rescheduled at
a reduced interest rate with 23-year repayment period including 6-year grace and progressive
payments.
- "commercial option": the claims treated were restructured at the appropriate market rate
over a longer period (25-year repayment period including 14-year grace). This was a non-
concessional option.
Concerning ODA credits, they were rescheduled at an interest rate at least as favourable as
the original concessional interest rate applying to these loans, with a 30-year repayment
period including 12-year grace and progressive repayment. This rescheduling usually resulted
in a reduction of the net present value of the claims, as the original concessional rate was
lower than the appropriate market rate. The reduction in the net present value varied on a
case-by-case basis, depending on the original interest rate of the claims of each creditor on
each debtor country.
23 countries benefited from London terms between 1991 and 1994, when these terms were
replaced by Naples terms.
The 1994 Naples terms
In 1994, after the G-7 Naples summit, the Paris Club creditors agreed to implement a new
treatment on the debt of the poorest countries. These new terms, the “Naples terms”, granted
two substantial enhancements with respect to London terms, that can be implemented on a
case by case basis, on the level of reduction and the conditions of treatment of the debt:
- for the poorest and most indebted countries, the level of cancellation is at least 50% and can
be raised to 67% in net present value terms of total bilateral debt of eligible non-ODA
credits9;
                                                
8 W. Easterly (1999), How did highly indebted poor countries become highly indebted? Reviewing two decades
of debt relief, World Bank, Washington D.C., September.
9 Creditors agreed in September 1999 that all Naples terms treatments would carry a 67% debt reduction.
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- stock treatments may be implemented, on a case-by-case basis, for countries having
established a satisfactory track record with both the Paris Club and IMF and for which there
is sufficient confidence in their ability to respect the debt agreement.
Creditors were invited to chose to implement the 67% debt reduction of non-ODA credits by
one of the two following options:
- "debt reduction option" ("DR"): 67% of the claims treated are cancelled, the outstanding
part being rescheduled at the rate of 23 years repayment period with a 6-year grace and
progressive payments);
- "debt service reduction option" ("DSR"): the claims treated are rescheduled at a reduced
interest rate according to 33 years repayment period with progressive payments.
Two other options were also designed, but have been very seldom used:
- the "Capitalisation of moratorium interest" ("CMI") option, similar to the "DSR" option
(with a reduction of 67% in net present value) but with slightly different repayment profiles;
- the "commercial option", with longer repayment profiles but no reduction of the claims in
net present value. It was agreed that creditors would refrain from using this option to very
exceptional circumstances.
Concerning ODA credits, they were rescheduled at an interest rate at least as favourable as
the original concessional interest rate applying to these loans, according to 40 years with 16-
year grace and progressive repayment. This rescheduling results in a reduction of the net
present value of the claims, as the original concessional rate is smaller than the appropriate
market rate. The reduction in the net present value varied from one country to another,
depending on the original interest rate of the claims.
Naples terms also included the possibility for creditor countries to conduct, on a bilateral and
voluntary basis, debt swaps with the debtor country. 31 countries have benefited from Naples
terms.
What however has been the common characteristics of all these mechanisms, presented as a
needed and effective action to redress the SSA countries’ imbalances, is that neither the
commercial banks have participated, for fear of setting a dangerous precedent for countries in
which their exposure is greater, nor the multilateral banks in the cancellation schemes.
2. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Due to rising evidence that the development prospects of many of the SSA countries suffered
from unsustainable debt, the member governments of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank agreed in fall 1996 the initiative for “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries”
(HIPC).
At that time, SSA countries’ external debt amounted to US$ 1,003.2 billion, gross national
product to US$ 168.4 billion and the debt-to-GNP ratio was 595.7%. The HIPC Initiative was
launched and, for the first time, it was based on specific contributions of the multilateral
institutions so that they were committed to reduce the level of their claims on the concerned
countries.
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Tab. 1 - SSA countries classified as IDA-eligible, HIPC, with low HDI, and Lldcs10
IDA-eligible SSA HIPC in SSA11 SSA with low HDI The Lldcs in SSA
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Republic of
Congo, Democr. Rep.
Cote D'Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria *
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Príncipe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe *
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Chad
Congo, Republic of
Congo, Democr. Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea**
Ethiopia
Gambia***
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi***
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria **
Rwanda
São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Central African Rep.
Chad
Congo, Democr. Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Democr. Rep.
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
* = Blend Countries (eligible to both IDA and World Bank loans)
** = Included at the beginning in the HIPC list, later excluded
*** = Excluded at the beginning in the HIPC list, later included
After the G-7 Lyon summit, in November 1996, the Paris Club creditor countries accepted to
raise up to 80 percent the level of bilateral debt reduction in net present value terms for the
poorest countries with the highest indebtedness, going beyond Naples Terms.
Lyon terms also confirmed the possibility for creditor countries to conduct, on a bilateral and
voluntary basis, debt swaps with the debtor country. This initiative is the current one,
enhanced by the decision, in November 1999, of the Paris Club creditor countries, after of the
                                                
10 Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Mayotte, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, and Swaziland are excluded by all
these four categories.
11 Other HIPCs: Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Republic of Yemen, Vietnam.
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G-7 Cologne Summit, to raise the level of cancellation for the poorest countries up to 90% or
more if necessary in the framework of the HIPC initiative.
As this is the most advanced debt relief initiative involving SSA countries and it has been
under implementation for six years12, we will analyse it more deeply.
The HIPC Initiative was endorsed by some 180 governments around the world as an effective
and welcome approach to help poor, severely indebted countries and reduce debt as part of an
overall poverty reduction strategy13. Declared objective of HIPC was to reduce the external
debt of the world's poorest, most heavily indebted countries (33, that is three fourth of them,
are in SSA) to “sustainable” levels. At the beginning, 41 countries were considered as eligible
to the HIPC Initiative. This included, for analytical purposes, 32 countries with a 1993 gross
national product per capita of $695 or less and 1993 present value of debt to exports higher
than 220 percent or present value of debt to gross national product higher than 80 percent.
Also included were nine countries that received, or were eligible for, concessional debt
rescheduling from bilateral creditors. In 1998, Nigeria no longer met the criteria, and Malawi
was added. In 1999, the number of countries was reduced to 40 because Equatorial Guinea no
longer met the criteria for “low income” or “heavily indebted”, as – with the onset of oil
production - GDP levels rose above those required for IDA-only assistance14. In the summer
of 2000, the Gambia was added as well, and the number of HIPC countries returned to 41.
The debt of the 40 HIPCs represents less than 10 percent of total developing country debt.
While this amount is but a small fraction of the total debt of developing countries of more
than $2.5 trillion, the debts of HIPCs are, on average, more than four times their annual
export earnings, and well exceed their annual GNPs. These are about twice the levels
considered to be sustainable. Thus, thirty-three African countries are recognised to have debt
that is unsustainable.
HIPCs have already been receiving substantial debt relief through traditional channels such as
Paris Club debt relief operations, forgiveness of aid debts, and commercial bank debt buy-
backs – reviewed in chapter 4 - at discounts in the order of 85 percent. These operations have
provided debt relief of about $25 billion during 1990-96.
Even though the debt of the HIPCs is on more concessional terms than that of other
developing countries, the debt burden of this group of countries is far more severe, in relation
to their capacity to meet debt obligations. By 1996, the ratio of the net present value (NPV)
of debt of the HIPCs to exports had fallen by 23 percent, from about 600 percent in 1991 to
450 percent. It largely reflected increasingly concessional debt relief provided by bilateral
and commercial creditors, but remained more than twice as high as those of all developing
                                                
12 In the context of a Paris Club concessional agreement, some debts that were previously reduced may be
further reduced under a concessional treatment with an increased level of cancellation. In this case, there is a
topping-up from the previous concessional treatment to the new one. If the initial amount due by a debtor was
$10 billion, and a creditor has cancelled in 1993 50% of the debt (London terms), then remaining debt is $5
billion. With a new 1998 treatment, involving the cancellation of part of the debt with a 80% debt reduction
level (under Lyon terms), the remaining debt is $2 billion, that is the difference between the initial amount and
80% cancellation. For creditors, who have already cancelled 50% of the debt in 1993, it means that they have to
cancel 60% of the non-ODA treated debt. Thus, in a strict sense, the net contribution of a given debt relief
initiative, as the HIPC is, should be calculated considering the difference of final relief compared to the
outcomes of the previous mechanisms.
13 "A Program for Action to Resolve the Debt Problems of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries -- Report of the
Managing Director of the IMF and President of the World Bank to the Interim and Development Committees,”
September 20, 1996, page 2 (EBS/96/152, Revision 1 and SecM96-975/1).
14 But the Equatorial Guinea's amount of arrears equally suggests that this country is unable to carry its debt
burden.
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countries as a group. Within the HIPC group, individual country indebtedness ratios varied
widely, ranging from below 200 percent to above 1,000 percent.
The actual debt-service payments of the HIPCs, expressed in percent of exports, are
approximately in line with those of all developing countries. However, in contrast to the
situation in other developing countries, the debt service paid by the HIPCs is only around
two-thirds of debt service due in 1995-97. Arrears, debt forgiveness and restructuring make
up the difference. High levels of gross new inflows of official resources have also contributed
to the ability of HIPCs to make debt-service payments and finance development programs.
The ratio of gross inflows (from long-term debt and grants) to debt service paid averaged
about two to one for the HIPCs as a group during the 1990’s and ranged upward of four to
one in half of these countries. Annual net transfers to the HIPCs on medium- and long-term
resource flows (including grants) have averaged about 10 percent of GNP over the 1990-96
period.
As we mentioned, the HIPC Initiative is particularly important, as it was the first
comprehensive effort by the international community to reduce the external debt of the
world's poorest countries. It went beyond earlier debt-relief initiatives in that it included debt
from multilateral creditors like the IMF and the World Bank.
The implementation of the HIPC Initiative has been reviewed regularly by Executive
Directors, and progress reports have been sent to the Interim and Development Committees
on the occasion of their regular semi-annual meetings, in April and September, since 1997.
When the Interim and Development Committees endorsed the Initiative, they agreed that it
would remain open for two years to HIPCs that pursue or adopt programs of adjustment and
reform supported by the IMF and IDA, after whom a decision would be made whether it
should be continued. This two-year “sunset clause” on entry reflected the intention that the
HIPC Initiative would not have been a permanent facility. The sunset clause gave countries
an incentive to adopt IDA- and IMF-supported adjustment programs. It also limited the time
available for build-up of new debt, and thus provided for relief on debt which mostly
predated the Initiative. The Executive Directors of the IDA and Fund agreed to an extension
of the initial deadline (sunset clause) for meeting the entry requirement until end-2000. They
also agreed that a comprehensive review of the Initiative would be undertaken as early as
1999.
The Initiative provides debt relief to countries that implement critical social and economic
reforms as part of an integrated approach to lasting development.
Debt sustainability targets
A country may be considered to achieve external debt sustainability when it is able to meet its
current and future external debt-service obligations in full, without recourse to debt relief,
rescheduling, or the accumulation of arrears. Sustainable debt levels under the Initiative are
defined on a case-by-case basis as: the net present value15 of public and publicly guaranteed
external debt in percent of exports within the range of 200–250 percent; the ratio of external
debt service to exports within the range of 20–25 percent. An NPV of debt-to-export target of
200 percent is assumed in the baseline scenario for all countries, excepting countries which:
                                                
15 The net present value of debt is a measure that takes into account the degree of concessionality, in contrast to
the face value of the external debt stock, which is not a good measure of a country’s debt burden if a significant
part of the debt is contracted on concessional terms; for example, with an interest rate below the prevailing
market rate. The net present value is defined as the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and
principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate.
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(i) have already reached the decision point,
(ii) have had preliminary HIPC discussions at the Boards; or
(iii) would be projected to qualify under the fiscal/openness criteria.
These criteria were agreed in April 1997, for countries where a large export base could
exaggerate the capacity to service external debt, in relation to other measures, such as fiscal
revenues. For such countries, being very open economies with a heavy fiscal debt burden,
which are also making a strong effort to generate fiscal revenues, that is cases with a
revenues-to-GDP ratio above 20 percent and an exports-to-GDP ratio above 40 percent, the
sustainability threshold under the original framework was the objective of reducing the NPV
of debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio to 280 percent at the completion point, other than an NPV
debt-to-export target below 200 percent16. These target ranges were based on the research
findings17.
Countries eligibility
The Initiative is open to the poorest countries, those that:
(i) are eligible only for highly concessional assistance such as from the World Bank's
International Development Association (IDA) and the IMF's Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility ( formerly called Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility);
(ii) face an unsustainable debt situation even after the full application of traditional debt
relief mechanisms; and
(iii) have a proven track record in implementing strategies focused on building the
foundation for sustainable economic growth.
The entry requirement
The first milepost toward establishing the policy track record necessary to qualify for HIPC
assistance is the entry requirement. The Program of Action states that “the Initiative would be
open to all HIPCs that pursue or adopt programs of adjustment and reform supported by the
IMF and IDA in the next two years, after which the Initiative would be reviewed and a
decision made whether it should be continued”. Staffs have interpreted this to include any
country which had an ESAF arrangement approved or midterm review completed starting one
year prior to the inception of the Initiative, together with an ongoing Policy Framework Paper
(PFP) and/or adjustment operations supported by IDA, as having met the entry requirement.
The decision point and amendments
Eligible countries reaching their decision points have generally completed three-year track
records of adjustment and reform. Based on the assumption of satisfactory performance under
IMF- and IDA-supported programs of adjustment and reform, a total of 26 countries (two-
thirds of all HIPCs) could have reached their decision points by the end of 2000.
Post-conflict countries represent a special challenge. Their needs are great, opportunities for
progress are substantial, but institutional and administrative capacity is often severely limited.
                                                
16 IMF and World Bank (1997), “HIPC Debt Initiative: Guidelines for Implementation”, IDA/R97-35 of
4/22/1997 and EBS/97/75 of 4/21/1997.
17 S. Claessens, E. Detragiache, R. Kanbur and Peter Wickham (1997), “Analytical Aspects of the Debt
Problems of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries”, Z. Iqbal and R. Kanbur (eds.), External Finance for Low-
Income Countries, Washington, D.C., 1997.
250
Many post-conflict countries have a substantial debt burden, and might ultimately be eligible
for HIPC assistance. A joint Bank/Fund issues note on providing additional assistance to
postconflict countries was prepared for consideration by the Interim and Development
Committees. In recognition of the exceptional needs of these countries, it was proposed to
provide an additional element of flexibility in the evaluation of the first three-year track
record period leading up to the decision point for post-conflict countries. Specifically,
satisfactory performance under economic recovery and emergency assistance programs
supported by the Bank and the IMF could be counted, on a case-by-case basis, toward
reaching the decision point.
Transitory measures
Several forms of HIPC assistance are available during the transitory period between the
decision and completion points. Bilateral and commercial creditors are in general expected to
provide flow rescheduling on eligible debt service involving an NPV reduction of up to 80
percent during the second stage. The Initiative also envisages that multilateral institutions
could, at their discretion, provide some of their assistance during the interim period. In this
context, IDA is providing grants instead of loans to eligible countries. In addition, under
certain conditions, supplemental IDA allocations could be made during the interim period18.
The IMF may provide some additional ESAF access in cases where this was justified by a
strong program and a balance-of-payments need.
The completion point
Countries reach completion points after establishing a further track record of adjustment and
reform, including appropriate social development policies, normally for three years following
the decision point. If a country experiences delays in meeting the performance requirements
during the interim period, this may lead to delays in reaching the completion point, as is
envisaged in the HIPC framework. The IDA and IMF Boards would decide this on a case-by-
case basis, and the completion point would not be reached for a given country unless both
Boards agreed. The amount of assistance committed at the decision point would be presumed
to remain the same as long as the projected NPV of debt-to-export ratio remained within the
plus/minus 10-percentage point target range. The ratio at the new completion point would be
based on the latest annual debt stock and export data available. Significant delays in
performance could require a country to return to the beginning of the second stage and staffs
would seek a reassessment from the Boards of the appropriate timing of the completion point.
Delivery of HIPC assistance
By commitments, 54 percent of the approved debt relief under the HIPC Initiative is covered
by multilateral creditors, with bilateral creditors providing 46 percent (on top of the debt
relief they have provided under earlier efforts). The World Bank and IMF account for the
largest shares of total costs among multilateral creditors, at 25 and 9 percent, respectively. In
providing the debt relief, both the World Bank and IMF are committed to pay for their full
share of the cost under the Initiative. To this end, the World Bank transferred $850 million to
the HIPC Trust Fund, the Bank’s principal vehicle to deliver the debt relief. The IMF has
                                                
18 The share of a country’s program support to come from IDA grants (rather than loans) is determined on a
sliding scale according to the projected NPV of debt-to-export ratio at the completion point. Grants would
account for up to one-third, one-half, or three-fourths of the IDA lending program, depending on whether the
projected debt-to-export ratio at the completion point (on a present value basis) was between 250 and 300
percent, 300 and 350 percent, or over 350 percent. See “World Bank Participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Debt Initiative” (IDA/SecM96-926 of 8/26/1996).
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provided for $520 million so far to finance its share of the debt relief. However, not all
multilateral institutions will be able to finance out of their own resources the needed HIPC
debt relief. In support of these institutions’ own efforts, the HIPC Trust Fund immediately
obtained about $450 million in bilateral contributions and pledges from 19 countries. These
contributions aim also at demonstrating the continued strong support this Initiative enjoys in
the donor community.
Both the World Bank and the IMF have allocated sufficient funds to cover the costs of the
assistance packages agreed to date. Both have stated their commitment to meet their full
share of the cost of the Initiative as eligible countries advance in the HIPC process. Ensuring
full financing of the Initiative by all participants remains the main challenge.
The Bank’s participation in the HIPC Initiative takes place primarily through the HIPC Trust
Fund, which provides relief on debt to IDA, either through the purchase and subsequent
cancellation of outstanding IDA credits or through servicing of a portion of the beneficiary
country’s IDA debt. The Bank transferred US$750 million from IBRD net income and
surplus to the HIPC Trust Fund, thereby front loading its contribution ahead of actual cash
needs, which arise only when countries reach their completion points. In July 1998, the
Executive Directors recommended to the IBRD Board of Governors another transfer of
US$100 million from fiscal year 98 net income, which will be considered in early October,
during the Annual Meetings. On a commitment basis, the Trust Fund has earmarked US$500
million for the six countries that have reached their decision point to date, leaving an
uncommitted balance of about US$300 million (including accrued investment income). The
remainder of the relief committed by the Bank to this group of countries (US$205 million in
NPV terms) is being provided by replacing IDA credits with grants, which will amount to
about US$660 million in nominal terms over the period of fiscal years 1998-2001. The Bank
intends to meet all the costs of its participation in the HIPC Initiative from its own resources.
IMF participation takes the form of special ESAF grants at the completion point that are
deposited into an escrow account to cover debt-service payments to the IMF under an agreed
schedule19. In addition, in March and April 1998, the IMF Board decided that no
reimbursement would be made to the General Resources Account (GRA) from the ESAF
Trust Reserve Account for the cost of administering the ESAF Trust during the fiscal years
1998 and 1999. It also decided that an equivalent amount will be transferred from the ESAF
Trust Reserve Account to the ESAF-HIPC Trust. In May 1998, the IMF transferred SDR 41
million to the ESAF-HIPC Trust for fiscal year 1998 and expects to make a similar payment
on a quarterly basis to the ESAF-HIPC Trust for fiscal year 1999. The IMF Board has also
authorised the transfer of up to an additional SDR 250 million from the ESAF Trust Reserve
Account to meet the IMF’s commitments under the Initiative20. IMF staff expected that
projected resources are sufficient to meet the Fund’s commitments under the HIPC Initiative
through 1999.
Other Multilateral development banks (MDB) participate in the HIPC Initiative, too. Most
MDBs have obtained the appropriate institutional approvals to enable them to participate in
the HIPC Initiative, and have defined the modalities through which they intend to deliver
their assistance. These vehicles include:
                                                
19 To finance these grants, several countries have contributed or made investments for the benefit of the ESAF-
HIPC Trust totaling SDR 35 million as of end-June 1998.
20 IMF commitments for the six countries that have already reached their decision points amount to US$270
million (SDR 200 million).
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(i) channelling resources through the HIPC Trust Fund, either for debt-service reduction
or debt buybacks;
(ii) using similar, self-administered, trust funds;
(iii) rescheduling current maturities or arrears on concessional terms tailored to provide
the agreed NPV debt relief; and
(iv) refinancing on grant terms.
Several MDBs face constraints in covering the full cost of their participation in the HIPC
Initiative from their own resources. Some have opted to use the Bank’s HIPC Trust Fund
mechanism to help deliver their share of HIPC relief to individual countries, which enables
them to receive additional contributions, beyond their own resources if necessary, from
interested donors. Thus far, sixteen bilateral donors have made contributions or pledges to the
HIPC Trust Fund to assist MDBs, amounting to about US$210 million.
For those countries, which have already received commitments of assistance, the division of
costs by creditor group reflects the amounts shown in each decision point document. For
prospective cases, burden sharing is assumed to be fully proportional.
The costing analysis of the HIPC Initiative must be based on the country-specific debt
sustainability analyses presented to the Boards, supplemented in some cases by additional
information prepared by Bank and IMF staff. A number of important caveats apply. The cost
estimates rely on important assumptions, and on debt projections which have mostly not been
fully reconciled between creditors and debtor governments. Therefore, the estimates need to
be interpreted with caution and should be seen as subject to a substantial margin of
uncertainty. In making these estimates, staffs have aimed to provide realistic but conservative
estimates of costs; thus, in cases where a choice of targets or timing was required, the option
implying a higher cost was used. HIPC costs are divided between multilateral and bilateral
creditor groups based on decision point agreements reached and, for future decision points
based on proportional burden sharing. On this basis, baseline costs for multilateral creditors
would be US$4.2 billion in 1996 NPV terms, or 51 percent of the total US$8.2 billion in
costs. Of this, the World Bank and IMF’s share would be, respectively, US$1.7 billion and
US$0.7 billion. Bilateral and commercial creditors would meet just under half of total costs,
or US$4.0 billion. In comparison with 1997 estimates, the cost to bilateral creditors has risen
in 1998 estimates, while that of multilateral creditors is unchanged. This fluctuation in cost
share is due to the different mix of country-specific costs21. Indeed, costs excluding countries,
which have not yet entered the Initiative, are lower in total and for each creditor group. Cost
estimates for the group of mostly post-conflict countries are likely to remain volatile.
                                                
21 Most of the increase for bilateral creditors reflects the increase for the Democratic Republic of Congo
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THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE
Summary
First Stage
Paris Club
Other
Multilateral institutions
Country
 provides flow rescheduling as per current Naples terms, i.e. rescheduling
of debt service on eligible debt falling due during the three-year consolidation period
(up to 67 percent reduction on eligible maturities on a net present value basis).
 bilateral and commercial creditors provide at least comparable treatment.
 continue to provide adjustment support in the framework of a 
World Bank/IMF-supported adjustment program.
 establishes first three-year track record of good performance.
Decision Point
Exit Borderline
Eligible
Second Stage
Or
If
If
... for borderline cases, where 
there is doubt about whether 
sustainability would be achieved 
by the completion point under a 
Naples terms stock-of-debt 
operation, the country would 
r e c e i v e  f u r t h e r  f l o w  
reschedulings under Naples 
terms.
 the outcome at the completion 
point is better than or as projected, 
the country would receive a stock-
of-debt operation on Naples terms 
from Paris Club creditors and 
comparable treatment from other 
b i l a t e ra l  and  c om me rc i a l  
creditors.
 the outcome at the completion 
point is worse than projected, the 
country could receive additional 
support under the HIPC Debt 
Initiative, so as to achieve exit 
from unsustainable debt.
Or... Paris Club stock-of-debt 
operation (on Naples terms) not 
sufficient for the country's overall 
debt to become sustainable by the 
completion point-country requests 
additional support under the HIPC 
Deb t  In i t ia t ive ,  and  World  
Bank/IMF Boards de termine 
eligibility.
· ... Paris Club stock-of-
Debt operation under Naples
terms (up to 67 percent
present value reduction of
eligible debt) and comparable
treatment by other bilateral
and commercial creditors is
adequate for the country to
reach sustainability by the
completion point-country
not eligible for HIPC Debt
Initiative.
Either
Paris Club
Other bilateral and commercial creditors
Donors and multilateral institutions
Country
 goes beyond Naples terms to
provide more concessional debt reduction of up
to 80 percent in present value terms.
 provide
at least comparable treatment.
 provide
enhanced support through interim measures.
 establishes a second track record of
good performance under Bank/IMF-supported
programs.
Completion Point
Paris Club
Other bilateral and commercial creditors
Multilateral institutions
 provides deeper stock-of-debt reduction of up to 80 percent in present value terms on 
eligible debt so as to achieve an exit from unsustainable debt.
 provide at least comparable treatment on stock-of-debt.
 take such additional measures, as may be needed, for the country's debt to be 
reduced to a sustainable level, each choosing from a menu of options, and ensuring broad and equitable 
participation by all
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3. The implementation of the HIPC Initiative22
Under the original HIPC Initiative approved in 1996, seven countries (Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Côte d’Ivoire, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda) reached their decision points and
five additional countries had their debt situations reviewed. Total assistance committed to
these seven countries under the original framework was US$3.5 billion in net present value
(NPV) terms.
During the first two years of implementation, ten countries were reviewed for eligibility for
assistance under the agreed framework of the HIPC Initiative. Eight of these were found to
face unsustainable debt levels, after full use of traditional debt-relief mechanisms, and hence
to require HIPC assistance. Debt relief was committed for six countries (Bolivia, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guyana, Mozambique and Uganda) and a decision was pending for Mali,
which was being proposed for assistance. The Boards also discussed a preliminary HIPC
document for Guinea-Bissau; the decision point for that country was delayed by the outbreak
of civil conflict. In two other countries (Benin and Senegal) traditional debt-relief
mechanisms were found to be sufficient to enable them to achieve sustainable debt situations.
The first country approved for HIPC debt relief (Uganda) reached its completion point in
April 1998, and creditors started to deliver the promised assistance. Two other countries
(Bolivia and Guyana) were close to their completion points.
Some of the first ten countries reviewed for eligibility for assistance (Bolivia, Guyana,
Mozambique and Uganda) had already demonstrated strong performance under Bank- and
IMF-supported programs for long periods. A number of countries in the initial group (Benin,
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mali and Uganda) had also concluded stock-of-debt
operations on Naples terms with Paris Club creditors in 1995-96. Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau and Senegal were completing programs supported by three-year ESAF arrangements
from the IMF and IDA-supported adjustment programs were broadly on track. All these
countries were, therefore, ready to reach their decision points, subject to preliminary debt
data reconciliation, completion of their tripartite debt sustainability analyses (DSAs), and
agreement on appropriate policies with IDA and the IMF. On this basis, five countries were
able to reach their decision points in 1997, and three more in the first half of 1998.
In line with the need of more flexibility provided in the agreed framework of the HIPC
Initiative, five of the six countries reaching their decision points which required assistance
under the Initiative were granted a shortening of the second stage to the completion point.
The shortening, in the case of countries with long-time and strong reform programs (Bolivia,
Guyana, Mozambique and Uganda), was to around one year, subject to continued strong
performance.
Concerning debt sustainability targets, the HIPC framework provided for consideration of
country-specific vulnerability factors, including the concentration and variability of exports
and fiscal indicators of the burden of debt service. The targets for NPV of debt-to-export
ratios were fixed at or near the bottom of the 200 to 250 percent debt sustainability range for
Burkina Faso (205 percent), Mozambique (200 percent) and Uganda (202 percent). For
Bolivia, a 225 percent ratio was agreed, since Bolivia is one of the least vulnerable of the
HIPCs under consideration. In the cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Guyana, which qualified for
HIPC assistance on the basis of the fiscal/openness criteria, the application of the guidelines
resulted in NPV of debt-to-export targets of 141 and 107 percent, respectively. The maximum
debt-service targets of 20-25 percent of exports considered in the framework of the Initiative
                                                
22 IMF and World Bank Development Committee (1998), “The Initiative For Heavily Indebted Poor Countries:
Review and Outlook”, DC/98-15, Washington D.C. September 22.
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have generally not been binding. In five of the six qualifying countries, the debt-service ratio
was projected to be below 20 percent at the completion point even without HIPC relief. In the
case of Bolivia, however, the debt service ratio (before HIPC debt relief) was expected to
remain above the 20-25 percent sustainability range agreed under the framework for several
years after the completion point. Creditors were therefore urged to front load their assistance
under the Initiative— as is being done by the Bank and the IMF— and thus reduce debt-
service obligations to as close to 20 percent of exports as possible.
The HIPC assistance committed to the six qualifying countries that reached their decision
points by July 1998 amounted to about US$3 billion in NPV terms, and US$5.6 billion in
estimated nominal debt-service relief over time. In NPV terms, bilateral creditors as a group
agreed to provide about 46 percent of the total and multilateral institutions 54 percent. Based
on their respective shares of the debt, the World Bank provided about 45 percent of the total
multilateral debt relief agreed so far, the IMF 17 percent, the IDB 13 percent and the AfDB
12 percent. Creditors were committed to deliver the agreed debt relief at the countries’
individual completion points. The Bank provides some relief earlier by substituting IDA
grants for IDA credits during the interim period for eligible countries. The Paris Club has also
provided interim debt relief for countries, which did not have existing stock-of-debt
operations— namely Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique— by increasing the NPV reduction
under flow rescheduling from 67 to 80 percent. For the six qualifying HIPCs that reached
their decision points so far, the reduction in NPV of debt from HIPC assistance at the
completion point was projected to range from 6 percent in Côte d’Ivoire to 57 percent in
Mozambique. The HIPC assistance package for Mozambique was by far the largest of those
approved; to ensure debt sustainability at the completion point, Mozambique wais expected
to receive assistance of over US$1.4 billion in NPV terms, or US$2.9 billion in nominal debt-
service relief, equivalent to 70 percent of GDP. The debt burden of the eight countries that
reached their decision points in the first two years of the HIPC Initiative (including the two
HIPCs deemed sustainable) was expected to drop substantially over the medium term. The
NPV of debt of these countries was projected to decline by a third between 1996 and 1998
and an additional 7 percent by the year 2000. This trend reflects both debt relief under
traditional mechanisms and the projected impact of HIPC assistance.
Co-ordination with Paris Club creditors in implementing the HIPC Initiative was been close.
IMF staff took the lead in consultations with bilateral creditors, working with Paris Club
creditors both in assisting the reconciliation of debt figures and in seeking creditors views’ on
the DSA assessments and their commitment to providing the assistance envisaged under the
HIPC Initiative. This was a particularly lengthy process in the case of Mozambique, as the
bilateral effort required for fully proportional burden sharing exceeded Lyon terms (80
percent NPV relief on eligible medium- and long-term debt). After prolonged discussions, it
was agreed that the difference between the two approaches would be covered by a
combination of additional exceptional efforts from bilateral creditors and donors, and the
Bank and the IMF, but that this should not be a precedent for future cases.
Uganda became the first country to reach its completion point under the HIPC Initiative in
April 1998. An updated DSA found the NPV of debt-to-export ratio at the completion
point— at 196 percent after the committed debt relief— lower than the target of 202 percent,
but well within the plus/minus 10 percentage point margin envisaged under the HIPC
framework. Paris Club creditors of Uganda agreed in April 1998 on a stock-of-debt reduction
of 80 percent under Lyon terms. As a result of HIPC assistance, Uganda’s debt service will
be reduced by about 20 percent, compared to that after traditional debt-relief mechanisms, or
US$30 million annually over the next ten years, and by about US$22 million, or 10 percent,
for the following decade. Uganda is expected to use the savings to support the
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implementation of a number of social programs, including, in particular, the Universal
Primary Education Plan and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan.
Another case cited by the IMF and the World Bank to demonstrate the success of impact of
the HIPC initiative in action was, in particular, the case of Mozambique.
Debt relief under the HIPC Initiative will amount to $4.3 billion. The Initiative will cut the
debt by 72 percent (in present value terms). As a result, Mozambique's annual debt service
payments will be reduced by up to two-thirds over the coming decade, to less than four
percent of yearly export earnings and seven percent of government revenue beginning in
2002.
4. The Enhamced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC-2)
Given the limited results after more than two years it has been in place and the consensus on
the fact that more could and needed to be done, in late January 1999, the German Chancellor
Schröder announced the Cologne Debt Initiative. At the G-7 Summit in Cologne, world
leaders committed themselves to provide a major impetus to the HIPC Initiative. In 1999 the
Boards of the World Bank and IMF have called for a comprehensive review of the HIPC
Initiative, including updated cost estimates.
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The enhanced HIPC Initiative adopted by the Boards of the Bank and the IMF in the fall of
1999 aimed at accelerating the delivery of HIPC Initiative assistance and linking debt relief
more firmly and transparently to poverty reduction23. At the same time, the enhancements
more than doubled the amount of relief projected to be provided under the Initiative.
The enhancements provide broader, deeper and faster debt relief mainly through:
(i) a lowering of the ratios considered to provide debt sustainability (together with a
lowering of the minimum thresholds to qualify for the openness/fiscal criteria),
(ii) replacing the principally fixed three-year period between decision and completion
points by the concept of a floating completion point, and
(iii) the provision of interim relief from some creditors between the decision point and the
completion point.
In order to accelerate the provision of debt relief, the provision of interim assistance
beginning at the decision point, and the adoption of a “floating completion point” represented
the two main changes to the original Initiative.
The underlying objective of the enhanced Initiative is to channel the government resources
freed up because of debt relief into poverty reduction programs. Under the programs being
negotiated by the World Bank and the IMF with countries eligible for debt relief, government
                                                
23 B. G. Gunter (2001), “Does the HIPC Initiative Achieve its Goal of Debt Sustainability?”, in the
WIDER/UNU Conference on Debt Relief Helsinki, Finland, 17-18 August.
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spending on public services—such as preventive health care and primary education—that
directly affect the poor must increase.
Linking debt service relief to poverty reduction
The initiative calls for countries to prepare a comprehensive, “country owned” poverty
reduction strategy before completing the initiative.
First, HIPC debt relief is primarily targeted at lowering external debt to sustainable levels,
with benefits accruing over time and not only in the short run. The time profile of HIPC
assistance may differ from that of desirable changes in social spending. Second, the fiscal
space created by HIPC debt relief for direct increases in social expenditures is determined by
the size of the actual cash flow savings generated by debt reduction. And may not be in some
cases very large in the early years, when compared to debt service paid in the past, especially
in the case of countries where not all debt service due was in fact being paid. Third,
governments are often faced with absorptive capacity constraints to implement social
programs expeditiously and efficiently. HIPC debt relief should be used in such a way as to
maximise development effectiveness. Finally, when considering the resources available for
social development, it should be recognised that most HIPCs are already receiving large
positive net transfers from creditors and donors that enable them to pursue their development
agenda. Debt relief should not be seen as a substitute for continued inflows of development
finance.
Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) will be introduced, country-by-country, according
to a timetable that is as ambitious as possible while recognising these constraints; and is
country-driven, reflecting the government’s stated commitment to poverty reduction. For
HIPCs generally, the PRSPs will need to include clear, monitorable key actions that would
allow, if endorsed by the two Boards, a country to reach its completion point under the HIPC
Initiative. It is also essential in this context that all available resources are integrated in a
transparent, accountable budgetary framework, which could include poverty/social funds, to
ensure their effective use to combat poverty. For HIPCs that have already reached their
decision or completion points under the original framework, additional debt relief will be
assessed based on their progress in designing and implementing their poverty reduction
strategy24.
This approach underpins a proposed tri-partite (government/Bank/IMF) PRSP and provides
the basis for ensuring that HIPC debt relief is an integral part of poverty reduction efforts.
The use of PRSPs would be pioneered in the ESAF/IDA pilot cases for enhanced Bank-Fund
collaboration and in HIPC countries where it would also provide a basis for ensuring a robust
link between debt relief and poverty reduction25.
Interim assistance and the interim PRSP
In order to facilitate the eligibility of HIPCs, the concept of an Interim PRSP was introduced
as a requested demonstration of good track records towards the implementation of a full
PRSP. In September 1999, the Development and Interim Committees endorsed a new
framework for Bank and Fund efforts to support our low-income members. Under this
approach, building on the principles of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF),
                                                
24 IMF and the World Bank (1999), IMF and IDA Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Status and Next Steps,
Washington D.C., November 19.
25 IMF and World Bank Development Committee (1999), Building Poverty Reduction Strategies in Developing
Countries, Washington D.C., September 27, 1999.
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nationally-owned, participatory poverty reduction strategies (PRSs)—embodied in PRSPs—
form the basis for Bank and Fund concessional lending and for debt relief under the enhanced
HIPC Initiative. Since the Boards’ discussions of the first interim PRSP (I-PRSP) in January
2000, momentum has been building steadily. By mid-September, 15 poverty reduction
strategy papers had been considered by the Boards—13 I-PRSPs and two full PRSPs. Several
other countries have either prepared I-PRSPs or are in advanced stages of drafting them.
While we have a relatively small sample of country experiences to draw on, there have been a
number of positive developments, and some emerging areas of concern.
The interim PRSP can serve as a basis for taking a country to a decision point within the
enhanced HIPC process. In an interim PRSP, a government should convey its commitment to
poverty reduction, indicate its overall strategic goals and programs to address the issue, and
define an action plan that would eventually lead to the articulation and adoption of a PRSP in
a participatory process. The companion PRSP paper discusses in greater detail the early
experience with this process. The provision of interim assistance from the decision point
enables countries to benefit from debt relief while still preparing a full PRSP and putting in
place other policy measures and actions that may be required for reaching the completion
point. Interim assistance effectively reduces the burden of debt service payments on HIPCs
while they prepare a full PRSP so that this can be done with due care and diligence.
Under the enhanced Initiative all creditors are encouraged to provide some portion of their
total assistance to each eligible country during the interim period. Interim assistance had been
provided under the original Initiative by bilateral creditors in the Paris Club through flow
rescheduling involving an NPV reduction of 80 percent on eligible debt. This interim
assistance has now been topped-up by the Paris Club to 90 percent (or higher if needed)
under Cologne terms.
The predominant method of delivering relief on IDA debt will be through debt service relief.
IDA delivers debt service relief, beginning at the decision point, with the aim of delivering its
full share of debt relief to a country within 20 years after the decision point. Within this
overall 20-year objective, IDA would provide annually, relief of not less than 50 percent of
the IDA debt service due on the amounts disbursed and outstanding at the reference year
when enhanced HIPC assistance is calculated. This level of debt service forgiveness would
apply during the interim period, with maximum interim relief equal to one-third of the total
NPV to be provided by IDA.
The IMF, subject to receipt of satisfactory financing assurances from other creditors, is
committed to deliver interim assistance in the form of grants. These grants are paid into a
country’s account, administered by the IMF as Trustee, and used to help meet the country’s
debt service payments to the IMF. A country may receive as much as 20 percent of total IMF
assistance (i.e., 20 percent of the total IMF share of relief for the country) each year during
the interim period, up to the total annual debt service due to the IMF by that country. Interim
assistance is not to exceed 60 percent of the overall IMF assistance.
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the European Union, the European
Investment Bank, and OPEC Fund, are either providing or have indicated their willingness to
provide interim assistance. The African Development Bank agreed on its modalities for
participation in the enhanced framework, including provision of interim relief. Other
multilateral development banks (MDBs) have been considering modalities to participate in a
similar fashion.
Floating completion point
The second modification to the original framework designed to accelerate delivery of debt
relief was the adoption of floating completion points. This eliminated the original three-year
260
interim period in favour of linking the completion point to the development and
implementation of a PRSP, and the implementation of a set of key, pre-defined structural and
social reforms. This places the timing of the completion point more clearly under the control
of country authorities and enhances country-ownership of the reform program. Based on the
assessment by authorities for each of the current decision point countries, the interim period
is expected to average about 15 months. Due to their special nature, the interim period for
retroactive cases is expected to average less than one year.
Similar to the original initiative, the World Bank and IMF prepare a Debt Sustainability
Analysis (DSA) and calculate whether a Paris Club stock-of-debt operation is sufficient to
bring the debt to a sustainable level. The threshold levels to define debt sustainability,
however, have changed somewhat If a Paris Club stock-of-debt operation is not sufficient to
reach a sustainable debt level, the country can go on to the second stage. At this point, all
creditors commit themselves to delivering a certain amount of debt relief at the Completion
Point. The second stage has changed a lot compared to the original initiative:
• The country must implement the PRSP.
• World Bank and IMF provide ‘front-loaded’ interim debt service reduction, instead of
providing IDA grants rather than IDA-credits, as proposed in the original initiative.
• Other multilateral and bilateral creditors provide interim debt service reduction. Paris
Club creditors offer flow rescheduling involving NPV reduction of up to 90% - instead of
the original 80% - on eligible debt.
When the country reaches the Completion Point, the creditors deliver the debt relief agreed at
the Decision Point, minus the interim-assistance delivered in the second stage. Paris Club
creditors have agreed to offer up to 90% stock of debt relief. Some creditors have announced
their intention to go beyond this unilaterally and cancel up to 100% of export credits,
including post cut-off date debts. Countries must seek equivalent treatment from non-Paris
Club bilateral and commercial creditors. Multilateral creditors deliver additional debt relief so
that countries reach debt sustainability targets.
Deeper Debt Relief
Under the enhanced framework, the target sustainability ratios were lowered to provide a
greater cushion against unanticipated economic shocks to export earnings. This is intended to
increase the probability of a permanent exit from unsustainable debt, and to significantly
lower debt-service payments, freeing up resources to support poverty reduction efforts.
The amended sustainability thresholds under the enhanced HIPC framework are 150 percent
NPV of debt-to-exports and a debt service ratio of 15-20 percent. The fiscal window
threshold was lowered to 250 percent NPV of debt-to-revenues, with qualifying criteria
reduced to 15 percent for the revenues-to-GDP ratio and 30 percent for the exports-to-GDP
ratio.
Tab. 2 - Debt Sustainability Threshold Levels
HIPC I HIPC II
NPV debt-to-exports 200-250% 150%
NPV debt-to-Government Revenues 280% 250%
Qualifying criteria:
- Exports/GDP
- Government Revenue/GDP
- Debt service-to-exports
≥40%
≥20%
20-25%
≥30%
≥15%
10-15%
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The introduction of Poverty reduction and growth facilities (PRGF)
A central objective of the enhanced framework was that countries would prepare credible,
effective and monitorable poverty reduction strategies as the basis for access and use of
extraordinary debt relief and other sources of concessional assistance provided by the Bank,
the Fund, and other development partners. With regard to debt relief, institutional
arrangements and procedures need to be developed to ensure that the savings from debt
service are channelled towards programs linked to poverty reduction.
Bank and Fund teams are collaborating to assess country capabilities and provide guidance to
governments on mechanisms to track and report on poverty-related public spending in
HIPCs. A preliminary assessment of early cases suggests that funds “saved” through debt
relief should be seen as part of the overall budget and monitored through the country’s own
public financial management system. While countries themselves should bear the primary
responsibility for monitoring and reporting, Bank and Fund staffs’ work in this area should
emphasise providing assistance to HIPCs to strengthen their own public expenditure
management systems.
In order to demonstrate the new emphasis on poverty reduction, IMF committed to move
from ESAF to Poverty reduction and growth facilities (PRGF). The core aim of the PRGF is
to arrive at policies that are more clearly focused on economic growth and poverty reduction
and, as a result of better national ownership, more consistently implemented. To achieve this,
PRGF-supported programs are being derived from the PRSPs, and are readily contrasted with
ESAF-supported programs:
• The objective is different: The PRGF explicitly makes poverty reduction a central
goal, whereas under the ESAF poverty reduction was an implicit by-product. Hence,
policies now have to be weighed in terms of their contribution to poverty reduction.
• The relationship with the country's strategy is different: The specific measures
supported by a PRGF loan arrangement have to derive from the poverty reduction
strategy described in the country's PRSP, which is also the basis for all other official
creditor support. The PRGF is therefore part of a more coherent and country-led
approach to poverty-reduction policies, with the macroeconomic and poverty-
reduction elements of the economic program better integrated than in the past.
• The way programs are formulated is different: The Policy Framework Papers (PFP),
the basis of ESAF loan arrangements, were prepared jointly by country officials and
IMF and World Bank staff without broader consultation. PRSPs, and thus PRGF-
supported policy programs, are country-led and incorporate contributions to policy
design from across society. Because PRGF-related documents are published more
extensively than under the ESAF, programs are more transparent, enabling other
donors to use PRSPs as the basis of support as well.
• The nature of conditionality is different: The PRGF's emphasis on country leadership
and enhanced collaboration with the Bank mean that IMF conditionality is less
extensive and more focused on the Fund's core areas of responsibility than before.
• The link with the World Bank is different: the Bank and Fund jointly assess the PRSP,
which then serves as the basis for concessional lending by both institutions. That way,
the two institutions can tailor assistance to fit their respective areas of responsibility in
supporting the PRSP strategy. Thus, there is both more collaboration and a clearer
division of labor.
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These changes should imply: greater transparency; a pro-poor shift in public expenditures;
more focus on governance and accountability for public resources; streamlined
conditionality; and willingness by some donors (such as the United Kingdom and the
European Union), to use the PRSP as a basis for their aid.
Over the longer term, this entails working to strengthening their entire financial management
architecture. In the short-run, Bank and Fund staffs will assist in selected areas of public
expenditure management, including working with those tools currently in place in each
country for monitoring specific types of poverty-oriented spending. Some countries, such as
Rwanda and Malawi, have a basic capacity to program, track and report on poverty-related
recurrent public expenditures and the potential to relate these to social indicators. Other
countries, such as Cameroon, are responding to significant shortcomings in their overall
public expenditure systems by establishing special HIPC-arrangements and accounts to
identify and track spending on poverty related programs. In virtually all cases, technical
assistance and extensive efforts at institution building will continue to be needed.
Long-term debt sustainability
The weakening of commodity prices, notably the double digit declines since 1997 of the
prices of cotton, coffee, cocoa, maize, sugar, and copper, combined with a sharp increase in
oil prices over the past year, has adversely affected a large number of HIPCs that rely heavily
on commodity exports and petroleum imports. As a result, about half of the 41 HIPCs are
estimated to have suffered major terms of trade losses in 1999–2000 compared to 1997.
These developments have created a difficult external environment for many HIPCs as they
seek to maintain macroeconomic stability and establish track records for qualification under
the enhanced HIPC Initiative. They also highlighted the difficulties and challenges many
HIPCs are facing in achieving long-term debt sustainability, a key objective of the HIPC
Initiative.
Debt relief delivered under the enhanced Initiative allows HIPCs to return to external debt
sustainability. However, maintaining external debt at sustainable levels ultimately requires
that HIPCs continue to pursue sound economic policies, in particular timely adjustment to
any economic shocks that may weaken their debt service capacity, prudent debt management,
and adequate financing on appropriate concessional terms. In the context of PRGF- and IDA-
supported programs, many HIPCs have undertaken to accelerate structural and institutional
reforms to improve the efficiency of domestic resource mobilisation and utilisation, thereby
increasing their resilience to adverse external developments.
In view of the continuing large financing needs of many HIPCs, adherence to a policy on new
borrowing that is consistent with long-term debt sustainability will play a particularly
important role in preventing their external debt from rising again to an unsustainable level.
Depending on each country’s specific circumstances, such a policy may require a strict limit
on, or even exclusion in some cases of any, new borrowing by the public sector on non-
concessional terms. It may also entail a need for restraint on borrowing on concessional
terms, and renewed efforts to shift concessional external financing from loans to grants.
Clearly, such a policy also entails action by donor agencies to provide financing for poverty
expenditures and development projects. Again, the sustainability must be implicitly referred
to commitments and actions from the lenders’ side of debt game.
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THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES ENHANCED  (HIPC-2) INITIATIVE
Summary
First Stage
Country established three-year track record of good performance and develops together with civil society a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); in early cases, an interim PRSP may be sufficient to reach the decision point.
Paris Club
Other
Multilateral institutions
 provides flow rescheduling as per current Naples terms, i.e. Rescheduling of debt service on eligible 
debt falling due during the three-year consolidation period (up to 67 percent reduction on eligible maturities on 
a net present value basis).
 bilateral and commercial creditors provide at least comparable treatment.
 continue to provide support within the framework of a comprehensive poverty 
reduction strategy designed by governments, with broad participation of civil society and donor community.
Exit Eligible
Second Stage
Or... Paris Club stock-of-debt operation 
(on Naples terms) not sufficient for the 
country's overall debt to become 
sustainable by the completion point-
country requests additional support 
under the HIPC Debt Initiative
All creditors (multilateral, bilateral, and commercial) 
commit debt relief to be delivered at the floating 
completion point. The amount of assistance depends 
on the need to bring the debt to a sustainable level at 
the decision point. This is calculated based on latest 
available data at the decision point.
· ... Paris Club stock-of-
Debt operation under Naples
terms (up to 67 percent
present value reduction of
eligible debt) and comparable
treatment by other bilateral
and commercial creditors is
adequate for the country to
reach sustainability by the
completion point-country
not eligible for HIPC Debt
Initiative.
Either
-  provide interim assistance.
• Oher multilateral and bilateral creditors and donors 
provide interim debt relief at their discretion.
-  continue to provide support within the 
framework of a comprehensive poverty reduction 
strategy designed by governments, with broad 
participation of civil society and donor community.
World Bank and IMF
All creditors
“Floating” Completion Point
Timing of completion point is tied to the implemention of policies determined at the decision point.All 
creditors provide the assistance determined at the decision point; interim debt relief provided between 
decision and completion points counts towards this assistance:
-  goes beyond Naples terms to provide more concessional debt reduction of up to 90 percent in 
NPVterms (and if needed even higher) on eligible debt so as to achieve an exit from unsustainable debt.
-  provide at least comparable treatment on stock of debt.
-  institutions take additional measures, as may be needed, for the country's debt to be reduced to 
a sustainable level, each choosing from a menu of options, and ensuring broad and equitable participation by 
all creditors involved.
Paris Club
Other bilateral and commercial creditors
Multilateral
Country establishes a second track record by implementing the policies determined at the decision point 
(which are triggers to reaching the floating completion point) and linked to the (interim) PRSP.
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Financing the enhanced HIPC Initiative
More debt relief means higher cost to creditors. Positive developments to date and the
initiatives being taken to accelerate implementation risk being undermined if further rapid
progress is not made on financing. Total costs for the enhanced HIPC Initiative have been
estimated at US$28.5 billion in end-1999 NPV terms—a slight increase compared to the
original HIPC costing. The breakdown between bilateral and multilateral creditors has
remained roughly even. Paris Club members account for most of bilateral creditor costs
(US$11 billion in NPV terms), and IDA, the IMF, AfDB, and IaDB account for the bulk of
multilateral creditor costs (in NPV, US$6.2, $2.2, $2.4, and $1.2 billion, respectively).
Commitments from bilateral creditors have mostly come from Paris Club creditors (many of
which have announced bilateral debt relief beyond their assistance under the HIPC Initiative,
according to G8 Köln meeting). The staffs have been working on a case-by-case basis with
non-Paris Club official creditors to discuss their participation, recognising the difficulties
some of them face - especially those that themselves qualify for assistance under the
Initiative, such as Tanzania.
Meanwhile, there has been steady progress in securing confirmation of participation from
multilateral creditors. The African Development Fund’s Deputies agreed on the financing for
its participation in the HIPC Initiative for the near term countries. A financing framework has
been agreed for the Inter-American Development Bank, but donor pledges remain to be
secured, holding up the release of IMF interim assistance to Honduras. More generally,
shortfalls in resources could emerge in the next future.
Tab. 3 -  Status of Paris Club Rescheduling SSA Countries as of End-July 2001
Countries that graduated from
rescheduling
Countries with rescheduling
agreements in effect
Countries with previous
rescheduling agreements, but
without current rescheduling
agreements, which have not
graduated from rescheduling
Equatorial Guinea (1)
Uganda (4)
2/96
9/00
Benin (4)
Burkina Faso (4)
Cameroon (4)
Chad (4)
Ethiopia (4)
Guinea (4)
Guinea-Bissau (4)
Madagascar (4)
Mali (4)
Malawi (4)
Mauritania (4)
Mozambique (3)
Niger (4)
Rwanda (4)
Sao Tome & Principe (2)
Senegal (4)
Tanzania (4)
Zambia (4)
12/01
12/01
12/03
3/03
3/04
4/04
12/03
2/04
12/01
12/03
6/02
12/01
12/03
12/01
4/03
12/01
3/03
3/02
Angola
Central Afric. Rep. (2)
The Côte d'Ivoire (3)
Congo,  Republic of
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Gambia, The
Liberia (4)
Sierra Leone (2)
Somalia
Sudan
Togo (2)
9/90
6/01
3/01
6/99
6/90
9/87
6/85
12/97
12/88
12/84
6/98
Sources:  Paris Club Secretariat; and Fund staff estimates.
(1) denotes rescheduling on London terms, (2) denotes rescheduling on Naples terms, (3) denotes rescheduling
on Lyon terms, and (4) denotes rescheduling on Cologne terms.
Depending on progress with individual country cases, and consistent with the objectives of
the overall funding package for the interim PRGF and the Fund’s contribution to the HIPC
Initiative, the IMF would need to consider carefully whether to continue to provide debt relief
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under the HIPC Initiative beyond late 2001 in the absence of the release of the remainder of
the investment income on the profits from gold transactions. Additional funding is also
required for MDBs other than IDA, a funding need that will become particularly acute as the
decision and completion points for countries with large exposure to the IaDB and AfDB are
reached. IDA itself will require donor-funding beginning around 2005. The Executive Boards
of IDA and the IMF discussed the costing and financing issue at their meetings, and called on
all creditors to meet their obligations under the Initiative as expeditiously as possible, and to
provide the additional financing needed to ensure full implementation of the HIPC Initiative.
5. The implementation of the HIPC-2
As of June 2001, 23 countries have reached their decision point under the enhanced Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative framework and are now receiving debt service
relief under the Initiative which will amount to about US$34 billion over time, or a reduction
of US$20 billion in the net present value (NPV) of their outstanding stock of debt. This is
approximately 70 percent of the total relief projected to be delivered under the Initiative.
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Within these 23 countries, three countries (Bolivia, Mozambique and Uganda) reached its
completion point under the original HIPC Initiative.
The IMF and the World Bank expect that about 35 countries could ultimately qualify for
assistance under the HIPC Initiative. However, roughly a dozen of the countries which have
yet to qualify for HIPC debt relief are either currently engaged in, or have recently ended,
internal or cross-border armed conflict, or are struggling with severe governance problems
which have made it impossible to move forward with HIPC assistance.
For the 23 countries that have reached their decision point so far, the enhanced HIPC
Initiative aims at slashing debt stocks, lowering debt service (compared with actual annual
payments made in 1998-99) and boosting social spending. Within the group of 23 countries,
four countries - Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania, and Senegal – qualified under the fiscal
criterion, 18 countries, which qualified under the export criteria.
Referring to a specific case of implementation, on September 2001, Mozambique became the
third country to reach this point (after Bolivia and Uganda). Debt service relief under the
enhanced HIPC Initiative from all of Mozambique's creditors will amount to approximately
US$600 million. US$306 million in net present value (NPV) terms - this includes an
additional $53 million to be provided in light of revisions that have been made to the debt
data available at the April 2000 decision point. Including assistance provided under the
earlier HIPC Initiative, this brings total estimated debt service relief to about $ 4.3 billion.
As a result of HIPC assistance and bilateral debt relief already committed, Mozambique's
total external debt is reduced by some 73 percent, and possible additional bilateral relief
could raise this figure. The NPV of debt-to-export ratio is expected to remain well below the
target ceiling of 150 percent throughout the period 2000-2020 (averaging 77 percent from
2000-2010; and about 44 percent from 2011-2020).
Debt service payments are cut almost in half (from over $100 million in 1998 to an average
of US$56 million from 2002 to 2010), creating room for additional public expenditures on
poverty reduction. Debt service as a percentage of government revenue is reduced from 23
percent to an average of just under 10 percent over 2000-2010 and 7 percent over 2011 –
2020. Resources made available by debt relief provided under the HIPC Initiative will be
allocated to key anti-poverty programs, which are outlined in Mozambique's Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
Mozambique's PRSP (which is officially designated as the Action Plan for the Reduction of
Absolute Poverty) was approved by Mozambique's Council of Ministers in April 2001. The
PRSP makes explicit the key role of accelerated and broad-based economic growth as a
significant element in Mozambique’s poverty reduction effort, and sets out six priority areas
for continued focus (i) education; (ii) health; (iii) agriculture and rural development; (iv)
basic infrastructure; (v) good governance; and (vi) macroeconomic and financial
management. In a joint assessment, Bank and IMF staff indicated that Mozambique's PRSP
contains a sound strategy for poverty reduction, including its incorporation of inputs from
civil society and key stakeholders. Despite the impact of the floods of early 2000, GDP
growth for 2000 measured 2.1 percent in real terms, reflecting aid-financed reconstruction,
new foreign direct investment, and the start of production at a new aluminium smelter. These
same forces have continued to drive the economy; a return to near double-digit growth is
expected in the near future. Progress was also recorded in a smaller-than-expected primary
deficit, stabilisation of consumer prices after the flood, and a significant narrowing of the
current account deficit as a result of higher net exports from large aluminium and energy
projects. By end-2000, all quantitative criteria were met for the PRGF-supported program.
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Looking at the broad figure, the roughly US$20.7 billion in NPV terms of debt relief
committed to the first 23 enhanced decision point countries amounts to nearly half of their
total stock of external debt in NPV terms. In combination with other co-ordinated debt
reduction mechanisms, the external indebtedness of these countries will be reduced by about
two thirds. Looking at debt as a percentage of GDP, this measurement of indebtedness is
slashed from about 60 percent in 1999 to 28 percent after HIPC relief, some ten percentage
points lower than the average for developing countries overall. Reflecting the reduction in the
HIPCs’ stock of debt, there is a significant reduction in long-term debt service obligations
beginning in 2001, whether measured against debt service paid in the past, due in the future,
or in relation to other economic indicators. For the 23 HIPCs that have reached their
enhanced decision points, overall debt service requirements are cut by one-third, or about
US$1.1 billion annually during the 2001-2003 period, compared with actual annual payments
made in 1998-99. This translates into annual savings per country of close to US$50 million.
Moreover, substantial annual debt service savings will be sustained over the coming two
decades, releasing to governments over the medium to long term predictable amounts of
additional resources for expenditures on poverty reduction programs. And while the absolute
dollar amounts vary across countries, the actual debt service savings for these 23 countries
over the initial years represents an average of 1.2 percent of GDP. The savings, of course, are
even greater when post-HIPC relief debt service obligations are compared to scheduled debt
service due in the absence of debt relief under traditional mechanisms and the HIPC
Initiative. On that basis of comparison, the average annual savings over the coming three
years amount to about US$2.4 billion (of which more than US$1.6 billion is HIPC relief), or
2.7 percent of GDP.
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6. Recent changes of perspectives on the Current HIPC Framework
The official documentation and data provided by the IMF and World Bank on HIPC Initiative
implementation give us a detailed description of good performance and results. As we will
describe in chapter 8, the picture is quite different from those analyses of other “actors”, who
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are interested in debt game: international civil society. An important result can be directly
derived from these critical external comments to HIPC Initiative, in terms of less enthusiasm
of IMF and World Bank for the initiative ‘s outcomes. In fact, on April 2001, the Staffs of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund presented a report, "The Challenge of
Maintaining Long-Term External Debt Sustainability". They admit, for the first time, that
HIPC Initiative will not necessarily represent the final exit solution to escape from
unsustainable debt, for those poor countries having reached their completion point. This
report assesses the extent to which the enhanced HIPC Initiative provides a solid basis for
sustainability for the 22 countries, which have reached their decision points under the
Initiative. The paper is based on the detailed Debt Sustainability Analyses for these countries
and investigates what additional actions will be needed to ensure that debt sustainability is
maintained over the longer term. This document stresses that:
• To assess long-term debt sustainability, the focus of attention must shift away from this
single debt indicator to a more complex and comprehensive view of the development
process in which policies, institutions, exogenous factors and debt management play an
integral role over time.
• While HIPC Initiative assistance will substantially reduce the debt service due on existing
debt, maintaining external debt at sustainable levels will depend critically on future
policies and growth performance of the HIPCs and on support from the creditor/donor
community.
• This restricted objective of HIPC Initiative requires a focus on overall debt sustainability
as an exit strategy from the rescheduling process, a focus on a country’s track record to
ensure that HIPC debt relief will be put to good use, and a focus on the concessionality of
new external finance, including grants, for countries benefiting from HIPC debt relief.
• long-term debt sustainability will only be achieved if the fundamental causes that
triggered the debt build-up in the first place have been redressed. Those fundamental
causes include some external factors such as worsening terms of trade and protectionist
policies that restrict access to export markets. HIPCs, typically the poorest members of
the international community, have a narrow production and export base, heavily
dependent upon a few primary commodities, which make them particularly vulnerable to
external shocks. Future borrowing on market terms will exacerbate the debt burden of
many of these countries.
• Fiscal policies are very important. To the extent to which external imbalances are the
result of fiscal imbalances (and they often are in SSA case), fiscal consolidation,
including tax reform to strengthen the fiscal payments capacity, is a key factor in
achieving debt sustainability. Prudent budgeting and reorienting of expenditures from
non-productive (such as military expenditures) to growth enhancing activities within a
medium-term framework would also help achieve a sustainable fiscal position.
• Longer-term growth prospects can be undermined by natural disasters, war, or health
threats such as the AIDS epidemic affecting many of the HIPCs, particularly several
decision point cases such as Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia. In such cases, in the absence
of adequate grant financing, external indebtedness (and the NPV-of-debt to exports ratio)
may need to rise to accommodate the financing of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
• Raising the past average annual growth rate by 2-3 percentage points (as projected in the
scenarios underlying the DSAs) over a decade should be not easy. A permanent 5 to 6
percent growth path is not feasible, and growth performance similar to the past decades
will not ensure long-term debt sustainability. The impact of lower growth targets would
be very negative.
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Source: World Bank (2001), World Development Indicators
• Trade policy is an area where trade partners should focus their efforts. The share of
HIPCs in international trade has been eroding since the 1970s, down from 2.2 percent of
world exports to only 0.7 percent in 1997 (see next Table 1. HIPC Initiative). Even as a
proportion of developing countries’ exports, HIPCs’ share has fallen from 8 percent to 2
percent over the same period.
• Rates of return on investment in the HIPCs have typically been low. It has been estimated
that African HIPCs would need to increase their savings and investment levels
substantially in order to achieve the international development goals over the next 10-15
years: at least, at 30 percent of GDP26.
• African HIPCs need to be integrated in the world economy, even though there has been
an almost complete withdrawal of commercial creditors from lending to the HIPCs. The
share of commercial debt in total new disbursements down from one-third in 1980 to
below 10 percent in 1990, and less than 1 percent by 1999.
• Even though a very good growth performance is assumed, nevertheless the NPV of debt-
to-exports ratio of Malawi and Niger is projected to remain above 150 percent for 10
years or more. Export trends are important explanatory factors: Malawi had high tobacco
exports before the decision point, while Niger is expected to face a continued decline in
its main export, uranium.
                                                
26 World Bank (2000), “Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century”, Washington D.C.
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• In addition to lower export growth, the assumed level of new finance can have a
significant impact on the debt stock ratios, and the terms of new borrowing can have a
significant impact on the debt service ratios. The assumptions contained in the DSAs,
including the volume of grants, and the terms and concessionality of new borrowing, have
important implications for long-term sustainability in the HIPCs. While the average grant
element of existing debt as of end-1999 for the 22 HIPCs was 30 percent, the DSAs
assume that the average grant element in new borrowing for 2000 to 2010 is twice as high
at 58 percent (80 percent for Niger).
What seems to be particularly important in this document is the fact that, for the first time in
a clear way, the IMF and the World Bank admit that the NPV target of 150 percent of exports
is simply a guideline for determining HIPC debt relief. It is not an absolute level for
sustainability beyond which countries would automatically face debt-servicing problems.
Both the original and enhanced HIPC frameworks begin to acknowledge that debt
sustainability involves other factors such as debt service ratios both in terms of exports and
relative to fiscal capacity. These factors – and real sustainability – are heavily dependent on
lenders’ policies. Some of the critical comments expressed by experts, campaigns and NGOs
seem to have effectively influenced the passage from HIPC to HIPC-2 and from the very
optimistic projections of the past years to the much more prudent conclusions in recent
documents.
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8. External critiques to the HIPC Initiative
1. Premise
As George Bernard Shaw once noted, debts are like any other trap: getting in is easy, but getting out
is pretty hard. Thus, the HIPC Initiative has been welcomed by a broad spectrum of observers as an
important innovation in addressing the external debt crisis. For a long time, the multilateral debt
problem was not even taken seriously. Even though the main part of the poorest SSA countries' debt
repayments went to multilateral creditors, the World Bank and IMF for many years denied that
there was anything like a multilateral debt problem. That’s why the HIPC Initiative is important, not
only because for the first time, creditors acknowledged the problem of multilateral debt, but also
because it is the first comprehensive attempt to deal with the debt crisis. The initiative involves
commercial, bilateral, and multilateral creditors. Following the Group of Seven (G-7) summits in
Toronto (1988), London (1991), and Naples (1994), debt relief provided on eligible debt were 33%,
50%, and 67%, respectively, whereby eligible debt was defined as pre-cut-off-date1, non-ODA
bilateral debt. ODA debt was excluded from debt reduction, but was usually rescheduled. Easterly’s
(1999) characterisation that substantial debt relief has been provided to HIPCs before the HIPC
initiative is misleading as traditional debt relief provided first of all only temporary relief on largely
unpayable debt, and second debt relief was only provided to eligible debt. Indeed, of the 37 low-
income countries that have rescheduled their debt with the Paris Club during the last two decades,
fewer than one-fourth have graduated from the rescheduling process2.
Sachs (1989) and Krugman (1988) have shown that debt relief can be more efficient than the
provision of new loans in cases where debt has accumulated beyond some critical level. During the
early 1990s, empirical evidence grew that many of the poorest countries had acquired unsustainably
high external debt stocks that had a significantly negative impact on investment and growth3.
At the same time, the framework has been subject to a number of critical comments, directly
involving the participation of a great number of civil society organisations, under the common
umbrella of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign4. From a practical point of view, we can try to regroup
different critical comments into some main areas.
2. Definition and targets of debt sustainability
From a general point of view, the rationale for adopting an average target for the debt indicators
remains weak, and the adoption of country-specific targets is a way to tailor debt relief more
accurately to country needs. Insisting on allocating debt relief on the basis of single values of debt
                                                
1 The cut-off-date refers to the date a debtor country approached the Paris Club for the first time for a debt rescheduling.
For many HIPCs this was in the 1980s.
2 IMF Survey, Supplement, Vol. 29, September 2000, p. 17. And, for a historical description of debt relief for low-
income countries from Toronto terms to the HIPC initiative, see Daseking and Powell (1999).
3 The empirical studies showed that unsustainable debt burdens crippled development, especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Borensztein (1990), Cardoso (1993), Cohen (1993), Faini and de Melo (1990), Greene and Villanueva (1991),
Schmidt-Hebbel and Müller (1992), and Serven and Solimano (1993). For more recent evidence see Elbadawi, Ndulu
and Ndung’u (1997) and Gunter (2001).
4 The Jubilee 2000 campaign commenced, with funding from three Christian aid organisations: CAFOD (catholic),
Christian Aid (ecumenical) and Tearfund (evangelical). In 1987, the campaign was launched in the US and elsewhere.
In October of that year, Jubilee 2000 (UK) became a formal coalition of aid agencies. Compared to HIPC, Jubilee 2000
campaign shared aim with HIPC, though it wanted more countries covered and more money spent. It earmarked 52
countries (compared with 41 under HIPC) with debts totalling $350 billion ($205 billion under HIPC) for relief of $200
to $300 billion ($100 billion under HIPC).
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indicators, to countries, whose debt-related problems are surely more diverse and complex than
could possibly be revealed by a unique indicator, increases the risk of ending up allocating available
funding inconsistent with individual country needs. It has been also argued that the target range for
the NPV of debt-to-export ratio is too high either to attain the stated objective of debt sustainability
or to ensure the expansion of public expenditures on basic social services. Some groups have
recommended targets below 200 percent (e.g. 150 percent) and debt-service ratios below 20
percent, while others have argued for maximum relief on humanitarian rather than debt
sustainability grounds, with recommendations ranging from partial to total cancellation of external
debt of poor countries. It is unlikely that the enhanced HIPC Initiative will achieve even its limited
aim of offering an exit from the rescheduling process. More importantly, it is unlikely to free up
sufficient resources to tackle poverty in LDCs. First, several LDCs with significant debt burdens are
not included in the initiative. For instance, Angola is considered to have a sustainable debt burden,
even though all its 1998 debt indicators are above the threshold level and Angola’s arrears almost
quadrupled from US$700 million (or 8% of total debt) in 1990 to US$2,704 (22% of total debt) in
1998. As Unctad puts it: “There has been a persistent tendency to underestimate what has been
needed, which has in itself contributed to the build up of the debt”5.  Attempts to significantly
reduce the burden of bilateral debt through Paris Club debt negotiations failed, mainly because of
the exclusion of large part of the debt, as the case of Uganda demonstrates. In 1995 Uganda
received a 67% stock reduction, but mainly because previously rescheduled debt was excluded, its
US$3.2 billion debt stock only decreased by 3,2%. The problem is, first of all, that the threshold
levels to measure debt sustainability are arbitrary and still too high. When the concept of debt
sustainability is approached from a human and social development perspective many more LDCs
have an unsustainable debt level6.
Thus, another important problem is that sustainability is defined in economic terms and not in terms
of human and social development. This in spite of the fact that many in the international community
think that debt needs to be seen in a broader context and that a human development perspective
must be incorporated into the HIPC Initiative. The human and social development perspective
should measure how much debt servicing is “affordable” as a percentage of government revenues,
explicitly acknowledging that the scarce resources available to LDC governments should first be
used to meet the basic human needs of their population. The HIPC definition of debt sustainability
assumes that a country can meet its current and future external debt servicing obligations in full,
without recourse to further debt relief, rescheduling or accumulation of arrears, and without
compromising growth. Sustainability implies a permanent “exit” from the rescheduling process. But
this definition is too narrow from an overall development perspective.
Based on earlier work of Cafod and Jubilee 2000, Eurodad supports a new bottom-up approach to
define debt sustainability, the “affordable debt-service approach”. Starting point of this approach is
that resources available to LDCs’ governments must be first used for essential expenditures that are
necessary to fight poverty: clean water, primary health care, education and basic infrastructure.
Government revenues that are left after these essential expenditures can then be spent on other
important but less essential items, such as capital expenditure, civil infrastructure, police, security,
domestic debt servicing – and external debt repayments.
In short, the approach defines how much a country can spend on external debt servicing, after it has
made sufficient investments in social and economic development and after domestic debt has been
serviced. Of course, this will differ for each individual country. This approach requires projecting
what realistic potential fiscal revenues might be.
                                                
5 Unctad, Least Developed Countries 2000 Report, p139.
6 Sachs et al. (1999).
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Tab. 1 - Simple method to calculate Affordable Debt Service
1.  Domestic budget revenue                         -
2.  Essential spending on poverty reduction  -
16. Domestic debt repayments x 20%          =
-------------------------------------------------------
4.  Net Feasible Revenue
                                                        x 20%    =
-------------------------------------------------------
5.  Affordable debt service
Eurostep proposes a methodology to project fiscal revenues. A tax threshold is set at the normal
international poverty line of $1 per day (conventionally taken as $1 /day at purchasing power of
1985 US dollars). Anyone living below this poverty line is held to be unlikely to be contributing
any tax at all. For the better off, tax is paid as normal, but with a tax break of $1 per day. The rest of
GDP is considered taxable, with a maximum tax rate of 25% (higher rates could be distortionary).
This gives a figure for potential government revenues. Another, simpler method would be to look at
recent fiscal receipts. The Cafod paper sets out the basis for $16 per capita spending on primary
health care and $12 per capita spending on education and basic infrastructure. The drawback of this
simple approach is that it does not reflect the variety of poverty reduction needs in HIPCs and that
is probably too low. For instance, the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report estimates that an
extra $80 billion must be spent annually on the 1.3 billion people living in poverty. This is an
additional $62 spending for each person living under the $1 per day.
The HIPC initiative has been designed around the concept of what debt reduction is needed,
according to inappropriate debt sustainability indicators instead of what debt reduction is needed for
sustainable development. It does not deal with issues of domestic debt, which are important for
fiscal sustainability, nor does it measure the adequacy of public resources to address priority
development programs after debt service has been paid. The basic indicators7 don’t reflect the
burden of debt. Their emphasis is on debt stock rather than debt service and, from a resources
perspective, it is debt servicing that counts. In addition, the focus is on exports. Exports are an
important source of foreign exchange, which is needed for debt repayments. But the debt-to-export
ratio can be misleading as rapid growth in exports does not always translate into more budgetary
resources for the government, and the volatility of currency and commodity markets also make the
debt-to-export ratio an unreliable benchmark to predict debt sustainability in the medium term8.
And the threshold to 150% is high, compared to the fact that research suggests that the historical
present value of debt-to-export threshold level for HIPCs is 140%.
3. The adoption of fiscal criteria
In the mid-1990s debt analysts and policymakers began looking beyond the traditional balance-of-
payments perspective to debt problems, by adopting a fiscal approach. This shift in emphasis rested
on the empirical observation that the bulk of poor country debt was (and is) a public sector liability.
                                                
7 a net present value of debt-to-exports ratio of 150%, a net present value of debt-to-government revenue of 250% - if
the exports/GDP ratio is 30% or more and the government revenue/GDP ratio is 15% or more -, a debt-service-to-
exports ratio of 15%.
8 As pointed out in the Unctad Least Developed Countries 2000 Report, LDCs exhibit a high degree of vulnerability to
external shocks and they are highly dependent on external financial resources. The government has limited control over
its own finances: its income depends to a large degree on tax revenues related to raw material exports and spending is
conditioned by aid flows and debt service requirements. The unpredictability of debt service obligations discourages
private investors.
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At the heart of the debt capacity of the public sector is what has become known as the “internal
transfer problem”. If the government uses most of the borrowed funds for investments in such areas
as infrastructure, education, health services, etc., the sustainable level of debt that the government
can take on will depend on different factors. Not only on the relationship between the marginal
social return on these investments and the marginal cost of borrowing, but also on the governments
ability to appropriate sufficient domestic resources (through more tax revenue) for debt service. The
fiscal source of debt service problems is thus evident if taxation is not expanded commensurately
with maturing public debt service obligations 9. The inclusion of a fiscal target in the HIPC debt
initiative is thus a reflection of a legitimate concern for the fiscal sustainability of poor country
debt.
A number of commentators think that the framework gives insufficient attention to the fiscal burden
of public debt. They argue that debt relief should not be based only on the foreign exchange burden
of public debt, but also directly on the government’s debt-servicing capacity, as this would establish
a more direct link to social expenditures, and increase debt relief. These commentators recognise
that this would likely complicate the framework, as it would also require dealing with domestic debt
and tax and expenditure issues. However, they feel that complementing the current framework with
a fiscal criterion could likely result in lower debt-sustainability targets than under the current
approach. The fiscal criterion is a more appropriate indicator, but it should be referred to a flow
perspective rather than a stock one, and the threshold should be lower. For example, Sachs (2000)
has expressed the view that the HIPC sustainability criteria have nothing to do with debt
sustainability in any real sense. Indeed, the HIPC initiative neglects standard debt-to-GNP ratios
and is far too restrictive in the application of the fiscal indicator10. Evidence is growing that the only
useful debt sustainability criteria for HIPCs have to be related to fiscal indicators. The NPV debt-to-
government revenue indicator could – together with poverty levels and other country specific
vulnerability factors – be used for the assessment of the long-term debt sustainability11. A debt
service-to-government revenue indicator could – together with needed investments for anti-poverty
programs – be used to determine the maximum annual debt service due. In any case, there should be
no minimum thresholds to apply these fiscal indicators. Furthermore, countries should not be
discouraged to improve their revenue collection and should at the same time not be punished (in
form of lower HIPC assistance) for improvements in government revenue collection. Thus, the
reference revenue components should be based on long-term backward looking averages ending
with the year before the modification gets adopted as a framework, not the country-specific decision
point. Referring to the SSA countries, more than ten years ago, Dittus (1989) had analysed the
budgetary dimension of the debt crisis in low-income Sub-Saharan Africa and suggested to assign
the debt service-to-revenue ratio a central role. But, as regards the fiscal dimension of the HIPC
Initiative, the procedure for opening the fiscal window appears to be unsatisfactory. In fact, most of
the countries that have reached decision point have used the export window. This emphasis on
export-led strategies rather than on fiscal component of development (through public expenditures
and revenues) is much more coherent with the market-oriented approach of neo-liberal
                                                
9 See: P. Hjertholm (2001), Debt Relief And The Rule of Thumb: Analytical History of Hipc Debt Sustainability
Targets, Paper for a WIDER Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, August. With respect to the indebted low-income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, a study by Hjertholm (1997) found that fiscal debt burden indicators played a
significant role in explaining the poor debt service performance of a large number of sub-Saharan African countries.
This study for 20 sub-Saharan African countries, while not generating strong evidence for the narrow debt overhang
hypothesis, showed clear evidence of the broad hypothesis in that public debt burdens had several (indirect) effects that
were transmitted through macroeconomic variables, such as the inflation rate, exchange rates and exceptional financing.
10 These budgetary aspects of the transfer problem have been analysed by Dani Rodrik and especially by Helmut
Reisen, see Hjertholm (1999) for further references.
11 A further sustainability criterion of having a debt service to government revenue ratio of no greater than 12%, is
suggested by Martin (2001).
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marketisation. Unsatisfying is the attached twin conditions that only very open economies with a
strong government tax effort are allowed to benefit from the fiscal window. It is still clear that many
HIPC countries are not going to benefit from the HIPC II fiscal window, since their tax efforts are
often well below the threshold stipulated of 15 percent as a precondition for additional debt relief 12.
Indeed that is one of the reasons why they have a fiscal problem in the first place13.
Moreover, As argued by Esquivel et al. (1998), the application of the joint tax-openness criteria
tends to produce an undesired biased treatment of HIPC countries. It does so by penalizing those
countries that are undertaking a substantial tax effort since the implied target value of the debt-to-
exports ratio (in present value terms) tends to increase as the tax rate increases, and by rewarding
countries that are highly export dependent since the implied target value of the debt-to-export ratio
tends to fall as the export-to-GDP ratio rises. So only highly open countries with a moderate tax
effort are going to benefit from this amendment to the HIPC scheme, although it was intended (or
so one would like to think) to deal with the fiscal aspect of the debt of all HIPC countries.
4. Criteria of country eligibility
As a direct consequence of incorrect adoption of criteria of sustainability, some groups consider the
eligibility criteria to be overly restrictive. They criticise the restriction to poor countries below the
IDA operational cut-off as excluding some highly indebted countries that could benefit from relief,
though most commentators agree that the poorest countries should have the highest priority in
concessional debt relief. Some have suggested that human development criteria be developed as
substitute for the NPV of debt-to-export and debt-service-to-export ratios, as measures of
sustainability. Others have questioned why it is necessary to exhaust traditional mechanisms in a
few cases where multilateral debt is dominant while the benefits of bilateral debt relief may be
offset by reduced flows of new aid.
For example, Nigeria is highly indebted: its NPV debt-to-export ratio is estimated to be 188% (38%
higher than what is considered to be sustainable under the enhanced framework). It is also a poor
country: GDP per capita is below US$300 a year and more than 70% of its 120 million population
live in absolute poverty (below one dollar-a-day). The official reason for Nigeria’s exclusion from
the group of HIPCs is that Nigeria does - due to its large oil reserves - not rely on IDA assistance. In
other words, it is expected that Nigeria extracts and sells its oil to generate the foreign exchange and
revenues necessary to repay its external debt, most of which was contracted by corrupt previous
governments.
In reality, to be very restrictive in terms of country eligibility to debt relief means to avoid to
involve “big” debtors – as non- IDA middle income countries -, which could be much more
expensive for official and commercial lenders.
5. Timing of debt relief
The performance period to receive HIPC debt relief has frequently been perceived by outside
commentators as too long and as unnecessarily delaying and reducing the potential benefits of the
                                                
12 . As noted by Tanzi and Blejer (1988), experience shows that it is very difficult to substantially raise the level of
taxation in the short or medium term. Tanzi and Blejer reports from that experience that, unlike in industrial countries,
no developing country had been able to raise the tax ratio by ten or twenty percentage points in a matter of one or two
decades, or, for that matter, by just several percentage points in a few years. But this is precisely what is asked for in the
HIPC context. Moreover, this scenario may then contradict the advice usually given to developing countries about the
criticality of expanding the tax base as the primary source of higher government revenue. This advice is based on the
assumption that higher tax rates, even if their initial values are relatively low, often act to discourage investment
activity.
13 See: P. Hjertholm (2001), ibid.
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HIPC Initiative. In particular, in the early cases (e.g. Uganda and Bolivia), where countries had
already established track records of more than the required six years of good policy performance,
there was criticism that the shortening of the interim period should have been more pronounced or
even that the decision point should have coincided with the completion point. Some observers have
argued that more weight should be given to past performance and the depth of reform, rather than
only the length of the track record. They also stressed that delays in the receipt of HIPC debt relief
have a high cost in terms of forgone social services. Some case studies demonstrate that the HIPC
relief comes too late to address adverse impacts and too little to meet poverty targets. This calls on
debtor countries to concentrate on complementary measures and the HIPC initiative to undergo
refinements like addressing the time lag between decision and completion points, and incorporating
ratio of recurrent expenditure as a threshold level14.
Again, in reality it is clear that to make the HIPC Initiative implementation faster means to oblige
donor countries to finance faster the HIPC Trust Fund, which can be undesirable.
6. Amount of debt relief
Another main problem is that the debt reduction on HIPC offer is too small.
· Debt service is still squeezing out much needed expenditure in health and education and, in
HIV/AIDS afflicted countries, preventing countries deal with, or exacerbating the HIV/AIDS
epidemic (Oxfam,2000; Eurodad 2000; Drop the Debt 2001; World Development Movement,
2001).
· Countries still face increasing debt service payment (Oxfam, 2000; Jubilee 2000, 2000; DFI,
2001).
· Projections of future export levels and government revenues are overoptimistic and do not take
adequate account of HIPC countries’ vulnerability to shocks (DFI, 2001).
Zambia will actually pay more debt service in the years 2001-2005 than they did in 1998-99,
implying that no fund is freed at all. For five out of sixteen HIPC-LDCs for which data are
available, the NPV of debt to export level in 2005 is still above the IMF and World Bank threshold
ratio of 150%. In addition, some countries will see much volatility in debt servicing, severely
disrupting government budget processes. Furthermore, after 2005, debt service levels start rising
again. For eleven out of the thirteen HIPC-LDCs, for which post-2005 debt service data are
available, debt service starts to increase after 2005 and for nine HIPC-LDCs, future levels are far
above present debt service levels. The fact that all HIPC-LDCs are projected to have sustainable
debt levels in 2018 cannot be attributed to declining debt levels, but to predictions of improved
economic performance. As has been the case in the past, however, these projections are very
optimistic, and there is a real risk that in the long run, most HIPC-LDCs will be back to where they
are now. Apart from rhetoric, the debt reduction offered is likely to be too small and there is no
straightforward relation between decreased debt service levels and increased spending on social
development. Increased social spending cannot be related directly to decreased debt service. HIPCs
have always borrowed money to pay part of their debt service. Consequently, it is impossible to
increase spending on social and human development with the same amount as the debt service is
lowered without new borrowing or grants. The stated HIPC debt service savings—comparing actual
payments before and after the HIPC initiative—are distorted by the fact that some HIPCs made
unusual high debt service payments shortly before reaching the enhanced decision point in order to
avoid any arrears that could have delayed the reaching of the enhanced decision point. This was the
case for Guinea, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, and Zambia, where actual debt service payments
                                                
14 A.V.Y. Mbelle (2001), The Hipc Relief: Too Late, Too Little? Perspectives From A New Qualifier, Tanzania,
Unu/Wider Conference On Debt Relief: Helsinki, Finland 17-18 August.
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in the decision point year increased by 30%, 26%, 11%, 17%, and 24%, respectively, compared to
actual debt service payments in the year before the decision point. Excluding these increases, the
actual annual debt service savings of the enhanced HIPC initiative are at least US$100 million.
Zambia is expected to pay US$22 million more in 2001 (US$158 million) than in 1999 (US$136
million) for debt service, and reached its enhanced decision point in December 2000.
7. The problem of burden-sharing and financing of the initiative
Burden sharing is unrelated to economic power. There are largely developing country creditors and
sub-regional MDBs that have—due to financial constraints—not fully participated in the provision
of HIPC debt relief. Under the original framework, the costs among bilateral creditors were
calculated based on the NPV of pre-cut-off date and non-ODA debt. Under the new framework, the
burden sharing among bilateral creditors is based on total NPV debt outstanding at the decision
point. Comparisons between the two methodologies show that the bilateral costs have been shifted
towards non-Paris Club creditors as they have relatively more post cut-off-date debt than the Paris
Club creditors.
Given that less than 4% of HIPCs’ total external debt was private non-guaranteed (PNG) debt, the
architects of the HIPC framework decided to exclude private non-guaranteed debt15. For bilateral
creditors, cancelling additional debt poses few financial problems. A large part of LDC loans are
non-performing loans, as indicated by the piling up of arrears. Writing off a non-performing loan
does not cost any new money, it simply involves accepting that the loaned money will not return. In
technical terms, it simply needs to be recognised that the revenues from the asset will not be
forthcoming and that total revenues will be lower than expected. Provisions can then be made that
reduce the size of the asset in the creditor’s account. In this way annual provisions gradually reduce
the paper value of the asset to recognise the decline in the asset’s real value. When the paper value
reaches zero, the asset has been simply ‘written off’ the financial accounts. For multilateral
creditors, cancelling loans is a bit more complicated. Multilateral creditors administer revolving
funds of money donated by the shareholders, and have 'preferred creditor status', meaning that their
loans are serviced more diligently than those of other creditors. The evidence submitted to Drop the
Debt by two independent experts commissioned to look at the question of how resources can be
used to fund deeper debt cancellation by the World Bank and IMF suggests indeed that a 100%
cancellation of HIPC debt by the Bank is not unrealistic. With the prudent use of a small proportion
of the IBRD’s reserves and an ongoing commitment from its net income, and the future use of
IDA’s greatly increased reflows16 more than enough funds can be realised to cancel 100% of the
outstanding debts owed by these poorest countries to the World Bank without affecting its financial
position and IDA lending by any significance. For the IMF, there is a consensus that it can easily
write off its debts to the HIPC countries by using the earning capacity of its general reserves,
together with a repeat of limited revaluation of its undervalued gold reserves. Other multilateral
creditors (which do not generate nearly as much net income from non-concessional lending in the
way that the IBRD does), in contrast, could go bankrupt if they were to offer 100% debt
cancellation. Multilateral development banks (MDBs), particularly the African Development Bank,
are in fact already technically bankrupt and rely on transfers from donors or on trust funds
administered by the World Bank 17.
                                                
15 Only a few SSA LDCs, such as Mozambique and Angola, owe a significant amount of debt to commercial banks and
other private creditors.
16 Its income from loans made earlier.
17 Drop the Debt (2001), Reality Check. The Need for Deeper Debt Cancellation and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS.
April 10.
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The problem of burden sharing implies a problem of financing of the initiative, too. Commentators
favouring an expansion of the HIPC Initiative have recommended that net additional resources need
to be made available by bilateral and multilateral creditors and donors for debt relief. They
recommend more progress in increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels towards
attaining the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNP. They also call for ODA to be more effective and
better targeted to benefit poor people. Other groups have pressured their governments and
legislatures to increase funding for the Initiative. It is clear that multilateral assistance to the HIPC
initiative can only be additional to traditional multilateral development assistance if overall budget
allocations to MDBs are increased in real terms. Excluding increases earmarked to fight the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, there is currently little indication for this to happen. It is thus realistic to
assume that HIPC debt relief will reduce traditional multilateral assistance. Previous analyses found
little evidence of additionality with regards to the resource transfers to HIPCs. For example, the
Concluding Report of a November 2000 Bretton Woods Committee Roundtable Discussion on
Reassessing Debt Relief stated that roundtable participants, including Bank and Fund officials, were
discouraged that at an early stage, little evidence of additionality could be found.
Excluding Bolivia, disbursements of commercial banks to the group of HIPCs decreased from
US$1.11 billion during 1994-96, to US$0.85 billion during 1997-99, even though disbursements of
commercial banks to Sub-Saharan Africa increased during the same time from US$1.98 billion to
US$3.04 billion. In real terms (using the SDR interest rate as discount rate), the 1997-99 average
disbursements of official creditors excluding the IMF to the group of HIPCs have been 18 percent
lower than the 1994-96 average disbursements. What makes these overall negative trends worse is
that even concessional disbursements, especially bilateral concessional disbursements, have
decreased. As long as bilateral creditors believe that the HIPC initiative provides debt sustainability,
they have no reason to continue shifting disbursements from decision point HIPCs to other
countries that are not covered under the HIPC initiative. However, if bilateral creditors believed that
the original HIPC initiative did not provide an exit from future debt rescheduling, they would
continue to shift disbursements from HIPC decision point countries to non-HIPCs, even after
reaching the decision point. Though there may be other explanations, data seem to generally support
the hypothesis that bilateral creditors did not believe that the original HIPC initiative would provide
a lasting exit from future debt rescheduling. Combining the various results, there is some indication
that (i) the adoption of the HIPC Initiative led to a reduction in disbursements to HIPCs and (ii)
HIPC debt relief has been deducted from traditional development assistance. Given that overall
development budgets are generally decreasing in real terms, it is to expect that this tendency might
continue. In other words, HIPCs could end up with no additional resources for poverty reduction.
Italian case
This ambiguity can be adequately demonstrated in the Italian case, taking in account the fact that
Italy is the only G7 member country to have approved by the half of 2000 a national law related to
the HIPC Initiative.
In fact, the purpose of Italian law18 is to make operative the understanding reached by creditor
countries at multilateral level regarding the treatment of the foreign debt reduction of the
developing countries with the lowest income and highest debt levels.
The developing countries subject to debt cancellation on the part of the Italian State are those
qualified for soft loans from the International Development Association (IDA). Therefore the Italian
programme for debt reduction potentially encompasses a larger group of countries (78, or 66 if we
consider the IDA-only countries) than that considered in the multilateral negotiations which were
restricted to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (41). Furthermore, in relation to the latter group,
                                                
18 Law N. 209/2000, “Measures for the Foreign Debt Reduction of Countries with the Lowest Levels of Income and
Highest Levels of Debt”.
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the Italian government reserves itself the capacity to bilaterally negotiate debt reduction and
concede debt cancellation under terms, timing and conditions different from those agreed between
the creditor Countries at multilateral level.
The Parliament proposes to resort to the International Court of Justice for an opinion on the legal
aspects of foreign debt reduction in order to proceed in accordance with the general principles of
law and within the framework of the rights of man and of peoples.
To qualify for debt cancellation, potential candidates must commit themselves to respect for human
rights and fundamental liberties, to the repudiation of war as a means to solve international
conflicts, and to the pursuit of full human and personal development, particularly with regard to the
reduction of poverty. In the event of natural catastrophes and serious humanitarian crisis, credits
relative to financial aid on the part of Italy may be totally or partially cancelled.
The following sums have been established as object of total or partial debt cancellation: a) an
amount not inferior to 3 thousand billion lire relative to aid credits (around US$ 1.5 billions); b)
insured credits held by the Italian Export Credits Guarantee Department (SACE) in the amount not
inferior to 5 thousand billion lire (around US$ 2.5 billions); and c) a total amount not inferior to 8
thousand billion lire (around US$ 4 billions). The debt may also be reduced through different kinds
of “social swaps”, as conversions into investments in development and poverty reduction
programmes. Finally, a term of Three years from the effective date of the present law has been
established within which the above mentioned sum of at least 8 thousand billion lire should be
cancelled.
Criteria and formalities for the execution thereof have been fixed by decree of the Treasury, in
2001. The conditions, types and terms of the cancellations, including eventual conversion
operations, will be defined in apposite bilateral intergovernmental agreements with each of the
interested countries.
The Treasury will submit to the Parliament a yearly report on the execution of the law, containing
detailed information on each of the beneficiary countries, on the value and conditions of the original
debt, the complete list of the projects and executors relative to cancelled aid credits, the complete
list of insured credits cancelled, together with the list of respective guarantees supplied by debtor
countries and the beneficiaries of compensations previously made by SACE relative to cancelled
credits.
If the spirit of this Law were respected by decree of the Treasury, it could effectively have
represented an innovative instrument, to be considered as an immediate and una tantum initiative to
cope with the foreign debt emergency and to prepare a new international order for financing
development, on which this Law does not provide any specific detail as it could be part of the
debate on the reform of Italian development cooperation19.
But, strictly linked to the current Law on debt cancellation and reduction, as the mechanism to
translate its principles into operative terms, is the Treasury’s decree on criteria and formalities for
the execution of Law. The rules for the enforcement of Law n. 209/2000 were approved the 4 April
2001, n. 185. This decree of the Treasury Ministry have drastically reduced the space of any
national initiatives, the rules for the enforcement of Law, n. 185, by the Treasury and Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, and it has carried back the application within the context of the Paris Club
agreements. As a consequence, the embedded innovation of Law has been dramatically retrenched.
It must be noted that this decree was rejected by the Parliament; nevertheless it was approved.
                                                
19 The new law embodying Italian bilateral ODA policy reforms has not passed. The legislative process was long,
taking all the year, and it was considered to be the condition for expanding the limited current stock of direct bilateral
ODA and for overcoming he constraints and deficiencies of the current aid management system.
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What seems evident is that debt relief represents a great opportunity for bilateral donors to take
officially their “responsibilities” in terms of ODA commitment, without real disbursement (NPV is
lower than nominal value) and simplifying the mechanism of disbursements (compared to the
procedures of project or programmes implementation). Italian recent figures confirm the real facts,
as we demonstrated in chapter 6, Appendix 2 (in particular, table 4: the following table is an
abstract from that table).
Tab. 2 - The importance of debt relief for ODA statistics (1999-2000, US$ million)
Amounts Extended Amounts Received Net Amounts
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000
I. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 1998.98 1598.93 -193.26 -222.67 1805.72 1376.26
 I.A. Bilateral ODA 643.98 599.47 -193.26 -222.67 450.72 376.80
 1.  Grants. 550.76 524.81 0.00 0.00 550.76 524.81
i) Debt forgiveness, total (incl. forgiven interest) (a+b+c) 101.92 201.47 / 101.92 201.47
 2. Non-grant bilateral ODA 93.22 74.66 -193.26 -222.67 -100.04 -148.01
      i) Rescheduling ODA claims (capitalised interest) 3.41 15.04 3.41 15.04
     ii) Other lending 89.81 59.62 -193.26 -222.67 -103.45 -163.05
 I.B. Multilateral ODA 1355.00 999.46 0.00 0.00 1355.00 999.46
 1. Grants and capital subscriptions, total 1355.00 999.46 0.00 0.00 1355.00 999.46
             i) IDA 297.06 297.06
             ii) IBRD,IFC,MIGA 5.77 18.70 5.77 18.70
             iii) Regional development banks 146.65 75.89 146.65 75.89
- HIPC Inititative 23.80 / 0.00 23.80
 II. Other Official Flows (OOF) (II.A+II.B) 189.63 103.01 -170.77 -206.50 18.86 -103.49
 II.A. Other Official Bilateral Flows 189.63 103.01 -170.77 -206.50 18.86 -103.49
 1. Rescheduling, total 189.63 103.01 0.00 0.00 189.63 103.01
         i) OOF claims (capitalised interest) 9.48 0.00 9.48
     ii) OOF component of debt service reduction 189.63 93.53 189.63 93.53
 2. Offsetting entry for debt relief / -170.77 -206.50 -170.77 -206.50
 II.B. Transactions with Multil. Agencies at Market Terms 0.00 0.00 0.00
                 - Offsetting entry for forgiven interest / -120.77 -88.50 -120.77 -88.50
Source: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs data set.
8. Misuse of discount rates and time horizons
For LDCs, and in particular for HIPC LDCs, the difference between the nominal and the market
value of their debt is likely to be particularly significant. Building on previous econometric
estimates of the secondary market prices of middle income countries prior to the Brady Initiative, a
recent academic paper shows that the HIPC initiative is about ten times less generous than face
value accounting would suggest20.
The economic value of LDC debts can also be calculated directly by using country specific discount
rates. These rates can be derived either from data from secondary loan swap markets or data from
debt buy-back operations. As interest rates are changing over time, any change in the DSA
reference date implies changes in the discount rates and thus represents changes in NPV debt and
HIPC assistance.
                                                
20 OECD-DC (2000), The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises, Daniel Cohen, Ecole normale superieure and
OECD Development Centre, June.
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As Uganda’s reassessment under the enhanced HIPC initiative showed, high discount rates and too
optimistic export projections can make a country’s debt look sustainable, even though it is not21.
Together with volatile exports (or volatile government revenues), this methodology results in highly
unpredictable numbers of HIPC assistance and HIPC costs.
The impact of different discount rates on a country’s HIPC assistance is relevant. Modifications are
needed with regards to the use of currency-specific discount rates in order to make the initiative
fairer, more predictable, and even simpler. All of the problems related to currency specific discount
rates could be avoided by adopting a single (a ten-year backward-looking average) fixed discount
rate for all currencies, all creditors, and all debtors.
Moreover, there is some doubt if the NPV calculations used in the HIPC framework are appropriate.
Among many problems related to discounting, the key argument is that discounting unpayable debt
at market discount rates gives the wrong picture about a HIPC’s debt burden.
As a World Bank (2001, Table 3) HIPC study shows, at least four countries (Guinea, Mauritania,
Niger, and Zambia) will continue to pay between 20-23 percent of their government revenues as
external debt service on public or publicly guaranteed debt after enhanced HIPC debt relief.
Another important aspect linked to time, is time horizon. In fact, the time horizons of governments,
communities and the private sector lead to bad policy (such as real exchange rate overvaluation)
and affect debt crisis.
The decision to borrow, and the choice of what to do with the loan, is intimately linked to the rate of
time preference of the borrower (or, put another way, the rate at which the future is discounted
relative to the present). This in turn drives resource exchanges across time, and thus the current
account position and other macroeconomic identities (Buiter 1981, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).
This is the approach taken by Easterly22 in seeking to explain why debt problems occur, and why
they persist: "A country that has gotten an 'excessive' external debt may be one with a high discount
rate against the future ... After receiving debt relief, the high discount rate country would like to
accumulate the same amount of external debt again".
But what causes such a high discount rate?
Easterly offers a number of possibilities ranging from high rates of pure time preference (rooted in
the shorter expected lifetimes of the populations of poor countries) to politicians with very short
time horizons, leading to excessive (debt-financed) current spending without concern to future debt-
service. He finds that average policies in HIPCs were generally worse than those of other LDCs,
controlling for income, over the period 1980-97. Easterly concludes that governments impose their
high discount rates on the rest of society through bad macro-economic policy, leading to debt-
service problems.
This result supports the IMF and World Bank focus on a country's track record of policy reform,
and the use of 'good policy' as a key criterion for eligibility for debt relief. This manifests itself in a
shortening of the government's time horizon (the bad policy effect in Easterly). This is a
provocative thesis on the cause of the debt crisis and overhang, which deserves a detailed
examination from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
                                                
21 Based on Uganda’s original completion point DSA, Uganda’s NPV debt-to-export ratio at end-June 1999 was
supposed to be 207%; however, as Uganda’s enhanced decision point DSA showed, the actual NPV debt-to-export ratio
was 240%.
22 Easterly, W. (2001), “How Did Highly Indebted Countries become Highly Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of
Debt Relief”, Working Paper 2225, Washington DC, World Bank.
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As its analytical basis, Easterly’s thesis rests on the inter-temporal borrowing/lending model. He
argues that a country with an excessive debt is one with a high discount rate against future and /or a
low inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
This views an `excessive debt’ of HIPCs as a reflection of their peculiar order of inter-temporal
preference (in particular, that of the public sector), exhibiting a tendency to run down country
assets. While interpreting the two key parameters of the model in this very specific perspective, his
analysis completely ignores a number of other main structural characteristics of low-income
developing economies.
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) show, this model visually links the current account concept and the
domestic investment-saving gap, and illustrates the role of international borrowing and lending to
fill the gap.
Thus, accessing the international capital market, i.e. borrowing, allows a country to undertake the
extra investment as well as to enjoy the extra first-period of consumption.
With the constant property of intertemporal preference, the process of debt relief and a progressive
substitution of concessional debt for a non-concessional one is seen as keeping the country
perpetually heavily indebted. Thus, the granting of debt relief without ensuring a full adherence to
policy conditionality set out by the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) is predicted to lead
to negative saving and declining investment.
This effect of debt relief is supposed to be in addition to other purported negative incentive effects,
such as the delay of policy reforms in anticipation of “selling” reforms at a higher “price”, or the
creation of a moral hazard for borrowing in the expectation of debt forgiveness. Easterly presents a
number of disparate empirical evidences to support his thesis of “high discount behaviour” as the
cause of HIPC’s misfortune against the alternative hypothesis suggesting that HIPCs became highly
indebted due to external shocks. He concludes that debt relief is futile with unchanged long-run
preferences23.
9. Performance criteria: the growing number of conditionalities
Easterly’s thesis clearly supports the presence of conditionalities. Many observers accepted the need
for conditionality to lessen the moral hazard problem and ensure that HIPC debt relief is put to good
use. Nevertheless, they felt that conditions are too stringent. In particular, the tight link to
IMF/ESAF-supported programs has been objected to, particularly by those who have concerns
about the design of these programs generally.
Conditionality under IDA and IMF adjustment operations has been criticised for not giving
sufficient weight to poverty reduction objectives.
The social development criteria have sometimes been seen as adding conditionality; and some
observers have advocated instead providing a positive incentive for stronger programs to support
human development by permitting lower debt sustainability targets in countries with particularly
strong programs in this area.
On the other hand, some observers have been concerned about the absence of conditionality after
the completion point, and the risk of misuse of funds or of the re-appearance of debt problems.
The introduction of the PRSP as a condition for debt relief not only involves a change of emphasis,
but also an extension of policy conditions. In addition to traditional macroeconomic and structural
reforms, the country must also implement a number of agreed social development policies. This
                                                
23 M. Nissanke and B. Ferrarini (2001), Debt Dynamics and Contingency Financing: Theoretical Reappraisal of the
HIPC Initiative, Paper for a WIDER Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, August.
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involves long, complex and comprehensive development planning, which may delay the road to the
Completion Point, the point where countries receive unconditional and irrevocable relief. As is
more detailed described in EURODAD (2000), GAO (2000) and Northover (2000), there is an
unacceptable tension between the urgent need for debt relief and the time required to build a
genuinely participatory PRSP process. Following a suggestion of Oxfam International (2000), the
enhanced decision point could be reached once a government produces an Interim Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper that provides some details on the workings of a poverty fund. Moreover,
the linkage between the HIPC Initiative and the PRS also erodes the quality of the PRS, as countries
are in a rush to enter the initiative. At the same time, the PRSPs do not seem to succeed in aligning
macro-economic issues and poverty issues more closely than in the past, and macro-economic
policy frameworks have not changed significantly as a result of the PRSP approach. Strictly linked
to this critique is that it was a fundamental mistake to let the creditors, led by the IMF and World
Bank, work out the original framework of the HIPC initiative24.
Eurodad’s ‘PRS-Watch’ program, which closely follows the formulation of PRSPs, has found that
even though there are many differences between countries' PRS processes, the PRSP concept
cannot be characterised as an overall success or a failure. There are some concerns that need to be
addressed.
First of all, the link between PRSP and the HIPC Initiative is delaying debt relief and lowering the
quality of PRSs. PRSPs are another layer of conditionality in an already complicated qualification
process for the HIPC Initiative. The interim-PRSP doesn’t solve this problem, simply postpones it.
Secondly, the PRSPs do not succeed in aligning macro-economic issues and poverty issues more
closely than in the past and macro-economic frameworks haven’t changed significantly as a result
of PRSPs.
Thirdly, as a result, growth is consistently prioritised as the primary motor of poverty reduction.
There has been little attention to quality aspects of growth, such as equity and distribution. This
partly results from a lack of a definition of what pro-poor growth is. In fact, poverty concerns are
not being placed at the heart of policy making.
Fourth, to ensure that policies proposed will maximise benefits for the poor, an open, transparent
ex-ante impact assessment is needed. However, there is little evidence of this occurring so far.
Fifth, the World Bank and the IMF remain the final arbiters of PRSPs. Given the general rules (and
bargaining powers) of debt game, the PRSP therefore hardly involves a change in the relationship
between countries and the World Bank and IMF. Instead of the World Bank and IMF approving or
rejecting a PRSP on an all or nothing basis, it would be desirable to see a national poverty reduction
strategy being presented to all donors equally, for example a UN round Table or a World Bank
Consultative Group meeting.
                                                
24 Nevertheless, there are some interesting experiences of funds such as the Poverty Action Fund created in Uganda,
which is considered a credible solution. Such structures have three main features:
- They are integrated in the national budget so that the expenditures being funded are included in the overall
development/poverty reduction strategy of the country.
-  Dedicated disbursement and reporting procedures ensure that the funds allocated to poverty reduction are truly
additional to current expenditures and guarantee the transparency of the process.
- The poor are involved in the monitoring of the structure.
In Uganda, this framework has enabled the country to make an efficient use of the funds freed by debt reductions
despite the fact that it was engaged in a war, highly corrupted and that no PRSP had yet been approved by the IFIs.
Furthermore, the expenditures programmed through the Poverty Action Fund have had a very significant impact on
social indicators (education doubled in a few years) and the participation of the different stakeholders (government,
civil society organisations, donors) has been by all means significant and fruitful.
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Sixth, although participation is better organised and being taken more seriously by governments
than in the past, proper participation will take significantly longer than in the past – up to five years.
Moreover, there are concerns about the lack of distinction between mere ‘consultation’ – where the
views and ideas of civil society are merely solicited – and full participation, where civil society
organisations share in decision making. The danger is that consultation could serve to rubber-stamp
and legitimise a strategy which civil society has not really had influence over.
Seventh, there is little evidence that the PRSP process – particularly because of the rush to get debt
relief – builds on existing processes. On the contrary, existing home-grown processes are being
shouldered aside by the arrival of PRSP. Although some of these existing processes were slow
moving and inadequate, there are still significant implications for the quality of ownership when
these are not built upon25.
It has been also argued that measures to provide assistance during the interim period should be
strengthened. Observers have argued that if the interim period is to be as long as three years, interim
measures should provide greater cash-flow relief, and more multilateral creditors should provide
interim relief to allow for needed expansion of development expenditures.
Observers have commented that there should be a closer and more visible link between HIPC debt-
relief and poverty reduction. Specifically, some have called for debt-relief efforts to be explicitly
integrated into a broader strategy to combat poverty as reflected in the human development targets
set in “Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation”, issued by the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
10. Real impact of debt relief
Some scholars considered how much poverty could be reduced through the HIPC Initiative. Using a
simple distribution function and measures of inequality, US one dollar a day, poverty was estimated
for the twenty-three countries. It is showed that the HIPC countries account for relatively little of
developing country poverty. Further, full debt cancellation would have a small impact on reducing
poverty in most of the HIPC countries themselves. The paper reaches the conclusion that neither a
distribution-neutral debt cancellation, nor transferring all debt payments to investment for faster
growth would achieve the International Poverty Targets. Therefore, debt relief must be combined
with redistribution measures to achieve those targets26.
Moreover, the HIPC is not able to prevent LDCs from falling again into the same debt trap: LDCs
remain dependent on external support and current borrowing and lending practises, all of them
being the conditions that generate the vicious circle of indebtedness. If the initiative is to fulfil even
its limited aim of an exit from the rescheduling process, much deeper debt reduction is needed. The
fact that debt reduction that is currently on offer may in the long run simply be not enough is also
demonstrated by the fact that the eligible countries remain dependent on new borrowing, as is
reflected in the building up of the debt and increasing debt service levels. As pointed out by the US
General Accounting Office, debt reduction only frees up resources if HIPCs continue to borrow at
the same rate as in the past. In effect, increased spending on poverty reduction now is being
financed by new debt that will come due in the future. As the IMF and the World Bank admit, in
their Debt Sustainability Analyses, a relatively neutral external environment' is assumed. However,
the economies of LDCs and HIPCs are very vulnerable, because of the volatility of global
commodity prices, and several other factors, including:
                                                
25 See: Eurodad (2000), Poverty Reduction Strategies: What have we learned so far? September.
26 H. Dagdeviren and J. Weeks (2001), How much poverty could HIPC reduce?, Paper for a WIDER Conference on
Debt Relief, Helsinki, August.
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· Fluctuations in import prices, such as the oil price;
· Exchange rate devaluation and its impact on import prices;
· The level of donor aid flows (which is assumed to increase significantly);
· The occurrence of non-economic shocks, such as climatic shocks, wars, or social conflicts, but
also slow-moving shocks, such as the AIDS/HIV pandemic.
The vulnerability of HIPCs to shocks and hence to fluctuations in GDP growth and export earnings
have been analysed by Martin (2001). He identifies six main sources of shocks, which clearly
contradict the IMF and World Bank’s assumptions:
1. High aid dependence and volatility
2. High prevalence of climatic shocks
3. High export concentration and volatility
4. High import dependence and volatility
5. Low reserves
6. Domestic revenue (excluding grants) volatility
Killick and Stevens (1996) present a comprehensive assessment of the traditional debt relief
mechanisms applied to low-income countries against a set of efficiency criteria in terms of
adequacy, productivity, transaction cost and transparency. In almost each criterion listed the pre-
HIPC mechanisms were assessed inefficient. They are found to be applying short-leash mechanisms
for dealing with mounting debt problems, thus burdened with the inadequacy of the relief provided
and the need for repeated rounds of negotiations. Despite major efforts to alleviate the debt burden,
the main debt indicators deteriorated with a series of convulsions. A question has been raised
repeatedly as to why the debt burdens of poor countries remain so onerous. One of the answers to
this lies in the reluctance of the donor community to grapple effectively with commodity price
shocks or terms of trade shocks - one of the critical factors shaping debt dynamics. Killick and
Stevens (1996) have made many recommendations for raising efficiency of debt relief measures by
noting, among other things: (i) provision for possible supervention of external shocks by
distinguishing between temporary vs. long-lasting shocks; and (ii) more flexible mechanisms for
larger and severer shocks27. Unfortunately, the HIPC Initiative does not imply any innovation as
referred to these aspects.
The external structure of SSA countries affects the consistency of the sustainability ondicators
themselves. In fact, as is well-known, the debt-to-export ratio has been used for mostly middle-
income Latin American countries in the aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis, whereby a substantial part
was private debt and exchange rate adjustments ensured substantial trade surpluses. However, most
HIPCs import not only more than they export (Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire are two exceptions).
Indeed, as was shown for example by López and Thomas (1990), Sub-Saharan African economies
depend highly on imports. Trade unbalances are likely to remain for HIPCs at least over the next 10
to 20 years.
11. The role of structural and exogenous factors in the vicious circle of indebtedness
What seems to be a very critical point of view on the HIPC Initiative is the fact that some comments
consider it as a partial and temporary solution to a structural problem of indebtedness, which should
require a systemic approach.
                                                
27 Killick and Stevens (1996), p. 147.
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Until recently, the new growth literature was a collage of theoretical and empirical studies, many of
them stressing the importance of one or a few sources of growth. Furthermore, there were some
influential studies suggesting that most of the high growth experiences were due to a rapid
accumulation of labour and capital (either physical capital or human capital, or both)28. However,
over the last few years, evidence has been mounting that the accumulation of labour and capital
does not explain the huge differences in growth experiences across countries. Instead, attention has
been shifting towards the residual representing total factor productivity, and institutions do matter29.
A systemic international political economic approach means to involve all the different actors who
play a role and have different interests in the debt game, from both the debtor and the creditor side.
Tab. 3 - The Multiple Players of  "Debt Relief" Game
 Lenders (good and bad) Borrowers (good and bad)
Multilateral II.OO. (=I.F.I.)
the World Bank, IMF and RDBs
Regional official lenders
EU
Bilateral official lenders
G7
Other members of the Paris Club
Other countries
Private lenders
Commercial Banks (London Club)
Private Enterprises
Export Credit Agencies
Civil society (indirect:stakeholders)
Savers, consumers, NGOs, poor...
HIPC
(small debtors, official exposure)
The Least developed countries
Low income countries
Middle income countries
(big debtors, private exposure)
Civil society (indirect:stakeholders)
Savers, consumers, NGOs, poor...
We have a map of multiple interests and preferences (political, strategic, economic, environmental,
etc.), each of one having different time horizons (long-term or short-term horizons). The
relationship between all the involved interests is thus of crucial importance.
In concrete terms, it is clear the responsibility of LDCs’ government, who should represent the
national interest. Corruption is one of the reasons why loans don’t generate the necessary resources
to repay the debts. Many civil society organisations, particularly organisations from the South, point
out that the debts that piled up under the rule of corruptive dictatorial and undemocratic
governments should be considered ‘illegitimate debts’. The people living in these countries now
bear the burden of these debts. For example, Nigeria’s former military regime, which is to a large
extent responsible for the country’s enormous debt burden, has transferred substantial sums of
money to foreign bank accounts. It has thus far not been possible to transfer this ‘stolen capital’
back to the country.
                                                
28 See Krugman (1994) and Young (1995).
29 For example, see Easterly and Levine (2000) and Senhadji (2000). Rama (1993) provides a good review of empirical
investment function specifications for developing countries. The specification here broadly follows that of Gunter
(1998) and Oshikoya (1994).
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Capital flight is another crucial phenomenon to be addressed. Most analysts have also attributed
sluggish growth and persistent balance of payments deficits in most developing countries including
Nigeria30, despite private transfers and long term capital inflows, to capital31. Capital flight is a
product of natural and economically rational behaviour of wealthy residents of these debtor
countries to diversify their portfolios in order to protect themselves against riskiness of any one
particular investment. The immediate consequence of capital flight is to reduce foreign exchange
reserves, which may, in turn, require increase external borrowing to finance development
expenditure. Capital flight also has some income distributional consequences: it would not be easy
to tax flight capital since such capital is normally not reported to the tax authorities32.
The basic problem of two/three gaps to be closed seems to persist, particularly when we are
referring to SSA countries.
a) Saving-investment (S-I), fiscal and foreign exchange gaps were all persistently large in the
period 1980-1998 and in part had been widening over time.
b) Net capital transfers and grants filling these gaps were generally declining, highly volatile and
grossly insufficient for initiating a self-sustainable investment-growth saving cycle.
c) External shocks, particularly in the form of persistently declining terms of trade of HIPCs
depending on the export proceeds from a small number of primary commodities, make a
sustainable accumulation process very difficult.
d) As a result, external debt stocks of HIPCs had been rapidly rising over time, with large shares of
new disbursements leaving the debtor countries under the guise of debt service on accumulated
external debt.
Accumulation of arrears, debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness had so far been inadequate for
reducing accumulated debt stocks or making debtors’ position sustainable. The S-I, fiscal and
foreign exchange gaps were filled by the recourse to external finance, showing the evolution of
current account deficits including current income transfers and grants, S-I gaps and net resource
transfers including grants. At least four common features regarding external resource flows apply to
all SSA ountries. These are as follows.
i) Current accounts, as defined here, were persistently negative, and there is any evidence that
neither foreign exchange gap nor S/I-gap are narrowing over time. Current net resource
transfers, almost exclusively from official creditors, and grants have been covering the
ensuing capital shortages.
ii) Official grant flows, the main source of external finance to the HIPCs, were declining
significantly during the nineties after a temporary surge in the early years of that decade.
iii) As compared to official grants, net transfers payments played a minor role, reflecting the
fact that large shares of new disbursements were made to HIPCs for enabling repayment of
existing debt, rather than for capital accumulation or as a cushion against external shocks.
This fact is further underlined by the more detailed debt-profiles analysis given below.
                                                
30 E. A. Onwioduokit (2001), Capital Flight From Nigeria: An Empirical Re-Examination, West African Monetary
Institute, Accra, Ghana.
31 See: Chang, P. H. and R. E. Cumby (1991), "Capital flight in sub-Saharan African countries", in J. Underwood (ed)
Africa’s External Finance in the 1990s, The World Bank, Washington; Cuddington, J. T. (1986), "Capital Flight:
Estimates Issues and Explanations", Princeton Studies on International Finance No. 58 Princeton, New Jersey; Khan, M
and N. Ul Hague (1987), "Capital flight from developing countries", Finance and Development Vol. 24 (1).
32 Lessard, D. R and J. Williamson (1987), Capital Flight: The problem and policy responses,Institute for International
Economics, Washington, D.C.
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iv) The high degree of volatility of net transfers and grants, suggesting a high level of
unpredictability of countries’ development.
In summary, on all three fronts, gaps were persistent and mostly widening over time, while capital
inflows were channelled towards servicing of debt rather than capital accumulation. Debt relief,
without taking in consideration the implementation problems, is not able to solve these main
constraints.
The IMF(1999a) attributes the high external debt burden of HIPC countries to “a combination of
factors including imprudent external debt management polices, lack of perseverance in structural
and economic reform, deterioration in their terms of trade and poor governance”33.
However, it is acknowledged that there may be culpability on the creditor side too. The IMF
(1999b) implies that the behaviour of export credit agencies of developed market economies may be
another factor as their lending activities were highly risky and there was a real possibility that
eventually much of the debt would not be paid. Lending behaviour by creditor governments is also
implied to be a factor as it was frequently driven by domestic economic factors – the need to protect
or create employment and boost exports - and the desire to strengthen diplomatic relations with
borrower countries (GAO, 2000) though this only holds true where aid is tied to purchases of the
creditor country’s goods and services.
A number of exogenous factors also contributed to the debt problems of HIPCs. Adverse terms of
trade shocks and political factors such as war and political instability were also significant factors in
a number of HIPCs. Furthermore, in contrast to the IMF/World Bank’s stress on the inadequacy of
adjustment effort by developing country governments, some argue that aid itself has compounded
the difficulties developing countries have had in adjusting to the global economic conditions of the
1980s and 1990s and attaining growth34.
At Eurodad’s 1998 Annual Conference in Rome, participants discussed a set of conditions for the
monitoring of borrowing and lending. The conditions are rather simple, and needs to be refined, but
it is a good starting point. Key assumptions are: (1) governments should not borrow from any
source without the authority from parliament, and (2) loans should have a “productivity
conditionality” attached to them. Loans should be used for productive activities, which generate
sufficient resources to pay off the loan.
12. The reliability of official data
Looking at the data on the distribution of enhanced HIPC debt relief in among the decision point
countries prompts two comments. First, there was a concentration in the distribution of debt relief in
absolute value. Four countries, Nicaragua, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, account for
approximately fifty per cent of the total relief in net present value terms. Second, in relative terms
the shares of Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé & Príncipe, Zambia and Guyana were larger when
measured on the basis of total savings accruing to each country as a percentage of their national
output.
Moreover, there are three main criticisms of the results of the HIPC Initiative, three complaints at
the Decision Point Documents, which are the basis of the statistical evidence of all the analyses:
1. Tables often lack internal consistency.
2. Summary statistics presented are not transparent (e.g. it is often not clear how ratios and growth
rates are calculated).
                                                
33 IMF(1999a), page 2
34 El Badawi (1999) provides an overview of these arguments.
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3. The Decision Point Documents do not follow the same format – contents and the order in which
they are presented vary format, and so become somewhat inaccessible (e.g. debt sustainability
analysis, use of IMF included and IMF excluded debt service figures).
And presentation of statistics on debt relief is often a great deal of rhetoric. As regards the
cancellation of foreign debt, the G-7 (responsible for financial matters) in Genoa did no more than
look over the progress made in existing initiatives, without taking any further action. The final
document underlined that the HIPC is a valid contribution to the fight against poverty.
In terms of statistics, the final Genoa report stress that, on the basis of the 1999 Cologne accords, 23
countries have qualified for the initiative’s benefits: with an initial debt of $74 billion, they are
eligible for a reduction of over $53 billion, that is 71.6 percent. Negotiations with five more
countries are underway, while nine others would be eligible but are at war.
Yet, on the basis of the latest World Bank and IMF reports on the HIPC, we can proceed in a more
detailed data analysis, which provides different figures. The $53 billion figure is the nominal value
of all existing mechanisms in place – traditional initiatives, HIPC, bilateral initiatives, recent
agreements with the Paris Club – not just the HIPC. And that if only the HIPC is calculated, the
reduction only comes to $34 billion (equals to 45.9 percent). If the actual market value of the debt is
used instead of the nominal value, that figure further reduces to $21 billion or 39.6 percent – 32
points less than indicated in the G-8 final document.
Another matter to be cleared up is that the HIPC reduction of foreign debt stock is only granted to
countries that manage to reach the “completion point”, before it the reduction is only promised. By
the end of June 2001, only Uganda and Bolivia had managed to go through the long process to the
completion point from the time the initiative was re-launched at the Cologne summit in 1999. Thus
the total real reduction for the moment has been less than $13 billion, that is 17.6 percent of the
nominal stock, equal to 15.3 percent in concrete terms.
Tab. 4 - Different methods of calculation of debt reduction linked to HIPC Initiative (US$ billion)
Debt reduction Total stock Reduction (%)
All the initiatives (nominal value) 53 74 71.6
only the HIPC (nominal value) 34 74 45.9
All the initiatives (net present value) 33 53 62.3
only the HIPC (net present value) 21 53 39.6
only the HIPC, real data (nominal value) 13 74 17.6
only the HIPC, real data (net present value) 8,1 53 15.3
Thus, compared to the “official” figure, presented in the final communiqué of the Genoa G8 summit
(July, 2001), the HIPC reduction is much lower.
Moreover, if we consider the outstanding debt of all the HIPC countries (more than US$200
billion), given that only Uganda and Bolivia have really reached their completion point (23
countries reached the decision point), it implies that no more than 6.2 percent of total debt of all the
HIPC countries has been cancelled thanks to HIPC Initiative.
Thus, we have provided a very different picture of the same current data and the estimates for the
coming years are even less encouraging. The 23 countries admitted at the end of 2000 will continue
to pay $2 billion annually to their creditors (on the average this is more than they spend on health –
$1.35 annually). Zambia, after qualifying for HIPC increased its debt servicing by approximately 23
percent, Niger by 32 percent: partial and slow mechanisms for reducing stock of debt can not
interrupt the vicious circle of debt service, which tends to increase as time passes. Sub-Saharan
Africa spends $14.2 billion to repay its debt – considerably more than the $7-10 billion the UN
considers necessary to combat AIDS.
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13. Concluding remarks
The HIPC Initiative was criticised by a wide range of organisations including UNDP, Oxfam,
Christian Aid, Drop the Debt, Jubilee 2000, Eurodad and Cafod. Among them a consensus has
emerged on three major aspects of HIPC.
First, the original HIPC initiative offered too little to too few and too late. The most important
factors for this were the criteria for debt sustainability and the conditionality accompanying debt
relief. The thresholds for debt sustainability were especially problematic.
Second, the HIPC lacked an explicit linkage with human development and poverty reduction.
Third, resources did not adequately support the initiative to fulfil its promises. Generation of
sufficient resources for HIPC initiative has been closely linked to the differing degrees of political
support from donor countries.
Modification to the original HIPC initiative came in 1999 as a result of increasing pressures from
debt-campaign groups. Even though the passage from the original HIPC to the enhanced initiative
has been well appreciated from outside, as an encouraging step to answer to some of the main
critical comments, there remain many problems with the enhanced HIPC Initiative itself. First of
all, evidence is once again mounting that even the enhanced HIPC framework does not provide
long-term debt sustainability for many of the poorest countries, mainly because:
(i) its growth assumptions are considered too optimistic35,
(ii) its debt sustainability analysis is still inappropriate, and
(iii) its country selection is too narrow.
More radical critical comments come from the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, asking for a 100 percent
cancellation of debt. The World Bank and the IMF typically argue that a write-off would undermine
the ability to lend to the poorest countries. The capital base of the institutions would be reduced,
and it is unlikely that governments of developed countries would increase their contributions to
replace the debt cancellation. With the IBRD’s equity leveraged at ‘about 5:1’, ‘its capacity to lend
would be reduced by $5 for every $1 distributed to debt relief’ (World Bank & IMF 2001, p. 5). In
other words, a debt write-off for poor countries would be bad for poor countries. This is not a
convincing argument. If it were, it would argue against any debt relief, or for as little as possible.
The paper makes it clear that 100 percent debt relief would not be in the self-interest of the IMF:
‘Debt cancellation would…impair the Fund’s financial integrity’. A similar interest is stated for the
World Bank: ‘it is likely that the write-off would result in a weaker equity capital position for the
Bank…’ (p. 5).
Apart from this specific radical comments36, there are different kinds of criticism, which comes
from various sides: from within the organizations (the World Bank and the IMF), from the “insider
stakeholders” (the major members states) and from outside (the “external actors” represented by the
international civil society and NGOs).
For example, in Spring 2000, the United States General Accounting Office concluded that the HIPC
Initiative might not provide a lasting exit from debt problems, unless strong and sustained economic
                                                
35 As population grows at 3% per year, it must be assumed a target growth rate of the economy of 6%, in order to have
an increase of 3% in the GDP per capita. It requires that SSA countries accumulate capital and invest. The estimates of
the World Bank take an Incremental Capital Output Ratio, which implies that these countries should invest every year
24% of their GDP, which is substantially higher than the 16% which is the average I/Y for these countries in 1998.
36 Other critical comments say that, once the decision point has been reached, another way to accelerate HIPC debt
relief would be to front-load debt relief, which is not receveing any priority in the enhanced HIPC Initiative.
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growth is achieved. The report cautions that the growth assumptions used by IMF and World Bank
staff for the country-specific debt sustainability analyses may be overly optimistic 37.
The United States General Accounting Office report concluded (p.13) that “unless strong, sustained
economic growth is achieved, the initiative is not likely to provide a lasting exit from debt
problems”38. Like others, it cautions that the growth assumptions used in the country-specific debt
sustainability analyses (DSAs) may be overly optimistic. For example, IMF and World Bank
assume that export earnings will grow in excess of 9% every year for 20 years in four of the seven
HIPCs the GAO analyzed (GAO 2000, p. 9). Too optimistic growth rates affect the debt
sustainability in two ways: first, they imply too optimistic growth rates of a country’s exports, and
second, they underestimate a country’s future financing needs. Given that the HIPC framework
defines debt sustainability largely by a debt-to-export ratio, overestimations of exports (which is in
the denominator of the ratio) and underestimations of future financing needs/new debt (which is in
the nominator of the ratio) result in highly unrealistic low future debt-to-export ratios, which then
indicate unrealistic long-term debt sustainability. A detailed analysis of capital flows, structural
transformation, and investment and savings rates of HIPCs show that there is little macroeconomic
foundation for the high growth projections of HIPC DSAs.
On April 2001, the IMF and World Bank have recently issued a paper on the challenge of
maintaining long-term debt sustainability. The paper emphasises the importance of establishing an
environment conducive to growth and poverty reduction, particularly in the areas of
macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, public sector management, governance and social
inclusion. It also notes that HIPCs are typically dependent upon a narrow export base, which makes
them vulnerable to externally induced shocks. It examines the sensitivity of long-term debt
sustainability to possible shortfalls in export revenues and less concessional financing than assumed
in the debt sustainability analyses, yet, the paper does not assess the likelihood of these and other
factors influencing growth prospects39.
                                                
37 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Developing Countries: Debt Relief Initiative for Poor Countries
Facing Challenges, Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office.
38 Even the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (2001, p. 102) has cautioned that the projected growth rates
may not be realistic.
39 IMF and World Bank (2001), The Challenge of Maintaining Long-Term External Debt Sustainability, Progress
Report presented to the Development Committee and the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC),
Washington DC, April.
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However, looking at the long-term trends (1990-99) as well as recent trends (1997-99) of the
investment and savings ratios of Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and Rwanda, indicate that their HIPC
DSA growth assumptions of more than 6 percent are highly optimistic. Guinea-Bissau’s investment
and savings ratios were lower in 1999 than in 1997, and their 1997 levels were either the same or
lower than in 1990.
The great vulnerability of SSA countries’ dependence on external interests for their export earning
performance is another main issue. For example, multinational enterprises own close to 90% of
Guinea’s exports and use most of the foreign exchange earnings for imports of equipment, salaries
of expatriate workers, and transfers of profits.
In any case, considering world history, any long-term real GDP growth rate of more than 6 percent
is highly exceptional. It seems unlikely that Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and Rwanda
will repeat what has been known as the East Asian miracle. The average growth rates for 2000-10,
assumed for the first 22 enhanced decisions point countries, are 5.5 percent for real GDP and 8.6
percent for exports (expressed in nominal US dollars, ranging from 4.4 percent for Guyana to 13.7
percent for Rwanda).
There is an implicit comparison being made with Latin America in the 1980s, where debt appeared
to be the major obstacle to resumed growth – and indeed, following the Brady Plan, private sector
inflows re-emerged and growth did resume. But the situation in SSA low-income countries is a very
different one. In the first place, most of their debt and resource inflows are from the public sector,
multilateral or bilateral – approximately 37 per cent of total external debt of poor countries is
multilateral, 48 per cent bilateral, and only 15 per cent private. In the Brady Plan, external public
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funds provided the private sector with relief, revived the confidence of that sector, and led to
resume private inflows. With HIPC, however, it is public debt, not private, that is being written off.
Over the last twenty-five years, SSA export earnings have increased only at the pace of population
growth (2.9% p.a.), greatly handicapping growth possibilities. This failure is partly due to slow
growth in the volume of exports, but deterioration in the terms of trade has played a major role.
Cumulative terms of trade losses for Sub-Saharan African non-oil exporters (excluding South
Africa) amounted to nearly 120% of average GDP, 1970-1997. Over the same period, aid transfers
amounted to 178% of GDP, but the increase after 1970-73 was little more than the terms of trade
loss. Behind the poor performance lies a failure to diversify exports out of primary products, a
failure, which has not been addressed at all effectively by successive adjustment programmes.
Average net transfers as a proportion of GDP for Africa as a whole have been about 12 percent,
representing half of all government revenue and most of all public investment. Despite high levels
of lending and grant programs, average GDP per capita at constant prices is lower in 2000 than it
was in 1960, and the number and proportion of poor people have increased. In sub-Saharan Africa,
40 percent of its population of 600 million today live on less than $1 a day.
Civil war has been another cause and consequence of many African countries’ poor development
achievements. Between 1960 and 1995, almost half the countries in the region were in conflict, and
an estimated 1.5% of the 1995 population is estimated to have died directly or as a result of war-
related famine.
Thus, the SSA problem is not debt by itself, nor insufficient flows of externally unearned resources,
but lies elsewhere, in the failure of countries to earn foreign exchange, and in deep structural
economic and political problems that are not addressed by HIPC Initiative40.
From this point of view, the main risk of the HIPC Initiative is not the inadequate implementation,
but the illusion that has been created that it will provide a major solution to poverty in poor indebted
African countries.
And, regardless of all slogans, catchwords and ideological disputes, today, also thanks to the mass
mobilisation of international civil society it has been widely proven that globalisation is not a zero-
sum game: there are winners and losers, between classes and social groups within individual
countries, within the same productive world, between countries and continents, between debtors and
lenders.
                                                
40 G. Ranis and F. Stewart (2001), HIPC: Good news for the poor?, Paper for a WIDER Conference on Debt Relief,
Helsinki, August.
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9. Current political debate within international civil society on
development, poverty reduction and foreign finance
1. Introduction
Over the past few years, the G-8 has become one of the main interlocutors in the international
community in discussion of strategies for international co-operation and development.  The
2001 G-8 Summit, which takes place in Genoa next July is a further step in this direction.
International civil society networks - NGOs, Third Sector organisations, interest groups, and
local administrations have shown increasing interest in communicating with governments and
international organisations, and in working together in new ways. During the 1990s, with the
mobilisation and campaigning activities that started on the occasion of United Nations world
conferences, the international civil society has become an increasingly powerful influence on
international relations.
They are academics, political activists, community leaders and representatives of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) who combine intellectual and scientific rigour with
concrete action in their societies and on an international level.
As agreed at the G-8 in Okinawa (23 July 2000):
«In a world of ever-intensifying globalisation, whose challenges are becoming
increasingly complex, the G8 must reach out. We must engage in a new partnership with
non-G8 0countries, particularly developing countries, international organisations and
civil society, including the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
This partnership will bring the opportunities of the new century within reach of all.»
The Italian Presidency made a further step in this direction by promoting the Genoa Non
Governmental (GNG) Initiative. The GNG Initiative is a Forum to encourage discussion on
global issues between the G-8 and NGOs. The GNG Initiative involved four Italian research
institutes: Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), Istituto di Affari Internazionali
(IAI), Istituto per la Cooperazione Economica Internazionale e i Problemi dello Sviluppo
(ICEPS), Istituto per le relazioni tra l'Italia e i Paesi dell'Africa, America Latina e Medio
Oriente (IPALMO). The four institutes had the role of facilitating the dialogue and will start
up the consultation process with representatives of international Non Governmental
Organisations, in particular with those organisations from G-8 countries. The Forum
facilitated consultation with international NGOs via the exchange of information and the
creation of a mutually agreed proposal, which will include recommendations on political
guidelines.
CeSPI facilitated the consultation on the «Poverty Reduction Strategies» issues, ICEPS on
«Finance for Development. Debt relief «, IAI on «International Governance and WTO
reform» and IPALMO on «Environment and sustainable development»1.
In our opinion, one of the most interesting and positive results of the initiative was that it
arranged for representatives of the Italian G8 Presidency (of the Office of the Prime Minister
and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury), of various international
organisations (World Bank, OECD, ILO, EU), scholars and the academic world, numerous
NGOs and civil society associations (approximately 200 international non-governmental
organisations and networks) to sit around the same table and be engaged in frank discussion.
                                                
1 The GNG Initiative has been co-ordinated by Marco Zupi, who has edited the final report in collaboration with
Isabella Falautano (IAI), Karl Giacinti (ICEPS) and Alessandra Filippini (IPALMO). For any further
information on it, see the GNG-Initiative Website: www.gnginitiative.net.
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The analysis and policy recommendations of this chapter do not necessarily reflect the view
of any particular NGO. This chapter is based on the reports resulted from the consultation
with the NGOs who took part in special meetings and conferences organised by the GNG-
Initiative. The Reports cite and derive from many background studies prepared on thematic
issues as well as analyses of experiences in countries, international technical reports and
position papers by NGOs, who generously shared their materials.
The work of the GNG-Initiative is an expression of the capacity of numerous organisations of
civil society to engage in debate and comparison on the content, which is a reflection of the
skill and know-how accumulated with regard to the issues of international relations.
Undoubtedly, civil society organisations constitute an innovation on the scene of international
relations. In the multifaceted world of civil society there co-exist specific and widespread
interests, at local, national and transnational level. In the previous chapter, we demonstrated
the role of a broad-based movement, politically expressive and capable of a more effective
critical approach to the HIPC Initiative. At the same time, however, international civil society
has a strong capacity in the costruens pars, that is they unquestionable prove the maturity of
the proposals.
This chapter is intended to furnish a comprehensive framework of the NGOs current
positions and recommendations for the international political agenda related to debt relief.
Most of NGOs agree on a "certain number" of focal points to be stressed. The sections of the
present chapter, divided in three paragraphs, correspond to the main areas of political debate.
However many of the issues covered in this chapter are interrelated and crosscutting. There
should be a clear understanding that any issue could be addressed in its diverse
interrelationships at any given point, being an integral part of an interrelated whole.
Paragraph 2 will consider the proposals of NGOs for addressing the challenge of poverty
reduction, paragraph 3 will explore innovative sources for financing for development
including taxation and market instruments. Paragraph 4 will examine the specific issue of
Debt Relief, which logically can be included in the general measures for the financing of
development. From the NGOs point of view, the positions concerning debt relief/cancellation
are on the top of the list for their urgency. The NGOs contributions and background papers
are quoted in the bibliography annex.
2. Poverty Reduction Strategies
2.1 - G8 can play a positive role to reduce poverty
One person in five across the world lives on less than $1 a day. The negative effects of the
uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of the process of globalisation and liberalisation
are evident. The number of people living in very bad conditions is increasing in various
regions of the world. The poorest countries are failing to catch up with developed and other
developing countries, and some are getting stuck in vicious circles of economic stagnation
and regression.
For these reasons, the commitment to halve world poverty by 2015, embodied in the
international development goals, is the shared priority of international development co-
operation.
Development NGOs share the idea that a global poverty reduction strategy clearly needs to be
mounted - with more resources, a sharper focus and a stronger commitment – only as a mid-
term strategy, in order to achieve the final end of poverty eradication. It is justice, not charity.
Countries are free to gather and consult. So are the G8. The G8 account for the bulk of
international trade, services industrial production, foreign direct investment, financial flows,
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information and technology flows, and ODA efforts in the world. The G8 determine to a
great extent the general orientations and dynamics of international affairs. However whether
internationally or not, the G8 exercise, when they meet, de facto governance and leadership.
Thus, their summit matters.
The governance of globalisation mechanisms and institutions which have been established
officially by the international community to deal with these issues are often insufficiently
invested with the necessary authority or endowed with adequate resources. They are also
often not conceived or organised or able to respond quickly and effectively to crises and
emergencies. Thus, the role of G8 can be crucial, because of their political, economic,
cultural power and influence all over the world. But G8 are neither the poor, who are the
main subjects of poverty reduction strategies, nor the developing countries, who are the
nations directly involved in designing and implementing strategies for poverty reduction, nor
the international organisations, who serve as the multilateral agencies to provide technical
and financial assistance, nor the international NGOs and private sector, who are important
partners to support progress in development.
NGOs consider important that G8 assume their own responsibilities, based on few and
precise commitments, rather than spending time and words on useless rhetoric and ineffective
spot actions. An effective co-ordination means that each actor should play its own role,
avoiding any risk of over-commitment, contradiction or duplication.
NGOs hope that G8 meetings resolutions and action plans prepare and consolidate and not
pre-empt and contradict the meetings and action plans of the accountable representatives of
the UN institutions, with due regard to existing international rules and representative
institutions of the global community. The NGOs stress that the G8 should meet the
commitments pledged in occasion of the UN Conferences held in the '90s, in the presence of
the world public opinion. Basically, G8 should commit on some political engagement to be
fulfilled and easily measured, in order to improve their performance and to serve as a
benchmark and model for other rich countries.
2.2 - G8 commitment on adhering to the International Co-operation Consensus, a shared
conceptual framework on poverty reduction
All the member states of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have declared
to share a broad understanding of poverty and its many dimensions. This International Co-
operation Consensus emerged during the last ten years, affirming that poverty encompasses
different dimensions of deprivation that relate to human capabilities including consumption
and food security, health, education, rights, power, security, dignity and decent work.
NGOs stress the importance of recognising the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, and the
need to operationalise it in terms of a framework of action to reduce poverty.
It implies that poverty reduction strategies should be strongly based on the high
differentiation in the evolution of poverty across dimensions, regions, communities,
households and individuals. Context does matter, poverty has a geography, because it is
present in some places but not others. Nevertheless, there are some key principles that
highlight the operative priorities.
Empowerment. Poverty is not the outcome of economic processes alone. The interaction of
social, political and economic processes determine poverty and power is a critical
determinant. Poverty derives from a situation in which wealth is concentrated in few hands.
Poor can escape from poverty if they assume the responsibility of their progress and find
enough political space to do so.
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Ownership. The importance of recipient «ownership» of development co-operation is widely
acknowledged. Recipient governments and population can be said to own aid when it
empowers them and serve their interests. Nevertheless, low ownership of aid is common.
Donors tend to dominate the aid process and to pay inadequate attention to the poor’s own
preferences.
Re-distribution. Poverty reduction can be achieved if and only if all the actors interested in
our future recognise the need of an effective chain between democracy, participation and
social justice. There is an unprecedented growth in the inequality of the distribution of assets
and income within and between countries. The combined wealth of the top 200 billionaires
hit $1,135 billion in 1999, up from $1,042 billion in 1998; compared to the combined
incomes of $146 billion for the 582 million people in all the least developed countries. More
than three billion people earn less than three dollars a day. With poverty and inequality
continuing to increase, there is a need for more fundamental change in economic and political
priorities. The degree of inequality in society matters. Studies find that the responsiveness of
income poverty to growth increases significantly, as inequality is lower. Initial levels of
inequality in assets also determine the poverty impact of growth. Addressing these structural
inequalities thus becomes a crucial component of poverty reduction strategy.
Partnership. Currently, 49 countries, where 10.5% of world population lives, are identified as
LDCs. LDCs are particularly ill equipped to develop their domestic economies and to ensure
an adequate standard of living for their populations. The economic and social development of
these countries represents a major challenge for themselves as well as for their development
partners. The NGOs agree on the fact that the definition of poverty reduction strategies by the
developing countries themselves is a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development.
The principle of partnership is supposed to encourage ownership of the development
strategies by the countries and population concerned. In order to ensure that the process for
achieving poverty eradication is defined by developing countries, the NGOs emphasise the
key role of political dialogue and the necessity of providing support and capacity building in
beneficiary countries. The dialogue should allow developing countries and G8 to address all
issues of mutual concern and to ensure consistency and the increased impact of development
co-operation.
Given these key premises, in terms of commitments, the NGOs think that G8 should resist an
ineffective, donor-driven approach and, rather, to commit themselves towards the
implementation of strategies, defining their own responsibilities, in order to reach out
common objectives. It methodologically implies that a pragmatic action-oriented donors’
commitment should come up with a clear and realistic action agenda based on some general
considerations:
(1) Men and women from developing countries are the main subjects to articulate
appropriate policies to reduce poverty. Their leaders must be committed to reduce
poverty, and donors should basically support these policies. Poverty reduction
strategies mean to support poor in their sustainable livelihood strategies.
(2) The donors’ development co-operation policies should support the diversity
and originality of local institutional arrangements that encourage sustainable
livelihoods and collective empowerment, rather than searching for a naïve unique
road to development imposed from abroad. Access to development and a sustainable
livelihood is an indivisible human right of all people. The means to preserve the
conditions for a globally sustainable development of each individual and its
community must be regarded as global public goods, independently whether the
source of production and the reach of effects is local, national or global. The mutually
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beneficial nurturing and caring of these goods must become the focus of the donors’
policy.
(3) Donor countries’ development co-operation policies should reflect a
participatory approach and openness to developing countries’ knowledge closely
linked with people living in poverty in developing countries.
(4) As a result of recession and cuts in public spending, women are increasingly
represented among the world’s poor. Women are more likely to suffer poverty than
men. Attention to women in development as a policy mainstreaming must increase,
given the fundamental importance of gender to the elimination of poverty. But it
should be translated in terms of a part of people’s everyday approach, rather than a
checklist. Gender needs to become a matter of reflex, not a checklist item, nor an
add-on late in the planning process. It means that great attention must be given to the
impact of development to women, but also increased priority to interventions whose
goal is poverty reduction through the enhancement of women’s position within
society.
(5) Donors’ development co-operation policies should promote investment in
human resources so as to guarantee full ownership and leadership of each developing
country in formulating effective national strategies to reduce poverty and to assure
the sustainability of processes. In this sense, the promotion of local participation, the
empowerment of the developing countries' civil society and their involvement in the
specification of common guideline of poverty reduction strategies, is an important
process to be supported.
(6) The G8 countries’ concern with balance of power and with balance of
development, should be reflected into transparency and innovative participative
approach to poverty reduction, designed through international brainstorming,
dialogue and concertation with non G8 countries, dialogue with and presence of
national and international civil society. This is a consensus building mechanism, a
welcome approach for establishing the agenda, analysing the issues and designing the
action plans.
Development in its fullest sense is at the centre of the agenda of poverty reduction. It must be
considered as a main way for addressing the governance of globalisation. The process of
global economic integration has altered the context in which most governments are thinking
about policies for economic development. The globalisation model considers that national
economic policymakers are accountable to foreign investors and international financial
capital, which are the groups that determine whether an economy is judged a success or not.
It means to empty political powers. On the contrary, poverty reduction strategy must be the
way for poor people to engage the economy on their own terms and interests, not on terms set
by global markets.
2.3 - From commitment to implementation of the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNP target
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has an important role in achieving progress in the
area of poverty reduction, by supporting the efforts undertaken by poor people in developing
countries.
The 1969 Report of the Pearson Commission, Partners in Development recommended an aid
target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. This has remained an influential goal, though only reached
today by few donors (none of them being a G7 member state).
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands have shown that it is possible to reach the
0.7 per cent of GNP target, without inducing negative fiscal effects. Nevertheless, most of the
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donors’ governments continue to say that aid flows remain restricted because of domestic
fiscal concerns, but it is a mere pretext: the United States has a large fiscal surplus and the
lowest level of ODA/GNP ratio in the DAC community (0.10 %).
In 2000, Denmark reached its highest ODA/GNP ratio ever recorded (1.06%), the
Netherlands (0.82%), Sweden (0.81%) and Norway (0.80%) continue to surpass this target,
and Luxembourg reached for the first time, the UN 0.7 per cent target for ODA as a
proportion of GNP. No other countries exceeded the average country effort of 0.39 per cent
of GNP.
Official Development Assistance by Member countries of the DAC fell slightly in 2000 - by
1.6 per cent in real terms. In current prices and exchange rates total net ODA flows declined
from $56.4 billion in 1999 to $53.1 billion in 2000 - a fall of 6.0 per cent. Per capita aid to
Sub-Saharan African countries declined from $32 per annum (1990) to $18 (2000).
During the 1990s, the DAC ODA/GNP ratio has fallen to around 0.25%, well below the
0.33% average maintained in the 1970s and 1980s. This is some $20 billion per annum less
than aid would have been, had the previous level of effort been maintained.
In 2000, the DAC ODA/GNP ratio has fallen to 0.22%.
In 2000, total aid from the non-G7 DAC countries increased by 8.3 per cent in real terms and
accounted for 26 per cent of DAC Members’ ODA, compared with their 12 per cent share of
DAC GNP. Total aid from G7 countries fell by 4.8 per cent in real terms.
Tab. 1 - Net Official Development Assistance Flows
ODA US$ m.
(2000)
ODA/GNP %
(2000)
Real % change 1999
to 2000
Real % change 1998
to 1999
Canada 1 722 0.25 -2.2 -1.9
France 4 221 0.33 -13.9 2.3
Germany 5 034 0.27 5.9 2.2
Italy 1 368 0.13 -14.3 -18.4
Japan 13 062 0.27 -17.9 27.1
United Kingdom 4 458 0.31 35.6 -10.6
United States 9 581 0.10 2.7 2.5
Total G7 countries 39 446 0.19 -4.8 7.3
Non-G7 countries 13 612 0.46 8.3 4.3
Total DAC 53 058 0.22 -1.6 6.5
Source: DAC-OECD, 2001
Among the G7 countries, Canada’s fell slightly, and reached its lowest level in 35 years (a
considerable drop from the peak of 0.50% registered in 1988). A fall occurred in aid from
France, due mainly to the fact that its aid to French Polynesia and New Caledonia is no
longer counted as ODA. Germany increased its aid. Italy experienced a fall in ODA, due to
the timing of its payments to multilateral agencies. An exceptional fall occurred in Japan’s
aid, which was $2.3 billion lower than in 1999, when it included exceptional contributions to
the Asian Development Bank in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Aid from the United
Kingdom rose by 35.6 per cent in real terms, more than compensating for the 10.6 per cent
fall last year, with the rebound due to the timing of its multilateral contributions and its
commitment to an increased budget for aid. Compared to 1999, the United States increased
his aid, as a consequence of his effort to assist refugees from Kosovo, but the low level since
1998 is a result of Israel non-longer being eligible for ODA.
G7 donors can not expect their commitment to the Development goals to be taken seriously,
when they are signally failing to provide their share of the resources needed.
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Basically, the NGOs recognise the importance of the 0.7 per cent of GNP target: an increased
volume of the G7 ODA is considered an essential contribution towards achieving poverty
reduction, by making the G7 commitment more reliable and its implementation possible.
NGOs consensus emerged on the fact that G7 countries should increase, in a gradual and
permanent way, their efforts to make additional official funds available, guided by the 0.7
target. The firmest commitment to positive long-term signs of an increase in aid is hoped,
through the identification of the interim steps towards the goal.
Any argument that the money is not available is not acceptable: in just one week, during
December 1997, donors managed to pledge US$57 billion to bail out South Korea (Japan
pledged US$10 billion, The US pledged US$5 billion). Public deficits in OECD countries
have been reduced from 4.3% of combined GDP (1993) to 1.3% (1998), yet ODA continues
to be cut.
2.4 - G8 commitment on objectives and measurable results to reduce poverty
Globally, 1.25 billion people are in extreme consumption (or income) poverty and they live
on less than one dollar a day; 3 billion live on fewer than two dollars a day. 1.3 billion have
non-access to clean water. 3 billion have no access to sanitation; 2 billion have non access to
electricity.
Moreover, the number of income-poor in the developing world is again on the rise —
estimated to exceed 1.2 billion in 1998 after having declined until 1996.
The group of least developed countries contains the hard core of the problem of
marginalisation in the world economy. Least developed countries account for 32 of the 35
countries in the lowest category of the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Projections of
social indicators on the basis of the 1990s do not paint a bright picture either. In 2015 life
expectancy would be only slightly higher than the 1998 average, and still well below the
prevailing levels in other developing countries. If the prevailing trends continue to 2015
under-five infant mortality rates in the least developed countries average will be over 110 per
thousand live births, double the rate in other developing countries in 1998. The gender gap in
education will be almost the same as the levels in 1998, at 20 per cent below the other
developing countries.
Referring to these data, two dynamic aspects are particularly important.
First, the outbreaks of financial crises have an immediate impact on the living conditions of
the population in the affected areas. The improvement in levels of poverty achieved during
years is rapidly being lost to the financial crisis: in East Asia, over 20 million people fell back
into poverty in 1997. It means that poverty is more and more linked to the concept of
vulnerability, exposure to risks and volatility people face in their everyday lives. In the
context of globalisation, a decent standard of living, adequate nutrition, health care,
education, decent work and protection against risks mean political and economic power,
rights and capabilities to escape poverty. Second, global inequality has risen during the last
years.
During the 1990s, various international conferences agreed to set targets to motivate and
provide focus for poverty reduction strategies of international development co-operation
policies.
Significant progress has been made at various international summits: the 1992 Earth Summit
in Rio, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the 1995
World Conference on Women in Beijing, the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen, the 1996
Human Settlement Conference in Istanbul, the 1996 Food Summit in Rome. Subsequently,
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the member states in the XXIV Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN (June
2000) committed themselves to halve extreme poverty by 2015.
The effort that went into reaching agreement on commitments at each of these conferences
must not be wasted. The G8 should honour agreed commitments.
In Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, a number of
specific  targets agreed in UN Conferences were reconfirmed by DAC member countries, all
the G7 countries included. More recently, in September 2000, in the Millennium Summit
Declaration these seven International Development Goals (IDGs) were confirmed by the
Heads of Government and State, in the context of the broader set of goals – including on
hunger, safe water and HIV/AIDS – and in the context as well of the ultimate objective of
poverty eradication.
Tab. 2 - the International Development Goals2
1 Reduce by at least one-half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing
countries by 2015. (Copenhagen)
2 Universal primary education in all countries by 2015. (Jomtien, Beijing, Copenhagen)
3 Demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating
gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005. (Cairo, Beijing, Copenhagen)
4 Reduction of infant and child mortality rates by two-thirds by 2015. (Cairo)
5 Reduction of maternal mortality by three-fourths by 2015. (Cairo, Beijing)
6 Access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals
of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family planning methods, by 2015. (Cairo)
7 National strategies for sustainable development in operation in all countries by 2005, so as to
ensure, by 2015, a reversal of current trends in the loss of environmental resources and the
accumulation of hazardous substances. (Rio)
Source: DAC-OECD, 1996
Among the International organisations, the World Bank (World Development Report
2000/2001), UNDP (Human Poverty Report 2000), IFAD (Rural Poverty Report 2001), DAC
(2001 Policy Statement by the DAC High Level Meeting upon endorsement of the DAC
Guidelines on Poverty Reduction) have all placed emphasis on taking concrete action to
poverty reduction, referring to the IDGs.
The IDGs include: by 2015, halving extreme income poverty, lowering infant, child and
maternal mortality, and ensuring universal primary education and access to reproductive
health services; and by 2005, achieving gender parity in education as a step towards gender
equality and the empowerment of women, and implementing strategies for sustainable
development as a step towards reversing the loss of environmental resources.
The basic idea of global goals of measurable progress is to define a shared vision of what can
be achieved, in order to move to the real implementation of poverty reduction strategies. And
trend data point to an alarming gap between commitment and achieving – a gap that
translates into millions of deaths.
All these goals must represent a basis for dialogue with developing countries, which must set
their own national goals in light of their particular circumstances. It is important to setting
time-bound goals and targets, which imply the need of a long-term strategy (the 2015
horizon).
The goals can be achieved, but progress in some countries and regions is great (China
reduced its number in poverty from 360 million in 1990 to about 210 million in 1998),
                                                
2 Continue addressing qualitative aspects of development that are essential to the attainment of the
aforementioned goals; these include capacity development for effective, democratic and accountable
governance, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law (Copenhagen, Vienna).
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whereas other countries have reversed their gains (many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa).
Thus, a real success will require great attention to the differentiated results in all the different
contexts, otherwise the outcome will be biased.
A lot of studies reveal that meeting the targets depend critically on three factors: future real
growth being higher than in the past (4% per capita per annum until 2015); policies that make
the growth path more pro-poor; and low income inequality.
Based on the assumption that the world does not lack the resources to reduce poverty and
achieve the international development goals and that donors must demonstrate clear links
between their development co-operation inputs and the IDG, the NGOs highlight the need
for:
(1) Poverty reduction is a mid-term strategy toward the long-term objective of poverty
eradication;
(2) Increased aid and debt reduction for health and education, including a global initiative on
basic education;
(3) Increased budget allocation for basic social services and for the least developed countries;
(4) The phasing out of cost-recovery and user-fees in basic health and primary education
systems, introduced by the implementation of the Structural adjustment programs supported
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund;
(5) Economic growth linked to redistribution in favor of the poor.
In order to translate the above goals into reality it is essential that the developed countries and
the LDCs jointly define objectively measurable indicators to assess the level of achievement
of the expected objectives. Clear mechanisms to assess the achievement of the jointly defined
objectives have to be designed and put in place.
2.5 - G8 commitment on the good practice in instrumental approaches to poverty reduction
The proliferation of projects, programs, Trust Funds increases the risks of duplication and
waste. NGOs underline the need to improve co-ordination. G8 are not required to introduce
new programs or spot Trust Funds; they are not required to add themselves to more than a
hundred bilateral, multilateral and NGOs’ agencies, each with its own procedures, priorities,
planning cycles, and reporting requirements. But they can commit themselves to promote
better co-ordination in sector wide approaches, supporting the central role played by the
recipient governments to undertake the challenge of poverty reduction.
Sector wide approaches can be useful frameworks. They are programs of action and reform
in one main sector – health, education, and transport – led by the government. G8
governments are supposed to contribute funds to the common programme. But if large
amount of money has been committed to sector wide approaches, then much less has been
spent, because specific donor conditionalities have not been met. It is important that
conditionality is reconciled with local ownership and capacity and that as the structural
adjustment conditionalities failed to work, they can not remain a dominant part of the donors
ODA regime.
Focus on basic Social Services. The 20:20 initiative, first suggested in Human Development
Report 1992 and agreed in the World Summit on Social Development in 1995, to allocate
20% of developing countries’ public spending and 20% of donors’ ODA budgets to basic
social services, in order to mobilise the additional $70-80 billion a year needed from national
and international sources to ensure basic social services for all.
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Many studies have documented a shortfall in public spending of up to $80 billion a year to
achieve universal provision of basic services, with around $206-216 billion required and only
$136 billion being spent. This shortfall is twice the estimate of up to $40 billion at the time of
the World Summit for Social Development in 1995. There is also serious discrimination in
public spending on health and education – which is biased towards richer people, event
though the needs remain greater for poorer people.
The Social Summit set a target of reducing adult illiteracy by half between 1990 and 2000.
But many regions are unlikely to reach this target. The same is true for child malnutrition,
which was also supposed to be halved between 1990 and 2000. In South Asia the percentage
of malnourished children remains high, and in Sub-Saharan Africa it has risen. Progress in
life expectancy has also been slow. In Sub-Saharan Africa, many countries are moving
backwards. In the least developed countries about a third of the population will not survive to
age 40.
The contributions of G7 countries for basic health care, basic education and water and
sanitation was only 6.2% of ODA in 1999, less than the average contribution of all bilateral
DAC donors (7.3%) and less than one third the 20% target of the 20:20 initiative.
Tab 3 - G7 countries’ ODA spending for basic social services (% of bilateral aid, 1999)
Basic education Basic health care Water and sanitation Sub-Total
Canada 0.8 0.8 1.8 3.4
France - 0.2 2.3 2.5
Germany 1.9 1.9 5.9 9.7
Italy 0.0 2.1 3.1 5.2
Japan 0.4 0.7 5.8 6.9
United Kingdom 3.0 2.3 2.5 7.8
United States 1.2 3.1 2.1 6.4
Total G7 countries 1.2 1.6 3.4 6.2
Total DAC 1.2 2.0 4.1 7.3
Source: DAC-OECD, 2001
Thus, G7 countries are not fulfilling their side of the 20:20 initiative. The NGOs reaffirm the
need to fulfil this proposal. Only in the context of this commitment, within the
implementation of the 20:20 initiative, NGOs agree to set up new specific initiatives to face
the dramatic challenge of HIV/AIDS, including matching funds to a Trust Fund by the
developing countries. This is a positive development, especially if co-ordinated by UN
agencies and coherent with global conventions, but NGOs refuse any spot or fragmented new
initiative.
The Education World Summit, hold in 2000 in Dakar, renewed the importance of the
commitment in terms of basic education.
Basic education is a human right, a motor for development and the foundation of responsible
governance, which implies accountability to domestic constituencies. Changing the
educational chances of children demands more resources and better co-ordinated and more
equitable use of these resources, including ODA as well as domestic revenue. It also demands
to support institutional reform and technical innovation; G7 countries should leverage
improvements in policy, but avoiding eroding the State’s financial and political responsibility
for basic education.
250 million of children are working in the world. Exclusion from school is one of the most
pervasive mechanisms for reproducing inequalities. An interesting scheme, introduced in
Brasilia, Brazil Federal District, in 1994, and now implemented in some developing countries
which can have wider multidimensional effect is the so called «Bolsa Escola» (scholarship
for poor families). It is a yearly renewed cash transfer (minimum income) program
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conditional on primary school attendance, targeted to poorest and most vulnerable families.
In addition, children have the opportunity to attend higher levels of education through savings
deposits. A Report prepared by an Advisory Group brought together by Ilo and Unctad, with
the participation of representatives from some African countries and from Unicef and World
Bank, has assessed the desirability and feasibility of applying such a scheme also in African
countries. This scheme would be a valuable and innovative mechanism for helping
government to achieve international development goals and to reduce future poverty by
increasing human capital and stopping children dropping out of school.
Microfinance. The Microcredit Summit’s goal of reaching 100 million of the world’s poorest
families by the year 2005 has not been achieved (the Summit estimated that US$ 11.6 billion
would be needed as grants and soft loans, raising the percentage of ODA going to microcredit
for the poorest from the current less than 1% up to 5%). Nevertheless, NGOs recommend the
fulfillment of the target, because of the main importance of microfinance as a means of
commanding resources (to incur debt, i.e. to gain credit), of real empowerment of poor.
Information and communication technology. The global online community has grown rapidly
– from about 16 million Internet users in 1995 to an estimated 304 million users in 2000. But
access to the Internet varies between regions. In 1998, more than 26% of all people living in
the US were connected to the Internet, compared with 0.8% of all people in Latin America
and Caribbean, 0.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 0.04% in South Asia. NGOs think
technology is central in reducing poverty, but it means not only to create an enabling
sustainable environment, a structural context to widely disseminate innovations (rather than
introducing spot technologies or using digital divide rhetoric), but also reviving pro-poor
technologies and support locally-owned technologies. It is not simply through the provision
of PC that poor have access to new technology; technical, institutional, attitudinal and policy
aspects of knowledge sharing are strictly interlinked.
Promotion of decent work. Globalisation poses major challenges to the world of work. New
jobs opportunities can be linked to increased uncertainty and insecurity, providing only a
temporary solution to the social excluded and weakening bargaining position of workers. G8
should promote job opportunities in condition of freedom, equity, security and human
dignity, that is decent work for women and men, extending social protection and promoting
social dialogue, encouraging productive investment, combating forced or compulsory labour,
child labour and discrimination in employment or occupation. NGOs want G8 to consider
work promotion as part of an integrated development strategy, a basic human right which
provides people and their families with self-esteem, dignity, equity, freedom and security.
This calls for the G8 to emphasise the promotion of sustainable livelihoods, self-employment,
informal sector, and micro, small and medium enterprises development.
Promotion of local development. A positive response to the challenge of globalisation can be
the systemic paradigm, by emphasising the «meso» dimension of the socio-economic
systems. The characteristics of territories and the grade of spill-over and interaction among
factor of production, institutions, organisations, technologies and social actors are very
important. The nature of economic accumulation can no longer identified with the value of
material and immaterial goods, rather with the one of relational goods. Thus, it is important to
create suitable conditions that would stimulate the domestic growth of medium, small and
micro-sized enterprises in developing countries, which are the main sources of decent work.
Donors can support it through the reinforcement of productive systems at the local level. The
mechanism of bottom-up partnership, based on NGOs networks and decentralised co-
operation can strengthen the favourable context for local development.
Support to policies for pro-poor growth. Concern for the human costs of adjustment has
centered on protecting social spending and targeting it more effectively to the poor. The
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20/20 Initiative, led by UNICEF and supported by UNDP, tries to restructure social spending
to promote human development more equitably. Shifting more resources to basic social
services and ensuring the quality of the services will definitely be more pro-poor than the
current pattern of allocation in most countries. But there is no guarantee that these efforts
alone will lead the poor to use the services. A more integrated set of interventions, both
economic and social, is needed.
With renewed emphasis on inequality, as an impediment to reducing poverty, growth is no
longer considered the single driving force for poverty reduction. The traditional thinking was
that only rapid growth mattered and that changes in inequality could make only a minor
difference in outcomes. But the consensus has shifted to recognising that high inequality can
be an imposing obstacle to poverty reduction, nationally and internationally
In some regions with high inequality, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, there is little chance of
reducing income poverty by half by 2015. In many countries the poorest receive a minuscule
share of national income. Economic growth cannot be accelerated enough to overcome the
handicap of too much income directed to the rich. Income does not trickle down; it only
circulates among elite groups.
Abandon the Structural adjustment programs. The World Bank introduced structural
adjustment lending in 1979, initially as a temporary measure for developing countries with
balance of payments problems and/or large debt burdens. These programs encouraged a focus
on economic restructuring as a prerequisite to social welfare improvements. Structural
adjustment became, and continues to be, a prominent feature of World Bank lending,
supported by G7 countries. The direct and indirect results of these programs have seriously
debilitating effects on the poor. The new poverty, characterised by the heterogeneity of its
members, since they come from different occupational and socio-cultural backgrounds, is the
direct result of structural adjustment measures. Recently, recognising the harsh consequences
of adjustment for the poor, the World Bank introduced Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as
the new foundation documents for aid. Whereas in the past, country strategies were written
by donor agency, the theory is that PRSPs will be prepared by developing country
governments: a PRSP is supposed top be developed in a participatory way, nationally owned
and to set out the government’s policy framework and agenda for tackling poverty. Donors
should use PRSPs as the basis for decisions on funding. Nevertheless, NGOs’ critics continue
to lament the lack of real progress towards new poverty reduction approaches, as the PRSPs
centre on the continuos separation between microeconomics (put in the hand of national
governments, supported by the UN agencies) and macroeconomic prescriptions (dominated
by the Bretton Woods Institutions). In practice, the old structural adjustment conditionality
based mindset is all too evident. Ownership is often nominal and civil society participation
easily ignored: country strategies are still written and owned mainly by the Bretton Woods
institutions. Like its predecessor, the New Washington Consensus seeks to make economies
adjust to the distorted world market rather than to challenge the global wealth and power
imbalances. The IMF and the World Bank note that their Boards will «endorse» a country
PRSP, but this endorsement amounts to a veto on national approaches to poverty reduction
and development.
Rather than introducing new rhetoric or spot initiatives, G8 should make much progress on
translating into operative sectoral approach the International Co-operation Consensus, on
concentration, co-ordinating the accounting and reporting requirements, reduced aid tying or
on transparent and predictable programs of ODA disbursement – all of which would
demonstrate G8 commitment to government ownership.
Policies for pro-poor growth should be part of any national anti-poverty plan. An examination
of the distributional effects of government taxes, current expenditures and investments should
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also figure in such plans. In some countries, making tax systems less regressive might do
more for the poor than the existing targeted programs.
In broader terms, NGOs ask for a shift from the Structural adjustment programs to a post-
Washington Consensus.
2.6 - G8 commitment on the coherence of overall policies which have an impact on poverty
reduction in developing countries
Daily more than $1.5 trillion is exchanged in the world's currency markets, and every year
nearly a fifth of the world's goods and services are traded. Foreign direct investment topped
$400 billion at the end of the 1990s. But the benefits of these global economic transactions
are being spread inequitably among countries and, within them, between rich and poor. About
a fifth of developing countries receive four-fifths of total private capital flows, and official
development assistance, which is supposed to counterbalance the effects of market forces, is
now a third lower than in 1990 in real terms - and shows no prospects of recovering.
The growth of developing countries was modest during the 1990s - a result of the slowdown
in world trade, declining commodity prices and heavy debt burdens. Fifty-five countries -
mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and the CIS -have registered declining
income.
Globalisation can (and does) negatively affect poverty especially in areas such as trade and
investment, finance, knowledge and technology. The challenge is to ensure that globalisation
will benefit poor people. Coherence is not a mere co-ordination between Bretton Woods
Institutions on their narrow range of policies. NGOs support the idea of «Systemic issues»
which frames that coherence has the dimension to make local development goals and
International Financial Institutions policy coherent each other. G8 should commit to set up
coherent and co-ordinated policies in order to reach the international development goals.
They have failed to bring their trade, aid and financial policies into line with their
commitments to poverty reduction.
The NGOs stress that coherence between aid goals and economic and trade policies which
affect poor countries must be strengthened and, moreover, adequate strategies and
methodologies should be co-ordinated among donors, and between donors and «beneficiary»
governments. Programs should have a concrete impact on the reduction of poverty and social
exclusion, considering all the different dimensions of poverty and promoting analysis of the
constraints and potentialities of each developing country. Another important responsibility of
G8 in terms of cohesion, is the strengthening of an integrated approach at international and
national level, as the necessary pre-requisite for making development co-operation more
efficient. At this regard the NGOs raise the problem of a more and more fragmented aid
system that causes great confusion among the different actors involved in development co-
operation.
Effective Poverty reduction strategies should integrate economic, social, environmental and
governance concerns within a comprehensive approach to development. Reducing poverty
requires coherence in all government policies affecting development. Key policy areas with
potentially strong poverty reduction impact include debt relief, trade, investment, agriculture,
the environment, migration, health research, security and arm.
The integrated set of these areas represents the bulk of international policies affecting poverty
and requiring coherence.
Arms trade. Arms trade is a major cause of suffering and of human rights abuses. Poor
countries spend more on military expenditure than on social development, communications
infrastructure and health combined. While every nation has the right and the need to ensure
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its security, nowadays arms trade adds fuel to conflicts, wars, genocide, and epidemic
diseases. Global military expenditure and arms trade is also the largest spending in the world
at 800 billion dollars, annually. As world trade globalises, so does the trade in arms. In order
to make up for lack of domestic sales, newer markets must be created. USA and Britain
respectively do the largest and second largest businesses of arms trade in the world.
Sometimes, these arms sales are made secretly and sometimes knowingly to human rights
violators, military dictatorships and corrupt governments. This does not promote democracy
in those nations. During the 1990s, the idea of a large peace dividend has drastically been
muted. The resources assigned to ODA are equivalent to only 1/10 of armaments expenses.
Rich countries’ weapons are not only used for national defense, they are used by the Turkish
army against the Kurdish population, by the Indonesian army against the population of East
Timor, and in civil wars on the Balkans and in Africa. Although rich countries’ governments
claim not to export arms to countries that are repressing their population or that are violating
Human Rights, in practice there is very little restriction on arms exports. Rich countries do
not only earn money from arms exports. They also support the build up of arms industries in
countries in the South by exporting technology and sometimes even whole production lines.
Rich countries are providing loans and export credits to clients of the arms factories. This
financial support is given by governments as well as by banks. Rich countries’ policy fails to
provide full respect for international humanitarian law and falls short of establishing adequate
mechanisms and procedures for States to take co-ordinated action to effectively monitor and
control transfers by the States and their nationals of military, paramilitary and security
equipment and services. Despite appeals from NGOs, there is no explicit obligation to
prohibit transfers to forces which would most likely use them to seriously violate
international humanitarian law (which sets out the rules of war). Moreover, there are virtually
no provisions to address the current deficiencies in G8 States' arms control regimes, such as
the failure to strictly regulate international arms brokering and licensed production
agreements, or to adopt rigorous systems of certifying and monitoring end-use. There is no
provision for public scrutiny over arms exports from the G8 and thus does little to foster
greater transparency and accountability over the arms trade across the world. These
omissions will need to be rectified in the near future if a real aim is to achieve high common
standards in management of and restraint in conventional arms transfers in order to get a
more coherent framework for poverty reduction strategies. First, G8 should commit to
effectively discourage developing countries from high level of military spending and contrast
arms trade, including the growing availability of small arms which has been a major factor in
the increase in the number of conflicts (in modern conflicts over 80 percent of all casualties
have been civilian, 90 percent of these are caused by small arms, and civilians are the main
landmine casualties), military propaganda for arms sales, the fact that army schools set up to
preserve democracy train many of the worst human rights violators and dictators in various
developing countries. The European Union has tried to take a responsible step in introducing
a Code of Conduct in the sales of arms, but the US seem unwilling to commit to an
international agreement.
Migration. In an interdependent world, poverty in developing countries increasingly affects
the economic, social and political welfare of developed countries. Poverty can lead to serious
global problems, such as environmental degradation, political and economic instability, and
large-scale migration of people in search of a better life. Political coherence requires that G8
immigration policies will play an important role with respect to improving the living
conditions of that part of the population, which may be forced into migration due to poverty.
Basically, the NGOs think that migration is not a basic question of security, rather it
substantially reflects development problems. The new dimensions of international migration
are linked to the multidimensional nature of development and poverty: environmental
political, ethnic, economic migrations. Insecurity, vulnerability, war, risk, lack of freedom
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induce people to migrate. Also the opposite side of the coin, peopling skilled international
migration and brain drains may affect development. One priority is the liberalisation of the
so-called «movement of natural persons», which basically means that it should be easier and
more transparent for workers from developing countries to get short-term visas to work in
developed countries. Thus, migration should be strictly linked to development co-operation
policies in a comprehensive approach. Migration is a direct outcome of poverty; sustainable
and equal development is the way to escape from poverty.
Finance and debt relief. Globalisation means much more financial-oriented exchanges in the
world. The key to meeting the financing needs to support the international development goals
in the poor countries does lie with domestic resource mobilisation, but also with how aid and
debt relief can provide additional resources and increasing developmental private capital
flows. Domestic resource mobilisation are requested for financing development goals, as the
shared strategic goal is to make countries less dependent on external financial aid, but
international finance institutions can not discharge their responsibility.
(1) Basically, G8 countries’ implementation of the enhanced HIPC initiative should be
accelerated and broadened, de-linking – if needed - debt relief from the rigid approval of
PRSPs in order to accelerate the process and complementing its implementation with
additional actions of poverty reduction strategies and ensuring that the benefits of this
debt relief are used to reduce poverty. With the debt burden still compromising
developing countries’ ability to address the basic needs of their populations, any credible
strategy by G8 countries on poverty reduction needs to incorporate much more substantial
debt reduction.
(2) G8 countries’ support to a reform of the International Finance Institutions, which should
foster pro-poor macroeconomic policies through their lending conditions. IMF policies
should be reformed to provide more effective prevention against financial crises, and
more even-handed burden sharing between debtors and private and public creditors
through new mechanisms for orderly debt workouts.
(3) G8 countries should define and implement approaches to reducing private flows
volatility, particularly equity portfolio investments, and collecting new resources based on
the private capital flows (see Paragraphs 3 and 4).
Trade. The figures speak for themselves: the level of overall subsidisation of agriculture in
the OECD countries rose from $182 billion in 1995 when the WTO was born to $280 billion
in 1997 to $362 billion in 1998. World exports of goods and services expanded rapidly
between 1990 and 1998, from $4.7 trillion to $7.5 trillion. But the least developed countries,
with 10% of the world population, accounted for only 0.4% of global exports, down from
0.6% in 1980 and 0.5% in 1990. Sub-Saharan Africa’s share declined to 1.4%, down from
2.3% in 1980 and 1.6% in 1990. Although average tariffs are higher in developing than in
developed countries, many poor countries still face tariff peaks and tariff escalation in such
key sectors as agriculture, footwear and leather goods.
As G8 governments negotiate global policies, they are charged primarily with pursuing
national interests, so they fail to produce pro-poor policies. After the Uruguay Round, it was
estimated that the new trade arrangements would lead to an increase in global income of
some $212-510 billion, but a net loss of $600 million a year for the least developed countries,
and $1.2 billion a year for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The collapse of the agricultural negotiations in Seattle is the best example of how extremely
difficult it is to change the attitude to pursue only national short-term interests. The European
Union opposed till the bitter end language in an agreement that would commit it to
"significant reduction" of its agricultural subsidies, which are $360 billion a year (more than
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the African GDP). The US resolutely opposed any effort to cut back on its forms of subsidies
such as export credits, direct income for farmers, and "emergency" farm aid, as well as any
mention of its practice of dumping products in developing country markets. The multilateral
trading system has placed the burden of adjustment on developing countries relative to
countries who can afford to maintain high levels of domestic support and export subsidies.
Trade development challenges vary from country to country, but most developing countries
wishing to increase their participation in the global economy face a common set of obstacles.
It is useful to think about these challenges at three levels: the international system, national
policy, and the private sector.
At the international level, inadequate market access and limited capacity to participate in
multilateral negotiations are perhaps the most pressing obstacles to trade development. The
Uruguay Round produced a number of valuable market access opportunities, but several
agreements important to developing countries have yet to be fully implemented. Tariff peaks
and tariff escalation still burden a number of exports, such as textiles and agriculture, in
which developing countries have comparative advantages, and anti-dumping actions and
other restrictive measures have proliferated in industrial country markets as traditional import
barriers have been removed. In addition, multilaterally agreed liberalisation measures have
eroded the value of special and differential treatment for many developing countries.
Many developing countries also lack the resources and skills necessary to participate
effectively in the WTO and other international economic fora. Several dozen developing
countries are unable to post a single full-time representative at the WTO, and some maintain
no diplomats in Geneva at all.
G8 should support policies relevant to providing enhanced access to our markets, improved
rules under the WTO system, appropriate responses to environmental and social concerns,
and effective participation of developing countries in international negotiations and system
building.
At this regard, the NGOs call for:
(1) More favourable conditions of market access, including the removal of anti-dumping
measures and non-tariff barriers by the G8, for major export items of developing
countries can offer the potential for $700 billion in additional exports by 2005 for these
countries, four times the average annual private capital inflows in the 1990s.
(2) G8 Adoption of the EU’s «Everything But Arms» initiative, which is only a first step.
The EU has proposed to remove all restrictions on imports from the 49 LLDCs of all
products apart from armaments. From a development perspective, the principal immediate
effects of EBA will be to improve, in theory, access to the EU market for the exports of
ACP LLDCs and, to a much smaller extent, non-ACP LLDCs; to increase competition for
industrialised countries, other ACP states and the Standard GSP beneficiaries of South
Asia, Mercosur, South East Asia and the states of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.
Neither the scale of the potential boost to LLDC exports nor the increased competition for
other developing countries is likely to be large in absolute terms (but non-LDC
developing countries - particularly those from the ACP group are concerned about the EU
proposal, and the result will be an increase in EU dumped exports onto the world market
where they will lower prices still further for ACP states). For the LLDCs, though, quite
small absolute gains are likely to be relatively more important because their export base
and their international bargaining power are so limited. EBA is a positive modest
statement of good faith, even though the amendments introduced in January 2001, which
concern the transitional periods for the phase-in of duty-free access for bananas, sugar
and rice, reflects domestic agricultural concerns. Moreover, The EBA initiative
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invalidates market regulation instruments such as the system of quotas and prices, in
order to pursue a free-trade liberalisation; but the real problem which prevents LLDCs
from real access to EU market is the supply capacity of exporters and the non-tariff
protectionism (including anti-dumping and standard measures).
(4) G8 should support effective trade capacity building and promote untying ODA to the
least developed countries, in order to promote domestic providers of goods and services.
While the proportion of aid tying has declined recently, it remains a significant factor
affecting the quality and impact of development co-operation. Around one fifth of
bilateral aid is given on the condition that it is used to purchase products and services
from donors.
Health research. The 1994 agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) tightens patent and copyright protection, favouring those who develop and
market technology rather than society’s interest in diffusion of new technology. This
agreement has negative consequences for protecting the traditional and collective knowledge
of indigenous people and for the rights to health, that is negative impact on poverty reduction
strategies.
Biotechnology for plant breeding and pharmaceuticals has given enormous economic value to
genetic materials, plant varieties and other biological resources. But industrialised countries
hold 97% of all patents, and global corporations 90% of all technology and product and
process patent, using traditional knowledge that communities have held for centuries.
At the end of 2000, more than 36 million of people are infected with the HIV virus: more
than 25 million live in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 million in South and South-Eastern Asia, 1.5
million in Latin America. During 2000, there have been 5.3 million new infected people
(only 40,000 in the Northern America and 30,000 in the EU). In the United States, people
who are infected with the HIV virus can now have their lives extended indefinitely through a
combination of drugs known as AIDS cocktails. The cost of these drugs is $10,000 to
$15,000 a year, placing them far out of reach of the 33 million people in low-income
countries. But the cost of producing these drugs is a tiny fraction of their price. An Indian
generic drug manufacturer, Cipla, recently offered to provide the drugs to governments for
$600 and to NGOs such as Médecins sans Frontières for $350. Copyright protection favours
the «AIDS profiteers» and affects negatively human rights and corporate reputations. There is
a widening health divide between rich and poor countries. This divide is being widened by
the growing disjunction between international research and development of drugs on the one
side, and the health needs of the poor on the other. The supply of drugs is increasingly geared
towards prolonging life in rich countries, rather than saving young lives in poor countries.
The development of treatment and vaccines for poverty-related diseases is dramatically
under-funded. For pharmaceutical corporations, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, among
the major causes of child mortality in poor countries, offer limited profits, and attract limited
investment. Meanwhile, the enforcement of patents is raising the costs of essential drugs.
At this regard, the NGOs call for stronger action:
(1) to consider poor people access to seeds for food crops or to live-saving medicines as a
priority of international poverty reduction strategies;
(2) to give, within the implementation of the 20:20 Initiative, more ODA resources to fight
against HIV/AIDS, whereas the ODA assigned to this end has decreased by 29% in the
last 20 years;
(3) to use market incentives, such as positive and negative tax credit schemes for
pharmaceutical companies to redirect research efforts priorities, nowadays focused on the
problems of rich, which is part of the under-provision of international public goods;
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Strengthening the capacity of public and private stakeholders to engage in a dialogue on
poverty reduction strategies cannot be done solely for the sake of promoting such a dialogue
and based uniquely on the financial resources. NGOs stress the importance of some data:
informal sectors in developing countries represent one of the most effective economies with
immense potential for decent job creation and poverty reduction, whereas small and medium
sized enterprises are the bulk of the most dynamic knowledge economies of industrialised
countries. Globalisation requires G7 countries to support an international partnership
involving the small and medium enterprises – which are not crucial in terms of foreign direct
investment – and informal sector and small and micro enterprises, in order to create an
enabling international environment of private sector involvement in poverty reduction and
decent work creation strategies, supported by institution building, technical programs and
development co-operation.
3. Finance for Development
The overall process of the Financing activities for Development is receiving increasing
attention due to the ongoing organisation of the International Conference on Financing for
Development. The international gathering is scheduled for 18-22 March 2002 in Monterrey,
Mexico, to be held at the highest political level under the auspices of the UN and the
involvement of all the international financial institutions (IFIs). The General Assembly of the
UN decided that this event should address national, international and systemic issues relating
to financing for development in a holistic manner in the context of globalisation and
interdependence. The Conference should address the mobilisation of financial resources for
the full implementation of the outcomes of major conferences and summits organised by the
UN during the 1990s. It is hoped that the meeting will provide a standard guideline, which is
expected to critically influence future policies on financing for development of governments
and IFIs. The positions of the NGOs presented in this report can be included in the general
discussion, which is animating this process.
Since the issue of Finance for Development is strongly linked to the strategies adopted to
reduce poverty and to the international trade mechanisms, some parts of the following
paragraph are overlapping with the paragraph 1 on Poverty Reduction and 4 on the WTO
reform.
3.1 - Official Development Assistance
There is a broad consensus among the development community that a new impetus in Official
Development Assistance (ODA) is necessary if the central goal of halving poverty by 2015
has to be achieved. Of course, ODA is not the only but just one fiscal instrument to fight
poverty and to promote sustainable development. However the transfer of public resources
has to play a vital role because in central areas of sustainable development simple blind faith
in private capital and the forces of free market alone would lead to damaging or, at the best,
to ineffective results. In addition, it should be noted that ODA flows continue to represent the
core of external financing in virtually all low-income countries.
Faced with this situation the crisis of ODA appears dramatic3.
NGOs recommend subjecting official development financing to a thoroughgoing review.
With this respect the following analyses and policy recommendations have been proposed:
                                                
3 Statement by Jens Martens (2000), Overcoming the Crisis of ODA the Case for a Global Development
Partnership Agreement, World Economy, Ecology and Development Association (WEED), November. See also
Chapter 1.
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(4) to introduce obligations and responsibilities of rich countries’ corporations, preventing
the exploitation of lack of environmental and health controls and research standard in
developing countries, in order to help shape social norms and create profit motives to
promote realisation of poverty reduction strategies;
(5) to support through ODA flows the set up of national health systems, reverting the
negative trend imposed by the implementation of the Structural adjustment programs;
(6) to build human rights safeguards into the TRIPS agreement and its implementation,
because of the concern about the compatibility of the TRIPS agreement with human
rights law and environmental agreement.
Environment. Environmental co-operation has risen to the top of the international policy
agenda. A coherent poverty reduction strategy must directly involve the environmental
mainstreaming component, as poverty is not only cause of environmental degradation, but it
is also worsened by unsustainable development. G8 must recognise the importance of their
commitment to implement international protocols and agreements as a way to address
industrialised countries’ concerns and poor interests. Full co-operation on this issue will
demand substantial commitment and coherent conduct by G8, more than by other countries.
G8 should require a private sector’s full participation in the fulfilment of this objective: only
a shared responsibility of all the involved stakeholders will make the commitment credible.
Investment. Foreign direct investment flows have boomed, reaching more than $600 billion in
1998. But these flows are highly concentrated, with just 10 countries receiving 70% of the
$177 billion going to developing and transition economies. The least developed countries
attracted less than $3 billion in 1998, a mere 0.4% of the total.
The NGOs recognise that foreign investment can be important for economic development, at
the same time they express their concern about the impact of these investment on host
countries, particularly referring to the economic, social and environmental elements of the
sustainable development agenda.
It is important that G8 assume their own commitments rather than those of other countries.
Rather than imposing particular conditionality in terms of favourable environment to
investment or defining rules and norms for developing countries (such as attempted by the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment negotiated by OECD and failed in 1998, which did not
fit the development needs of developing countries), G8 should commit to implement a set of
recommendations for responsible transnational corporate behaviour world-wide, consistent
with existing legislation. Introduction of procedures and mechanisms established to promote
transnational corporations’ transparency and accountability, to eliminate child and enforced
labour, combat corruption, promote human rights and environmental sustainability. G8
should facilitate to incorporate stronger social, ethical and environmental standard into their
management strategies. The OECD Guidelines for Multilateral Enterprises and OECD
guidelines for Export Credit Agencies at the highest international standards set out some
standards and benchmarks for improving the governance of FDI.
Private corporation - through investment decision with huge effects on economic growth,
employment conditions and environment – can help open opportunities for decent work and
for reducing poverty.
2.7 - G7 commitment on governance and co-ordination involving governments, international
organisations, private sector and civil societies
Achieving poverty reduction for all people in the world requires action and commitment from
all the groups in every society, NGOs, media and business, local as well as national
government, parliamentarians and opinion leaders.
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New partnership is needed to extend to donor relationships with the private sector and civil
society in developing countries, not just to relations with their governments. The goal of these
new alliances is the creation of a locally owned development strategy in which donors are
able to respond more precisely to national priorities.
The weakness of political power compared with economic and financial powers, as the most
urgent problem to be solved in the international co-operation system and more in general in
the governance of globalisation.
The NGOs recognise that the governance of globalisation requires co-ordination between all
the international actors involved in development co-operation as well as cohesion within all
the activities implemented by a development agency.
The NGOs emphasise the need to retrench the role of the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) involved in the development process and for States to retake possession of their role of
leadership in proposing development policies.
Politics must regain its guidance and monitoring role at multilateral level too, and this is
possible by granting stronger mandates along these lines to the United Nations. In this case,
the role of the United Nations, considered by the NGOs to be the only institution fit for
fighting the international economic system's distortions and for promoting stronger
partnership with developing countries to fight poverty, must be reaffirmed. NGOs state that
in the context of globalisation an international system capable of ensuring that economic and
financial integration is consistent with the objective of the fight against poverty and social
marginalisation and exclusion is needed. The UN organisations should be vested with
political powers not reduced to the level of mere executors of co-operation programs.
In the field of development, especially the UN-ECOSOC should be supported and made more
effective in its procedures, through a reform process emphasising its model character of
stakeholder participation at equal levels, in order to increase coherence and consistency of
operations and policies. The Intergovernmental machinery must form an integral part of the
UN reform process. NGOs believe that the Under Secretary General responsible for
development issues should also be Executive Secretary of ECOSOC, which has an important
role to play on economic, social or environmental issues of overriding importance. NGOs
support strengthening of ECOSOC, leading it to becoming a more effective body. This would
involve, inter alia, the change of the ECOSOC membership: a proposal currently debated
implies a membership distributed in a three-tiers way (1/3 representatives from the G7
countries, 1/3 from the most peopled countries, 1/3 from general election).
Private capital, entrepreneurial capacity, knowledge, technology are crucial to promote
development and reduce poverty. But private interests are not automatically effective in
stimulating long-term development. The discussion on the Public/Private Partnership is the
core of the current international debate on poverty reduction strategies.
The NGOs affirm to welcome partnerships between public and private sectors that can
contribute on making business decision makers more "development sensitive", but they
disagree with the creation of spot Trust funds, which they consider a form of disguised
charity.
A partnership with the private sector should urge enterprise to act according to codes of
conduct based on the respect of human rights and sustainable development, and in accordance
with the International Development Goals.
The PPP needs to be a long-term, comprehensive process-oriented approach. International
private sector must be involved, not only in terms of financial resources, but in terms of
coherent conduct and respect of culture, law and international declarations.
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- Donors countries should avoid any declines in ODA and should pledge to honour existing
commitments to meet the international ODA target of 0.7% GNP within a defined time
frame.
- In order to overcome the traditional dependency relationship between "donors" and
"recipient", new forms of contractual relations between all countries should be established
under the auspices of the UN. This objective could be met by a Global Development
Partnership Agreement4, based on existing legal documents such as the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Cotonou Agreement between EU
and Africa, Caraibi and Pacific countries (ACP) can serve as an indication; while the
proposal for a binding Anti-Poverty-Convention discussed in Geneva during
"Copenhagen +5" follows the same reasoning.
- It is time to rethink the quantitative target of ODA. So far the Gross National Product of
the donor countries has served as the "assessment criterion" for the level of ODA and it
remains to be an important political criterion. But, while this target reflects the "supply
side" of ODA, it could equally think about other indicators focusing on the "demand
side". This new need-based target for ODA, however, must not be regarded as an attempt
to justify a further decline of ODA flows.
- A large share of the current development assistance is provided in the form of soft loans.
Any increase in this concessional kind of development assistance leads to a possible
increase in the foreign debt of the recipient countries. It raises the general question of
whether ODA should, in future, be made available in form of repayable loans at all.
- There is a large consensus on situations for which only grants not loans are appropriate:
natural and conflict emergencies, basic social services (basic education, health care and
nutrition, reproductive health, water supply and sanitary facilities) and technical
assistance in capacity building. But this list should also consider environmental measures
and support for non-export-oriented agricultural production.
- The policy of cost recovery which some bi- and multilateral aid agency introduced in the
‘90s in some basic social services should be completely abandoned. User fees for health
services and education have a detrimental effect on access of the poor to such facilities
and the funds raised by user fees have very little impact on financial stability of these
services.
Finally, the UN approach on this topic must be considered. In his Report to the PrepCom for
the Intergovernmental event on Financing for Development5, the Secretary General states that
ODA should be structure around two basic principles: "…supporting strategies that revolve
around the goal of poverty reduction and that generate sustainable, equitable growth; and
relying on policies and programmes that enjoy ownership by recipient countries'
Governments and civil societies".
The NGOs agree with the principles expressed by UN in the report: the conditionality from
above (i.e. structural adjustment programs) has proved detrimental; ODA flows must be
linked to poverty reduction, and above all it is necessary to strengthen ownership and
empowerment of local actors to conduct development programs on their own behalf.
But the NGOs are seriously worried that the instruments to achieve these goals would really
involve all the institutional subjects, according to their competencies, and the civil societies.
Among the national strategies for poverty reduction proposed by International
                                                
4 Ibid.
5 Report to the PrepCom for the High Level International Intergovernmental event on Financing for
Development (A/AC.257/12).
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Organisations6, the PRSP seem the fittest. But since this approach is quite new, there is
uncertainty on the degree of autonomy that governments from developing countries will have
to draw up the papers. The NGOs welcome a recent proposal from the IMF’s General
Director, Mr. Koehler, which implies the involvement of the UNDP in the evaluation of the
PRSPs. However the main concern among NGOs is the real involvement of the civil societies
in the PRSP process. Whatever kind of program for the exit from the debt crisis and for
poverty reduction should start from the needs of the people, and the subjects of the civil
society are the only one that can understand and mediate with the people.
3.2 - Trust Funds
After the analysis of the ODA as a way to get major resources for development, it is
important to understand the instruments that could be used as a vehicle for the allocation of
these resources. Some first funding schemes have been already ventured, such as the "Global
Environment Facility". Others have lately been proposed by the Italian Treasury, such as a
"Multilateral Health Facility" administered by the WHO or a Special Trust Fund for
education in highly indebted countries in co-operation with UNESCO. Some NGOs underline
the importance of specific initiative for special cases, as it is the case for the HIV pandemic.
But the participation and direct involvement of the civil society in the management of the
thematic funds is the conditio sine qua non for their success. On the other hand special funds
are multiplicating in the last year and there is great concern on the capacity of the
international community to administer the new financial architecture created by the funds. In
this context, some NGOs believe it is now possible to provide an overall framework in which
a contractual global fund for the financing of development activities or the preservation of
global public goods can become reality.
The global conferences of the UN in the last decade have also established a consensus on the
range of issues to be regarded as global public goods (GPGs): protection of the environment,
education and sanitation, protection from social exclusion, gender justice, enforceable human
rights and access to food. Mostly the provision of these public goods remains the task of
national governments. As a matter of facts, however, national public goods are increasingly
turning into international (regional e global) public goods, and their provision depends for the
most part on international co-operation. This is surely the case for the global public goods of
financial stability.
In the Report of the coming Financing for Development Conference it is expressed an
"…urgent need to review different options for financing GPGs… and to ensure that resources
earmarked for GPGs concerns are additional to those geared to ongoing development
assistance programmes". Referring to it, the Secretary General recommends: "…one option
to consider could be to increase sector ministry budgets in donor countries to allow them to
fund international cooperation linked to GPGs in their sector- while existing aid resources
remain focused on the financing of national programmes."
NGOs agrees with UN on this issue, but they also go a step further. Some of them propose to
complement and strengthen existing bi- and multilateral efforts in development assistance by
the setting- up of a contractual global fund under the auspices of the UN for the financing of
GPGs7. Such a system would not substitute but complement the action taken at a government
level, according to a principle of subsidiary. However, in a perspective of financing GPGs at
international level, it is necessary to look beyond the funding capacity of individual
                                                
6 i.e. the UN Development Assistance Framework, the PRSP, the Comprehensive Development Framework and
the Common Country Assessment.
7 A specific proposal has been advanced by an Italian platform of NGOs, see Italian NGOs Platform on FfD
(2001), Towards a Contractual Global Fund for the Development of Global Public Goods, mimeo.
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governments or intergovernmental agencies and devise a complementary global fund on a
contractual, un-reversible basis.
The goal of such a mechanism is to collect and distribute the surplus that the global economy
is generating at the cost of externalising its negative effects across borders. By tapping a
small part of these benefits, it is possible to create a global income for the financing of a fund
for the preservation and development of specific GPGs.
The form of a contractual global fund refers to the fact that all the nation-states are as well
producers as consumers of GPGs, thought to highly different degrees. Moreover, only a
contractual framework with automatic payment obligation and drawing rights according to
national balances of production and consumption of GPGs, established in a common frame of
evaluation, can assure the alignment of benefits. Such a system must necessarily build upon
the capacity of states to provide an adequate governance and institutional framework for the
pursuance of such goals, and on the adoption of incentives and internationally binding
covenants.
3.3 - Taxation
On the topic of innovative sources for development, including taxation, the Report of the SG
on Financing for Development doesn't contain any proposal apart from a general advise on
promoting national and international public/private partnership and a soft suggestion for a
better analysis of national currency transaction taxes. This lack in the UN agenda of new
forms of financing, including taxation, it is due to the strong opposition against international
taxes by some government, particularly the US. As an example, the US tax law for the fiscal
year 2000 makes all the contribution to UN conditional on the fact that UN is not engaged in
any effort to implement or impose any taxation on US persons.
On the other hand, NGOs explored several ways of improving taxation. Proposals have been
done for the introduction of new national and/or international taxation. It has been decided to
analyse some approaches to the topic, also if based on completely different criteria. Three of
them are exposed here: (a) currency transaction taxation (CTT); (b) progressive income tax
on the GNP of the rich countries; (c) taxation of negative externalities of production and
consumption.
(a) Currency Transaction Tax
The idea to tax international currency transactions was firstly argued by the Nobel laureate
James Tobin in 1972. Tobin proposed a CTT in order to stabilise exchange rates and to
hinder short term speculation. The basic idea behind this so-called Tobin tax is simple: a
small tax is levied on every currency transaction, i.e. both on buying and selling a foreign
currency. This measure renders all currency transactions that speculate on minor exchange
rate changes unprofitable. In particular, very short run speculations would hence be deterred.
The financial crisis of the ‘90s determined the current revival of Tobin’s idea to tax
international currency transaction. At present the support for a CTT is rising steadily among
different institutions. Various parliaments (EU, US, France, Belgium, Canada, and Germany)
have presented a draft bill for a CTT and the preparation process for the International UN
Conference on Financing for Development discussed this topic.
But the strongest call for a CTT, often denoted as "speculation tax", comes from the civil
society. ATTAC8 is the organisation leading the movement for regulating financial markets
in order to achieve a socially equitable and an ecologically sustainable development. Also the
political opposition to the Tobin tax shall be noted. This political resentment was felt most
                                                
8 Association pour une taxation des Transactions financières pour l'Aide aus Citoyens.
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strongly in the US. The following points are the main outcomes attended from the
introduction of such a tax on financial transaction:
- a CTT functions like a filter. It would discourage speculation by making currency trading
more costly, i.e. by "throwing some sand in the efficient wheels of international finance".
Because the tax rate is insensitive to the maturity of the transactions, the real tax burden
would be higher the shorter the time horizon of the operation, so short-term speculative
behaviour would be penalised. This implies a digressive structure of the tax. Currency
transactions that have a base in real economic activity will not be hindered by the tax9.
- A CTT stabilises financial markets. Assuming a decline in short-term transactions, the
incentive to speculate on short-term exchange rate movements vanishes, too. This would
also prevent speculative bubbles and the tax assumes a prophylactic effect with respect to
crises. Especially developing countries would benefit from the reduced threat of a crisis,
since this economies are particularly vulnerable to shocks and financial crises. From the
point of view of development, the general increase in stability is very valuable. Both
foreign trade and credit relations would become more predictable.
- - Such a tax instrument would generate revenue that could be used as one possible source
of finance to help meet some of the world's global economic and political challenges,
such as maintaining a stable international financial system or world-wide poverty
alleviation. Annual estimates of the tax revenue range from a few tens of billions to a few
hundreds of billions US$ (depending on assumptions over the tax base, tax rate and types
of financial instruments taxed). Thus, this globally raised revenue, largely out of the
control of sovereign states, would create a truly global revenue base. Even at the lowest
rate of 0.05%, the tax revenue would be more than twice as large as all current official
development assistance by all industrialised countries taken together. The discussion on
how the revenue should be used is still open: it has been proposed to collect the revenue
in an international fund for development, ecology and social equity, or in a global fund to
fight poverty. But, since part of the revenue could be used to solve national financial
problems, it would increase the consensus also among budget-constrain countries. A
mixture of national and international expenditure might be optimal from a strategic point
of view to gather more support for the tax.
As to the criticism, it has been said that such a tax would require a vast administration or
would be technically unfeasible. But there is already an infrastructure, established for other
purposes, which can be readily used without much effort for collecting the tax, both
nationally and internationally: the system of inter-bank foreign-exchange netting and
settlement10.
Taking into account some of the indeed valid technical counter-arguments to the (initial)
Tobin tax proposal, it has been demonstrated that a CTT can work, in practice, if it is
engineered carefully11.
                                                
9 See De Brunhoff Suzanne, Jetin Bruno (2000), The Tobin Tax and the regulation of Capital Movements,
mimeo.
10 See for further details Clunies Ross Anthony (1999), A Tax on Foreign-Exchange Transactions Report of a
Consultation held by CIDSE in collaboration with the University of Antwerp (UFSIA), October 1999, Antwerp,
Belgium.
11 A workable variant would draw upon the work of Professor Bernd Spahn of Frankfurt/Main University, who
launched his proposal in 1995. This is based on  a two-tier Tobin tax, levied as a national tax but introduced
through an international agreement, with a minimal-rate transaction tax on all transactions (the “basic tax”), and
a high tax rate (an exchange “surcharge”) that, as an anti-speculation device, would be triggered only during
periods of exchange rate turbulence and on the basis of well-established quantitative criteria.
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A CTT should not be regarded as a universal remedy for all the ills of the international
financial system, it is one instrument among several for regulating financial markets.
Especially with regard to the most serious speculative attacks and crises the tax is an
instrument of little value.
However the most important obstacle to the implementation of a CTT is the obstinate
resistance of those who take advantage from the volatile financial system, i.e. private
financial market players and individual governments, in particular the US administration.
But NGOs are convinced that a CTT undoubtedly makes good economic sense. And for this
reason they are fighting to stress that the Tobin tax is a strong means in favour of social
justice for its function of redistribution- from top to bottom.
(b) Progressive International Income Tax
The proposal of a progressive international income tax to stabilise ODA flow comes from a
study by Keith Griffin and Terry McKinley, published by UNDP Office of Development
Studies. Both authors call for a new global safety net, a progressive income tax on the GNP
of rich countries, the proceeds of which would be allocated to the poorer countries in line
with a fixed formula. Their appeal is unambiguous:
In creating a new framework for development co-operation, the objective should be to
abandon the present system, where aid contributions are voluntary, the aid burden is
distributed randomly and inequitable, and the aid flows are unpredictable because they are
subject to annual appropriation by national parliaments. The world should move instead to a
system, where contributions to the aid effort are obligatory, the burden is distributed
progressively, and the annual flows are predictable. The idea of a progressive international
income tax to finance foreign aid is not new, and if development aid is to have a future and be
more than marginal in size, the idea should be taken seriously12.
There are already precedent of such a "solidarity tax". In Germany, for instance, under the
concept of financial adjustment among the federal states- the so-called "state financing
offset" billions of Dollars are transferred from the economically stronger to the weaker
regions each year. The EU, to name another example, has the instrument of Structural Funds
to support the poorer regions and weaker economic sectors within the Union. By these means,
between 2000 and 2006 an estimated 195 billion Euro will flow from the richer to the poorer
sectors and regions of the EU.
(c) Taxation of negative externalities on production and consumption
The world economy uses global resources to generate benefits, which often do not return to
the appropriate factors of their production or are consumed unequally. By tapping a small
part of this benefits it is possible to create a global income for the financing of a development
fund or for the preservation of specific GPGs, whose provision are clearly the task for the
international community, such as the preservation of ecological and cultural resources,
financial stability and equitable trade13.
As already seen above, three forms of negative externalities on production and consumption
shall become the sources of generating revenues for the contractual global fund:
- Taxation of the use of global environmental goods: air, water, soil, forests and genetic
resources. These are important factors of production that contribute to various transnational
economic activities. Taxation of the transnational use of environmental commons, especially
                                                
12 quoted in the Statement by Jens Martens (2000), ibid.
13 see Italian NGOs Platform on FfD (2001), ibid.
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by transnational companies, on the basis of a global collective resource valuation, promotes
the GPG of preserving and regenerating ecological and cultural capacities.
- Taxation of short term financial and foreign exchange transaction promotes the global
public good of financial stability.
- Taxation of specific items in the trade of goods and services with particularly negative
international externalities, such as: 1) goods whose production chain has an impact on global
ecological balance (i.e. climate change or bio-diversity); 2) goods that can increase the
chance of conflicts, such as arms; 3) products extracted in socially and environmentally
sensitive areas. Indirect taxation by means of an increase in the insurance fees and export
credits could also be explored. Its introduction promotes the GPG of equitable and just trade.
3.4 - Ethical Finance
NGOs and academic institutions have proposed new creative sources of financing for
development which are not only resorting simply to more aid, but with some use of market
instruments. There are in fact different possibilities, in developed countries, for collecting
private contributions and there is surely a large amount of people who would support
ethically, environmentally and economically sustainable development aid projects. The
precondition to assure the ethic value and the transparency of the process it is the strong
involvement of both the civil societies of the countries in which the funds are raised/utilised.
- The market for ethical saving is increasing in OECD countries, as it is shown by the fact
that there are several 'ethic banks' and also that some commercial banks open 'ethical
accounts'. Private non-profit companies with both high degrees of financial reputation and
strong ethical credibility, could be the best actors for the market of ethical funds (i.e.
churches and big international NGOs).
- One proposal has been advanced14 to let the World Bank act as an intermediary institution
between the savers in developed countries and the borrowers in poor countries. The
World Bank may act as a sort of buffer between the rules of international financial
markets and those that are fair for developing countries. The bank is already credible
financial intermediary and manages guarantee funds, but possibly must establish its
reputation also in terms of the appropriate way of employing its funds: i.e. sustainable
human development oriented projects.
- The OECD countries could allow their taxpayers to devote part of the taxes, or to deduct
from their taxable income the money dedicated to a special fund for HIPC and/or
development finance.
- The microcredit and the fair trade are two milestones in the promotion of more effective
"ethically correct" development policies. 24 million persons borrow money worldwide
through micro credit programs, while 5 millions are involved in the fair trade.
From the NGOs’ point of view, particularly micro credit, and the ethic finance in general, has
a big potential and has to be intended as the finance of micro enterprises, of small producers
and of local systems of production and not only as the "chance to come out from extreme
poverty without assistance".
The different possibilities illustrated in this paragraph: ethic funds, targeted development
funds and microcredit to be financed through bond issues, tax facilities for northern taxpayers
and ethical saving are not mutually exclusive. The general idea is that of testing the intentions
                                                
14 see G. Vaggi (2001), From Aid to Sustainable Finance and Trade, University of Pavia-CICOPS, April,
mimeo.
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and orientations of Northern savers, either through markets or through open mechanisms like
the tax declaration. These instruments are more innovative and they have some obvious
advantages over a 'compulsory' new tax for debt cancellation.
4. Debt Relief. HIPC at a glance: the need for more15
In the broader debate NGOs believe the debt has been determined by the inequity in the
macroeconomic relations between the North and the South. The policies that caused the
incredible revaluation of the dollar, at the end of the 70s, determined the multiplication of the
payments for the debtor countries. If the amount of money paid by the debtors is calculated
again using not the dollar as unit but an average value among currencies of different
countries, it is clear that the debt has been completely returned, and debt has been paid many
times over because of compound interest. NGOs believe that to cancel the debt is a question
of justice and not of solidarity with the poor.
During the year 2000 the debt relief process for the poorest countries received a much-needed
boost achieving debt cancellation for some of the world's poorest countries. Thanks to the
efforts of the G8 leaders, IFIs and the Jubilee 2000 campaigns, 22 countries achieved the so-
called decision point in the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)16.
But the general opinion, among NGOs, is that the present initiative concerning debt relief is
not enough. As chapters 7 and 8 have stressed, a recent internal paper from the World Bank
and the IMF17 states that "HIPC debt relief alone does not ensure long-term debt
sustainability" (p. 24), offering that "the HIPC initiative provides a good basis for these
countries to exit from rescheduling" (p. 2). This stands in marked contrast to earlier claims by
creditors that the HIPC initiative would itself provide a "lasting exit" from debt problem.
That is why this “official” paper is often cited by NGOs.
In NGOs' opinion, there is strong evidence of the necessity of further steps for a permanent
solution of the debt crisis:
- the 22 mentioned countries are still spending on average more on debt servicing payments
than on health care. And the projections for the future are not encouraging: the total
scheduled amount spent annually by the 22 countries on debt between 2001-05 is 2.02$bn,
while they currently spend 1.35$bn on the health care of their population18.
- The HIPC initiative has managed to reduce the actual debt servicing burden of the
beneficiary indebted countries by a grand total of just 3% in the period between 1996 and
January 2001, that is the reduction of debt service effectively delivered by the HIPC
Initiative19.
- Zambia and Niger both face increased debt service payments after qualifying for HIPC, by
23 per cent and 32 per cent respectively20.
                                                
15 This paragraph relies upon much of the issues which are covered by chapter 4 (the history of foreign debt
crises) and chapters 7 and 8 (the current multilateral HIPC initiative). Nevertheless it is treated here as a matter
of recommendations, because of its political relevance and links to the other issues we present in this chapter.
Obviously, a detailed analysis of these issues can be best found in the other paragraphs.
16 See part IV.
17 IMF and WB (2001), The Challenge of Maintaining Long-Term External Debt Sustainability, internal paper,
April  (DC2001-0013), mimeo.
18 World Bank (2001), Global Development Finance,  World Bank, Washington D.C. and World Bank (2001),
World Development Indicators 2000,  World Bank, Washington D.C.
19 see EURODAD (2001), Debt and HIPC Initiative update, Spring meetings 2001, May 2001,. For the
calculation, World Bank (2001), WB Financial Impact of the HIPC Initiative: first 22 country cases, March,
mimeo.
20 World Bank (2001), ibid.
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Facing this situation, NGOs alert Governments and institutions around the world that without
major improvements, the enhanced HIPC initiative is likely to fail in its two stated goals:
delivering a permanent exit from debt crisis and releasing substantial resources for poverty
reduction. In particular the international community has committed itself to the achievement
of the international development goals, including halving poverty, achieving universal
primary education and reducing child mortality by two thirds, by 2015. Debt cancellation
alone will not ensure success, but these targets are certainly out of reach if there is not a
sustainable end to the debt crisis. NGOs unanimously agree that it is time to make a new
contract with clear and fair mechanisms to achieve a common solution between North and
South of the debt crisis.
We now present in terms of operative proposals what has been presented in chapter 8 as
critical comments to the HIPC Initiative. This is a complementary part that is much more
oriented in terms of practical solutions.
4.1 - Sustainability
NGOs and campaigners for debt cancellation reject the IFIs narrow financial and economic
conception of debt sustainability, altogether believing that good economics and social justice
are inseparable.
In fact if passing from the general problem of debt to the technical suggestions for its
solution, NGO accept a discussion with the IFIs on the issue of sustainability. In this
discussion the main problem is: which criteria should be adopted to measure the
sustainability of debt?
The concept of debt sustainability has been defined by the WB as follows: "… a country can
be said to achieve external debt sustainability if it can meet its current and future external
debt service obligations in full without recourse to debt rescheduling or accumulation of the
arrears and without compromising growth"21. As we will see in detail, the main indicator
adopted under the HIPC Initiative to calculate the sustainability of a country has been the
"export-to-debt" ratios criterion.
Only in recent years and in few, specific cases, IFIs started to consider other economic
indicators of the debt sustainability, such as the debt to fiscal revenue ratios.
Among NGOs, the common idea is that the current HIPC criteria are still inadequate, because
countries' overall development needs - and particularly resources required to tackling poverty
- have not been taken into account when assessing debt sustainability22.
The main argument against the concept of sustainability used by the WB and the IMF has
been developed by some Christian NGOs. CAFOD, in a document presented in the 1998,
expressed the principle that debt sustainability must be seen in a broader context that
incorporates the human development needs of the beneficiary countries. To this end a precise
proposal has been suggested, which takes into consideration Human Development Indicators
in the debt capacity analysis23.
                                                
21 A deeper analysis on sustainability conceptualisation and modelling is in part II.
22It is interesting to note that today the WB and IMF themselves admit that the definition of debt sustainability
under the HIPC initiative "is quite narrow from a development perspective… and… does not measure the
adequacy of public resources to address priority development programs after debt service has been paid", in
IMF and WB (2001),  ibid. (p. 12).
23 see H. Northover, K. Joyner and D. Woodward, (1998), A Human Development Approach to Debt
Sustainability for the World's Poor, position paper, mimeo, which has been adopted then as a joint paper with
Caritas Internationalis and CIDSE.
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From the human development prospective, the focus of debt sustainability analysis should be
shifted towards government revenues. In fact the debt threshold should take into
consideration the governments' feasible net revenue, in other words the ability of
governments to raise revenue and to fund poverty reduction programmes and to meet
minimal primary services (health and education) for their population before paying the debt
service24. In the traditional approach to sustainability debt service is a priority and not a
residual, while according to the "bottom-up" approach described above the priority is human
development.
Other ways have been examined to modify the HIPC criteria. Many NGOs have argued that a
specific assessment of the cost of meeting the 2015 development targets should be made and
the definition of affordable debt payments (and therefore sustainable debt) based on. Oxfam,
for example, calculates that future debt service for the 22 countries, at 2$bn a year, nearly
matches the cost of achieving the education and health goals in these countries, at around
2.7$bn a year25.
4.2 - Eligibility criteria to receive debt relief
Logic consequence of a "bottom up" approach to debt sustainability is that the eligibility
criteria to receive debt relief should be re-opened. In NGOs' opinion, eligibility under the
HIPC Initiative should be separated from the export rate and linked to the poverty and human
development index. As said above, the criteria to define the sustainability for being eligible of
a country should be based on the ability of governments to fund basic needs satisfaction for
their population before paying the debt service.
From this perspective, any low-income country that currently suffers from high levels of
indebtedness coupled with low government revenues and widespread poverty should be
eligible for such initiative. Nigeria, for example, is a case for immediate inclusion in the debt
cancellation process, but also all the low-income countries, as proposed by the Italian
government26. Countries that are relatively less indebted, or have relatively high government
revenues, would as a result receive a lower absolute amount of debt reduction. Such an
approach would be empirically consistent across countries, avoiding the arbitrary and unfair
current distinction between poor countries that are HIPC and those that are not HIPCs, which
is sometimes advanced by the IFIs as a reason for not proceeding further with debt reduction.
A special case should be considered for the eligibility of countries afflicted by economic,
natural and social shocks; in particular the HIV/AIDS emergency in the Sub-Saharan Africa
and the future impact of this epidemic on the governments' ability to repay debt27.
Concerning the situation of countries which are not eligible for the cancellation because of
conflict or violation of human rights, NGOs welcomed the announcement by the UK
government to put in a trust fund any debt service from those countries till their achievement
of the Decision Point in HIPC.
                                                
24"This is in contrast to the enhanced HIPC initiative's fiscal criterion where the setting "sustainable" ratios of
debt to revenue are qualified by even more arbitrary sub-criteria". In H. Northover (2001), The Human
Development Approach to Debt Sustainability for the World's Poor, background paper presented to the GNG
Initiative, mimeo.
25 Oxfam (2001), Debt Relief: Still failing the poor, position paper, April, mimeo.
26 See M. Zupi (2000), Note sul tema della riduzione del debito estero dei paesi poveri, "Finance and
Development" Working paper, CeSPI, Roma, Dicembre.
27 S ee National Aids Trust for more detailes on the topic.
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4.3 - Cut-off date
Under the HIPC criteria only the debt contracted before a given day (the so-called cut-off
date) can be cancelled. But some countries, like Zambia and Niger, face increased debt
service payments after qualifying for HIPC.
Thus, NGOs call for a redefinition of the cut off date. Most NGOs hope that the G8 would
invoke a new cut-off date for the Genoa summit: the day of the Koln summit, in July 1999,
has been proposed.
4.4 - Cancellation of the Multilateral Debt
In order to provide further debt relief to the HIPCs, the G8 have set a powerful example by
agreeing on 100 per cent cancellation of bilateral debt. This example needs to be replicated
throughout all the creditor countries (both the Paris Club and non-Paris Club members). For
the NGOs it is now important that WB and IMF would follow the G8 with an immediate 100
per cent cancellation for the graduate HIPCs.
According to Drop the Debt28, the successor to the Jubilee 2000 English Campaign, two main
facts must be considered to justify the cancellation of the multilateral debt:
After the effects of the enhanced HIPC initiative and the additional multilateral pledge, the
major creditors to the 22 decision point countries will be the multilateral agencies, with on
the top of the list the WB's International Development Association (30%) and the IMF (10%).
The benefit of a 100 per cent cancellation by the World Bank and IMF alone would be
around $7.2 billion in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, or about $13 billion in nominal terms.
In the case of the IMF, such a cost could be easily met by using the Fund's own income
stream. For the WB, the total additional cost of going up to a 100% cancellation for the 22
graduate HIPCs amounts to an additional $215 million per year for the next five years. This is
eminently affordable, and could be provided from a range of resources. These are the findings
of an independent analysis commissioned by Drop the Debt.
4.5 - Fair and transparent arbitration process
The NGOs believe that inequity in the relations between the North and the South is the main
reason determining the unbalanced process of decision making in international debt
management. At present, the debtor countries have to submit their economic sovereignty
completely to the conditions set by the creditors, who define the process as such and set up
the rules of the process.
The NGOs and international campaigns for debt relief support the introduction of an
international arbitration procedure between debtors and creditors. A fair and transparent
arbitration process (FTAP) must be established to this end, containing the following
principles:
- an impartial decision making body, independent from the involved parties;
- the right of all stakeholders to be heard before a decision is being made;
- the protection of the debtor's basic needs - especially the needs of the most vulnerable
sectors of a sovereign debtor's society;
                                                
28 see Drop the Debt (2001), Reality Check report, London, mimeo, April. It incorporates independent studies by
accountants Chantrey Vellacott (DFK) and Subhrendu Chatterji.
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- the institution of an automatic stay once an international arbitration case is opened, in
order to avoid a creditor's run on the debtor's remaining assets and to allow for an orderly
procedure.
These elements are part of the Chapter 9 of the US Insolvency Code, which has been
proposed by the Austrian economist Kunibert Raffer for an international insolvency
procedure to afford the debt crisis. The proposal has been taken up positively by the UN
Secretary General in his Millennium address, by UNCTAD and by the German Federal
Reserve (Bundesbank), thus reflecting the growing interest for the issue caused by the
international debate among civil society organisations and academics.
Other measures have been proposed: to abolish the debt when the financing has been used for
assisted projects by the creditor partner who had a bad economic performance.
4.6 - From debt to development through debt-for-development swaps
Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI) is conducting the debt-for-development swaps in Zambia
and Guinea. This operation is now possible in Italy, thanks to a specific law on debt relief29.
This law explicitly considers the cancellation of debt through conversions for sustainable
development purposes.
As a first step, the CEI is raising funds to finance the debt swap in Zambia and Guinea. If the
Italian government doesn't cancel its credits, the Italian Catholic Conference is ready to buy
the debt of these countries. The third actor involved, the local governments, should put part of
its debt on a counterpart fund. Representatives of the local civil societies will then administer
this fund to finance projects for poverty reduction. In fact the goal of a debt-for-development
swap is not only the debt cancellation but also the obligation to destine the money freed to
poverty reduction, with the direct involvement of the local civil society30. To enforce the
participation of the civil society the Italian law make provision for the direct involvement of
organisations that, after a fund raising, can participate in the management of the money
coming from the conversion and from their own funds.
In Zambia and Guinea two counterpart funds have been created with the money paid by the
local government and the money collected by the Italian Church. A committee will
administer this money, with representatives of the local civil society, one representative of
the CEI and one of the local government. In the meantime a working group composed by
representative of local associations, NGOs, and churches is selecting the projects that will be
financed31.
                                                
29 Italian Law n. 209 approved on 28 July 2000. For details, see Zupi, M. (2000), ibid.
30 For a good analysis of the debt swap mechanisms see Jurgen K. and Lambert A. (1998), Debt swaps for
sustainable development, IUCN/EURODAD/SCDO, London, mimeo.
31 The Italian profit company Italsystems for Environment has proposed innovative ways for the managing of
freed resources through the debt conversion, especially in the field of water resources. See for more information
on the National Ecclesiastic Campaign for Debt Reduction and documents from the Italian Episcopal
Conference.
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Conclusions
Debt per se is not bad so long as it is properly invested and managed to bring about rapid economic
growth and social development which would not have occurred had a country relied solely on its
own resources. Loan contraction should enhance capacity to pay, and debt levels should be kept
within manageable limits in order to maintain credit worthiness. When contracting additional loans,
it is imperative for counties to adopt debt management policies, which ensure that the marginal
returns to investment remain within the country.
The provision of large investment capital suggested in the growth theories of Harrod (1939), Domar
(1946) and Rostow (1956) has very often motivated proposals for foreign aid as means of bridging
the resource gaps created by ambitious production targets in the developing world.
External debt is regarded as one of the main economic ills facing Sub-Saharan Africa in its current
stage of development. Foreign loans and aid, which spurred growth during the sixties and early
seventies, have turned into a nightmare of debt, constantly forcing countries to initiate relief
measures. Since 1980 total external debt has grown faster than any region, mounting to a crisis level
which has since drawn international attention. The crisis has taken a heavy toll in human terms,
depriving countries the necessary external resources needed for growth and social development.
Lamentably, debt burdens are continuing to rise under weak economic performance and uncertainty
increase in net transfers. Furthermore, debt burdens are also mounting at the time countries are
undertaking difficult policy reforms under Structural Adjustment Programs. While present lending
is linked to policy reform initiatives, there are still formidable obstacles facing Sub-Saharan
countries which preclude many from achieving the rapid growth needed for debt reduction.
Sub-Sahara Africa total external debt now stands at a staggering level of $223 billion. This amount
is negligible compared with over $2.5 trillion owed by all Third World countries. However, its
implications are serious for SSA region that is experiencing high population growth, high debt
burden indicators, low and stagnating per capita income and human development as well as
faltering GDP and export growth rates. SSA per capita debt of about $400 outpaces the region’s per
capita income of $340. A large share of total debt (65%) is owed to official creditors at concessional
rates while the remaining 35% is owed to private sources. A higher proportion of bilateral aid (loans
and grants) is tied in one form or the other. Donor nations still prefer to channel most of their aid to
former colonies. The region’s commercial debt not only trades at very low rates in the secondary
market but have also received less attention as a remedy of Africa’s debt problems. Although debt
burden is not uniform across countries, low-income African nations have been hit hardest because
of their relatively weak economic position. Several internal and external factors have been blamed
for the causes of African debt crises, especially the OPEC oil shocks and weak commodity prices
which brought about drastic changes in international lending and borrowing policies of many
African countries. International efforts to curb the region’s crippling debt have not been very
successful in bringing debt levels of many countries to manageable levels. While these measures
continue to provide short-term palliatives, countries are obliged to cope with short-term non-
negotiable payments to the revolving fund.of IMF. Long term solutions to Africa’s debt problems
calls for a concerted and coherent effort by donor nations, the World bank and African countries to
bring about substantial reduction in African debt and inducing favourable trade, financial, security
environments. Commercial debt is a small proportion of the region’s total debt and does not
immediately constitute a threat to the international financial system. Unless sufficiently addressed,
Africa’s continued debt overhang raises fears of the region being trapped in a “vicious cycle” of
debt and permanent reliance on external assistance.
The debt-export ratio is also a “liquidity indicator” relating total external debt to exports. Debt-GNP
ratio is a “solvency indicator” which evaluates a country’s ability to service debt on the basis of its
national income assuming convertibility of currencies. SSA countries’ situation is veryy bad
considering both these two indicators.
And paradoxically, as a matter of fact, Africa’s military expenditure as a percentage of GDP was
the highest in the world for most of the 1970s and 1980s. Unwarranted military expenditures were
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not only uneconomical, but caused internal havoc and destabilized many countries, including
among others Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia (for Africa as a whole,
the ratio for 1977 was about 4.7% and dropped only to 4.3% in 1987)1.
In sum, it is true that, at a general level of investigation, there are some important common
characteristics of African indebtedness. Sub-Sahara Africa debt differs fundamentally in many
respects from those of other Third World countries, especially the highly indebted countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). External debts of African countries are bilateral and
multilateral in nature, contracted mainly on concessional terms - low interest rates with long
repayment and grace periods. They are mostly public loans guaranteed by respective governments
for various public development projects. In contrast, Latin American debts are from private
commercial banks in creditor nations, acquired at market rates of interest with short repayment and
grace periods. Although governments guaranteed most of the loans, the major customers were
private corporations and individuals in Latin America who borrowed to finance private business
ventures. Hence, the two types of debts can be distinguished as “publicly guaranteed versus
privately guaranteed loans. Sub-Saharan Africa is less indebted compared to LAC but it is the most
debt burdened region of the Third World. Its current total external debt, which is equivalent to the
combined debts of Brazil and Argentina, constitutes about 11% of Third World debt. In contrast,
LAC is the most indebted region of the world holding about 30% of Third World debt,
approximately ten times that of SSA. Although the debt-service ratios of both regions have declined
since 1988, those of LAC have been higher largely because of the high interest rates on their debts.
Because of strong export performance of LAC, the debt-export ratios has continued to decline since
1987 and are currently below those for SSA. The debt-GNP ratios for LAC have also been
declining since 1987 and are much below those of SSA.
Though countries like Nigeria borrowed heavily from private commercial banks, capital flight has
not been the major reason for Africa’s debt problems. The main cause of Sub-Sahara Africa debt
problems lies more with the interaction between internal and external factors.
At the beginning of the third Millennium, marked as it has been by enormous political,
technological, and economic upheavals that are no more than vaguely delimited by the keyword
“globalisation”, we are faced with the question of how to permanently overcome poverty on a
world-wide basis. Globalisation has been given different definitions by different people. In any
case, it has generally been assumed that globalisation has helped spur economic growth throughout
most of the world. However, in terms of the practical experiences in many SSA countries, the
definition relevant to our circumstances is another. The official data for the last two decades (1980-
2000) remind us a different story. Economic growth has slowed dramatically, especially in the less
developed countries, as compared with the previous two decades (1960-1980). For example:
· From 1960-1980, output per person grew by an average, among countries, of 83%. For 1980-
2000, the average growth of output per person was 33%.
· Eighty-nine countries – 77%, or more than three-fourths – saw their per capita rate of growth
fall by at least five percentage points from the period (1960-1980) to the period (1980-2000).
Only 14 countries – 13% – saw their per capita rate of growth rise by that much from (1960-
1980) to (1980-2000).
The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) has recently released a report titled, “The
Emperor Has No Growth: Declining Economic Growth Rates in the Era of Globalisation” written
by Mark Weisbrot, Robert Naiman, and Joyce Kim of CEPR.  The report illustrates how
globalisation and the policies of the IMF and the World Bank, have failed to bring about economic
growth in the developing countries in which they promote their macroeconomic policies. It
concludes by asserting that we should be very cautious in pretending that someone has the
                                                                
1 Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1989), World Military Expenditures and Transfers,
Washington, D.C.
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necessary expertise or answers to the difficult and often country-specific problems of economic
growth and development.
The uncertainty that pervades financial markets in the early months of 2002 should shift to cautious
conclusions on the natural and immediate benefits of globalisation, particularly referring to SSA
countries.
Some main conclusions emerge from our study.
First, the problem of highly indebted countries is not a new one, both in theory and in practice.
From the two Greek city-states who defaulted on loans from the Delos Temple in the fourth century
BC to Mexico’s default on its first foreign loan after independence in 1827 to Haiti’s 1890s high
ratio of debt to exports and to the German crisis of post-war repayments in the first half of the XX
century, debt servicing difficulties have been a feature of the world economy throughout history.
And we should remind that during the 1800s, Britain extended huge loans to the United States to
finance industrial development and expand its capitalistic state. The United States later turned into a
creditor country after World War II, and through the Marshall plan aid provided loans that helped
rebuild Europe from the ravages of war. In both these cases, debt settlements were made only after
long negotiations that resulted in concessional rescheduling, payment in kind and eventually large
amounts of debt forgiveness. Thus, debt crises are not new and debt is not bad by itself. Even
though development economics emerged after the II World War to confront the causes of poverty in
developing countries and to define strategies for economic progress, nevertheless we showed how
old and profound is the relationship between foreign finance and theory of development process.
Since the beginning of the theoretical debate, it was clear how complex is this relationship. In
particular, we emphasised the importance of fiscal components of external debt problem, the so
called three-gaps model, which is considered a peculiarity of SSA case. But we also stresses the
complexity of factors that interact, as demonstrated by the fungibility argument and the Dutch
disease. The complexity and the presence of counteracting effects seem to be the real nature of
development and debt linkages, when we analyse in detail economic literature. Schematic and
simple relations must be abandoned in favour of case-by-case analysis.
Second, the idea of foreign debt sustainability, conducting the discussion in economic and financial
as well as political terms, is much more complex and ambiguous than it may appear. And this
relates to the question of debt relief. In fact, it is very different to consider sustainability from the
lenders point of view (how much debt relief can they afford?) than from the borrower countries
(how much debt repayment can they guarantee?). Sustainability is complex as complex is the map
of lenders: we know that the most important component of SSA foreign debt burden is long-term
debt outstanding, that the next important category is short-term debt outstanding, followed by the
use of IMF credit, which became more and more important in the 1980s, when structural adjustment
and enhanced structural adjustment facilities became important components of flows to SSA. And
another characteristics of the structure of the SSA debt is the changing pattern of its creditors. It can
be generally be said that bilateral debt is the most important component of the total debt. Most of
the increase in the 1980s reflects the impact of repeated rescheduling with interests being
capitalised and compounded rather than flows of new money. Although, in general, the three types
of flows (bilateral, multilateral and private) grew dramatically in the 1980s, the grow in multilateral
flows was relatively large. And contrary to common belief, it is interesting to note that private debt
is a serious problem, even more serious in the 1990s in the West and Central Africa. The most
significant component of such debt is suppliers’ credit and bank credit covered by Export credit
agencies, such as the Italian case demonstrated. A larger share of the official debt is on concessional
terms. The level of concessionality is the highest for East and Southern Africa, but there has been a
growing trend towards non-concessionality. Such non-concessionality is the highest for West and
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Central Africa. Besides, the SSA debt has increasingly been characterised by the importance of
interest and principal arrears in shaping its level. Beyond prevailing rhetoric of international
initiatives, which affirm to make external debt sustainable (as the current multilateral initiative
says), differences among countries are important, the nature and composition of debt are important,
specific history and context do matter, the interests and motivation and bargaining power of
different lenders and debtors are crucial. There is no “scientific” reason to define a general
threshold of debt sustainability or to identify 41 countries eligible to debt relief initiatives (as the
current HIPC initiative does), rather than concrete, legitimate political will. The implications of
approaching debt sustainability from a development and human rights bias, rather than from the
fiscal bias of the present debt cancellation proposals are impressive. So far, the international
community has proposed to write off about $100 billion of the $2465 billion developing country
debt. A “rights based approach” would require the writing off of perhaps $500 billion in debt owed
by 66 countries that cannot afford to pay their full debt service and still meet development and
human rights targets to which the international community is already committed. Using historic
precedents would require the writing off of $900 billion or more.
Third, the characteristics of African problems stress the importance of contextual and specific
national and historical aspects, within the same thematic issue of debt crisis. Heterogeneity does
matter. It can be argued that Africa’s external finance problem is the result of the structure of its
trade in the world economy in general and its place as a commodity producer in particular. The
general African economies’ performance since the time of political independence can only be
classified as dismal. There has been a secular deterioration of their terms of trade, dependency on
foreign capital (debt and aid) has also grown at alarming rates exasperated by stagnation in exports,
the level of investment is extremely low, physical and social infrastructures are deteriorating
rapidly. These are aggravated by political instability and frequent wars, and they are inter-linked to
wide corruption, wrong economic policies, serious responsibilities of inadequate local élites.
However, again, specific context and differences do matter a lot. The origin of external debt can be
traced to the willingness of the debtor country to borrow and the lenders to lend. From the debtor
country’s perspective the need and decisions arised from given contexts, and it is also important to
keep in mind that external debt was also driven by the pressure and willingness of lenders to lend –
particularly the IMF and the World Bank, in SSA case -.
Fourth, as a direct consequence of the preceding point, we need to go beyond the averages. Beneath the
aggregate numbers exists a variety of experiences. And it does imply relevant consequences in terms of
econometric analyses. Most work in the growth literature relies simply on cross-country regressions.
However, we don’t consider cross-country regression as a reliable method of empirical
argumentation relating to African development. We think that the most compelling evidence on
these issues can come from careful and patient in-depth case studies of individual countries. Weak
theoretical foundation and specification of functional forms for the relationship, poor quality of data
bases and errors and biases of measurement, inappropriate econometric methodologies are common
problems. In the context of relationships that have both a temporal and cross-sectional dimensions,
there is the problem that the estimated impact from a cross-section need not be the same as that
from time-series data. Regressions and their conclusions are strongly dependent on the period,
sample of countries, and variables chosen. Thus, we adopted different techniques, in order to
demonstrate the importance of the heterogeneity across countries and the interactions across
channels of capital inflows in terms of development. In fact, our basic idea is that the relationship
between external debt – and, in general, foreign capital flows – and economic development is
complex and non-linear. It does clearly depend on the specific country’s context (a cross-section
component) and on the specific past history (a time-series component). Moreover, and we think that
it does represent the bulk of this work and the implicit mainstreaming of all the chapters, we
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disagree with the conventional wisdom, which attributes to some kind of foreign capital inflows to
be good or bad in itself for development. An implicit recommendation of this conventional wisdom
is that a large share of FDI in total capital inflows is a measure of something good happening in the
economy, as well as a large share of debt is bad. We think that the real effects are associated with
the nature, size and composition of each capital flow, in addition to the cross-section and time-
series components, and above all with the interaction component among different kind of foreign
capital inflows. We believe that foreign capital inflows enter multiplicatively rather than additively
into a development equation (again, the specific analysis of Italian experience, in terms of aid and
debt relief policies, very clearly and dramatically confirmed it). It has direct policy implications.
First, it is hard to argue that the rise in the share of external debt is an indication of good health. But
this does not mean that the rise in debt is bad in itself. Hence, there is no reason to say that, in the
next future, debt must be totally replaced by grants – as it was recently and authoritatively affirmed
by the US Congress - or that in perspective, FDI should be the bulk of foreign capital inflows, for
the sake of private sector promotion.
Fifth, from the beginning we admitted that “class” is a concept to be reconsidered, because the
important changes of the organisation and division of labour and the very specificity of developing
countries’ context should imply a reconsideration of the concept of class as it was categorised by
Marx. But, concerning the appropriateness of the units of investigation, we stress that countries are
not necessarily the best units to analyze economic growth, particularly in the new context of
globalization. The importance of both the local development and territorial context from one side,
and de-localization of economies emphasize other dimensions and borders than national ones.
Particularly in Africa, we can use concepts as enclaves, export-oriented and cash-crops sectors. We
have also to remind the importance of informal sector and dual economies. Even concerning
external debt, we have to recognise that we have a map of multiple actors (multilateral, bilateral,
private lenders, governments, countries, institutions, organisations, people,…), interests and
preferences (political, strategic, economic, environmental,…), each of one having different time
horizons (long-term or short-term horizons). We seriously question whether the country entity is the
most appropriate unit and dimension to be investigated.
Sixth, in terms of political implications, debt relief seems to demonstrate the emergence of
international political consensus and capacity to implement a win-win strategy, which will satisfy
debtor countries as well as most of the constituencies based in developed countries. But apart from
the rhetoric widely spread all over the world on debt cancellation, international politics offers no
quick panacea for the myriad social interests, which are involved in external debt and aid game. We
stress the importance of holistic visions of change and development, as those which can be referred
(even if they are not explicitly assumed as a system) to international civil society. Our study tried to
provide a systematic analysis of the economic rationale of external debt for development of poor
countries, to analyse debt crisis in SSA and to review the extent, the effectiveness and the future
prospects for current debt relief initiatives (HIPC Initiative, above all) and also to explore the
vision, expressed as a set of recommendations, of international civil society, which has been
seriously involved in the search for solutions of debt crisis. We presented an original synthesis of a
lot of separate political requests from civil society organisations that can be reduced at coherent and
comprehensive approach. This is particularly important as, in the context of a multi-players game
such as debt-game is, we think that those organisations, which can be called international civil
society and are deeply interested in the globalisation issues, can not be reduced to the grotesque
image of the “no-global people” (a terms implying the negative idea of those who simply raise
objections, who have their destruens pars without any concrete vision and proposal to submit to
political arena). We proposed an integrated vision, which would like to be an indirect expression of
the capacity of numerous organisations of civil society to engage in debate and comparison on the
content, which is a reflection of the skill and know-how accumulated with regard to the issues of
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international relations. Undoubtedly, civil society organisations constitute an innovation on the
scene of international relations. In the multifaceted world of civil society there co-exist specific and
widespread interests, at local, national and transnational level. We emphasised the theoretical
foundations of a vision belonging to an important constituency, a broad-based movement,
politically expressive and capable of a more effective critical approach to the HIPC Initiative 2. At
the same time, and this is what we stress, international civil society has a strong capacity in the
costruens pars, that is they unquestionable prove the maturity of the proposals. These proposals are
an important political counter-part to the economic analyses we presented. It is not necessarily
based on the theoretical assumptions proposed in the economic literature, but it represents an
effective lobbying campaign to be taken in account, which should be seriously assessed. The
international civil society has become an increasingly powerful influence on international relations;
its political contribution to international finance and development co-operation has to be
considered.
Seventh, and linked to the international civil society’s proposals, to analyse the relationship
between debt and development in Africa as well as current debt relief initiatives is a way to analyse
development co-operation, within the main context of finance for development. This is the bulk of
Italian case-study (presented in chapter 6, Appendix 2), and is the final result of our work. It is
important to link debt relief initiatives to aid policies, trade regimes, financial systems and national
economic and social policies. Aid and debt effects are a complex matter, and selectivity in foreign
capital allocation is a difficult task, if defined in general terms. The aid and debt effectiveness
depends on the external and climatic environment: the worse this environment, or the more
vulnerable the recipients countries, the higher the aid effectiveness. Many SSA countries continue
to undergo both trade and current account deficits; and debt service provides a major additional
impediment. In fact, both the trade balance and the current account have always been negative, but
the trade deficit is usually much smaller than the current account deficit. This is not just a trade
problem; even with a trade account on balance or in the positive, this group of countries would have
had negative current account, mainly because of the external debt service. SSA countries have a
negative, large and increasing net factor income. Aid has substantially increased from the eighties to
the nineties; but is smaller than debt service, and figures seem to indicate that aid has been used to
service the debt, at least partially. Nevertheless, everyone repeats that aid has to be fully employed
to undertake a process of social and economic transformation instead of being used for repaying
past debt. Apart from aid, no forms of external finance have substantially contributed to the needs
of external finance of these countries, neither commercial loans, nor FDI, nor Portfolio Investments
as can be seen from the composition of the flows to SSA countries in the nineties. We have to adopt
a political economy approach, being concerned with the interface of politics and economics – the
influences on economic policy rather than political systems per se. Thus, the focus must be on how
aid (and the associated relations with donors), especially in relation to debt relief, interacts with the
political factors that influence the policy process. The evidence of the 1990s gives ground for
cautious considerations. There is no simple answer to this question, given the real-world complexity
of recent African history. the Dollar and Kraay3 view, that “anyone who cares about the poor should
favor the growth-enhancing policies of good rule of law, fiscal discipline, and openness to
                                                                
2 In a very broad sense, some doubts on the real effectiveness of the HIPC initiative are spread all over the costituencies.
«The enhancement of the initiative for highly indebted poor countries will reduce the indebtedness of those countries
that meet the scheme’s conditions. However, most will still be left with a large debt burden, which could become
unmanageable should there be large fluctuations in prices. The IMF and World Bank admitted as much in a recent
paper. A large write-off of IMF and World Bank debt will happen only if there is pressure from the institutions’
shareholders», Financial Times, 26 April 2001.
3 Dollar, David and Aart Kraay (2000), “Growth is Good for the Poor”, World Bank, Development Research Group,
mimeo, March
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international trade” as well as the opposite view that the growth reforms induced increasing
inequality, denying benefits to the poorest4, are wrong. Freedom and democracy – as Julius Nyerere
wrote – are not commodities which can be just lifted from a shelf and given life, in a easy way.
Moreover, after two decades of economic and social crises in SSA, to increase output and exports
diversification needs time and investment, to increase the saving ratio through tax reform and a
more accountable credit and financial system also requires time and investment, to achieve high
rates of both capital accumulation and human development requires time and investment. Given the
above considerations finance for development will remain an absolute necessity, even if all the
foreign debt should be cancelled, which is not the case yet.
Obviously, this overview and these recommendations are a stage in a process, not a final product.
They are presented here in a spirit of discussion, debate, correction and improvement.
Now, the crucial question is: is there some room for hope that the development failures of the past
decades, combined with new interest in the concept of global public goods (from international
health and security, all the way to financial stability) provide strong arguments in favor of SSA
development?
When world leaders met in September 2000 to commit to the Millennium Development Goals, a
horizon of optimism lit up. Only 18 months later, approaching the Global Summit on Financing for
Development taking place 18-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, hopes were fading that the
world leaders take their commitments seriously. The Monterrey Consensus that heads of states and
governments signed after two years of debate and negotiations, did not contain any concrete
commitment to raise the finances needed to half the number of the world’s poor by 2015, as
envisaged by the Millennium Development Goals. It also failed to address the many structural
problems that prevent the realisation of a more equitable and inclusive economic globalisation.
Instead, it just repeats the unproven promise of the last two decades that further trade and
investment liberalisation will enable the private sector to take care of the world’s poor. But
evidence is mounting that this idea fails to deliver wealth and economic justice for all.
At the beginning of 2002, international NGOs demand for comprehensive solutions to external debt
problems of poor countries and they are also proposing a reformed procedure between debtors and
creditors which would not only overcome this structural and ethically questionable imbalance, but
would also be likely to lead to a more efficient debt management:
(1) A neutral decision making body, which is independent from both parties involved;
(2) The right of all stakeholders to be heard before a decision is made;
(3) The protection of the debtor’s – in this case the most vulnerable sectors of a sovereign debtor’s
society – basic needs, before debts are collected.
(4) The institution of an automatic stay, once an international »insolvency” or »arbitration” case is
opened, in order to avoid a creditors’ run on the debtor’s remaining assets and to allow for an
orderly procedure.
Nowadays, this is one of the most debated issues, but it does make sense if and only if it is part of a
more general global development partnership agreement, extended to the main aspects of
international relations.
A lot of international high level conferences and summits risk to be journalistic events with abstract
outcomes. The important commitments must not remain pure lip-service, they have to be translated
into concrete political actions. The financing for development challenge offers a crucial opportunity
to give a signal of global change. Governments and international organisations have to move
beyond the !agreed language” and to take credible steps towards a new North-South partnership,
based on more resources of better quality than in the past and more coherent policies.
                                                                
4 Forsyth, Justin (2000), Letter to The Economist, June 20.
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To conclude, a sort of anecdote. When we were going to conclude our work, we discovered and
read two papers recently published, which shared the same idea we have assumed in a part of our
econometric analysis. These are the work of Ricardo Hausmann5, from the Harvard University
(concerning the critique to the rhetorical assumptions on the benefits due to FDI), and of Henrik
Hansen6 (on the importance of interactions between debt and aid), from the University of
Copenhagen. This fact simply confirmed to us that the room for original ideas is – as it always is -
much more constrained than we supposed at the beginning of this research, two years ago. And,
directly or indirectly, what we think and write is basically the result of what we listened, read and
learnt.
                                                                
5 Development Centre Seminars (2001), Foreign Direct Investment Versus Other Flows to Latin America, Oecd- Iadb,
Paris.
6 H. Hansen (2001), “The Impact of Aid and External Debt on Growth and Investment: Insights From Cross-Country
Regression Analysis”, WIDER Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, August.
